Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

Will, be it conscious or unconscious, has no say in what neural networks do or do not do.

So, I took the time to explain, how in a fixed algorithm, will has a fundamental objective and well defined role in determining what that fixed algorithm does.

Neurons may (do, must, are entirely?) Encode algorithms.

Therefore, "will" absolutely can have a say in what neural networks "will" or "will not" do.

State machines can set their own state as much as have state changes imposed by volatile means.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Operational free will, the one that is actually used, does not require freedom from antecedent events or freedom from the laws of nature. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence.

You are not taking the 'action production by deterministic processes' nature of the mechanisms that form and generate your conscious experience into account.

Hi. Perhaps you haven't met me yet. I'm that set of deterministic processes acting within the real world as a real person. I cannot explain to you exactly how I work. But, obviously, I am here and I do work.

That what you think, believe and do is being produced by an interaction of information unconsciously within the system....milliseconds prior to conscious initiation.

Yeah, pretty amazing aren't I.

Thereby ''an actions production by deterministic processes presents a challenge for compatibilism''

No challenge at all. It is simply a matter of staying clear about who does what. In the restaurant, I decide for myself what I will order for dinner. The waiter brings me my salad and I pay my bill.

I cannot explain to you the firing of each neuron. But I can explain why I chose the salad instead of the steak, and explain it as a deterministic process, reliably caused by my own goals and my own reasons.

The fact that my choice was reliably caused by my own goals and reasons doesn't bother me. The fact that these goals and reasons had antecedent causes does not make them any less my own goals and my own reasons.

It presents a challenge for compatibilism because action production is not open to regulation, modification, negotiation or change.

Well, given that my actions were regulated, modified, and negotiated solely by my own brain, what would I want or need to change?

You think and do as a result of 'action production by deterministic processes' - not will.

Hi, have you met me? I am those deterministic processes, deciding that I will have the salad instead of the steak.

Just saying 'it is me' is not sufficient to establish freedom of will

No other object in the physical universe decided that I would have the salad. That was all me, both the parts that I can consciously describe as well as the parts of which I was never consciously aware. It was still me that chose the salad, and thus it was me to whom the waiter brought the salad and the bill.

And, since I made this choice while free of coercion and undue influence, my "I will have the salad, please" was a freely chosen "I will". The only thing that free will needs to be free of is coercion and undue influence. It does NOT need to be free of my own brain. It does NOT need to be free of causal necessity.

Compatibilists have a much simpler proposition to prove. We simply prove that free will is commonly understood as a choice we make that is free of coercion and undue influence. This is proven by common usage of the notion in private and public life and in the courtroom. It is the specific free will that is used to assess a person's responsibility for their actions.

Oh, and the notion of free will is also embedded in the notions of voluntary and volitional. So, any argument against free will could be used to strike down the words volunteer and volition. So, don't assume that changing the name of the notion changes the notion.

It is too simple. It doesn't take a host of elements into account, the means and mechanisms of experience.

Nothing is left out. We are who and what we are. All of the means and mechanisms are still there, but they are acting together as a living organism of an intelligent species, something we call a "person". Explaining how a "person" works in terms of its internal organs does not "explain away" the person, it just explains how the person works.

Compatibilists do not have to prove that free will is uncaused, because we assume it is reliably caused, just like every other deterministic event. We do not have to prove that we have a soul that operates independently from the brain, because we assume that the brain is the center of our decision making. We do not have to prove that free will operates outside of the laws of nature, because we recognize that everything we do is consistent with those laws.

So, the compatibilist proposition is simple and uncontroversial. All of the debate is between the two incompatibilists: the libertarians and the hard determinists.

It doesn't have to be uncaused. If will is to be branded as free will, it really has to be free.

Hmm, "really" free. An ironic flag telling us that we're entering the world of figurative thinking and leaving reality.

What you mean is that free will must be free of the things you think it ought to be free of, like freedom from the deterministic processes of our own brains. How exactly does one accomplish freedom from one's own brain?

