Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

Causal necessity is a useful model to understand philosophically. It is exactly the principle we engineers use to make solid statements about "what happened" and infer where bugs arise from.

Causal necessity tells you nothing more than "something caused this". All of the useful information comes from knowing the specific causes of specific effects. Only the specific causes and their effects can tell us "what happened".

Causal necessity is a fulcrum. It says when a piece of memory is changed without a write operation that some unintended or unmapped physical effect operated within the system. Or that a write happened but misbehaved for explainable reasons.

Both sides of that fulcrum are equally causal necessitated. Causal necessity itself gives you no clue as to which is the case. Causal necessity is like a constant that always appears on both sides of every equation, and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result.

For example, if we excuse the pickpocket because his crime was causally necessary, then we must also excuse the cruel judge who chops off his hand. All events are always equally causally necessary.

Causal necessity necessitates that my shape is a part of cause, too, and since I cause my own shape, I have some manner of free will.

Okay, that's sounds a bit mystical to me. Could you provide an example?

I can play a video game. I can play the same game three times and make different decisions in all of them. Three different instances of the same fundamental universal architecture, three different results.

But you are different each time, because you've learned from prior experience.

You could hook it up to a dice roller, and get different results every time.

Or, you could use "loaded dice" and get the same result every time.

Some things are determined. Some things aren't.

What you mean to say is that some events are predictable, some are not. Causal necessity says that every event is reliably caused, even if it is difficult or impossible to predict.

It's exactly the flexibility of determination versus probability collapse that gives this weird dichotomy in that the real universe appears semi-deterministic.

The appearance of "semi-deterministic" is due to the difficulty of predicting some events, such as the roll of dice. But science would assert that every event has a cause. That's what motivates science to look for the cause, because they assume there is one.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

 

[bilby]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

Physical entropy is universal, with decreasing entropy only possible as a strictly local phenomenon in the context of universally increasing entropy.

A black hole has the maximum possible entropy for an object of its size, as all arrangements of matter within a black hole are indistinguishable from all other arrangements, to an observer outside the event horizon.

The idea that black holes spawn new universes is wild speculation, and almost certainly untrue; Rather their ultimate fate is to evaporate by Hawking Radiation.

The total entropy of the universe always increases (or at least, it has since as far back in time as our current physics can determine). It's probable that in a very real sense, time exists only because of an entropy gradient from past to future, so it's not meaningful to talk about 'before' the universe was at its lowest entropy state - because all higher entropy states are necessarily in the future of any lower entropy states for closed systems such as universes.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

Physical entropy is universal, with decreasing entropy only possible as a strictly local phenomenon in the context of universally increasing entropy.

A black hole has the maximum possible entropy for an object of its size, as all arrangements of matter within a black hole are indistinguishable from all other arrangements, to an observer outside the event horizon.

The idea that black holes spawn new universes is wild speculation, and almost certainly untrue; Rather their ultimate fate is to evaporate by Hawking Radiation.

The total entropy of the universe always increases (or at least, it has since as far back in time as our current physics can determine). It's probable that in a very real sense, time exists only because of an entropy gradient from past to future, so it's not meaningful to talk about 'before' the universe was at its lowest entropy state - therefore all higher entropy states are necessarily in the future of any lower entropy states for closed systems such as universes.

To both of you, as I explained to my boss who had the same issue, entropy here is a mathematical property, not a strictly physical one. Imagine a board with a grid of arrows on the lid, all on pivots. You can turn any arrow. Out of the sides, all around along the middle is a slot which another arrow extends from.

The arrow from the slot, splitting the box like a hamburger, is exactly the combined directions of all the other arrows.

The big arrow is the "macrostate". The small arrows are the "microstate". The entropy of the system is the magnitude of the macrostate arrow.

If all the little arrows point in the same direction, the big arrow will point far as can. There is little entropy.

If they are all in different directions, the big arrow will be short and face wildly with any turn of a small arrow. There is much entropy.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Nobody is arguing against the ability to be conscious of the world and to think and act in response to its objects and events. We can think and we can act. The issue is how that ability is achieved....a question of the nature of cognition and action within a determined system.

It seems pretty clear. The person is faced with a decision, they consider their options and choose the one that seems best at that time. Neuroscience can help to explain what is going on inside the brain at each of these steps. But neuroscience never contradicts the fact that it is our own brains (us) that is making the decision.

