• Welcome to the new Internet Infidels Discussion Board, formerly Talk Freethought.

Compatibilism: What's that About?

It's irrelevant. The argument is related to compatibilism, which in turn is related to determinism. Why do you keep introducing extraneous elements into the debate (if that's what it could be called)?

Again, if you want to argue for the existence of free will in relation to stochastic/probabilistic/random, start a new thread.
No. There are already three threads that you wish to metastasize this bullshit of yours across, and all three are Entirely about compatibilism, determinism, and how these concepts relate to "indeterministic action": stochastic systems.

The fact that you do not grok this is sad, but I the kind of way that usually invokes pity.

Now you can keep throwing tantrums over that or you could start paying attention.

Stochastic models are entirely present in deterministic systems at scale.

I gave you an example of the imperfect stochastic modelling of an objectively observable actor in a deterministic system giving rise to observable and objectively identifiable free will (and constrained will), as well as imposed state changes.

This whole thread is about the interplay between free will, stochastic modelling, and deterministic system. Though the fact you wish to avoid the topic seems to me a really good reason to press it further...


It seems that you have no idea.


The claim is quite straightforward;

''Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.''

For a critique of the SEP article, see Compatibilism: What's Wrong, and How to Fix It.

I've read it. It fails for the given reasons.
 
The issue of free will is that of agency. Obviously, there is a distinction to be made between being forced or coerced against your will, and acting according to your will.

Right. For example, when I tell the waiter "I will have the Chef Salad, please", I am the agency that caused the chef to prepare a salad.

In terms of free will, the distinction lies between external coercion or force and inner necessitation and neural agency. Neither is a matter of free will.

The "inner necessitation" was my neural architecture deciding to have the salad instead of the steak. Free will means that my inner necessitation was free of coercion and undue influence. Or, more simply, it was actually I, myself, that decided to have the salad due to my own goals and my own reasons.

Yes, free of external coercion but not free from internal necessitation. Freedom, by definition, requires genuine regulation and the ability to do otherwise. No ability to regulate or do otherwise eliminates the idea of free will.

To act according to one's will does not qualify as free will because actions necessarily follow necessitated production of 'will.'

Unconscious processes are neither willed or regulated by will.

The choice sets my intent upon having the salad. I express that intent to the waiter by saying "I will have the salad". Thus my will causally determines that the chef will fix me the salad, and the waiter will bring me the salad, and I will also pay the bill for the salad. That is the nature of my agency in the restaurant, and how my chosen will causes a series of events.

What you decide is determined by brain activity, information processing, not will, not regulation, no alternate actions possible. Inputs in, inputs processed, decisions made, actions taken.....neural network functionality/not free will.
We either act according to our will as a matter of necessitation, which is not free will, or we are forced or coerced, which is being forced against our will.

Another way to say the same thing is that we were either free to decided for ourselves what we would have for dinner, or, we were coerced.

Everything in the universe behaves according to its nature and makeup. No free will involved. In animals/humans, will emerges microseconds after inputs, processing and action initiation.

System functionality/not free will.
Will is not free will, just will. We can be forced to act against our will. ''He was forced against his will,'' is the correct description.

Another way to say the same thing is that his decision was either externally forced or it was free of that force. I don't know why you are shying away from the word "free".

Determined by the system. Functionality/not free will.
 
You wasted your time on an explanation that goes against the very thing you are arguing for
I am not arguing that the universe is not deterministic.

Rather I am arguing that all actors within all systems, regardless of whether they are "deterministic" have "free will" so long as the system holds state. For instance, "1+n" holds no state as function.

"1+n+(previous n)" is a state function of will on (previous N state).

It's more a function of the existence of a state machine. You're the one arguing what relationships state machines can and cannot have of themselves, and embarrassing yourself because you don't seem to understand state machines, or stateliness of systems in general.


You are simply asserting free will. The system doesn't operate on the principle of free will. A tree grows and responds to its environment, signaling, adapting, responding, etc, without will or consciousness, just its own makeup.

Functionality is not free will. Acting according to one's makeup and nature is inevitable so does not equate to 'free will' because nothing is willed. The system functions as it has evolved to do.
 
''Operational free will'' is an add on. The brain functions on the principle of architecture and processing ability. Each brain's capacity and abilities being determined by its evolutionary makeup and function, different species, different abilities and capacities for conscious action.

The notion of an "operational" definition comes from Pragmatism. In order to settle disputes that arise from people using different definitions, it is helpful to examine how a word or phrase is actually used in practice. How does the word actually function in the real world, or as William James said, "You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your experience."

The notion of "free will" is used to distinguish deliberate acts where the person is held responsible, versus an action where someone else (a guy with a gun) is responsible for the action, versus something else (a significant mental illness or brain injury) that is responsible for the action. Any such extraordinary influence, that can reasonably be said to remove a person's control over their actions, would be something that removes their freedom to make that choice for themselves.

