Compatibilism: What's that About?

[none]

I would suggest that Desmurget is not overstating his case. I would point out that he is describing his experiments on the human brain and their results.

He is not the only one. The evidence coming out of neuroscience supports everything that has been said: basically, that the brain is a modular system which acquires and processes information and generates output based on architecture, condition, inputs and memory, a failure in any of these elements disrupting or destroying consciousness.

Will has no say in the matter.

Mark Hallet is a specialist;


How Can There Be Voluntary Movement Without Free Will?
''Humans do not appear to be purely reflexive organisms, simple automatons. A vast array of different movements are generated in a variety of settings. Is there an alternative to free will? Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction.

Muscle contraction is under the complete control of the alpha motoneurons in the spinal cord. When the alpha motoneurons are active, there will be movement. Activity of the alpha motoneurons is a product of the different synaptic events on their dendrites and cell bodies. There is a complex summation of EPSPs and IPSPs, and when the threshold for an action potential is crossed, the cell fires.

There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control. Such a situation likely holds also for the motor cortex and the cells of origin of the corticospinal tract. Their firing depends on their synaptic inputs. And, a similar situation must hold for all the principal regions giving input to the motor cortex.

For any cortical region, its activity will depend on its synaptic inputs. Some motor cortical inputs come via only a few synapses from sensory cortices, and such influences on motor output are clear. Some inputs will come from regions, such as the limbic areas, many synapses away from both primary sensory and motor cortices. At any one time, the activity of the motor cortex, and its commands to the spinal cord, will reflect virtually all the activity in the entire brain.

Is it necessary that there be anything else? This can be a complete description of the process of movement selection, and even if there is something more -- like free will -- it would have to operate through such neuronal mechanisms.

The view that there is no such thing as free will as an inner causal agent has been advocated by a number of philosophers, scientists, and neurologists including Ryle, Adrian, Skinner and Fisher.(Fisher 1993)''

One of the things missing in Hallet's narrative is the events external to the brain, you know, the ones providing the external inputs. A guy says, "Raise your hand". Then, back inside the brain, we hear what he said, and then we decide "What the heck, I'll raise my hand", and then we act upon that intention by actually raising our hand.

Another thing missing is where the decision making takes place. Mark says, "Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction." That may be sufficient to explain a twitch, but it does not explain me deliberately raising my hand.

Mark finally points out, "There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control." If it is a deliberate act, then the origin of the signal has to come from neural mechanisms that actually decide if I want to bother to raise my hand or not. "Raise your hand" is not understood by the motor neurons. They cannot act directly upon that until it gets through auditory sensation, word interpretation, and deciding what to do about it.

Fortunately, the brain comes with the neural functionality required to choose what the organism will do, and then to initiate that intention through the motor neurons.

Where's the free will? Well, as long as the brain is functioning well, and no one is pointing a gun at it, then the brain is free to decide for itself what it will do. But if there's a guy with a gun, then these are additional sensory inputs that must be converted into useful information so that the neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex can decide what to tell the motoneurons to do.

Apparently, other neuroscientists have identified where the decision making takes place. That's where the will is formed. Whether it was formed in the absence of coercion and undue influence is how we decide whether the choice was freely made.

So when was all this decided?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

My theory is that every tick in that noise is reliably caused, perhaps by some quantum level chain of events. But we would call it chaotic, because it is beyond our ability to predict these events. It is indetermistic in that it cannot be be predicted, but it may still be causally deterministic.

But I'm not saying it's indeterministic. I'm saying that:

1. It is not known whether it's deterministic.

2. If it turns out to be nondeterministic, we are not less free because of it - at least not as long as the nondeterminism is limited to the rule I mentioned; different kinds of nondeterminism can be relevant for free will.

So, I believe that even the "true" random number generator's output will be causally deterministic, but certainly random enough to be unpredictable, which is sufficient for its usage in cryptography. Basically, you just want a number that no one else can guess.

Suppose for the sake of the argument that your theory happens to be false. Are we not free?

Reliable cause and effect enables prediction, which enables control, which enables our ability to do things. Our ability to do things makes freedom, the ability to do what we want, possible. Unreliable causation would impair or remove prediction and control, reducing our ability to do things, thus reducing our freedom.

If you're worried about the loss of imagination, and variety, and surprise, don't be. Imagination is a deterministic operation in which we deliberately move stuff around, or sort things differently, or unintentionally but reliably make mistakes that enlighten us to new possibilities.

The brain presumes reliable cause and effect. When something good, or bad, happens, we want to know why. If we know the cause then we gain some control over the event. We take it for granted that every event has a cause. So, it's not really my theory, but a common understanding.

 

[fromderinside]

Have a baloney sandwich.

It's just as trivial to come up with two or more distinguishable at time t that have the same predecessor pattern at time t-1.