Simply defining free will as the ability to act according to ones will is insufficient for the given reasons,

Free will is not "the ability to act according to our will". Free will is our ability to choose our will, to causally determine what our will becomes, by choosing a specific intention. Our chosen intent is expressed as "I will do this". And that chosen intent causally determines, by motivating and directing our subsequent actions, specifically what we will do.

the world acts upon the agent, the brain is inseparable from the world

I'm sorry but that is a contradiction. If the brain is "inseparable" from the world then the world cannot act upon the brain. In order for one thing to act upon another, there must be a distinction between the two things.

What I believe you are saying is that the agent and the rest of the world are two separate objects. And you are claiming that only the rest of the world has any agency, while the agent (ironically) has no agency.

and it is this deterministic action upon the brain that governs thought and action.

And it turns out that is precisely what you are saying. The world, excluding our own brain, is forcing the brain to do the will of the rest of the world, leaving the brain with no will of its own.

I'm pretty sure you, and any other philosopher or scientist who makes such a claim, is mistaken about that.

And, you guessed it, once will is formed deterministically there is nothing prevents the action that follows if that action is determined. Not only is the following action not impeded, it freely progresses as determined.

We don't know that we will be free to perform the action we've chosen. The freedom to carry out our will is a separate issue from the freedom to decide what we will do. I may decide that I will do a swan dive, and you may come from behind and push me off the diving board.

This form of freedom of motion or action applies to all things, animals act unimpeded according to their nature, etc. necessitated actions not being the result of freely willed processes.

Except that I could come from behind and push an actual swan off of the diving board, frustrating whatever he had decided to do.

The anatomy of movement:
''Almost all of behavior involves motor function, from talking to gesturing to walking. But even a simple movement like reaching out to pick up a glass of water can be a complex motor task to study. Not only does your brain have to figure out which muscles to contract and in which order to steer your hand to the glass, it also has to estimate the force needed to pick up the glass. Other factors, like how much water is in the glass and what material the glass is made from, also influence the brains calculations. Not surprisingly, there are many anatomical regions which are involved in motor function.''

In other words, the brain performs a number of habitual calculations when picking up the glass of water. That will happen beneath conscious awareness. But suppose he has just been called upon to speak for the first time, and he must decide whether he has time or not to take a drink of water. That kind of choice will include conscious decision making and the formation of explanations. Habits are fast. Conscious decision-making is slower, because there is more work to be done.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

We can't create causal indeterminism. You have that cart before the horse. To be indeterministic is to have an outcome unbound to the observable state.

To be semi-deterministic is to have a bounded outcome, but only "bounded" and the value within that bound "random", which is exactly to say, "if you were to take out the dice right now and switch them, the system rolling would not be able to model or predict, in fact with mathematically certain unpredictability, that this happened.

This more or less describes our current understanding of the universe.

I am not saying that for us and things like us to exist that any causal indeterminism is actually necessary. Perhaps we can predict and model the most "random" thing that ever seemed random down to not-even-chaos!

But I have described semi-deterministic systems and this universe strongly qualifies.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

To be indeterministic is to have an outcome unbound to the observable state.

That still sounds like a problem of prediction. (It sounds like you're saying that the outcome is unobservable).

To be semi-deterministic is to have a bounded outcome, but only "bounded" and the value within that bound "random", which is exactly to say, "if you were to take out the dice right now and switch them, the system rolling would not be able to model or predict, in fact with mathematically certain unpredictability, that this happened.

I'm not sure, but I think you're saying that all events are causally bounded, including random events. If that's the case then I agree. Both random and chaotic events are causally deterministic but still epistemologically indeterministic (unpredictable).

This more or less describes our current understanding of the universe.

Right. Our understanding of the universe is incomplete, in that we cannot yet explain why certain events happen (e.g., quantum events).

I am not saying that for us and things like us to exist that any causal indeterminism is actually necessary. Perhaps we can predict and model the most "random" thing that ever seemed random down to not-even-chaos!

Perhaps. But my religiously held belief is that there is no causal indeterminism to be found anywhere, despite the fact that the causes of many events remain a mystery to us.

But I have described semi-deterministic systems and this universe strongly qualifies.

And I would say that all events are causally determined even though what actually causes many events is not yet determined, and may never be.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

Physical entropy is universal, with decreasing entropy only possible as a strictly local phenomenon in the context of universally increasing entropy.

A black hole has the maximum possible entropy for an object of its size, as all arrangements of matter within a black hole are indistinguishable from all other arrangements, to an observer outside the event horizon.

The idea that black holes spawn new universes is wild speculation, and almost certainly untrue; Rather their ultimate fate is to evaporate by Hawking Radiation.