Obviously, we do not need to be free of our own brain's normal functions. In fact, if we were free of our brains we would lack the equipment necessary to make any choices at all. So, the notion that we must be free of our brain in order to be the causal agent of our choices is an absurdity.


Nobody is arguing for being free from our own brain.

The basic or fundamental definition of freedom is to be free from necessitation, yet the brain - the state of the system, which is not chosen - necessitates every thought, feeling and action.

In order to qualify for free will, the brain itself needs to have the capacity to do otherwise, the will or capacity to regulate in such a way as to change outcomes within its own system, an executive function that is not bound by its own condition.

Of course, that is not possible.

To be bound is not a state of freedom. Freedom of will is not possible within a determined system.

“How can we be “free” as conscious agents if everything that we consciously intend is caused by events in our brain that we do not intend and of which we are entirely unaware?”
― Sam Harris, Free Will

Hi Sam. I see you're still generating dualistic riddles. We ARE our brains. It is not necessary for us to be consciously aware of the firings of each neuron when we ourselves ARE the firing of those neurons. Our brains do not control us against our will, because our brains are us, deciding for ourselves what we will do.

It's a case of demonstrating the impossibility of freedom of will within a determined system. Dualism is no more real than free will.

Neither exists as an agency operating within the brain. No free will, no dualism. No alternate actions. No freedom from inner necessitation.

“We do not know what we intend to do until the intention itself arises. To understand this is to realize that we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions in the way that people generally suppose.”
― Sam Harris, Free Will

But Sam, if we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions, then who is? Where's the "puppet-master" pulling our strings, and what's his interest in whether I have the steak or the salad for dinner?

The system, organism/brain/mind, functions according to makeup and condition, not free will. The state of the system determines output in the form of thought and action.

There is no puppet master, no free will and no alternate actions. Function is not chosen. Function does not equal free will.

Sam, as a PhD in neuroscience, you should already be aware that it is our own brain that is forming our thoughts and actions. There is no puppet-master. There's just us.

Or, as I pointed out to DBT, whether the brain makes the decision consciously or unconsciously, it is still the brain itself making the decision. If the process is entirely unconscious and awareness shows up after the fact, it is still our brain that made that decision.

Not sufficient to qualify as free will. Nothing is being freely willed. If nothing is being freely willed, it is false to apply the label of 'free will.'

Free will?

Neurons do not have free will. But the neural network known as the Central Nervous System, which includes our thinking brain, may be free of coercion and undue influence, in which case it is free to choose for us what we will do. But if the CNS is coerced or unduly influenced, then it is not free to choose for us what we will do.


The thinking brain is its neurons. The state of the neurons and their activity is the state of the person. Neither the brain or the state of the person is a matter of will. To apply the free will label to the system is a case of misdirection designed to support compatibilism.


''The increments of a normal brain state is not as obvious as direct coercion, a microchip, or a tumor, but the “obviousness” is irrelevant here. Brain states incrementally get to the state they are in one moment at a time. In each moment of that process the brain is in one state, and the specific environment and biological conditions leads to the very next state. Depending on that state, this will cause you to behave in a specific way within an environment (decide in a specific way), in which all of those things that are outside of a person constantly bombard your senses changing your very brain state. The internal dialogue in your mind you have no real control over.''
 
You wasted your time on an explanation that goes against the very thing you are arguing for
I am not arguing that the universe is not deterministic.

Rather I am arguing that all actors within all systems, regardless of whether they are "deterministic" have "free will" so long as the system holds state. For instance, "1+n" holds no state as function.

"1+n+(previous n)" is a state function of will on (previous N state).

It's more a function of the existence of a state machine. You're the one arguing what relationships state machines can and cannot have of themselves, and embarrassing yourself because you don't seem to understand state machines, or stateliness of systems in general.


You are simply asserting free will. The system doesn't operate on the principle of free will. A tree grows and responds to its environment, signaling, adapting, responding, etc, without will or consciousness, just its own makeup.

Functionality is not free will. Acting according to one's makeup and nature is inevitable so does not equate to 'free will' because nothing is willed. The system functions as it has evolved to do.
The problem here is that you seem to get easily confused when more than one complicated thing must be observed interacting.

The basic or fundamental definition of freedom
Using a dictionary to NEWSPEAK the actual functional definition of freedom away because you wish to engage in a philosophical straw-man argument again?

YAWN!

I showed you a REAL system where a REAL property "will" is held by a REAL actor, and that REAL property of will has an observable geometry such that it can be calculated whether that will is free, marking it as objectively REAL.

The only reason that the will cannot in this example be directly controlled by the actor is that the actor is missing (but not necessarily; just by circumstance) a choice function which chooses the will.

And it is trivial insofar as self-review is lacking on account of the core function not having state variable handles into the various choice functions.