In Conway's Life? Example, please.

The only way for the game to be consistent with t = 0 natural law statement is for the game to permit both forward and backward reference for all time. Stacking deck is not an example of determinism statement. Provide a game that works both ways and I'll bet my assertion works.

Conway's life game isn't an example of anything relevant to determinism discussion.

 

[DBT]

But I'm not saying it's indeterministic. I'm saying that:

1. It is not known whether it's deterministic.

2. If it turns out to be nondeterministic, we are not less free because of it - at least not as long as the nondeterminism is limited to the rule I mentioned; different kinds of nondeterminism can be relevant for free will.


Suppose for the sake of the argument that your theory happens to be false. Are we not free?

Reliable cause and effect enables prediction, which enables control, which enables our ability to do things. Our ability to do things makes freedom, the ability to do what we want, possible. Unreliable causation would impair or remove prediction and control, reducing our ability to do things, thus reducing our freedom.

If you're worried about the loss of imagination, and variety, and surprise, don't be. Imagination is a deterministic operation in which we deliberately move stuff around, or sort things differently, or unintentionally but reliably make mistakes that enlighten us to new possibilities.

The brain presumes reliable cause and effect. When something good, or bad, happens, we want to know why. If we know the cause then we gain some control over the event. We take it for granted that every event has a cause. So, it's not really my theory, but a common understanding.

Because each 'cause' is an effect and each 'effect' is a cause, cause and effect is not an accurate description.

 

[DBT]

I would suggest that Desmurget is not overstating his case. I would point out that he is describing his experiments on the human brain and their results.

He is not the only one. The evidence coming out of neuroscience supports everything that has been said: basically, that the brain is a modular system which acquires and processes information and generates output based on architecture, condition, inputs and memory, a failure in any of these elements disrupting or destroying consciousness.

Will has no say in the matter.

Mark Hallet is a specialist;


How Can There Be Voluntary Movement Without Free Will?
''Humans do not appear to be purely reflexive organisms, simple automatons. A vast array of different movements are generated in a variety of settings. Is there an alternative to free will? Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction.

Muscle contraction is under the complete control of the alpha motoneurons in the spinal cord. When the alpha motoneurons are active, there will be movement. Activity of the alpha motoneurons is a product of the different synaptic events on their dendrites and cell bodies. There is a complex summation of EPSPs and IPSPs, and when the threshold for an action potential is crossed, the cell fires.

There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control. Such a situation likely holds also for the motor cortex and the cells of origin of the corticospinal tract. Their firing depends on their synaptic inputs. And, a similar situation must hold for all the principal regions giving input to the motor cortex.

For any cortical region, its activity will depend on its synaptic inputs. Some motor cortical inputs come via only a few synapses from sensory cortices, and such influences on motor output are clear. Some inputs will come from regions, such as the limbic areas, many synapses away from both primary sensory and motor cortices. At any one time, the activity of the motor cortex, and its commands to the spinal cord, will reflect virtually all the activity in the entire brain.

Is it necessary that there be anything else? This can be a complete description of the process of movement selection, and even if there is something more -- like free will -- it would have to operate through such neuronal mechanisms.

The view that there is no such thing as free will as an inner causal agent has been advocated by a number of philosophers, scientists, and neurologists including Ryle, Adrian, Skinner and Fisher.(Fisher 1993)''

One of the things missing in Hallet's narrative is the events external to the brain, you know, the ones providing the external inputs. A guy says, "Raise your hand". Then, back inside the brain, we hear what he said, and then we decide "What the heck, I'll raise my hand", and then we act upon that intention by actually raising our hand.

Another thing missing is where the decision making takes place. Mark says, "Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction." That may be sufficient to explain a twitch, but it does not explain me deliberately raising my hand.

If the whole picture of cognition is considered, it must include inputs.

Nobody denies the role of input. That is what I have been pointing out, that there is no single factor like 'free will' at work, that brain output/behaviour is based on a number of factors, brain architecture and state (someone may be drunk, a chemical imbalance, lesion etc) inputs interacting with memory and so on....memory function (if severe) disintegrates consciousness, loss of recognition, loss of self awareness.

Mark finally points out, "There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control." If it is a deliberate act, then the origin of the signal has to come from neural mechanisms that actually decide if I want to bother to raise my hand or not. "Raise your hand" is not understood by the motor neurons. They cannot act directly upon that until it gets through auditory sensation, word interpretation, and deciding what to do about it.