Compatibilists can explain freedom from coercion (for example, nobody was pointing a gun at you).
Compatibilists can explain freedom from other undue influences (for example, was the mental illness a significant cause of the behavior or irrelevant to the act, etc.)

It has to be able to do something meaningful. It has to be able to make a difference.

I ordered the salad instead of the steak (making a difference in the restaurant's inventory). And I did pay the bill (making a difference in the restaurant's bottom line).

But, for the given reasons, necessitation, an actions production by deterministic processes, etc, does not allow will to make a difference to outcomes, will cannot act freely, cannot make a difference....which makes freedom of will an empty claim, an idea, an ideology.

Hi. Have you met me? I'm the guy who ordered the salad, of my own volition. This is not an ideological belief, but an objective observation of what just happened in empirical reality.

We simply call as we see it.

(A) A woman decides to order a salad for herself. She was not coerced nor unduly influenced to do so, therefore she was free to choose the salad for herself. It was a freely chosen "I will have the salad, please".

(B) A woman decides to order a salad for herself. Her choice is reliably caused by her dietary goals and her genetic food preferences. These goals and reasons have antecedent causes found in her prior life experiences. Her life itself has antecedent causes, going back through the evolution of the human species, the appearance of life on the planet, the formation of the planet, all the way back to the Big Bang (and whatever preceded that, ad infinitum). So, this was also a causally necessary event, the fundamental notion of determinism.

Both A and B happen to be true. Thus the notions of operational free will and determinism appear to be compatible.

Compatibilist free will is a carefully worded definition; acting according to our will without external force or coercion, but ignores inner necessitation.

The inner necessitation IS the brain's own decision making according to the person's own goals and interests. It is not ignored, but rather displayed on a wide screen in 3D. The person's own brain was running the show.

If external necessitation is a problem for compatibilism, so is internal necessitation because neither are subject to regulative control.

Still no problem. If I am "that which decides what I will do", then that is me doing the choosing and exercising control.

M . Hallett
Abstract
This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex. - Clinical Neurophysiology , Volume 118 , Issue 6 , Pages 1179 - 1192

That doesn't matter. Whether the brain makes the decision consciously or unconsciously, it is still the brain itself making the decision. If the process is entirely unconscious and awareness shows up after the fact, it is still that brain that made that decision.

And, if the brain was free of coercion and undue influence during the process, then it was the brain's own freely chosen will.

Neuroscience can educate us as to how the brain goes about making decisions, but neuroscience will never claim that the person's own brain does not make the choices that decide what the person will do.

 

[fromderinside]

If only your subjective declarations made sense. They don't. I've tired of wading around in your hypothetical subjective declarations.

I'm tired of your inability to generalize and inability to observe objective properties objectively in well defined systems.

You wish to declare "subjectivity" around actual material objects so you don't have to face the reality that free will objectively exists for human beings stuck as individual stochastic actors within a deterministic system.

As I pointed out, I'm describing an object, well defined as a deterministic universe all the way to it's binary field interactions.

You can cry and moan all you want that it is subjective and all you will do is objectively embarrass yourself.

I have pointed out free will, demonstrated unequivocally an entity demonstrating free will. And of the objective existence of an "entity".

You dislike this so you handwave it away.

I suspect that it is unclear to you largely because you wish it to be, that you fail to understand it in the same way Metaphor fails to understand simple sentences of seventh grade level english: your religion demands that you look away from it lest your absolution be put at risk.

Well defined systems need not be objective. From my view and I believe the view of the scientific method the well defined system of Physics requires certain qualities In order to communicate the discoveries of physics and in order to compare theory with experiment, it is necessary to have an internationally agreed vocabulary, a system of quantities, a method of conveying how well the measurement has been made, and a correspondingly well defined system of units. My view is mathematical elegance does not make empirical reality.

Below are the elements that define Physics as a well defined system. It has a log and continuous history a consistent development of a philosophy of physics, well defined and empirically confirmed theories of physics, relations and meaning with related branches of material science, a consistent evolving methodology. These are laid out in the titles below.