The total entropy of the universe always increases (or at least, it has since as far back in time as our current physics can determine). It's probable that in a very real sense, time exists only because of an entropy gradient from past to future, so it's not meaningful to talk about 'before' the universe was at its lowest entropy state - because all higher entropy states are necessarily in the future of any lower entropy states for closed systems such as universes.

My impression is that the description of the state of the universe prior to the Big Bang corresponds closely to the description of black holes. In both cases we have a lot of stuff packed in a small space.

If we presume we are in the middle of eternity (where else in time would we be?), then the notion of universal entropy would have vanished the universe by now because 1/2 of eternity equals eternity. If an eternity has already passed, then everything that is going to vanish via entropy would already be gone by now.

A second argument is that, if it is impossible for something to come out of nothing, then it should also be impossible for something to turn into nothing.

So, I'm pretty sure that universal entropy must be incorrect.

 

[bilby]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

Physical entropy is universal, with decreasing entropy only possible as a strictly local phenomenon in the context of universally increasing entropy.

A black hole has the maximum possible entropy for an object of its size, as all arrangements of matter within a black hole are indistinguishable from all other arrangements, to an observer outside the event horizon.

The idea that black holes spawn new universes is wild speculation, and almost certainly untrue; Rather their ultimate fate is to evaporate by Hawking Radiation.

The total entropy of the universe always increases (or at least, it has since as far back in time as our current physics can determine). It's probable that in a very real sense, time exists only because of an entropy gradient from past to future, so it's not meaningful to talk about 'before' the universe was at its lowest entropy state - therefore all higher entropy states are necessarily in the future of any lower entropy states for closed systems such as universes.

To both of you, as I explained to my boss who had the same issue, entropy here is a mathematical property, not a strictly physical one. Imagine a board with a grid of arrows on the lid, all on pivots. You can turn any arrow. Out of the sides, all around along the middle is a slot which another arrow extends from.

The arrow from the slot, splitting the box like a hamburger, is exactly the combined directions of all the other arrows.

The big arrow is the "macrostate". The small arrows are the "microstate". The entropy of the system is the magnitude of the macrostate arrow.

If all the little arrows point in the same direction, the big arrow will point far as can. There is little entropy.

If they are all in different directions, the big arrow will be short and face wildly with any turn of a small arrow. There is much entropy.

Obviously entropy is both physical and mathematical.

Equally obviously, your claim that it's mathematical is poorly supported by your use of a physical model as your analogy.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

Physical entropy is universal, with decreasing entropy only possible as a strictly local phenomenon in the context of universally increasing entropy.

A black hole has the maximum possible entropy for an object of its size, as all arrangements of matter within a black hole are indistinguishable from all other arrangements, to an observer outside the event horizon.

The idea that black holes spawn new universes is wild speculation, and almost certainly untrue; Rather their ultimate fate is to evaporate by Hawking Radiation.

The total entropy of the universe always increases (or at least, it has since as far back in time as our current physics can determine). It's probable that in a very real sense, time exists only because of an entropy gradient from past to future, so it's not meaningful to talk about 'before' the universe was at its lowest entropy state - because all higher entropy states are necessarily in the future of any lower entropy states for closed systems such as universes.

My impression is that the description of the state of the universe prior to the Big Bang corresponds closely to the description of black holes. In both cases we have a lot of stuff packed in a small space.

If we presume we are in the middle of eternity (where else in time would we be?), then the notion of universal entropy would have vanished the universe by now because 1/2 of eternity equals eternity. If an eternity has already passed, then everything that is going to vanish via entropy would already be gone by now.

A second argument is that, if it is impossible for something to come out of nothing, then it should also be impossible for something to turn into nothing.

So, I'm pretty sure that universal entropy must be incorrect.

I don't make claims of the properties of nothing. To do so is idiocy as it is not possible for us to observe it.

I spend hours staring into the void, and rather than getting nothing, I get a lot of something. Madness mostly. But not even the void itself gives "nothing".

I make claims, instead, of the properties of something, namely systems with particular architectural models. When a system is set in such a way as to either start executing on chaos or randomness as the case may be, and either way opaque to the operation within the system, it is an indeterministic element.

It does not imply that the universe in operation can be different, any less inevitable from what it is, and part of it is most certainly us, and we are a part of whatever causal necessity that exists of it, be it semi-deterministic in basic platform or merely semi-deterministic for philosophical purposes of internal actors; the possible ways that particles can come together from certain configurations in the conditions of the universe have rules that will drive a more steady-state chaos into the universe over time.