It's not a matter of ''finally'' - not everything can be said in a limited time frame. The role of each function can be explored in detail if need be;

As an outline of the systems of the brain and their functions:

perceptual processing
• Superior colliculus

Modulation of cognition
(memory, attention)
• Cingulate cortex
• Hippocampus
• Basal forebrain

Representation of emotional response
• Somatosensory-related
cortices

Representation of perceived action
• Left frontal operculum
• Superior temporal gyrus

Motivational evaluation
• Amygdala
• Orbitofrontal cortex

Social reasoning
• Prefrontal cortex

Fortunately, the brain comes with the neural functionality required to choose what the organism will do, and then to initiate that intention through the motor neurons.

As can any sufficiently complex information processor. Not as a matter of free will, just function enabled by architecture; the ability to acquire information, process it and proceed with an action based on a given set of criteria/algorithms.

No free will needed.

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems! - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If the whole picture of cognition is considered, it must include inputs.

Nobody denies the role of input. That is what I have been pointing out, that there is no single factor like 'free will' at work, that brain output/behaviour is based on a number of factors, brain architecture and state (someone may be drunk, a chemical imbalance, lesion etc) inputs interacting with memory and so on....memory function (if severe) disintegrates consciousness, loss of recognition, loss of self awareness.

Mark finally points out, "There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control." If it is a deliberate act, then the origin of the signal has to come from neural mechanisms that actually decide if I want to bother to raise my hand or not. "Raise your hand" is not understood by the motor neurons. They cannot act directly upon that until it gets through auditory sensation, word interpretation, and deciding what to do about it.

It's not a matter of ''finally'' - not everything can be said in a limited time frame. The role of each function can be explored in detail if need be;

As an outline of the systems of the brain and their functions:

perceptual processing
• Superior colliculus

Modulation of cognition
(memory, attention)
• Cingulate cortex
• Hippocampus
• Basal forebrain

Representation of emotional response
• Somatosensory-related
cortices

Representation of perceived action
• Left frontal operculum
• Superior temporal gyrus

Motivational evaluation
• Amygdala
• Orbitofrontal cortex

Social reasoning
• Prefrontal cortex

Fortunately, the brain comes with the neural functionality required to choose what the organism will do, and then to initiate that intention through the motor neurons.

As can any sufficiently complex information processor. Not as a matter of free will, just function enabled by architecture; the ability to acquire information, process it and proceed with an action based on a given set of criteria/algorithms.

No free will needed.

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems! - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

Okay, so now we have all the primary functions of the brain. We've got the sensory processing that organizes external input into a model of reality. We've got decision-making and planning parts that evaluate that model, imagines what we might do next, and then chooses the specific plan for what we will do. And finally we've got the motor management parts that enable our bodies to carry out our deliberately chosen will.

And, assuming all of these parts are reliable, in good working order, we now have all we need to deal with practical real world issues. We can consider our options and then carry out what we, ourselves, have deliberately decided we will do.

Then Martha Farah asks us us to replace the notion of "free will" with the notion of "rationality", pointing out "that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning", and assuring us that "there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system".

Well, Ms. Farah, we're not quite done with the notion of "free will" yet. We still have the practical problems that arise when that rational system is subjected to coercion and other forms of undue influence. We must still distinguish the deliberate choice of a rational mind, from a choice being forced upon us by a guy with a gun. And we must take into account any significant mental illness or injury that renders the normally rational mind irrational.

Free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. This is the definition we use when assigning moral or legal responsibility for a person's actions. It informs us of the meaningful and relevant cause of the action, so that we know what we need to do to correct actions that break the law. Do we correct the behavior by psychiatric treatment or by rehabilitation? Or, is the behavior corrected by simply removing the guy with the gun who coerced the behavior?

Free will, when properly defined, remains a key concept that makes significant distinctions about events in the real world. And it has no issues with the mind as a physical system.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Reliable cause and effect enables prediction, which enables control, which enables our ability to do things. Our ability to do things makes freedom, the ability to do what we want, possible. Unreliable causation would impair or remove prediction and control, reducing our ability to do things, thus reducing our freedom.

Actually, the situations under consideration are such that we cannot predict the outcome. It happens with some random number generators. Our inability to predict the outcome remains the same regardless of whether it turns out that the randomness is real - i.e., indeterminism - or apparent but invincible - due to some deterministic but unpredictable quantum stuff.

If it turns out that your theory that it's not true randomness is true, or if it turns out it is false, our ability to make predictions remains equal.

If you're worried about the loss of imagination, and variety, and surprise, don't be.

I am not. Again, compatibilism is true. And we do not lose any freedom if your theory happens to be correct and the world is deterministic, compared to the indeterministic alternative. My point is that in the opposite scenario, we still do not lose freedom.

The brain presumes reliable cause and effect. When something good, or bad, happens, we want to know why. If we know the cause then we gain some control over the event. We take it for granted that every event has a cause. So, it's not really my theory, but a common understanding.