Neural systems allow back-prop and training such that when the choice function executes and the result fails the pre-check, the choice function gets modified.

I know this because I'm the one whose activity is narrated generally through subvocalization, and the thing that is narrated is exactly that activity: the output of the thing was not "like" any sort of output that would get me to my goal. You could even say I "dislike" the output, and, just like I keep rejecting YOUR bullshit, I train the system until it produces output that, when I route it through that other set of neurons, that set does not complain.

Then I actually DO the thing and observe the result. Another more automatic set of neurons looks at whether the goal of the behavior was "satisfied", and if it was, gold star, and if it was not... Reject that output and back to back-propagation.

At any rate we have trivially proved that an entity can hold a "will", and that the will can objectively be constrained or free. At this point it is you who must prove that neurons are incapable of this basic form of simple algorithmic structure.
 
You wasted your time on an explanation that goes against the very thing you are arguing for
I am not arguing that the universe is not deterministic.

Rather I am arguing that all actors within all systems, regardless of whether they are "deterministic" have "free will" so long as the system holds state. For instance, "1+n" holds no state as function.

"1+n+(previous n)" is a state function of will on (previous N state).

It's more a function of the existence of a state machine. You're the one arguing what relationships state machines can and cannot have of themselves, and embarrassing yourself because you don't seem to understand state machines, or stateliness of systems in general.


You are simply asserting free will. The system doesn't operate on the principle of free will. A tree grows and responds to its environment, signaling, adapting, responding, etc, without will or consciousness, just its own makeup.

Functionality is not free will. Acting according to one's makeup and nature is inevitable so does not equate to 'free will' because nothing is willed. The system functions as it has evolved to do.
As I have pointed out, while the dwarf becoming a wererabbit was inevitable (well, statistically speaking it may never have happened, but it was very VERY likely), while his failure to open the door was inevitable, while his tantrum was inevitable, and while his knocking over that statue in that room was inevitable...

He still had free will in a number of those situations, and observably so.

He didn't even need to know he had free will to have it!
 
Yes, free of external coercion but not free from internal necessitation. Freedom, by definition, requires genuine regulation and the ability to do otherwise.

Hi, it's Me, Marvin's internal necessitation, once again explaining to you that I genuinely regulate what Marvin chooses to write in this comment. And, I also engage conscious awareness as needed, to review what I've written, to see what it sounds and looks like to me, so that I can choose to write otherwise (like adding the "and looks" to "see what it sounds and looks like to me").

All of your requirements for freedom are right here, in Marvin's own brain.

I assume you too have a brain, and that your internal necessitation is responsible for for what you write.

No ability to regulate or do otherwise eliminates the idea of free will.

I suppose that would be the case if it were in any way truthful. But I've demonstrated repeatedly that brains routinely make decisions between the many things a person can do (all the otherwise's) while causally determining what they actually will do.

You know, that restaurant menu with all its delicious possibilities, and me choosing the salad even though I could have ordered the steak instead.

To act according to one's will does not qualify as free will because actions necessarily follow necessitated production of 'will.'

I certainly hope that my actions do necessarily follow from my choice to have the salad. If I told the waiter, "I will have the lobster, please", after I had decided to have the salad, we'd all question my sanity!

Unconscious processes are neither willed or regulated by will.

You are creating another paradox by suggesting that conscious will must manage the unconscious processes that produce that will. That would result in a logical loop. So, stop playing word games.

We know that conscious awareness is just one of the many functions of the working brain. It will usually be involved whenever we need to communicate or explain ourselves. For, example, right now as I type the words that are appearing on cue from my brain, I am seeing them and hearing them, and judging them.

Will, whether conscious or unconscious, is what keeps my attention upon the task at hand, whether writing a comment or deciding between the steak and the salad.

The college student chooses to stay in and study for tomorrow's chemistry exam, rather than going out to the party tonight. That choice sets her intent upon studying. That intent causes her to review her textbook and her lecture notes. Her studying modifies her own neural pathways, reinforcing the paths that will be exercised tomorrow as she confronts each question on the test. Note that her conscious intent (her will) is actually modifying her own neural architecture.

What you decide is determined by brain activity, information processing, not will, not regulation, no alternate actions possible. Inputs in, inputs processed, decisions made, actions taken.....neural network functionality...

I think we agree that my decision to have the salad instead of the steak was determined by my own brain activity, a form of information processing called "choosing what I will order for dinner". As you, yourself said:
"Inputs in" (the menu),
"inputs processed", (should I have steak for dinner after the bacon and eggs for breakfast and the double cheeseburger for lunch? Hmm. Best order the salad for dinner)
"decisions made", (I will have the salad even though I could have had the steak)
"actions taken", (Waiter, I will have the Chef Salad, please)
"neural network functionality", Of course, it was a physical process that took place within my own physical brain.