• 1History
  • 1.1Ancient astronomy
  • 1.2Natural philosophy
  • 1.3Medieval European and Islamic
  • 1.4Classical
  • 1.5Modern
• 2Philosophy
• 3Core theories
  • 3.1Classical
  • 3.2Modern
    • 3.2.1Fundamental concepts in modern physics
      • Causality
      • Covariance
      • Action
      • Physical field
      • Symmetry
      • Physical interaction
      • Statistical ensemble
        • In the discussion given so far, while rigorous, we have taken for granted that the notion of an ensemble is valid a priori, as is commonly done in physical context. What has not been shown is that the ensemble itself(not the consequent results) is a precisely defined object mathematically. For instance,
          • It is not clear where this very large set of systems exists (for example, is it a gas of particles inside a container?)
          • It is not clear how to physically generate an ensemble.
        • In this section, we attempt to partially answer this question.
          
          Suppose we have a preparation procedure for a system in a physics lab: For example, the procedure might involve a physical apparatus and some protocols for manipulating the apparatus. As a result of this preparation procedure, some system is produced and maintained in isolation for some small period of time. By repeating this laboratory preparation procedure we obtain a sequence of systems X1, X2, ....,Xk, which in our mathematical idealization, we assume is an infinite sequence of systems. The systems are similar in that they were all produced in the same way. This infinite sequence is an ensemble.
          
          In a laboratory setting, each one of these prepped systems might be used as input for one subsequent testing procedure. Again, the testing procedure involves a physical apparatus and some protocols; as a result of the testing procedure we obtain a yes or no answer. Given a testing procedure E applied to each prepared system, we obtain a sequence of values Meas (E, X1), Meas (E, X2), ...., Meas (E, Xk). Each one of these values is a 0 (or no) or a 1 (yes).
          
          Assume the following time average exists:
          
          {\displaystyle \sigma (E)=\lim _{N\rightarrow \infty }{\frac {1}{N}}\sum _{k=1}^{N}\operatorname {Meas} (E,X_{k})}
          
          
          For quantum mechanical systems, an important assumption made in the quantum logic approach to quantum mechanics is the identification of yes-no questions to the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space. With some additional technical assumptions one can then infer that states are given by density operators S so that:
          
          {\displaystyle \sigma (E)=\operatorname {Tr} (ES).}
          
          
          We see this reflects the definition of quantum states in general: A quantum state is a mapping from the observables to their expectation values.
      • Quantum
      • Wave
      • Particle
  • 3.3Difference
• 4Relation to other fields
  • 4.1Prerequisites
  • 4.2Application and influence
• 5Research
  • 5.1Scientific method
  • 5.2Theory and experiment
  • 5.3Scope and aims
  • 5.4Research fields
    • 5.4.1Nuclear and particle
    • 5.4.2Atomic, molecular, and optical
    • 5.4.3Condensed matter
    • 5.4.4Astrophysics
  • 5.5Current research
• 6See also
• 7Notes
• 8References
• 9Sources
• 10External links

Where we are disagreeing is in the area of statistical ensemble. I have highlighted the sentences that make what we can use or measure accurately inaccessible to reality are highlighted. These areas are place holders not established physical fact. They seem to work but they do not meet the standard of well defined system because in this case causal certainty is beyond us. We must await new data and methods before we marry statistical with causal.

It is just as it is in the case of the debate about "equal to sum of parts" versus emergence. I believe this latter case will come down to multiple representations of "equal to sum of parts" rather than emergence. ... and that may resolve our problem as well.

 

[Jarhyn]

Well defined systems need not be objective

It's literally an object, sitting on a desk.

From my view

Actually subjective.

view of the scientific method

The scientific method does not "view" anything. You are treating it like a deity.

the well defined system of Physics requires certain qualities In order to communicate the discoveries of

Rambling word salads...

it is necessary to have an internationally agreed vocabulary

No, it isn't. It is necessary to have a functional vocabulary that describes the thing. That is all that is necessary here.

You are attempting to use NEWSPEAK, to try to force all the world to define "free will" as some thing which is nonsensical, assumedly in an effort to ignore the real implications free will of the form that actually exists, compatibilist free will, has.