That's a matter for psychology research. And it seems many physicists think otherwise (and are indeterminists or take no stance), given the information available to them (which is a lot more than that available to the public at large). Perhaps, it is the default view for inanimate objects and pretheoretically. For minds, it's harder to tell. Iirc (it's been a while), some experiments give different results depending on how the questions are worded. But I see no evidence that there is some kind of default belief that when we choose a random number, the outcome was determined beforehand. Not that I think would matter.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Actually, the situations under consideration are such that we cannot predict the outcome. It happens with some random number generators. Our inability to predict the outcome remains the same regardless of whether it turns out that the randomness is real - i.e., indeterminism - or apparent but invincible - due to some deterministic but unpredictable quantum stuff.

If it turns out that your theory that it's not true randomness is true, or if it turns out it is false, our ability to make predictions remains equal.




I am not. Again, compatibilism is true. And we do not lose any freedom if your theory happens to be correct and the world is deterministic, compared to the indeterministic alternative. My point is that in the opposite scenario, we still do not lose freedom.

The brain presumes reliable cause and effect. When something good, or bad, happens, we want to know why. If we know the cause then we gain some control over the event. We take it for granted that every event has a cause. So, it's not really my theory, but a common understanding.

That's a matter for psychology research. And it seems many physicists think otherwise (and are indeterminists or take no stance), given the information available to them (which is a lot more than that available to the public at large). Perhaps, it is the default view for inanimate objects and pretheoretically. For minds, it's harder to tell. Iirc (it's been a while), some experiments give different results depending on how the questions are worded. But I see no evidence that there is some kind of default belief that when we choose a random number, the outcome was determined beforehand. Not that I think would matter.

Ironically, I would agree that events are not causally determined beforehand. No event is ever happens until its final causes have played themselves out. And, in an infinite causal chain, what we really care about are just the meaningful and relevant causes. A meaningful cause efficiently explains why something happened. A relevant cause is one we can do something about. The most meaningful and relevant cause of a deliberate action is the act of deliberation that precedes it.

The Big Bang is not a meaningful or relevant cause of any human event. Nor is causal necessity. After all, causation never causes anything and determinism never determines anything. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the universe can cause events to happen. Causation is a concept we use to describe the interactions of these objects and forces as they bring about events. And determinism merely asserts that the behavior of these objects and forces is reliable, and thus theoretically predictable. We happen to be one of those actual objects that go around causing stuff to happen, and doing so for our own purposes, our own reasons, and our own interests. So, causation is about us (and of course all those other objects and forces).

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Random does not equate to free will. Determined does not equate to free will. The term "free will" simply does not apply....therefore a semantic construct.

Then again, random and determined are also semantic constructs. Every word and concept is.

 

[steve_bank]

Deterministic has a mathematical and subjective meaning.


A deterministic mathematical function means you plug numbers into an equation an get an answer.

Speed = Distance x Time is a deterministic function.

Flipping a coin is probabilistic. The probability of heads or tails is 50/50 on each toss, but there is ni dteenistic way to predict which will occur on a toss. Flip a coin 100 times and it will be close to 50/50.

Probabilistic does not Violeta causality.

Quantum indeterminacy plays out in routine measurements. There are no absolutely exact measurements. Therer is alwas a probability that goes with a measurement. DC current in a wire wire is measured as an average of a large quantity of electrons in a wire. At 10 amps the error or uncertainty is low, quantum effects of the electrons can be ignored. As current gets small quantum effects become an issue. At the quantum level there is 'quantum noise'.

Philosophical determinism is whether or not all things are predetermined. Am I destined to write this post?

 

[fromderinside]

Random does not equate to free will. Determined does not equate to free will. The term "free will" simply does not apply....therefore a semantic construct.

Then again, random and determined are also semantic constructs. Every word and concept is.

Before I begin uncontrolled laughter Let me get something straight.

You assert logic depends, depends on semantic structure. That maths, science, history - even though all of these have material basis independent of the domains which their semantic definitions encompass - are subservient to how each lexicon is derived represented by a word or few "how one expresses it" sentences.

a ha, a ha ha, a ha ha ha, hahahahahahahahaha........

You may go back to your Platonic heritage now you poor puppy.

 

[Emily Lake]

The specific causes of specific effects must be reliable in order to create a consistent pattern. For example, I press the "H" key and an "h" appears in my text. But, suppose the effect of pressing the "H" was indeterministic. Suppose that sometimes when I press the "H" I get an "m". Other times I press "H" and a "7" appears.

Let's turn up the indeterminism dial. Now, when I press any key on the keyboard, I get a random letter each no matter which key I press. All I will get is gibberish. My freedom to type my thoughts would be gone.

So, in order to have freedom, we must have control. In order to have control, the results of our actions must be predictable. And, in order for the results of our actions to be predictable, we must have reliable cause and effect.

Freedom requires a deterministic world, a world of reliable cause and effect. Agency requires determinism, or at least a deterministic world.

