Compatibilism: What's that About?

[pood]

Yes, I hold that he has that ability, but will never excercise it. Consider if we could back up the world, so to say, and replay it, again and again, and it turns out that the end of this tape x always does y, without fail. Now we ask, since x always does y under identical circumstances, does it therefore follow that x could not have done other than y? No, that does not follow, and no experiment could be done to prove it so. (But then again, of course, the experiment of backing up the world and replaying it can’t be done, either.)

What I am saying is that operationally, x will only do other than y if one or more antecedent circumstances are actually different.

 

[The AntiChris]

What I am saying is that operationally, x will only do other than y if one or more antecedent circumstances are actually different.

Then I'm afraid I have no idea what you mean when you say he has the ability do do otherwise or why you think it's important. The problem for me is that I think you lay yourself open to DBT's criticism that compatibilists are not true determinists.

 

[pood]

What I am saying is that operationally, x will only do other than y if one or more antecedent circumstances are actually different.

Then I'm afraid I have no idea what you mean when you say he has the ability do do otherwise or why you think it's important. The problem for me is that I think you lay yourself open to DBT's criticism that compatibilists are not true determinists.

Not at all, because as I’ve said, he WILL NOT do otherwise.

 

[pood]

The point I’m making is that causal determinism can only say what WILL happen (were we perfect predictors), not what MUST happen. To confuse WILL with MUST is to commit a modal fallacy, and moreover it is to argue either that all events are logically necessary (an absurdity) or that they are nomologically necessary, but there is no legitimate modal category called nomological (i.e. causal) necessity, so I do not recognize it.

 

[The AntiChris]

What I am saying is that operationally, x will only do other than y if one or more antecedent circumstances are actually different.

Then I'm afraid I have no idea what you mean when you say he has the ability do do otherwise or why you think it's important. The problem for me is that I think you lay yourself open to DBT's criticism that compatibilists are not true determinists.

Not at all, because as I’ve said, he WILL NOT do otherwise.

So long as you insist that a subject has the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances your determinist credentials will be questioned. In any event I don't see how this claimed ability helps the compatibilist case.

 

[Jarhyn]

What I am saying is that operationally, x will only do other than y if one or more antecedent circumstances are actually different.

Then I'm afraid I have no idea what you mean when you say he has the ability do do otherwise or why you think it's important. The problem for me is that I think you lay yourself open to DBT's criticism that compatibilists are not true determinists.

For the same reason that the marbles in a bag of marbles are possibilities on the choice function "squeeze bag for marbles" even if the bag is never in the life of the universe squeezed, and even if they are never the marbles squeezed out of it, assuming it is squeezed < nMarbles.

 

[The AntiChris]

The point I’m making is that causal determinism can only say what WILL happen (were we perfect predictors), not what MUST happen. To confuse WILL with MUST is to commit a modal fallacy, and moreover it is to argue either that all events are logically necessary (an absurdity) or that they are nomologically necessary, but there is no legitimate modal category called nomological (i.e. causal) necessity, so I do not recognize it.

I take your point but I don't think it's necessary for the compatibilist case (the case for compatibilism does not rely on this 'ability') and it will undoubtedly sow confusion.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

What I am saying is that operationally, x will only do other than y if one or more antecedent circumstances are actually different.

Then I'm afraid I have no idea what you mean when you say he has the ability do do otherwise or why you think it's important. The problem for me is that I think you lay yourself open to DBT's criticism that compatibilists are not true determinists.

Not at all, because as I’ve said, he WILL NOT do otherwise.

So long as you insist that a subject has the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances your determinist credentials will be questioned. In any event I don't see how this claimed ability helps the compatibilist case.

Here's the "fly in the ointment" and a couple of ways to swat it.

The phrase "could have" always carries two very significant logical implications:
(1) When anyone says they "could have" done X, it always implies that they definitely did not do X.
(2) When anyone says they "could have" done X rather than Y, it always implies that they would have done X only under different circumstances.

So, when someone asks the question: "Could you have done differently under the same circumstance?" they are creating a paradox. If we make the 2nd implication explicit, we get "Could you have done differently under the same circumstances under different circumstances?" The question, when the implication is explicit, becomes nonsense.

The other way to "swat the fly" is basically what Pood said. I've been trying to express the same thing by pointing out the difference between say something "can" happen versus saying something "will" happen. It is always the case that multiple things "can" happen while only a single thing "will" happen. This is the distinction between possibility and necessity. Many things are possible while only one thing will be actual.