In many ways causal necessity may be simulated by something that has none but rules of probability; and then the rules of large numbers that come out of the probabilistics drive certainties, deterministic activities. These deterministic activities them create chaos, and the chaos then simulates... Probabilistics!

At some point all this probability and determinism from statistical certainty mushed together to create a system that models the probabilistics into determinations!

The whole thing is fucking bonkers.

It took 14 billion "years" for that to happen following a certain epoch of matter being capable of organizing in a particular way (mostly).

And we don't know what determines the sequence of a "locus", or if it can be known!

 

[bilby]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

Physical entropy is universal, with decreasing entropy only possible as a strictly local phenomenon in the context of universally increasing entropy.

A black hole has the maximum possible entropy for an object of its size, as all arrangements of matter within a black hole are indistinguishable from all other arrangements, to an observer outside the event horizon.

The idea that black holes spawn new universes is wild speculation, and almost certainly untrue; Rather their ultimate fate is to evaporate by Hawking Radiation.

The total entropy of the universe always increases (or at least, it has since as far back in time as our current physics can determine). It's probable that in a very real sense, time exists only because of an entropy gradient from past to future, so it's not meaningful to talk about 'before' the universe was at its lowest entropy state - because all higher entropy states are necessarily in the future of any lower entropy states for closed systems such as universes.

My impression is that the description of the state of the universe prior to the Big Bang corresponds closely to the description of black holes. In both cases we have a lot of stuff packed in a small space.

If we presume we are in the middle of eternity (where else in time would we be?), then the notion of universal entropy would have vanished the universe by now because 1/2 of eternity equals eternity. If an eternity has already passed, then everything that is going to vanish via entropy would already be gone by now.

A second argument is that, if it is impossible for something to come out of nothing, then it should also be impossible for something to turn into nothing.

So, I'm pretty sure that universal entropy must be incorrect.

Entropy doesn't make things vanish. The second law of thermodynamics is completely consistent with the first law.

The early universe had very low entropy; If it didn't, we would see similar unpredictability in the past to that we see in the future - that is, the present would, as a consequence of the time symmetry of physical law, represent the low point of entropy, with disorder increasing in both temporal directions.

The total mass of the pre-inflation universe could be very low, and inflation theory suggests it might have been as low as ten kg, but with a uniformly metastable Higgs value of zero; The rest of the mass we see comes from the vast energy released from the Higgs field as it falls to its minimum, bringing to an end the inflationary period. It's basically extracted from all the spacetime that's generated by inflation. The most striking feature of Higgs fields is that they have energy minima at non-zero values.

That's highly counterintuitive, but has now been demonstrated experimentally at CERN.

Just ten kg of matter with a fairly consistent Higgs field value of zero, falling to the lower energy state implied by a non-zero value, would suffice to generate a universe of the mass-energy we observe today.

This may be happening repeatedly, with new universes budding off our own (and others) due to random fluctuations in the Higgs field.

Cosmology is weird (it has to be to be consistent with the quantum nature of reality); But any philosophy that assumes as a premise a cosmology other than that described by physics is simply wrong.

Reality is, as far as we can tell, indeterministic at a fundamental level; And dependent on a universal spacetime entropy gradient for the existence of an arrow of time.

 

[fromderinside]

I think your bigger issue is that you are not understanding my point. Yes, you can say "just so" determinism as a preloaded set of dice rolls, but that does not change the fact that local entities cannot model the deterministic pattern. In fact, the deterministic "pattern" may have far more complexity in it than even the internal action of the universe may be capable of expressing.

Yes. While prediction is "theoretically" possible in a deterministic system, it is often practically impossible to predict what will happen next in a complex deterministic system. "Determine" has two distinct meanings, "to know" and "to cause". For example, "We could not determine (figure out, know) whether it was the increase in pressure or the increase heat that determined (triggered, caused) when the reaction would take place".

So, often reality is indeterministic, in that we are unable to know, even if it is perfectly deterministic in causation.

The entropy on the determination can be higher than the entropy expressible within the framework itself.

Entropy. Argh. As I understand entropy, it is the tendency of order to disintegrate. Information entropy would destroy information by the increase in chaotic static over time. At least that's what I get from Wikipedia. On the other hand, physical entropy would have to be a local phenomena, because eventually everything that exists would be swallowed up into black holes (Big Crunch) that would later explode (Big Bang) into another universe in which new objects are reliably formed.

In this way, for all intents and purposes for the denizens, this is a global "indeterminism": It is just-so and there is no derivable sense of it.