Don't make the mistake of equating stochastic processes with uniformly random processes. Statistics has clear cause and effect, but it is not deterministic. Statistics is stochastic.

Realistically, your keyboard does have the possibility of random letters in it already. The underlying hardware and software could end up with a bug, it could already have a bug for all you know. But since 99.99999999999999% of the time, any time you hit the "H" key, you're going to see "h" typed out. And that remaining 0.00---1% of the time you'll probably chalk it up to fat fingering the keyboard

Stochastic processes have very clear causes. They have very clear effects. It simply isn't a *single* effect. There are multiple possible effects prior to the event, but ultimately only a single effect will occur.

Consider a bag full of marbles. Before you reach in, you may have a 90% chance of pulling out a red marble, and a 105 chance of pulling out a blue marble. Those chances are real chances. There are two possible effects. But the cause is clearly you sticking your hand in and picking a marble.

After you have chosen a marble, the prior probabilities are no longer relevant. The fact that you had only a 10% chance to select the blue marble that you hold in your hand doesn't alter the fact that you now have a blue marble with 100% certainty.

This gets into some bayesian stuff, which I have mostly forgotten the mechanics of at this point.

I find it simpler to assume a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Chaotic or random behavior are problems with prediction, not causation. I assume that quantum events are also problems of prediction, and that the quarks are behaving deterministically, but by their own rules, which we have yet to decipher.

Once we assume that perfectly reliable cause and effect are universal, causal necessity becomes a triviality that can be dismissed. It is like a constant that appears on both sides of every equation, and it can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result. For example, if causal necessity excuses the thief who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who cuts off his hand.

Universal causal necessity changes nothing. It has no practical implications to any human scenarios. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.

I think you are using a different meaning of "deterministic" than I understand.

https://www4.stat.ncsu.edu/~gross/BIO560%20webpage/slides/Jan102013.pdf

• In deterministic models, the output of the model is fully determined by the parameter values and the initial conditions.
• Stochastic models possess some inherent randomness. The same set of parameter values and initial conditions will lead to an ensemble of different outputs.

The two processes are discrete. If the universe is deterministic, then no uncertainty of outcome can exist. If uncertainty of outcomes can exist, then the universe is not deterministic.

In case there's any confusion, this is all based around evaluation immediately prior to the moment that the action occurs. After the occurs, the probability collapses to 1, because it did actually occur. Like I said earlier, prior to selecting a marble from the bag, you have a 10% chance of picking a blue one in the future. After you stick your hand in and pull out a blue marble, you have a 100% chance of having selected a blue marble.

 

[Emily Lake]

For the reasons given above, we have the perception of conscious regulative control. The perception of conscious regulative control, as shown in the given examples is an illusion formed by a disconnect (absence of a feedback loop) between the means of experience and the experience itself, which lacks awareness of the underlying production activity.

Of course, once the drive and desire to act is formed, there is no impediment to action;

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

I suspect there is a different pattern for new experiences than for repeated and routine experiences.

Ages ago when I used to do archery, I had the muscle memory down pretty well. I could certainly see that the process of drawing, aiming, breathing, and releasing were essentially calling up a pre-existing program and executing. But when I was first learning to shoot... those were very conscious activities. I had to draw, and evaluate how I was drawing as I did it. Was I drawing to the same reference location each time? Was my hand higher or lower than it should be relative to my cheekbone? Was my elbow high enough? Was I dropping my shoulder? Same with each step. There was a lot of repetition involved in learning to draw a bow properly, so that it became repeatable.

As I understand it, most of what we think of as 'decisions' and 'choices' are actually routine, and don't involve much (if any) executive function. We already made that decision at some point in the past, we don't have to make it again. I have a pair of tan shoes that I wear with my burgundy suit, as long as my shirt doesn't have any black of gray in it. If the shirt has black or gray, I'll wear my black shoes. I only really had to make that decision once, and it probably wasn't even with respect to that burgundy suit. It's based on a pre-existing set of likes and dislikes with respect to style, comfort, and color combinations. I don't wear brown shoes with black clothing or vice versa. I don't wear black or brown shoes with navy, I wear cordovan (preferred) or grey.

But sometimes it takes a little more effort. I have a pair of bright red suede boots that I love. But figuring out when to wear them takes a lot more thought - conscious thought - than most other outfits. They're pretty and I enjoy them, but they're also a bit uncomfortable if I have to do a lot of walking, and because of the particular shade, they clash with a lot of things. So when I have an outfit that I think they'll work with, I have to give actual thought to whether they clash, what my schedule is like that day, and whether I should back a back-up pair of shoes just in case I end up with more meetings than were originally on my calendar.