And, when my neural network performs the function, of deciding what I will have for dinner, while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called "a freely chosen will" or simply "free will".

Everything in the universe behaves according to its nature and makeup.

Of course. And deciding for ourselves what we will do is obviously part of our nature and our makeup.

No free will involved.

Sorry, but that claim is not supported by any objective evidence. Whenever we decide for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence, it is a choice of our own free will. Free will does not require any freedom from nature and makeup. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence.

In animals/humans, will emerges microseconds after inputs, processing and action initiation.

No, I think you're confusing "will" with "awareness of will". It is the awareness that takes additional time for the brain to construct. A pianist, through years of practicing, no longer thinks of each key she presses, and can quickly play a new piece with minimal thought and planning. That speed is only possible because the motions of her fingers no longer require constant attention.

Determined by the system. Functionality/not free will.

What you're having difficulty grasping is that being determined by our brain's functionality, is precisely "free will", whenever that specific function is choosing what we will do while the system is free of coercion and undue influence.
 
The notion of "free will" is used to distinguish deliberate acts where the person is held responsible, versus an action where someone else (a guy with a gun) is responsible for the action, versus something else (a significant mental illness or brain injury) that is responsible for the action. Any such extraordinary influence, that can reasonably be said to remove a person's control over their actions, would be something that removes their freedom to make that choice for themselves.

Obviously, we do not need to be free of our own brain's normal functions. In fact, if we were free of our brains we would lack the equipment necessary to make any choices at all. So, the notion that we must be free of our brain in order to be the causal agent of our choices is an absurdity.

Nobody is arguing for being free from our own brain.

And yet you constantly bombard us with the neuroscience of our own brains. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT THE BRAIN'S INFORMATION PROCESSING INCLUDES CHOOSING WHAT WE WILL DO. Free will is simply when that choosing is free of coercion and other extraordinary influences that prevent us from making a rational choice for ourselves.

The basic or fundamental definition of freedom is to be free from necessitation, yet the brain - the state of the system, which is not chosen - necessitates every thought, feeling and action.

WE ALREADY KNOW THAT THE BRAIN'S INFORMATION PROCESSING INCLUDES CHOOSING WHAT WE WILL DO.

In order to qualify for free will, the brain itself needs to have the capacity to do otherwise,

The brain obviously has both the capacity to choose the salad and also the capacity to choose the steak. We know this because, in the past, it has chosen the salad sometimes and at other times it has chosen the steak. So, the brain always has the capacity to choose either one. (By the way, "capacity" is the "ability to do something", it is something that we "can" do, whether we ever actually do it or not. Capacity is just another notion from the language and logic of possibilities).

the will or capacity to regulate in such a way as to change outcomes within its own system

Please, keep your paradoxes to yourself. They are both harmful and infectious.

, an executive function that is not bound by its own condition. Of course, that is not possible.

I'm glad you are able to admit the absurdity of what you are demanding. The executive function is part of the brain. That which decides what will happen next is exercising executive control. And the brain itself is constantly doing that.

To be bound is not a state of freedom.

So, the guy in handcuffs has no freedom of speech?

The point is that every notion of freedom references some specific form of constraint. For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We have freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. We have freedom of and from religion (free from a state imposed religion).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

Freedom of will is not possible within a determined system.

Freedom of will is the ability to choose for ourselves what we will do (free from coercion and undue influence). It never requires freedom from deterministic cause and effect. So, stop pretending that it does.

No freedom from inner necessitation.

Inner necessitation includes us deciding that we will have the salad instead of the steak. Free will would be impossible without that ability to decide for ourselves via our own inner necessitation. Free will when our inner necessitation is free from coercion and undue influence.

The system, organism/brain/mind, functions according to makeup and condition

Of course. And the organism/brain/mind chooses whether to have the salad or the steak according to its own makeup (you know, all those neurons) and conditions (which include the restaurant menu and the need to make a decision between the salad and the steak).

not free will.

And I keep pointing out the free will for you right there in the fully deterministic system, as a deterministic function of a deterministic brain. Free will is not freedom from deterministic causation. Free will is not freedom from the fully deterministic organism. Free will is not freedom from any function in the normal brain.

Free will is simply that deterministic system, deterministically choosing for itself what it will have for dinner, while free of coercion and undue influence.
 
Minus a minor quibble about what is "absurd" versus "nonsense", Marvin is pretty spot on here.
 
Yes, free of external coercion but not free from internal necessitation. Freedom, by definition, requires genuine regulation and the ability to do otherwise.

Hi, it's Me, Marvin's internal necessitation, once again explaining to you that I genuinely regulate what Marvin chooses to write in this comment. And, I also engage conscious awareness as needed, to review what I've written, to see what it sounds and looks like to me, so that I can choose to write otherwise (like adding the "and looks" to "see what it sounds and looks like to me").