Yes, many events appear to be unpredictable.

Of course, chaotic systems simulate this, and we exist on the level of scale by which such chaotic inputs become functionally indeterministic anyway.

Yeah, what you said.

Remember that these discussions rely on perspective, context, and locality.

Well, being a young, idealistic, senior citizen, I still hold out for the ability to translate concepts across perspectives. And, that is the main occupation of a compatibilist.

It is the fact that it is "just so" from the perspective of the denizen that creates the indeterminism.

I don't think we can create causal indeterminism. To create means to cause something. To cause something means to determine it. It would be paradoxical to reliably cause unreliable causation. But we do manage to confuse things a lot, helping to make things less predictable.

Physical entropy is universal, with decreasing entropy only possible as a strictly local phenomenon in the context of universally increasing entropy.

A black hole has the maximum possible entropy for an object of its size, as all arrangements of matter within a black hole are indistinguishable from all other arrangements, to an observer outside the event horizon.

The idea that black holes spawn new universes is wild speculation, and almost certainly untrue; Rather their ultimate fate is to evaporate by Hawking Radiation.

The total entropy of the universe always increases (or at least, it has since as far back in time as our current physics can determine). It's probable that in a very real sense, time exists only because of an entropy gradient from past to future, so it's not meaningful to talk about 'before' the universe was at its lowest entropy state - because all higher entropy states are necessarily in the future of any lower entropy states for closed systems such as universes.

My impression is that the description of the state of the universe prior to the Big Bang corresponds closely to the description of black holes. In both cases we have a lot of stuff packed in a small space.

If we presume we are in the middle of eternity (where else in time would we be?), then the notion of universal entropy would have vanished the universe by now because 1/2 of eternity equals eternity. If an eternity has already passed, then everything that is going to vanish via entropy would already be gone by now.

A second argument is that, if it is impossible for something to come out of nothing, then it should also be impossible for something to turn into nothing.

So, I'm pretty sure that universal entropy must be incorrect.

Entropy doesn't make things vanish. The second law of thermodynamics is completely consistent with the first law.

The early universe had very low entropy; If it didn't, we would see similar unpredictability in the past to that we see in the future - that is, the present would, as a consequence of the time symmetry of physical law, represent the low point of entropy, with disorder increasing in both temporal directions.

The total mass of the pre-inflation universe could be very low, and inflation theory suggests it might have been as low as ten kg, but with a uniformly metastable Higgs value of zero; The rest of the mass we see comes from the vast energy released from the Higgs field as it falls to its minimum, bringing to an end the inflationary period. It's basically extracted from all the spacetime that's generated by inflation. The most striking feature of Higgs fields is that they have energy minima at non-zero values.

That's highly counterintuitive, but has now been demonstrated experimentally at CERN.

Just ten kg of matter with a fairly consistent Higgs field value of zero, falling to the lower energy state implied by a non-zero value, would suffice to generate a universe of the mass-energy we observe today.

This may be happening repeatedly, with new universes budding off our own (and others) due to random fluctuations in the Higgs field.

Cosmology is weird (it has to be to be consistent with the quantum nature of reality); But any philosophy that assumes as a premise a cosmology other than that described by physics is simply wrong.

Reality is, as far as we can tell, indeterministic at a fundamental level; And dependent on a universal spacetime entropy gradient for the existence of an arrow of time.

Tick Talk! The arrow shot into the air came down everywhere.

 

[DBT]

Choice means realizable options. Determinism doesn't allow options, only what is determined. Within a determined system, choice is an illusion.

I can show you people walking into a restaurant and browsing through an actual menu of realizable options. If you wish to test whether any of those options are realizable, just sit down and place an order. When the waiter brings you the meal, are you having an illusion? Or do you pick up your fork and start eating?

With a little thought, we can also demonstrate that all of these events were reliably caused. My invitation caused you to walk into the restaurant. Your desire to see whether the items on the menu were truly "realizable options" caused you to order the cheese burger, and then the salad, and then the apple pie. You only stopped because the waiter brought you the bill, holding you responsible for your orders, and you ran out of cash.

So, we have choosing actually happening, right in front of us. And, we have reliable causation actually happening, also right in front of us.

Since we found none of the illusions that you claimed exist, we must conclude that your assertion is the only real illusion here.

Determinism does not make choosing an illusion. Determinism makes choosing inevitable.

Nobody is arguing against the ability to be conscious of the world and to think and act in response to its objects and events. We can think and we can act. The issue is how that ability is achieved....a question of the nature of cognition and action within a determined system.