I also think this process isn't the same for everyone. I'm fairly efficient at decision making, and a good chunk of my professional work requires decision-making - very, very little of it is routine work. My spouse is horrible at decision making. It's difficult for him. Part of it is method. I'm really good at identifying and removing things that aren't material or are irrelevant, and I'm quick to spot the "no" options and then ignore them. He... isn't.

When we pick out jelly, for example, he ends up giving thought and consideration to every flavor up there, as well as brand, and consistency, and I don't honestly know what else. I do know, however, that he doesn't do a first pass the way I do. I will give it all a glance and pretty much exclude the stuff I know I'm not interested in. I don't like strawberry or grape jam, I only like marmalades in small doses, definitely don't want mint unless I'm having lamb, etc. I prefer tart flavors to sweet, so I tend to exclude blueberry and cherry unless it specifies 'tart cherry'. I also prefer to avoid large brands that use corn syrup, and if I can find a local or small-batch option, I'll go with those. So I can limit my universe of options to about a half a dozen jellies & jams in the matter of moments. That's almost all routine execution of pre-exiting preference sets. Then it's a matter of "what do I think sounds best, and do I really care?". There's a point where the difference between plum jam and blackberry preserves just doesn't matter much, so it's whichever jar is prettier, or which one I can reach without assistance, or whatever random influence swings me to one rather than another. It takes me about thirty seconds to pick out a jelly. There've been times he has spent fifteen minutes in the aisle trying to make a selection.

 

[Emily Lake]

The only true freedom within a determined system would be the possibility to have done otherwise within any moment in time. But of course determinism does no allow multiple selections at any moment in time, and this essentially kills the possibility of free will.

Feelings can be deceptive. We simply have ''will.''

Will is not free.

The bolded has been my largest objection to determinism, and also why I end up pretty waffly on compatibilism. Determinism and agency are at odds with one another unless determinism gets redefined to allow for stochasticism.

I think a stochastic existence can be compatible with agency, but I don't think that a deterministic existence can be. That's why a lot of my arguments end up based not on the endless argument over what 'will' is and whether it's 'free' or what extent of 'freedom' it has... but on whether or not the assumption of determinism makes sense in the first place.

 

[none]

I find it simpler to assume a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Chaotic or random behavior are problems with prediction, not causation. I assume that quantum events are also problems of prediction, and that the quarks are behaving deterministically, but by their own rules, which we have yet to decipher.

Once we assume that perfectly reliable cause and effect are universal, causal necessity becomes a triviality that can be dismissed. It is like a constant that appears on both sides of every equation, and it can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result. For example, if causal necessity excuses the thief who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who cuts off his hand.

Universal causal necessity changes nothing. It has no practical implications to any human scenarios. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.

I think you are using a different meaning of "deterministic" than I understand.

https://www4.stat.ncsu.edu/~gross/BIO560%20webpage/slides/Jan102013.pdf

• In deterministic models, the output of the model is fully determined by the parameter values and the initial conditions.
• Stochastic models possess some inherent randomness. The same set of parameter values and initial conditions will lead to an ensemble of different outputs.

The two processes are discrete. If the universe is deterministic, then no uncertainty of outcome can exist. If uncertainty of outcomes can exist, then the universe is not deterministic.

In case there's any confusion, this is all based around evaluation immediately prior to the moment that the action occurs. After the occurs, the probability collapses to 1, because it did actually occur. Like I said earlier, prior to selecting a marble from the bag, you have a 10% chance of picking a blue one in the future. After you stick your hand in and pull out a blue marble, you have a 100% chance of having selected a blue marble.

Emily, that example is qualified by immediacy.
If I can recall block time was brought up very early on in this thread.
To me, the "push the button research" indicates that prior to the event the probability was already fixed.

 

[Emily Lake]

I think you are using a different meaning of "deterministic" than I understand.

https://www4.stat.ncsu.edu/~gross/BIO560%20webpage/slides/Jan102013.pdf


The two processes are discrete. If the universe is deterministic, then no uncertainty of outcome can exist. If uncertainty of outcomes can exist, then the universe is not deterministic.

In case there's any confusion, this is all based around evaluation immediately prior to the moment that the action occurs. After the occurs, the probability collapses to 1, because it did actually occur. Like I said earlier, prior to selecting a marble from the bag, you have a 10% chance of picking a blue one in the future. After you stick your hand in and pull out a blue marble, you have a 100% chance of having selected a blue marble.

Emily, that example is qualified by immediacy.
If I can recall block time was bright up very early on in this thread.
To me, the "push the button research" indicates that prior to the event the probability was already fixed.

I confess to laziness, and not wanting to wade through the chaff to find the wheat for this. Could you expand on what you mean?

 

[none]

I don't even know the purpose of the experiment and can't recall the names.
But from what I read maybe 2 years ago...
There was an experiment, an exercise...
They took this guy and hooked wires to his brain.
Told him to push buttons, either red or blue.
After a while they figured out they could tell which button he was going to push at least 20 seconds before the push.
To the guy he didn't know which button he was going to push until he pushed it.