Not according to neuroscience. What Marvin chooses to write is determined by the information acquired by the brain interacting with the systems of the brain. The state and condition of the system in each incremental moment of processing makes the decision.

Given the deterministic nature of the process, if regulation means a possible alternative, there is no regulation because there is no possible alternative.

Regulation in this instance is the non chosen state of the system.

All of your requirements for freedom are right here, in Marvin's own brain.

I assume you too have a brain, and that your internal necessitation is responsible for for what you write.

Freedom requires the possibility to do otherwise in any given circumstance. Determinism eliminates the possibility to do otherwise in any given circumstance.

Freedom is incompatible with determinism.

Will is not the agency or initiator of thought or action (neural networks are), therefore will cannot be described as free will. We have will, not free will.
 
You wasted your time on an explanation that goes against the very thing you are arguing for
I am not arguing that the universe is not deterministic.

Rather I am arguing that all actors within all systems, regardless of whether they are "deterministic" have "free will" so long as the system holds state. For instance, "1+n" holds no state as function.

"1+n+(previous n)" is a state function of will on (previous N state).

It's more a function of the existence of a state machine. You're the one arguing what relationships state machines can and cannot have of themselves, and embarrassing yourself because you don't seem to understand state machines, or stateliness of systems in general.


You are simply asserting free will. The system doesn't operate on the principle of free will. A tree grows and responds to its environment, signaling, adapting, responding, etc, without will or consciousness, just its own makeup.

Functionality is not free will. Acting according to one's makeup and nature is inevitable so does not equate to 'free will' because nothing is willed. The system functions as it has evolved to do.
The problem here is that you seem to get easily confused when more than one complicated thing must be observed interacting.

The basic or fundamental definition of freedom
Using a dictionary to NEWSPEAK the actual functional definition of freedom away because you wish to engage in a philosophical straw-man argument again?

YAWN!

I showed you a REAL system where a REAL property "will" is held by a REAL actor, and that REAL property of will has an observable geometry such that it can be calculated whether that will is free, marking it as objectively REAL.

The only reason that the will cannot in this example be directly controlled by the actor is that the actor is missing (but not necessarily; just by circumstance) a choice function which chooses the will.

And it is trivial insofar as self-review is lacking on account of the core function not having state variable handles into the various choice functions.

Neural systems allow back-prop and training such that when the choice function executes and the result fails the pre-check, the choice function gets modified.

I know this because I'm the one whose activity is narrated generally through subvocalization, and the thing that is narrated is exactly that activity: the output of the thing was not "like" any sort of output that would get me to my goal. You could even say I "dislike" the output, and, just like I keep rejecting YOUR bullshit, I train the system until it produces output that, when I route it through that other set of neurons, that set does not complain.

Then I actually DO the thing and observe the result. Another more automatic set of neurons looks at whether the goal of the behavior was "satisfied", and if it was, gold star, and if it was not... Reject that output and back to back-propagation.

At any rate we have trivially proved that an entity can hold a "will", and that the will can objectively be constrained or free. At this point it is you who must prove that neurons are incapable of this basic form of simple algorithmic structure.


Your brain is generating not only your 'subvocalizations.' it is generating your you; your sense of self identity, self awareness, thoughts, feelings and actions.

Whatever you do, believe, think or feel, the underlying unconscious information processing activity of the brain is doing it without your awareness as a conscious being.

The illusion of conscious agency or 'free will' is exposed when something goes wrong with the system. Consciousness emerges from information processing; it cannot access it or control the means of production: the activity of neural networks/the brain as a modular system.

If the mechanisms fail, consciousness suffers the consequences. Free will is an illusion.
 
Minus a minor quibble about what is "absurd" versus "nonsense", Marvin is pretty spot on here.

Only as an impression from a compatibilist. Incompatibilists disagree. There are two sides of the debate. Incompatiblists have evidence on their side: neuroscience.

Philosophy alone is insufficient. It's just a play on words, God is Love, free will is acting in accord to one's will.....never mind how will is produced.
 
The notion of "free will" is used to distinguish deliberate acts where the person is held responsible, versus an action where someone else (a guy with a gun) is responsible for the action, versus something else (a significant mental illness or brain injury) that is responsible for the action. Any such extraordinary influence, that can reasonably be said to remove a person's control over their actions, would be something that removes their freedom to make that choice for themselves.

Obviously, we do not need to be free of our own brain's normal functions. In fact, if we were free of our brains we would lack the equipment necessary to make any choices at all. So, the notion that we must be free of our brain in order to be the causal agent of our choices is an absurdity.

Nobody is arguing for being free from our own brain.

And yet you constantly bombard us with the neuroscience of our own brains. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT THE BRAIN'S INFORMATION PROCESSING INCLUDES CHOOSING WHAT WE WILL DO. Free will is simply when that choosing is free of coercion and other extraordinary influences that prevent us from making a rational choice for ourselves.