Simply defining free will as the ability to act according to ones will is insufficient for the given reasons, the world acts upon the agent, the brain is inseparable from the world, and it is this deterministic action upon the brain that governs thought and action.

And, you guessed it, once will is formed deterministically there is nothing prevents the action that follows if that action is determined. Not only is the following action not impeded, it freely progresses as determined.

This form of freedom of motion or action applies to all things, animals act unimpeded according to their nature, etc. necessitated actions not being the result of freely willed processes.


The anatomy of movement:
''Almost all of behavior involves motor function, from talking to gesturing to walking. But even a simple movement like reaching out to pick up a glass of water can be a complex motor task to study. Not only does your brain have to figure out which muscles to contract and in which order to steer your hand to the glass, it also has to estimate the force needed to pick up the glass. Other factors, like how much water is in the glass and what material the glass is made from, also influence the brains calculations. Not surprisingly, there are many anatomical regions which are involved in motor function.''

Who said that I was a hard determinist?

Are you suggesting you're not?

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism

Hard determinism (or metaphysical determinism) is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist.

I said that I am arguing against the concept of free will. Compatibilism argues that free will is compatible with determinism. I argue that it is not.

If a Libertarian came along, I would argue against Libertarian free will.

 

[DBT]

I wonder if DBT or other hard determinists make a distinction between the following:

A quantum experiment in which “spin up” is registered instead of “spin down.”

A rock rolling down a hill.

A maniac running amok and killing a bunch of strangers.

A man being forced to drive his hijacked car at gunpoint by a criminal.

My choosing eggs instead of pancakes this morning for breakfast.

Who said that I was a hard determinist? The issue is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism....giving their definition of free will as, essentially, acting according to one's will without restriction or impediment.

The validity of this definition is questioned by incompatibilists. I argue on the side of incompatibilism for the given reasons

Basically -''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X'' - so the action that follows is inevitable for all things that happen within a determined system. Nothing to do with free will, therefore the term is merely a semantic construct.

If you are an incompatibilist, you are either a hard determinist or a libertarian. Both believe free will is incompatible with determinism. The difference is that the hard determinist rejects free will, whereas the libertarian rejects determinism, or at least rejects the idea that determinism affects human choices. Since you obviously are not a libertarian but are an incompatibilist, it follows you are a hard determinist by definition.

I wonder if you would explain what difference, if any, you see between the five choices that I gave?

I also wonder if you would address the idea that in any given situation, given identical antecedent events, a person would not have done differently, as opposed to could not have done differently. You go for the latter and I go for the former. The distinction, I think, is crucial.

The concept of free will is problematic, be a matter of determinism or indeterminism.

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore, indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

Where is freedom of will without regulative control? Actions within the system simply flow deterministically.

Where is freedom of will to be found in random or probabilistic events? Events that simply happen without agency, control or being willed.

 

[DBT]

... The issue is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism....giving their definition of free will as, essentially, acting according to one's will without restriction or impediment.

Free will is not about being free to carry out one's will. Free will is about a person being free to choose for themselves what they will do.

Again, ''free to choose'' implies realizable alternatives. Realizable alternatives do not exist within a determined system. The action that is taken is the only action possible in any given moment in time.

The brain processes information and it is that information that acts upon its networks to produce the action that is taken in any given instance;

Cognition:
''When it comes to the human brain, even the simplest of acts can be counter-intuitive and deceptively complicated. For example, try stretching your arm.

Nerves in the limb send messages back to your brain, but the subjective experience you have of stretching isn't due to these signals. The feeling that you willed your arm into motion, and the realisation that you moved it at all, are both the result of an area at the back of your brain called the posterior parietal cortex.

This region helped to produce the intention to move, and predicted what the movement would feel like, all before you twitched a single muscle.

Michel Desmurget and a team of French neuroscientists arrived at this conclusion by stimulating the brains of seven people with electrodes, while they underwent brain surgery under local anaesthetic.

When Desmurget stimulated the parietal cortex, the patients felt a strong desire to move their arms, hands, feet or lips, although they never actually did. Stronger currents cast a powerful illusion, convincing the patients that they had actually moved, even though recordings of electrical activity in their muscles said otherwise.

A person's "will" is very different from a person's "needs" or "desires". Our needs and desires are not chosen. But our will to act upon a desire is chosen. And the specific means by which we satisfy our needs is also chosen. This is why a person is held responsible for their deliberate acts, because they chose to do it.