And the "ability" to do something continues to exist even if you never actually do it (I think that was also Hume's approach).

If I must choose between the steak and the salad on the menu, then there will be two things that I can choose but only one thing that I will choose. So, at the beginning of the choosing operation it will always be true that "I can choose the steak" and also true that "I can choose the salad". One of these will become the thing that I did choose, and the other will be the thing that I could have chosen, but did not.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So long as you insist that a subject has the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances your determinist credentials will be questioned. In any event I don't see how this claimed ability helps the compatibilist case.

Here's the "fly in the ointment" and a couple of ways to swat it.

The phrase "could have" always carries two very significant logical implications:
(1) When anyone says they "could have" done X, it always implies that they definitely did not do X.
(2) When anyone says they "could have" done X rather than Y, it always implies that they would have done X only under different circumstances.

So, when someone asks the question: "Could you have done differently under the same circumstance?" they are creating a paradox. If we make the 2nd implication explicit, we get "Could you have done differently under the same circumstances under different circumstances?" The question, when the implication is explicit, becomes nonsense.

The other way to "swat the fly" is basically what Pood said. I've been trying to express the same thing by pointing out the difference between say something "can" happen versus saying something "will" happen. It is always the case that multiple things "can" happen while only a single thing "will" happen. This is the distinction between possibility and necessity. Many things are possible while only one thing will be actual.

And the "ability" to do something continues to exist even if you never actually do it (I think that was also Hume's approach).

If I must choose between the steak and the salad on the menu, then there will be two things that I can choose but only one thing that I will choose. So, at the beginning of the choosing operation it will always be true that "I can choose the steak" and also true that "I can choose the salad". One of these will become the thing that I did choose, and the other will be the thing that I could have chosen, but did not.

 

[The AntiChris]

So long as you insist that a subject has the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances your determinist credentials will be questioned. In any event I don't see how this claimed ability helps the compatibilist case.

Here's the "fly in the ointment" and a couple of ways to swat it.

The phrase "could have" always carries two very significant logical implications:
(1) When anyone says they "could have" done X, it always implies that they definitely did not do X.
(2) When anyone says they "could have" done X rather than Y, it always implies that they would have done X only under different circumstances.

So, when someone asks the question: "Could you have done differently under the same circumstance?" they are creating a paradox. If we make the 2nd implication explicit, we get "Could you have done differently under the same circumstances under different circumstances?" The question, when the implication is explicit, becomes nonsense.

The other way to "swat the fly" is basically what Pood said. I've been trying to express the same thing by pointing out the difference between say something "can" happen versus saying something "will" happen. It is always the case that multiple things "can" happen while only a single thing "will" happen. This is the distinction between possibility and necessity. Many things are possible while only one thing will be actual.

And the "ability" to do something continues to exist even if you never actually do it (I think that was also Hume's approach).

If I must choose between the steak and the salad on the menu, then there will be two things that I can choose but only one thing that I will choose. So, at the beginning of the choosing operation it will always be true that "I can choose the steak" and also true that "I can choose the salad". One of these will become the thing that I did choose, and the other will be the thing that I could have chosen, but did not.

Sure, I agree with everything you've said.

I prefer your first approach to the 'could have done differently' question. There may well be situations in which your second approach will be intellectually persuasive but I'm pretty certain that claiming that we have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (even if never instantiated) will only reinforce DBT's belief that compatibilists do not understand determinism and do nothing to move the discussion on.

 

[pood]

LOL I don’t think anything we say is going to convince DBT!

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So long as you insist that a subject has the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances your determinist credentials will be questioned. In any event I don't see how this claimed ability helps the compatibilist case.

Here's the "fly in the ointment" and a couple of ways to swat it.

The phrase "could have" always carries two very significant logical implications:
(1) When anyone says they "could have" done X, it always implies that they definitely did not do X.
(2) When anyone says they "could have" done X rather than Y, it always implies that they would have done X only under different circumstances.

So, when someone asks the question: "Could you have done differently under the same circumstance?" they are creating a paradox. If we make the 2nd implication explicit, we get "Could you have done differently under the same circumstances under different circumstances?" The question, when the implication is explicit, becomes nonsense.