Yet it has been constantly pointed why 'acting in accordance to one's will' is not sufficient to establish freedom of will. That asserting 'free will is acting in accordance to one's will' does not take how will, thought, deliberation and motor action is produced into account - which is the work of neuroscience.

If the process of producing will is not willed, or subject to regulation through the agency of will, will plays no part in determining thought or action, and cannot be described as free.

If will is not free, it cannot be logically asserted to be free.

Will is not free to do anything other than what is determined.

The basic or fundamental definition of freedom is to be free from necessitation, yet the brain - the state of the system, which is not chosen - necessitates every thought, feeling and action.

WE ALREADY KNOW THAT THE BRAIN'S INFORMATION PROCESSING INCLUDES CHOOSING WHAT WE WILL DO.

It's the HOW of the process of volition that determines whether will is free or not. The brain's information processing activity has nothing to do with will.

That is the point being overlooked.

Asserting ''free will is acting without coercion'' or ''in accordance to one will'' ignores the NATURE of the means of action.


In order to qualify for free will, the brain itself needs to have the capacity to do otherwise,

The brain obviously has both the capacity to choose the salad and also the capacity to choose the steak. We know this because, in the past, it has chosen the salad sometimes and at other times it has chosen the steak. So, the brain always has the capacity to choose either one. (By the way, "capacity" is the "ability to do something", it is something that we "can" do, whether we ever actually do it or not. Capacity is just another notion from the language and logic of possibilities).

Whatever is chosen in the moment is determined by the state and condition of the brain in that moment.

If the state and condition of the brain determines salad in that moment in time, steak is not a possibility in that moment and never was.... incremental deterministic states unfolding over time, etc, not freely willed options being realized (an illusion of the conscious mind).

''Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.) Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). - Marvin Edwards.


the will or capacity to regulate in such a way as to change outcomes within its own system

Please, keep your paradoxes to yourself. They are both harmful and infectious.

Just an outline of the impossible conditions necessary for 'free will' to be something real, something that can make a difference to outcomes. ;)

, an executive function that is not bound by its own condition. Of course, that is not possible.

I'm glad you are able to admit the absurdity of what you are demanding. The executive function is part of the brain. That which decides what will happen next is exercising executive control. And the brain itself is constantly doing that.

Just demonstrating the absurdity of free will within a determined system.

Plantinga, a theist, regards compatibilism as nonsense. He states "One might as well claim that being in jail doesn't really limit one's freedom on the grounds that if one were not in jail, he'd be free to come and go as he pleased".


To be bound is not a state of freedom.

So, the guy in handcuffs has no freedom of speech?

The point is that every notion of freedom references some specific form of constraint. For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We have freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. We have freedom of and from religion (free from a state imposed religion).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

The ability to speak is determined by the brain's architecture which enables the capacity for speech. The brains of other species may have no such capacity or ability.

What is said is determined by information input and memory function (life experience, education, etc).

This has nothing to do with free will. The ability is not willed, nor is what is said.


That's all I have time for tonight.

It's going around in circles as it is. Another infinite time and information loop.

The issue of free will hinges on agency, the means of thought and action, not semantic constructs, careful wording or rhetoric.
 
You wasted your time on an explanation that goes against the very thing you are arguing for
I am not arguing that the universe is not deterministic.

Rather I am arguing that all actors within all systems, regardless of whether they are "deterministic" have "free will" so long as the system holds state. For instance, "1+n" holds no state as function.

"1+n+(previous n)" is a state function of will on (previous N state).

It's more a function of the existence of a state machine. You're the one arguing what relationships state machines can and cannot have of themselves, and embarrassing yourself because you don't seem to understand state machines, or stateliness of systems in general.


You are simply asserting free will. The system doesn't operate on the principle of free will. A tree grows and responds to its environment, signaling, adapting, responding, etc, without will or consciousness, just its own makeup.

Functionality is not free will. Acting according to one's makeup and nature is inevitable so does not equate to 'free will' because nothing is willed. The system functions as it has evolved to do.
The problem here is that you seem to get easily confused when more than one complicated thing must be observed interacting.

The basic or fundamental definition of freedom
Using a dictionary to NEWSPEAK the actual functional definition of freedom away because you wish to engage in a philosophical straw-man argument again?

YAWN!

I showed you a REAL system where a REAL property "will" is held by a REAL actor, and that REAL property of will has an observable geometry such that it can be calculated whether that will is free, marking it as objectively REAL.

The only reason that the will cannot in this example be directly controlled by the actor is that the actor is missing (but not necessarily; just by circumstance) a choice function which chooses the will.

And it is trivial insofar as self-review is lacking on account of the core function not having state variable handles into the various choice functions.

Neural systems allow back-prop and training such that when the choice function executes and the result fails the pre-check, the choice function gets modified.