They were not forced to do it. They did not do it accidentally. And they were of sound mind when they made the choice.

So, their choosing to do it was the final responsible prior cause of the behavior. And if their behavior was harmful, such that we want to prevent it from happening again, then our methods of correction will involve changing how they think about such choices in the future. This correction will normally involve both penalty and rehabilitation.

Brain activity is not willed, information is processed and behaviour generated in the form of thoughts and actions.

Will is an aspect of needs and wants. There is rarely a singular undivided will. There are many scattered and contradictory sets of will, each need or want being an article of will, which may be in conflict with other article of will;

The taste of chocolate generates the will to eat chocolate, perhaps to excess. Then the will to keep slim and healthy forms the will to abstain from eating chocolate, and we have a conflict of wills, one driving the desire to eat, the other in opposition, the will or desire to abstain.

No. The notion of free will, unlike universal causal necessity/inevitability, is an essential concept:

Free will distinguishes a deliberate act, from a forced act, an accidental act, or an insane act. This locates the responsible cause of the behavior so that we know which methods to use to correct it. This is a very important distinction, because using the wrong methods of correction are likely to backfire. For example, we want to correct an insane act by psychiatric treatment and we want to correct a coerced act by holding the guy with the gun responsible rather than the victim of coercion.

That's a matter of rationally identifying the elements a problem and responding accordingly. The situation itself determines the best course of action according to the information we have available to us at the time.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I said that I am arguing against the concept of free will. Compatibilism argues that free will is compatible with determinism. I argue that it is not.
If a Libertarian came along, I would argue against Libertarian free will.

Then it is time for you to give us your definition of "free will", so we know specifically what you are arguing against.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Realizable alternatives do not exist within a determined system. The action that is taken is the only action possible in any given moment in time.

You are presuming that to be "realizable" requires that the option actually be realized. That's incorrect. An option may be realizable without ever being realized. For example, every option on a restaurant's menu is realizable. If someone selects that option, the chef has the ingredients and the skills required to cook that meal. There may be an option on the menu that no one ever selects. It is still realizable despite the fact that it will never ever be prepared and served. Realizable simply means it can be prepared and served. Realizable does not mean that it will be prepared and served, ever.

It's the same problem of confusing or conflating what "can" happen with what "will" happen. If something will happen, then it certainly will happen. But if something can happen, it may happen or it may never happen.

Given a deterministic universe, whenever a choosing event shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true, but "I would have done otherwise" will always be false.

The brain processes information and it is that information that acts upon its networks to produce the action that is taken in any given instance;
...

Yeah, we've been through all of that. The brain is a complicated thing and conscious awareness sometimes shows up after some insignificant decisions have already been made. So what? It is still our own brains that are making the decisions, and they are doing so according to our own goals and reasons. The brain is where "freely choosing what we will do" is going on. And, that brain will make a different decision if a guy is pointing a gun at it and telling it what to do than it would when free of coercion and undue influence.

Will is an aspect of needs and wants.

No. Will is what we have decided to do about those needs or wants. We can choose when, where, and how we will satisfy a need. We can choose between our multiple wants and desires which we will or will not indulge.

There is rarely a singular undivided will.

No. At the end of choosing what we will do, there is a single (and causally inevitable) intention that drives our behavior to a specific outcome.

There are many scattered and contradictory sets of will, each need or want being an article of will, which may be in conflict with other article of will; The taste of chocolate generates the will to eat chocolate, perhaps to excess. Then the will to keep slim and healthy forms the will to abstain from eating chocolate, and we have a conflict of wills, one driving the desire to eat, the other in opposition, the will or desire to abstain.

No. There are diverse desires, such as the desire to eat chocolate, and the desire to be slim. This is a conflict of desires. We resolve this conflict by choosing what we will actually do about these two desires.

Free will distinguishes a deliberate act, from a forced act, an accidental act, or an insane act. This locates the responsible cause of the behavior so that we know which methods to use to correct it. This is a very important distinction, because using the wrong methods of correction are likely to backfire. For example, we want to correct an insane act by psychiatric treatment and we want to correct a coerced act by holding the guy with the gun responsible rather than the victim of coercion.

That's a matter of rationally identifying the elements a problem and responding accordingly.

Yes, it is precisely that.

The situation itself determines the best course of action according to the information we have available to us at the time.

You keep attempting to shift control somewhere else. Now you have "the situation itself determines the best course of action", as if our own brains, our own goals, and our own interests played no role in deciding the matter. We, in response to the situation, are determining the best course of action. The situation itself is not an entity with any interest in the outcome. The only entity with an interest in the outcome is us.