A+A-°A$•$_+ <>$_-•∆+:-° says the same thing as "if two classes have the same elements they are identical".

Physics is a well defined system not because of any sophistry or words in books or any other such garbage as you wish to point to.

Physics is well defined because there are a limited number of quantum states that a particle can have, a limited number of ways a confluence of such particles can spit energy out, and on the basis that all this happens mechanically against fields with well behaved describable states

It would have to, to be called "deterministic" in any meaningful way.

All physicists do is write down the models by which it interacts, and observe generally that those models are describable by the axioms of math.

I have pointed out a system well defined enough not merely to say "it appears deterministic" but "it is deterministic and this is how, all the way to the field interaction layer."

I have pointed out in this well-defined deterministic system "a free will" by exactly the terms discussed by myself, @Marvin Edwards and @pood

This model of free will has all the ethical implications that free will has in law, and in the discussion of guilt and culpability. What we may freely will through our process, and what may be modified from within the system, includes the will itself. I can choose to want something.

Somewhere something in the process asks a question "what doing?" and something else answers back "set of things?" and then something says "this one!" and it starts getting done.

 

[fromderinside]

Yes science is:

Physics is well defined because there are a limited number of quantum states that a particle can have, a limited number of ways a confluence of such particles can spit energy out, and on the basis that all this happens mechanically against fields with well behaved describable states

that have been universally demonstrated through experiment, not because

"I ran this and that model which I believe is the way of things,"

No something (whatever the hell that be) somewhere doesn't.

I understand this is a philosophy forum so you think words are objects. They aren't. They're words you wrote based on nothing more than your saying you've run models.

The result of that is subjective because it doesn't obey a system of laws used to develop descriptions of physical nature according to rules. I've created publications based on empirical studies (experiments). My words in those publications are are accepted by the scientific community into its body of evidence. All you have done is set up and run on computer conceptual models which are, at best, lay published.

I've shown you relevant scientific data and scientific theory. You've shown me you like to see your words in print. No contest.

movin on.

 

[DBT]

It's irrelevant. The argument is related to compatibilism, which in turn is related to determinism. Why do you keep introducing extraneous elements into the debate (if that's what it could be called)?

Again, if you want to argue for the existence of free will in relation to stochastic/probabilistic/random, start a new thread.

No. There are already three threads that you wish to metastasize this bullshit of yours across, and all three are Entirely about compatibilism, determinism, and how these concepts relate to "indeterministic action": stochastic systems.

The fact that you do not grok this is sad, but I the kind of way that usually invokes pity.

Now you can keep throwing tantrums over that or you could start paying attention.

Stochastic models are entirely present in deterministic systems at scale.

I gave you an example of the imperfect stochastic modelling of an objectively observable actor in a deterministic system giving rise to observable and objectively identifiable free will (and constrained will), as well as imposed state changes.

This whole thread is about the interplay between free will, stochastic modelling, and deterministic system. Though the fact you wish to avoid the topic seems to me a really good reason to press it further...

It seems that you have no idea.


The claim is quite straightforward;

''Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.''

 

[DBT]

Definitions don't necessarily prove the proposition.

Definitions make it clear what we are talking about. There is a big difference between free will as a choice we make for ourselves that is "free of coercion and undue influence", versus a choice we make for ourselves that is "free of causal necessity". One definition can be demonstrated in real life. The other definition is a logical impossibility.

The issue of free will is that of agency. Obviously, there is a distinction to be made between being forced or coerced against your will, and acting according to your will.

In terms of free will, the distinction lies between external coercion or force and inner necessitation and neural agency. Neither is a matter of free will.

We either act according to our will as a matter of necessitation, which is not free will, or we are forced or coerced, which is being forced against our will.

Will is not free will, just will. We can be forced to act against our will. ''He was forced against his will,'' is the correct description.

 

[DBT]

Will, be it conscious or unconscious, has no say in what neural networks do or do not do.

So, I took the time to explain, how in a fixed algorithm, will has a fundamental objective and well defined role in determining what that fixed algorithm does.