 

[Jarhyn]

It makes no difference if "'freedom' is exercised before awareness" as noted in your excerpt from the abstract. If the choice is made unconsciously, and then presented to awareness as a dinner already cooked, then the choosing is still being performed by that same brain. And the only explanation we have for the choice is how it is described by the conscious experience of events, the part of the brain that Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", the part that explains our behavior to ourselves and others.

So, if deciding what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, is happening consciously or unconsciously, it makes no difference. Free will is not freedom from one's own brain. That's an impossible freedom. Free will is a question of whether the decision making performed by that brain is free of coercion and undue influence.

As the abstract notes, neuroscience is studying how volition works. Volition is will. Will is chosen. Hopefully, neuroscience will continue to increase our understanding of how the brain performs this function. But explaining how something works does not "explain it away", it simply explains how it works.

The notion of "free will" references both internal (mental health) and external (coercion) influences upon our process of choosing what we will do. The neuroscientist provides information to the psychiatrist as to any physical causes behind a mental illness. The psychiatrist addresses mental illness due to both physical and psychological factors.

In any case, free will remains what it has always been, choosing what we will do when free of coercion and undue influence.

But within a deterministic system there is no actual ''freedom is exercised before awareness'' either. Some use that figure of speech to convey the meaning that the results are determined before awareness, that it is not consciousness itself that processes information and produces response.

Freedom simply means the attributes and abilities of a brain to perform its function according to architecture, inputs and memory.

The same freedom that a planet orbits a star, water cascades down a gorge, the same freedom that trees grow and birds fly.... abilities that have nothing to do with 'will' or 'free will.'


For compatibilism to select behaviour that is uncoerced, unforced, and call this an example of 'free will' fails for that reason.

The only true freedom within a determined system would be the possibility to have done otherwise within any moment in time. But of course determinism does no allow multiple selections at any moment in time, and this essentially kills the possibility of free will.

Feelings can be deceptive. We simply have ''will.''

Will is not free.

It kills the possibility of "having done differently". But compatibilism does not place "having done differently" as the meter of "free will".

Rather, it places free will as a function of executive contribution in a different consideration of the model of ethics: free will is not the ability to do differently in this framework, but rather the ability to, of various probabilistic outcomes arising from imperfection of physical mode, having available a means to compare and contrast what would happen, probably, "if A" versus "if !A"

Choosing then is a function of whether (then, of 'if->then") from the relationship is (down/towards goal) or (not down/towards goal). It is a function of simulation and assumption based on model.

There was, given the consideration, a single choice made on the basis of factors. Could the graph have chosen differently? No. No more than f(x)=1+X has any choice of grinding out 2 given x=1.

Really, free will becomes an element of the discussion of executive function, which is to say "in the reference frame of an event, what is the executive agency?"

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It makes no difference if "'freedom' is exercised before awareness" as noted in your excerpt from the abstract. If the choice is made unconsciously, and then presented to awareness as a dinner already cooked, then the choosing is still being performed by that same brain. And the only explanation we have for the choice is how it is described by the conscious experience of events, the part of the brain that Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", the part that explains our behavior to ourselves and others.

So, if deciding what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, is happening consciously or unconsciously, it makes no difference. Free will is not freedom from one's own brain. That's an impossible freedom. Free will is a question of whether the decision making performed by that brain is free of coercion and undue influence.

As the abstract notes, neuroscience is studying how volition works. Volition is will. Will is chosen. Hopefully, neuroscience will continue to increase our understanding of how the brain performs this function. But explaining how something works does not "explain it away", it simply explains how it works.

The notion of "free will" references both internal (mental health) and external (coercion) influences upon our process of choosing what we will do. The neuroscientist provides information to the psychiatrist as to any physical causes behind a mental illness. The psychiatrist addresses mental illness due to both physical and psychological factors.

In any case, free will remains what it has always been, choosing what we will do when free of coercion and undue influence.

But within a deterministic system there is no actual ''freedom is exercised before awareness'' either. Some use that figure of speech to convey the meaning that the results are determined before awareness, that it is not consciousness itself that processes information and produces response.

Freedom simply means the attributes and abilities of a brain to perform its function according to architecture, inputs and memory.

The same freedom that a planet orbits a star, water cascades down a gorge, the same freedom that trees grow and birds fly.... abilities that have nothing to do with 'will' or 'free will.'


For compatibilism to select behaviour that is uncoerced, unforced, and call this an example of 'free will' fails for that reason.

The only true freedom within a determined system would be the possibility to have done otherwise within any moment in time. But of course determinism does no allow multiple selections at any moment in time, and this essentially kills the possibility of free will.

