Marvin Edwards
Veteran Member
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '' - Oxford Scholarship.
I'm beginning to think you are posting that quote without reading it yourself. It is saying that there is no distinction between our deliberate action versus an action forced upon by other agents. The basis for abolishing that distinction is that all actions, whether our own or those imposed upon us at gunpoint, are produce by a deterministic process. Do you actually agree that we should remove that distinction between what we decide to do versus what we are forced to do at gunpoint?
Necessitated actions - being determined - are by definition are neither chosen, negotiable or alterable, events that proceed or unfold deterministically according to antecedent events and the laws of nature.
Operational free will does not require freedom antecedent events or freedom from the laws of nature. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence.
Necessitated actions are not freely willed actions.
All actions are equally causally necessary, including those actions we deliberately choose of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence, NOT freedom from causation).
To label necessitated actions, not being willed, as an example of free will is case of mislabeling determinism, which is the error of compatibilism
We simply call as we see it.
(A) A woman decides to order a salad for herself. She was not coerced nor unduly influenced to do so, therefore she was free to choose the salad for herself. It was a freely chosen "I will have the salad, please".
(B) A woman decides to order a salad for herself. Her choice is reliably caused by her dietary goals and her genetic food preferences. These goals and reasons have antecedent causes found in her prior life experiences. Her life itself has antecedent causes, going back through the evolution of the human species, the appearance of life on the planet, the formation of the planet, all the way back to the Big Bang (and whatever preceded that, ad infinitum). So, this was also a causally necessary event, the fundamental notion of determinism.
Both A and B happen to be true. Thus the notions of operational free will and determinism appear to be compatible.
... That which is necessitated is not free.
One need not be free of causal necessity in order to be free from coercion and undue influence. Causal necessity is a universal constant of our deterministic universe, and every freedom we have requires reliable cause and effect, so, your assumption is incorrect.
It is you doing it, therefore free will is not an adequate argument because it ignores the means and mechanisms of decision making,
We assume that the means and mechanisms of decision making are fully deterministic processes occuring within our physical brains. But, again, operational free will does not require freedom from our brains, but only freedom from coercion and undue influence. So, our conclusion is incorrect.
Necessitated actions - being determined - are by definition not chosen.
If it is necessary that we make a choice, such as when we are in the restaurant and the waiter is waiting for our order, then, obviously, a necessitated action is, in fact, chosen. You have a lot of faulty assumptions in your argument.
These are events that proceed or unfold deterministically according to antecedent events and the laws of nature.
Correct!
Necessitated actions are not freely willed actions.
Except when they are necessarily freely chosen actions. Another faulty assumption.
''Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.) Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").'' - Marvin Edwards
Absolutely! Always has been. Always will be. This includes those events in which we decide for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence. (You know, choices of our own free will).
Both 'higher' and 'lower' functions work on the principle of information processing that is determined by the 'wiring' and connectivity of the network, brain region or structure, not will, not free will.
The wiring in one area will organize sensory data into a model of reality that supports the functions of imagination, evaluation, and choosing. This is where we will decide for ourselves what we will do. If that process is free of coercion and undue influence, then we call that "a freely chosen will", or simply "free will".
The point being: that it is the state and condition of the system, not will, that determines the decision made in any given instance in time.
Yes. We call that system the Central Nervous System. It does our thinking and our deciding, and whatever it deliberately chooses to do, we, as a whole person, have chosen to do.
Saying ''you made the decision'' is just a general reference to the person as a whole.
Yes. Most of us refer to ourselves and others as whole persons. We all know that we have brains that make decisions and perform lots of other functions. But, decisions as to what we as a whole person will do, such as skydiving, really involves all of our parts.
We are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that work together for the benefit of the person as a whole.
Which doesn't explain the nature of the process.
Everything that is needed to understand the nature of free will is already common knowledge. If anyone wants to know the details of what the different parts of the brain are doing, there are many good books out there on neuroscience, by people like David Eagleman ("The Brain"), Michael Gazzaniga ("Who's in Charge?"), Michael Graziano ("Consciousness and the Social Brain").
It is specifically the brain that 'decides.' The brain acquires and processes information and makes decisions based on sets of criteria,
Exactly.
the only possible option (being determined) can be realized in any given circumstance.
There is no such thing as choosing between a "single possibility". Every choosing process requires at least two real possibilities. Every time it is determined that you must make a choice, it will also be determined that there will be at least two options to choose from.
Only one thing will be chosen, but all of the other things can be chosen.
Neuroscience is the means by which we gain an understanding of how the brain works, how decisions are made and actions are taken. Which is without a doubt relevant to the question of free will....whether such a thing exists or not.
Neuroscience may explain how our decision making works, but it cannot "explain it away" as if decision making wasn't actually happening. What neuroscience will always continue to assert is that our brains are in fact making choices that control our behavior. Neuroscience can also inform us of the various ways that mental illness and brain injury may alter our normal decision making process.
But neuroscience will never assert that it is anything other than our own brains that are controlling our behavior.
Abstract
''Belief in free will has been a mainstay in philosophy throughout history, grounded in large part in our intuitive sense that we consciously control our actions and could have done otherwise. However, psychology and psychiatry have long sought to uncover mechanistic explanations for human behavior that challenge the notion of free will. In recent years, neuroscientific discoveries have produced a model of volitional behavior that is at odds with the notion of contra-causal free will and our sense of conscious agency. Volitional behavior instead appears to have antecedents in unconscious brain activity that is localizable to specific neuroanatomical structures. Updating notions of free will in favor of a continuous model of volitional self-control provides a useful paradigm to conceptualize and study some forms of psychopathology such as addiction and impulse control disorders. Similarly, thinking of specific symptoms of schizophrenia as disorders of agency may help to elucidate mechanisms of psychosis. Beyond clinical understanding and etiological research, a neuroscientific model of volitional behavior has the potential to modernize forensic notions of responsibility and criminal punishment in order to inform public policy. Ultimately, moving away from the language of free will towards the language of volitional control may result in an enhanced understanding of the very nature of ourselves.''
Please note that the free will they object to is "contra-causal free will", that is, "freedom from reliable cause and effect", an irrational and thus impossible freedom. That is not operational free will. Operationally, free will is simply a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence.
Note also that the authors are affirming a model of volitional self-control (human agency) and disorders of agency (which presumes human agency and control).
The way in which neuroscience can modernize forensic notions of responsibility and criminal punishment is not by abolishing responsibility, but by assuring that offenders whose behavior is controlled by mental illness are treated psychiatrically and not just punitively.
In short, they are not buying the hard determinist's incompatibilism. They recognize that people normally exercise self-control by their own volition (their freely chosen will). And the fact that the brain provides the mechanism for that self-control does not impair their understanding of volition (operational free will).