I know this because I'm the one whose activity is narrated generally through subvocalization, and the thing that is narrated is exactly that activity: the output of the thing was not "like" any sort of output that would get me to my goal. You could even say I "dislike" the output, and, just like I keep rejecting YOUR bullshit, I train the system until it produces output that, when I route it through that other set of neurons, that set does not complain.

Then I actually DO the thing and observe the result. Another more automatic set of neurons looks at whether the goal of the behavior was "satisfied", and if it was, gold star, and if it was not... Reject that output and back to back-propagation.

At any rate we have trivially proved that an entity can hold a "will", and that the will can objectively be constrained or free. At this point it is you who must prove that neurons are incapable of this basic form of simple algorithmic structure.


Your brain is generating not only your 'subvocalizations.' it is generating your you; your sense of self identity, self awareness, thoughts, feelings and actions.

Whatever you do, believe, think or feel, the underlying unconscious information processing activity of the brain is doing it without your awareness as a conscious being.

"The illusion of" conscious agency or 'free will' is exposed when something goes wrong with the system. Consciousness emerges from information processing; it cannot access it or control the means of production: the activity of neural networks/the brain as a modular system.

If the mechanisms fail, consciousness suffers the consequences. Free will is an illusion.
Obviously, it IS doing it with my awareness as a conscious being because I am aware of it, as a conscious being.

My brain as Marvin points out so many times IS me, or at least a part of my brain is.

It's entirely possible to address the part of the brain, specifically, that implements a mutable algorithm of task evaluation.

I don't even need to have consciousness to have free will, though, which I demonstrated with my example of a deterministic universe with active free will.

Consciousness is entirely separate from the process of free will.

Consciousness isn't even required for moral culpability.

All that is required for ethical culpability is "object ownership of cause" which is to say "this object caused this outcome as a production of itself through prior causes; prior causes would not cause this if not mediated by this formed object."

Or in other words "it was the state of this state machine that needs to be altered lest the state it is in lead to bad things"

Or "it was that machines will that caused this presently so we need to modify it's will".

Or "Tom is a murdering bastard, let's throw him in the pokey until he learns killing people is wrong."
 
Minus a minor quibble about what is "absurd" versus "nonsense", Marvin is pretty spot on here.

Only as an impression from a compatibilist. Incompatibilists disagree. There are two sides of the debate. Incompatiblists have evidence on their side: neuroscience.

Philosophy alone is insufficient. It's just a play on words, God is Love, free will is acting in accord to one's will.....never mind how will is produced.
No, they don't. Neuroscience says "a brain is capable of as much as a dwarf".

A dwarf is capable of holding a will.

The will of a dwarf is objectively observable as to whether it is "free".

Therefore a brain is as capable of holding an objectively free will, just as the dwarf.

If you wish to talk about consciousness, that's another whole ball of wax.

Your "neuroscience" handwave is trying to wave away fundamental properties of a system just because you who have never studied algorithms or process or systems theory at all don't understand how or why Neurons Encode Algorithms.

If you want to discuss CONSCIOUSNESS, though, you need to discuss how neurons allow algorithmic redefinition and backpropagation.
 
Not according to neuroscience.

Neuroscience says it is my own brain that is making my own decisions, such as whether I will have the steak or the salad for dinner. Do you seriously disagree after posting all of those quotes from neuroscientists saying that it is in fact my own neural architecture that is producing my own decisions?

What Marvin chooses to write is determined by the information acquired by the brain interacting with the systems of the brain. The state and condition of the system in each incremental moment of processing makes the decision.

Exactly. And that's actually my brain interacting both within its own collection of specialized functional areas as well as with the external social and physical environments. For example, as I walk my body through the doorway into the restaurant, as I browse the restaurant menu, and as I recall what I had for breakfast and lunch today, and choose to have the salad instead of the steak, and tell the waiter "I will have the Chef Salad, please", and later when I pay the bill. That's all my own brain doing its thing.

Given the deterministic nature of the process, if regulation means a possible alternative, there is no regulation because there is no possible alternative.

And that is exactly what this thread is about: every event is always causally necessary from any prior point in time, but, what of it? Should this bother us in any way? Does this change anything at all in how we operate, the alternatives that we imagine, and the things that we can do, or the things that we will do?

Nothing changes at all! It is still us being us, doing what we choose to do. We walk into the restaurant, browse the menu, and choose the salad, even though we could have chosen the steak.

All of the events are exactly what they look like, one event reliably leading to the next. It's dinner time and we feel hungry. Several of us decide we will have dinner at a restaurant. We walk into the restaurant, browse the menu, and each of us decides what we will have for dinner. We each tell the waiter what we will have. The waiter tells the chef. The chef prepares the meals. The waiter brings us our meals and our bills. We eat our dinners, have our conversations, and when we're done we responsibly take our bills to the cashier and pay for our dinners.