You wasted your time on an explanation that goes against the very thing you are arguing for. You are arguing against your own proposition.

Worse, you don't realize it.

Neurons may (do, must, are entirely?) Encode algorithms.

Therefore, "will" absolutely can have a say in what neural networks "will" or "will not" do.

State machines can set their own state as much as have state changes imposed by volatile means.

Will has nothing to do with the function of neurons or their networks, which function according to structure and architecture, not will. It's too silly for words. I'm not prepared to waste much time on your claims.


Principle 1.

The brain is a physical system whose operation is governed solely by the laws of chemistry and physics. What does this mean? It means that all of your thoughts and hopes and dreams and feelings are produced by chemical reactions going on in your head (a sobering thought). The brain's function is to process information. In other words, it is a computer that is made of organic (carbon-based) compounds rather than silicon chips. The brain is comprised of cells: primarily neurons and their supporting structures. Neurons are cells that are specialized for the transmission of information. Electrochemical reactions cause neurons to fire.

Neurons are connected to one another in a highly organized way. One can think of these connections as circuits -- just like a computer has circuits. These circuits determine how the brain processes information, just as the circuits in your computer determine how it processes information. Neural circuits in your brain are connected to sets of neurons that run throughout your body. Some of these neurons are connected to sensory receptors, such as the retina of your eye. Others are connected to your muscles. Sensory receptors are cells that are specialized for gathering information from the outer world and from other parts of the body. (You can feel your stomach churn because there are sensory receptors on it, but you cannot feel your spleen, which lacks them.) Sensory receptors are connected to neurons that transmit this information to your brain. Other neurons send information from your brain to motor neurons. Motor neurons are connected to your muscles; they cause your muscles to move. This movement is what we call behavior.......or "processed information" in a way that enhanced the adaptive regulation of behavior and physiology.''

 

[DBT]

Operational free will, the one that is actually used, does not require freedom from antecedent events or freedom from the laws of nature. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence.

''Operational free will'' is an add on. The brain functions on the principle of architecture and processing ability. Each brain's capacity and abilities being determined by its evolutionary makeup and function, different species, different abilities and capacities for conscious action.


“How can we be “free” as conscious agents if everything that we consciously intend is caused by events in our brain that we do not intend and of which we are entirely unaware?”
― Sam Harris, Free Will

“We do not know what we intend to do until the intention itself arises. To understand this is to realize that we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions in the way that people generally suppose.”
― Sam Harris, Free Will

M . Hallett
Abstract
This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex. - Clinical Neurophysiology , Volume 118 , Issue 6 , Pages 1179 - 1192

That doesn't matter. Whether the brain makes the decision consciously or unconsciously, it is still the brain itself making the decision. If the process is entirely unconscious and awareness shows up after the fact, it is still that brain that made that decision.

Yes, but it isn't a matter of will, conscious regulation or the ability to do otherwise....which are the basic principles of freedom. Without which, 'free will' cannot be claimed.

I can say, it is the computer that makes decisions (select options), therefore the computer has free will.

Functionality doesn't equate to free will.

And, if the brain was free of coercion and undue influence during the process, then it was the brain's own freely chosen will.

Function, not will.

Neuroscience can educate us as to how the brain goes about making decisions, but neuroscience will never claim that the person's own brain does not make the choices that decide what the person will do.

Nobody is saying otherwise. The issue is agency. Neurons do not have free will. Neural networks do not have free will. They function according to their physical makeup and connections;

Free will?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It's irrelevant. The argument is related to compatibilism, which in turn is related to determinism. Why do you keep introducing extraneous elements into the debate (if that's what it could be called)?

Again, if you want to argue for the existence of free will in relation to stochastic/probabilistic/random, start a new thread.

No. There are already three threads that you wish to metastasize this bullshit of yours across, and all three are Entirely about compatibilism, determinism, and how these concepts relate to "indeterministic action": stochastic systems.

The fact that you do not grok this is sad, but I the kind of way that usually invokes pity.

Now you can keep throwing tantrums over that or you could start paying attention.

Stochastic models are entirely present in deterministic systems at scale.