Feelings can be deceptive. We simply have ''will.''

Will is not free.

It kills the possibility of "having done differently". But compatibilism does not place "having done differently" as the meter of "free will".

Rather, it places free will as a function of executive contribution in a different consideration of the model of ethics: free will is not the ability to do differently in this framework, but rather the ability to, of various probabilistic outcomes arising from imperfection of physical mode, having available a means to compare and contrast what would happen, probably, "if A" versus "if !A"

Choosing then is a function of whether (then, of 'if->then") from the relationship is (down/towards goal) or (not down/towards goal). It is a function of simulation and assumption based on model.

There was, given the consideration, a single choice made on the basis of factors. Could the graph have chosen differently? No. No more than f(x)=1+X has any choice of grinding out 2 given x=1.

Really, free will becomes an element of the discussion of executive function, which is to say "in the reference frame of an event, what is the executive agency?"

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The operation is deterministic because the output is a reliable result of our own purposes and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, and any other things that make us uniquely us. So, the choice is not only reliably caused, but it is reliably caused by us.

The "ability to do otherwise" is built into the choosing operation. For example, suppose we need to decide between A and B. In order for the choosing operation to proceed, "I can choose A" must be true and "I can choose B" must also be true. If either of those are false, then choosing cannot proceed. For example, if "I can choose A" is false then we would simply do B, without any choosing. And, if "I can choose B" is false, then we would simply do A. So, before we can get to the comparative evaluation phase of the operation, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true, by logical necessity (they are required by the operation).

Whenever "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true, then I have the "ability to do otherwise".

Suppose the result of the comparison is that I choose A. Then A becomes the thing I will do and B becomes the thing that I could have done, but didn't do. Why is "I could have done B" true? Because "I can choose B" was true earlier, and "could have" is just the past tense of "can".

So, as it turns out, in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" is ALWAYS true. It is "I would have done otherwise" that is ALWAYS false.

It is an error to confuse "can" and "will". If something will happen, then it certainly will happen. But if something can happen, then it may happen, or, it may never happen. What "can" happen constrains what "will" happen, because if it cannot happen then it will not happen. But what will happen never constrains what can happen. What can happen is only constrained by the imagination.

Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. However, in order to build an actual bridge, we must first imagine one or more possible bridges.

The fact that a possibility will not happen does not make it an impossibility. It only makes it a possibility that never happened.

 

[none]

It kills the possibility of "having done differently". But compatibilism does not place "having done differently" as the meter of "free will".

Rather, it places free will as a function of executive contribution in a different consideration of the model of ethics: free will is not the ability to do differently in this framework, but rather the ability to, of various probabilistic outcomes arising from imperfection of physical mode, having available a means to compare and contrast what would happen, probably, "if A" versus "if !A"

Choosing then is a function of whether (then, of 'if->then") from the relationship is (down/towards goal) or (not down/towards goal). It is a function of simulation and assumption based on model.

There was, given the consideration, a single choice made on the basis of factors. Could the graph have chosen differently? No. No more than f(x)=1+X has any choice of grinding out 2 given x=1.

Really, free will becomes an element of the discussion of executive function, which is to say "in the reference frame of an event, what is the executive agency?"

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The operation is deterministic because the output is a reliable result of our own purposes and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, and any other things that make us uniquely us. So, the choice is not only reliably caused, but it is reliably caused by us.

The "ability to do otherwise" is built into the choosing operation. For example, suppose we need to decide between A and B. In order for the choosing operation to proceed, "I can choose A" must be true and "I can choose B" must also be true. If either of those are false, then choosing cannot proceed. For example, if "I can choose A" is false then we would simply do B, without any choosing. And, if "I can choose B" is false, then we would simply do A. So, before we can get to the comparative evaluation phase of the operation, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true, by logical necessity (they are required by the operation).

Whenever "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" are both true, then I have the "ability to do otherwise".

Suppose the result of the comparison is that I choose A. Then A becomes the thing I will do and B becomes the thing that I could have done, but didn't do. Why is "I could have done B" true? Because "I can choose B" was true earlier, and "could have" is just the past tense of "can".

So, as it turns out, in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" is ALWAYS true. It is "I would have done otherwise" that is ALWAYS false.

It is an error to confuse "can" and "will". If something will happen, then it certainly will happen. But if something can happen, then it may happen, or, it may never happen. What "can" happen constrains what "will" happen, because if it cannot happen then it will not happen. But what will happen never constrains what can happen. What can happen is only constrained by the imagination.

Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. However, in order to build an actual bridge, we must first imagine one or more possible bridges.

The fact that a possibility will not happen does not make it an impossibility. It only makes it a possibility that never happened.

OK, preform the basic function of your assessment.
Use your imagination..
Put it out there, perform a physics motion test.
Produce a possibility that will not happen.