The other way to "swat the fly" is basically what Pood said. I've been trying to express the same thing by pointing out the difference between say something "can" happen versus saying something "will" happen. It is always the case that multiple things "can" happen while only a single thing "will" happen. This is the distinction between possibility and necessity. Many things are possible while only one thing will be actual.

And the "ability" to do something continues to exist even if you never actually do it (I think that was also Hume's approach).

If I must choose between the steak and the salad on the menu, then there will be two things that I can choose but only one thing that I will choose. So, at the beginning of the choosing operation it will always be true that "I can choose the steak" and also true that "I can choose the salad". One of these will become the thing that I did choose, and the other will be the thing that I could have chosen, but did not.

Sure, I agree with everything you've said.

I prefer your first approach to the 'could have done differently' question. There may well be situations in which your second approach will be intellectually persuasive but I'm pretty certain that claiming that we have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (even if never instantiated) will only reinforce DBT's belief that compatibilists do not understand determinism and do nothing to move the discussion on.

All we can do is lay out the truth, as clearly as we can.

 

[fromderinside]

Patience is required when convoluted non-material assertions are the basis for what is laughingly called a 'compatibilist position.'

Well, whenever you feel up to it, consider the compatibilist argument and see what you can do with it:

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof goes like this:

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Compatibilism is simple. It begins with the recognition that free will is a deterministic event, just like every other event in the causal chain. However, the meaningful and relevant causes of that freely chosen will happen to be located within us. Our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences. All these things, though each has a history of prior causes, make up who and what we are now. And all of that is the determinant that causally necessitates our chosen intent. In other words, the meaningful and relevant cause of our choice is us, and no other object in the physical universe.

I have considered it and it comes down to whether a being senses the material world or some derivative of it contaminated by on going mental processes together with the derivative senses all of which I categorize as subjective. One can't include within reality something that is derived from material reality as part of it.

The rule is that if one uses oneself to determine one isn't practicing determinism. Material things need to be considered separate from the experimenter as the Scientific Method dictates.

I have provided a path forward for those who want to organize what man uses to decide worth and substance that subsumes the subjective verified by the objective as topics for such as good, bad, truth, choice, plan, etc.

 

[Jarhyn]

can't include within reality something that is derived from material reality as part of it

"Reality does not include what reality includes"

So do we pin that up next to "objects are not objects" and "then, which implies 'if', does not imply 'if'"

This is not the first time your confused, addled arguments have amounted to nonsense.

 

[DBT]

Some people might agree with you but many others don't. Why should we accept your view to the exclusion of any other view?

Whether you agree or not, the terms and conditions are entailed in the given definition of determinism.

No alternate actions. No choosing otherwise. Everything proceeds as determined by prior states of the system.


Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

It's not an assumption. It's the given definition of determinism, the very same definition given by Marvin and Jarhyn.

The argument here, in case this still hasn't been understood, is the claim that free will is compatible with that very same definition of determinism.

 

[Jarhyn]

Some people might agree with you but many others don't. Why should we accept your view to the exclusion of any other view?

Whether you agree or not, the terms and conditions are entailed in the given definition of determinism.

No alternate actions. No choosing otherwise. Everything proceeds as determined by prior states of the system.


Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

It's not an assumption. It's the given definition of determinism, the very same definition given by Marvin and Jarhyn.

The argument here, in case this still hasn't been understood, is the claim that free will is compatible with that very same definition of determinism.

No, it is not. We in fact leave off exactly this part as bolded because Occam's Razor doesn't abide by unnecessary bullshit in a definition.

None of our definitions include this assumption. None of our definitions of free will, none of our definitions of determinism.

It is only in YOUR incompatibilist definitions where these paradoxes and paradoxical definitions live.

As I have pointed out, I have a whole environment, enclosed unto itself with regular deterministic function such that every event that proceeds in the same context results in the same outcome.

In fact that's why I brought it up in the first place: it allows us to study a real environment that verifiably works in the way you claim our reality works, as regards determinism...

Yet in that environment, the concepts of "free" and "will" and "requirement" as presented among my many posts can still be objectively identified by outside observers!

This is because none of us compatibilists use such a definition which begs the question on free will. Rather, we just use the definition of determinism which means result = rules(field) yields a single unique answer for every possible value of "field".

Again, nobody in math or information science considers 'choice functions' on the basis of 'it must be able to return any of the possibilities'.