I gave you an example of the imperfect stochastic modelling of an objectively observable actor in a deterministic system giving rise to observable and objectively identifiable free will (and constrained will), as well as imposed state changes.

This whole thread is about the interplay between free will, stochastic modelling, and deterministic system. Though the fact you wish to avoid the topic seems to me a really good reason to press it further...

It seems that you have no idea.


The claim is quite straightforward;

''Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.''

For a critique of the SEP article, see Compatibilism: What's Wrong, and How to Fix It.

 

[Jarhyn]

It's irrelevant. The argument is related to compatibilism, which in turn is related to determinism. Why do you keep introducing extraneous elements into the debate (if that's what it could be called)?

Again, if you want to argue for the existence of free will in relation to stochastic/probabilistic/random, start a new thread.

No. There are already three threads that you wish to metastasize this bullshit of yours across, and all three are Entirely about compatibilism, determinism, and how these concepts relate to "indeterministic action": stochastic systems.

The fact that you do not grok this is sad, but I the kind of way that usually invokes pity.

Now you can keep throwing tantrums over that or you could start paying attention.

Stochastic models are entirely present in deterministic systems at scale.

I gave you an example of the imperfect stochastic modelling of an objectively observable actor in a deterministic system giving rise to observable and objectively identifiable free will (and constrained will), as well as imposed state changes.

This whole thread is about the interplay between free will, stochastic modelling, and deterministic system. Though the fact you wish to avoid the topic seems to me a really good reason to press it further...

It seems that you have no idea.


The claim is quite straightforward;

''Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.''

For a critique of the SEP article, see Compatibilism: What's Wrong, and How to Fix It.

And the reasons WHY they are compatible come down to... Godel's Incompleteness Theorem intersected with the fact that we are necessarily "incomplete" observers of the deterministic system. The gaps in our knowledge specifically mean that: we have responsibilities to each other as respects those gaps.

 

[Jarhyn]

You wasted your time on an explanation that goes against the very thing you are arguing for

I am not arguing that the universe is not deterministic.

Rather I am arguing that all actors within all systems, regardless of whether they are "deterministic" have "free will" so long as the system holds state. For instance, "1+n" holds no state as function.

"1+n+(previous n)" is a state function of will on (previous N state).

It's more a function of the existence of a state machine. You're the one arguing what relationships state machines can and cannot have of themselves, and embarrassing yourself because you don't seem to understand state machines, or stateliness of systems in general.

 

[Jarhyn]

<word salad>

You posed a hypothesis: that free will could not be observed as a property of an objective event in a deterministic universe.

To disprove this all one needs to do is produce an objective event in a deterministic system (that just so happens to be "a whole universe") that has the observed property of "compatibilist free will".

As this is about a described property of math within a well fined class.

I held up a deterministic system containing a freely willed actor, disproving your hypothesis.

At that point it becomes on you to provide that neurons capable of assembling to arbitrary functional behavior as a result of conditioning and response, which is something humans train AI on.

I can't see why it wouldn't be possible for an AI to undergo the process itself of (isolate neurons, train until response conforms to expected output), especially seeing as I have done exactly that thing, or something that I recognize as it, entirely from within my own mind.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The issue of free will is that of agency. Obviously, there is a distinction to be made between being forced or coerced against your will, and acting according to your will.

Right. For example, when I tell the waiter "I will have the Chef Salad, please", I am the agency that caused the chef to prepare a salad.

In terms of free will, the distinction lies between external coercion or force and inner necessitation and neural agency. Neither is a matter of free will.

The "inner necessitation" was my neural architecture deciding to have the salad instead of the steak. Free will means that my inner necessitation was free of coercion and undue influence. Or, more simply, it was actually I, myself, that decided to have the salad due to my own goals and my own reasons.

The choice sets my intent upon having the salad. I express that intent to the waiter by saying "I will have the salad". Thus my will causally determines that the chef will fix me the salad, and the waiter will bring me the salad, and I will also pay the bill for the salad. That is the nature of my agency in the restaurant, and how my chosen will causes a series of events.