This is what the hard determinist continually attempts to do, to shift the control to something that is external to us. But it is not a true representation of the facts.

 

[pood]

Choice means realizable options. Determinism doesn't allow options, only what is determined. Within a determined system, choice is an illusion.

I can show you people walking into a restaurant and browsing through an actual menu of realizable options. If you wish to test whether any of those options are realizable, just sit down and place an order. When the waiter brings you the meal, are you having an illusion? Or do you pick up your fork and start eating?

With a little thought, we can also demonstrate that all of these events were reliably caused. My invitation caused you to walk into the restaurant. Your desire to see whether the items on the menu were truly "realizable options" caused you to order the cheese burger, and then the salad, and then the apple pie. You only stopped because the waiter brought you the bill, holding you responsible for your orders, and you ran out of cash.

So, we have choosing actually happening, right in front of us. And, we have reliable causation actually happening, also right in front of us.

Since we found none of the illusions that you claimed exist, we must conclude that your assertion is the only real illusion here.

Determinism does not make choosing an illusion. Determinism makes choosing inevitable.

Nobody is arguing against the ability to be conscious of the world and to think and act in response to its objects and events. We can think and we can act. The issue is how that ability is achieved....a question of the nature of cognition and action within a determined system.

Simply defining free will as the ability to act according to ones will is insufficient for the given reasons, the world acts upon the agent, the brain is inseparable from the world, and it is this deterministic action upon the brain that governs thought and action.

And, you guessed it, once will is formed deterministically there is nothing prevents the action that follows if that action is determined. Not only is the following action not impeded, it freely progresses as determined.

This form of freedom of motion or action applies to all things, animals act unimpeded according to their nature, etc. necessitated actions not being the result of freely willed processes.


The anatomy of movement:
''Almost all of behavior involves motor function, from talking to gesturing to walking. But even a simple movement like reaching out to pick up a glass of water can be a complex motor task to study. Not only does your brain have to figure out which muscles to contract and in which order to steer your hand to the glass, it also has to estimate the force needed to pick up the glass. Other factors, like how much water is in the glass and what material the glass is made from, also influence the brains calculations. Not surprisingly, there are many anatomical regions which are involved in motor function.''

Who said that I was a hard determinist?

Are you suggesting you're not?

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism

Hard determinism (or metaphysical determinism) is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist.

I said that I am arguing against the concept of free will. Compatibilism argues that free will is compatible with determinism. I argue that it is not.

If a Libertarian came along, I would argue against Libertarian free will.

Well, that makes you a hard determinist by definition, as previously noted.

 

[pood]

I wonder if DBT or other hard determinists make a distinction between the following:

A quantum experiment in which “spin up” is registered instead of “spin down.”

A rock rolling down a hill.

A maniac running amok and killing a bunch of strangers.

A man being forced to drive his hijacked car at gunpoint by a criminal.

My choosing eggs instead of pancakes this morning for breakfast.

Who said that I was a hard determinist? The issue is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism....giving their definition of free will as, essentially, acting according to one's will without restriction or impediment.

The validity of this definition is questioned by incompatibilists. I argue on the side of incompatibilism for the given reasons

Basically -''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X'' - so the action that follows is inevitable for all things that happen within a determined system. Nothing to do with free will, therefore the term is merely a semantic construct.

If you are an incompatibilist, you are either a hard determinist or a libertarian. Both believe free will is incompatible with determinism. The difference is that the hard determinist rejects free will, whereas the libertarian rejects determinism, or at least rejects the idea that determinism affects human choices. Since you obviously are not a libertarian but are an incompatibilist, it follows you are a hard determinist by definition.

I wonder if you would explain what difference, if any, you see between the five choices that I gave?

I also wonder if you would address the idea that in any given situation, given identical antecedent events, a person would not have done differently, as opposed to could not have done differently. You go for the latter and I go for the former. The distinction, I think, is crucial.

The concept of free will is problematic, be a matter of determinism or indeterminism.

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore, indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

Where is freedom of will without regulative control? Actions within the system simply flow deterministically.

Where is freedom of will to be found in random or probabilistic events? Events that simply happen without agency, control or being willed.

You did not answer my questions, which is fair enough if you don’t want to. You simply restated your “regulative control” argument, an argument I have already deconstructed and rebutted, but you didn’t address my rebuttal, either. So unless you want to address my rebuttals of your arguments I don’t see how the conversation can move forward.