Now, if we want, we can add the phrase, "It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that", at the start of every one of those sentences. Each is a separate event reliably caused by the prior event in the previous sentence. And each snippet from the chain is an inevitable event that would not have been otherwise.

The surprising fact is that one of the things that would not have been otherwise, was our logically necessary notions that "I can order the steak" and "I can order the salad" were both true. And if "I can order the steak" was true at that moment, then "I could have ordered the steak" will be true later. "I could have" is just the past tense of "I can". If any "I can" was ever true in the past, then its matching "I could have" will forever be true in the future. This is the logic of our language.

It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that "I would choose the salad", and it was also causally necessary from any prior point in time that "I could have chosen the steak". And these two facts could not have been otherwise, due to causal necessity.

Ironically, even the ability to do otherwise could not have been otherwise.

And that completes the understanding of why universal causal necessity/inevitability changes nothing.

Regulation in this instance is the non chosen state of the system.

The fact that the system makes choices was unchosen. Making choices is just one of those things that the system naturally does. It never had to choose to have the ability to make choices, it just found itself making them, frequently.

Freedom requires the possibility to do otherwise in any given circumstance. Determinism eliminates the possibility to do otherwise in any given circumstance.

Well, no, not in "any given circumstance", but only in the circumstances where you must choose between two or more options. And in those circumstances where you must make a choice, there will always be at least two options to choose from.

Determinism eliminates nothing. If it is causally necessary that you will make a choice, then you will definitely be making that choice, and you will definitely have at least two options to choose from, and you will definitely be the causal determinant of the thing that you will do, and you will definitely have at least one option that you didn't do, but could have done instead.

Freedom is incompatible with determinism.

Freedom requires reliable cause and effect. Determinism, which presumes perfectly reliable cause and effect, would be especially compatible with freedom. So, your claim of incompatibility is false.

Will is not the agency or initiator of thought or action (neural networks are), therefore will cannot be described as free will. We have will, not free will.

Free will is when we (our neural networks) choose for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Since we observe ourselves and others doing this all the time, it is silly to suggest that it doesn't happen.
 
[Some stuff]
I would argue that we don't even need to decide it "for ourselves" for it to be "our will", nor for "our will" to be free or constrained as the case may be.

In many ways the operant ideas of justice (exile/execution/imprisonment forms) are a product of this fact.

Consciousness just gives us better opportunities such as self-review and psychological corrections.

What is necessary is for a state machine to hold an observable mutable state.
 
Yet it has been constantly pointed why 'acting in accordance to one's will' is not sufficient to establish freedom of will.

I agree that 'acting in accordance to one's will' is not what free will is about.

Free will is when we are free to choose for ourselves what we will do. If the choosing is free of coercion and undue influence, then it is free will. If our choice is coerced or unduly influenced, then it is not free will.

It's a simple notion which people generally understand and correctly apply when assessing a person's responsibility for their action.

The brain's information processing activity has nothing to do with will. That is the point being overlooked.

It has never been overlooked in this conversation. The brain's information processing includes making decisions. It is the brain's information processing that chooses whether I will have the steak or the salad for dinner.

If the state and condition of the brain determines salad in that moment in time, steak is not a possibility in that moment and never was....

You still do not understand what a possibility is. A possibility exists solely within the imagination. My having the steak for dinner existed within my imagination as something that I could do if I chose to. This is what a real possibility is. The steak was definitely a real possibility.

So, your claim is false.

''Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.) Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). - Marvin Edwards.

Of course. Have I ever said anything that conflicts with those two statements?

Just an outline of the impossible conditions necessary for 'free will' to be something real, something that can make a difference to outcomes. ;)

Free will is an event. Events are real and are causally necessary. Free will is specifically the event in which someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Free will is not only possible, it is objectively observed to happen repeatedly every day. It is both real and the effective cause of subsequent events.

Plantinga, a theist, regards compatibilism as nonsense.

A lot of people do. However, a lot of people also find compatibilism to be the true state of things.

The point is that every notion of freedom references some specific form of constraint. For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We have freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. We have freedom of and from religion (free from a state imposed religion).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

It's going around in circles as it is.

To avoid going around in circles, you must actually engage with the ideas that threaten your own.
 
What is necessary is for a state machine to hold an observable mutable state.

For example ... ?


static volatile State state(INITIAL);
RegisterStateLocation(&state);//unnecessary, but this allows external access to the state so that the while loop "makes sense"

while(1)
{
if (state.trylock())
{
switch(state.value())
{
case INITIAL: //"Will"
...
if (IsInitialDone()) state.set(FIGHT);
break;
...
}
state.unlock();
}
}

Here, we can see that "state" encodes a "will", as in literally "the next time this comes around the switch will enter case initial.

The system has a "will".

Whether the will is free to operate depends on other geometries: maybe a failure case is entered.

There are a number more complexities but this is really what it all comes down to: systemic state retention.
 
Back
Top Bottom