We either act according to our will as a matter of necessitation, which is not free will, or we are forced or coerced, which is being forced against our will.

Another way to say the same thing is that we were either free to decided for ourselves what we would have for dinner, or, we were coerced.

Will is not free will, just will. We can be forced to act against our will. ''He was forced against his will,'' is the correct description.

Another way to say the same thing is that his decision was either externally forced or it was free of that force. I don't know why you are shying away from the word "free".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

''Operational free will'' is an add on. The brain functions on the principle of architecture and processing ability. Each brain's capacity and abilities being determined by its evolutionary makeup and function, different species, different abilities and capacities for conscious action.

The notion of an "operational" definition comes from Pragmatism. In order to settle disputes that arise from people using different definitions, it is helpful to examine how a word or phrase is actually used in practice. How does the word actually function in the real world, or as William James said, "You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your experience."

The notion of "free will" is used to distinguish deliberate acts where the person is held responsible, versus an action where someone else (a guy with a gun) is responsible for the action, versus something else (a significant mental illness or brain injury) that is responsible for the action. Any such extraordinary influence, that can reasonably be said to remove a person's control over their actions, would be something that removes their freedom to make that choice for themselves.

Obviously, we do not need to be free of our own brain's normal functions. In fact, if we were free of our brains we would lack the equipment necessary to make any choices at all. So, the notion that we must be free of our brain in order to be the causal agent of our choices is an absurdity.

“How can we be “free” as conscious agents if everything that we consciously intend is caused by events in our brain that we do not intend and of which we are entirely unaware?”
― Sam Harris, Free Will

Hi Sam. I see you're still generating dualistic riddles. We ARE our brains. It is not necessary for us to be consciously aware of the firings of each neuron when we ourselves ARE the firing of those neurons. Our brains do not control us against our will, because our brains are us, deciding for ourselves what we will do.

“We do not know what we intend to do until the intention itself arises. To understand this is to realize that we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions in the way that people generally suppose.”
― Sam Harris, Free Will

But Sam, if we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions, then who is? Where's the "puppet-master" pulling our strings, and what's his interest in whether I have the steak or the salad for dinner?

Sam, as a PhD in neuroscience, you should already be aware that it is our own brain that is forming our thoughts and actions. There is no puppet-master. There's just us.

Or, as I pointed out to DBT, whether the brain makes the decision consciously or unconsciously, it is still the brain itself making the decision. If the process is entirely unconscious and awareness shows up after the fact, it is still our brain that made that decision.

Yes, but it isn't a matter of will, conscious regulation or the ability to do otherwise....which are the basic principles of freedom. Without which, 'free will' cannot be claimed.

We have conscious regulation when we need it. For example, this is a second explanation and not the one I first started typing. And this also demonstrates the ability to do otherwise. I suspect you have plenty of similar examples in your own work. It is a simple matter of reviewing our work, and changing it when needed.

I can say, it is the computer that makes decisions (select options), therefore the computer has free will.

The computer is a machine we created to help us do our will. It has no will of its own. We come with a built-in biological will, to survive, thrive, and reproduce. We evolved intelligent brains to help us carry out that will more successfully.

Functionality doesn't equate to free will.

Not always, but sometimes it does. For example, when the function is deciding for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, then that specific function does equate to free will.

Function, not will.

The function of deciding what we will do, creates will (I will have the salad, please"), and that will creates additional functions (the waiter performs the function of taking my order to the chef, the chef performs the function of creating the salad, etc.).

Nobody is saying otherwise. The issue is agency. Neurons do not have free will. Neural networks do not have free will. They function according to their physical makeup and connections;

Is the central nervous system (CNS) free of coercion and undue influence? If so, then the CNS has free will, otherwise it does not.

Free will?

Neurons do not have free will. But the neural network known as the Central Nervous System, which includes our thinking brain, may be free of coercion and undue influence, in which case it is free to choose for us what we will do. But if the CNS is coerced or unduly influenced, then it is not free to choose for us what we will do.