If I hand you a bag of marbles and ask you to squeeze one out of the mouth of the bag, and you hand it back to me, all the remaining marbles in the bag are still "possibilities" of it's choice function, and all the marbles including the one you squeezed were "possibilities" of that previous operation. The ones that did not are no less "possibilities". Rather "possibilities" merely references "marbles in the bag, such that applying force to the bag would squeeze one of this set out".

It does not mean rewinding time and getting different marbles. In fact, choice functions in a deterministic universe are deterministic.

It does no injury to the existence of the set upon which the choice function operates.

 

[DBT]

The explanation is right in front of your eyes.

Like the restaurant menu, and the people choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner.

The action - according to your own definition - was determined to happen precisely as it happens before the customers were born or the restaurant built.

That is not choice. That is action proceeding as determined, not willed or chosen. The will to go to the restaurant is determined, the selection is determined, the meal arrives and it consumed as determined, including every word of the discussion, every twitch, laugh, feeling of pleasure, etc......that is how determinism works. And why free will is clearly not compatible with determinism

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

It's reasons why free will is incompatible with determinism is entailed in the nature of determinism, as explained.

They are only incompatible if you use definitions that make it incompatible. If you define free will as "the opposite of determinism" or you define determinism as "the opposite of free will", then they become incompatible.

Your own definition of determinism makes free will incompatible with free will, as described above.

All that is required to make them compatible is to use the sensible definition of free will and the sensible definition of determinism.

I agree with your definition of determinism. It's the compatibilist definition of free will that's flawed beyond recovery.

Free will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.
Determinism is the belief that every event is reliably caused by prior events.

If determinism is true, nobody chooses. All actions are determined and proceed as determined. There are no possible alternatives in any given instance. Events proceed without deviation.

If you could have done otherwise - which is not possible - you could claim that you have choice.

But of course, as specified in the given definition, there is no deviation. With no possible deviation, nobody chooses what they: their actions must necessarily proceed as determined, without deviation

That's determinism.

When a person decides what they will do according to their own goals and their own reasons, the choice is reliably caused by prior events. Determinism is satisfied.

The person 'decides' precisely what is determined that they would 'decide.' Every thought and deliberation in each and every instance in time being fixed by the prior state of the system, everything proceeding without deviation (the given definition), the no choice principle of determinism.

When a person decides what they will do according to their own goals and their own reasons, the choice is reliably caused by that person. Free will is satisfied.

Goals, reasons, thoughts, deliberations and actions are not chosen, they emerge and proceed as determined by prior states of the system, this state becomes that state and the next without alternate options or choices, determinism doesn't allow multiple realizable choices, everything is necessitated, not willed. Will itself is fixed by the prior state of the system.


What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Necessity;
Necessity is the idea that everything that has ever happened and ever will happen is necessary, and can not be otherwise. Necessity is often opposed to chance and contingency. In a necessary world there is no chance. Everything that happens is necessitated.

''The No Choice Principle implies that I cannot have a choice about anything that is an unavoidable consequence of something I have no control of.''

 

[Jarhyn]

The "no choice principle" is yet another nonsense proposed to wave away language pertaining to all of math and rules-based understanding of the universe.

It only works tentatively in language, and only that far barely, on the nonsensical proposition of ignoring what is meant by the vast majority of people when they say "choice", and in so doing ignore that they break "knowledge in general" I such a worldview.

Nobody when they utter "choice" generally means that the choice must be capable of yielding a nondeterministic result, except the deluded hard determinist.

Instead they mean "of this set of inputs, this function will operate to produce an output".

The queue is a choice function on a set, that only yields the head of the queue. All the people in the line are "possibilities" of it's choice function. The queue is only unfree to choose when it is empty.

In some respects Marvin is wrong that choice functions need more than one possibility to be a choice function. A queue with one person in it still "chooses" the one person in it.

Then, this is why the empty set is considered as a member of all sets: this special case, the case of unfreeness is the hidden second "possibility".

 

[pood]

Necessity;
Necessity is the idea that everything that has ever happened and ever will happen is necessary, and can not be otherwise. Necessity is often opposed to chance and contingency. In a necessary world there is no chance. Everything that happens is necessitated.

''The No Choice Principle implies that I cannot have a choice about anything that is an unavoidable consequence of something I have no control of.''

And there you go again, cherry-picking an essay you apparently did not read. I have addressed this upthread.

 

[pood]

It’s really strange. DBT quoted the opening paragraph of an article that then went on to refute the opening paragraph! How can he not be aware of this?