 

[Jarhyn]

So, the notion that we must be free of our brain in order to be the causal agent of our choices is an absurdity nonsense

The rest is pretty spot on. Generally, absurd things happen all the time. It is absurd that any side of a D(2^256) would roll on any given face, but one of those faces will nonetheless be.

Absurdity may be silliness but silliness may be!

Free will is absurd and yet it happens to be. We are absurd too. All of this is an absurdity of sorts just as is my absurd little game where free will is observed.

But it is described under axioms which, while absurd, seem functional to describe all the absurd things, and so under those axioms, "it at least makes sense".

Which is more than can be said about the notions hard determinists wish to ascribe to free will.

It's a philosophy designed around a straw man argument for the sake of absolution.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So, the notion that we must be free of our brain in order to be the causal agent of our choices is an absurdity nonsense

The rest is pretty spot on. Generally, absurd things happen all the time. It is absurd that any side of a D(2^256) would roll on any given face, but one of those faces will nonetheless be.

Absurdity may be silliness but silliness may be!

Free will is absurd and yet it happens to be. We are absurd too. All of this is an absurdity of sorts just as is my absurd little game where free will is observed.

But it is described under axioms which, while absurd, seem functional to describe all the absurd things, and so under those axioms, "it at least makes sense".

Which is more than can be said about the notions hard determinists wish to ascribe to free will.

It's a philosophy designed around a straw man argument for the sake of absolution.

Hmm. Perhaps we should just stop making sense...

 

[fromderinside]

I can't see why it wouldn't be possible for an AI to undergo the process itself of (isolate neurons, train until response conforms to expected output), especially seeing as I have done exactly that thing, or something that I recognize as it, entirely from within my own mind.

I can't see how it would be possible for an AI to replicate actual neurons given we don't yet have all the variables and aspects of their form and function worked out via empirical experiment. If you don't know how a neuron works its pretty hard to make a verifiable plan for one. No. One does not know until one models all the functions a neuron carries out. Best estimates aren't satisfactory.

 

[Jarhyn]

I can't see why it wouldn't be possible for an AI to undergo the process itself of (isolate neurons, train until response conforms to expected output), especially seeing as I have done exactly that thing, or something that I recognize as it, entirely from within my own mind.

I can't see how it would be possible for an AI to replicate actual neurons given we don't yet have all the variables and aspects of their form and function worked out via empirical experiment. If you don't know how a neuron works its pretty hard to make a verifiable plan for one. No. One does not know until one models all the functions a neuron carries out. Best estimates aren't satisfactory.

The problem you are having here is that it does not have to.

The actual meat neurons merely have to be "as capable or more" of implementing algorithms such as choice function and selective will for to have freedoms at least as rich as those enjoyed by such beings as "dwarves", which as discussed have objective free will.

you are saying, in effect "we don't know that P = NP so how could you possibly know A=C when A = B and when B = C?"

More complex neural networks inherit properties, such as the ability to host... Anything an artificial neural network currently can host.

 

[fromderinside]

I can't see why it wouldn't be possible for an AI to undergo the process itself of (isolate neurons, train until response conforms to expected output), especially seeing as I have done exactly that thing, or something that I recognize as it, entirely from within my own mind.

I can't see how it would be possible for an AI to replicate actual neurons given we don't yet have all the variables and aspects of their form and function worked out via empirical experiment. If you don't know how a neuron works its pretty hard to make a verifiable plan for one. No. One does not know until one models all the functions a neuron carries out. Best estimates aren't satisfactory.

The problem you are having here is that it does not have to.

The actual meat neurons merely have to be "as capable or more" of implementing algorithms such as choice function and selective will for to have freedoms at least as rich as those enjoyed by such beings as "dwarves", which as discussed have objective free will.

you are saying, in effect "we don't know that P = NP so how could you possibly know A=C when A = B and when B = C?"

More complex neural networks inherit properties, such as the ability to host... Anything an artificial neural network currently can host.

And A, B, and C can be explained by.... wait ...... They can't. You have no idea how neurons work beyond "I make a model out of pure BS." Back to basics bud. Until one makes a silk purse out of a sow's ear no-one is going to explain A,B, and C from presumptions.