Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

...
from:   Scientific Method

1. Define a question
2. Gather information and resources (observe)
3. Form an explanatory hypothesis
4. Test the hypothesis by performing an experiment and collecting data in a reproducible manner
5. Analyze the data
6. Interpret the data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting point for a new hypothesis
7. Publish results
8. Retest (frequently done by other scientists)

You are failing to properly explode the bolded portion.

You've added extra unnecessary language and hidden the important shit behind a wall of obfuscation.

Testing the hypothesis is to aim an honest attempt and disproof at it.

I provided a link to the article for christ's sake.

On theory you are soooo. f...ing wrong. The goal of the research is to expand scientific knowledge and theory. Most experiments try to include themselves within the domain of some theory or system of theory. If they have a result that conflicts with a theory they need to justify their work either by developing improvements on the theory or, in the worst case, trying to supply another explanation for the body of results ( a new theory).

Generally, new material fits within the scope of good existing theories. Very few strong theories in physical science are falsified each decade.

Physiological, Psychological and Neuroscience theories are collapsing every month.

 

[Copernicus]

...Nor is it a matter of me 'digging in my heels.'

In case you haven't noticed, there are two sides to this argument, compatibilism and incompatibilism. The reasons why compatibilism is inadequate to prove the proposition of free will have been explained and supported by quotes and references...

You simply prove my point in your reply. Nobody is denying that there are two sides to the argument, and your quote is nothing more than a reference to Pereboom's convoluted "manipulation argument", which has lots of critics and supporters in the literature. Like you, I don't see Pereboom seriously advocating the abolition of criminal law on the grounds that people don't actually have free will. It is really hard to argue for a conclusion that one does not take seriously, so I think that Pereboom deserves some credit for being really good at defending an absurd conclusion. Would you like references to some of his critics, or can you handle the Google search on your own?

Of course there are critics, everyone has a point of view. I have read what Pereboom's critics have to say. Just as there are critics of compatibilism.

What you say about ''advocating the abolition of criminal law on the grounds that people don't actually have free will'' indicates that you don't understand the issue.

Actions that are taken in terms of law, regulation, punishment, are made in response to human behaviour and are meant to modify or prevent undesirable activity, crime, etc.

The knowledge that there are consequences acts as a deterrent for most people, so of course nobody is suggesting abolition of the law.

Some are calling for a review.

Again;

The law
''Because most behavior is driven by brain networks we do not consciously control, the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior. In the light of modern neuroscience, it no longer makes sense to ask "was it his fault, or his biology's fault, or the fault of his background?", because these issues can never be disentangled. Instead, the only sensible question can be "what do we do from here?" -- in terms of customized sentencing, tailored rehabilition, and refined incentive structuring.''


On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

I did not respond to this earlier, because I was on vacation and had very limited time and internet connectivity, so I'll make my response now.

You aren't a philosopher, and I seriously doubt that you have any comprehensive grasp of the criticism that has been directed at Pereboom. Nor have I, for that matter, but it is easy to see that he has attracted a lot of commentary pro and con. You are using him here to bolster your position, because you sense that he is an authority, but arguments from authority are known to be invalid. You need to discuss arguments rather than just cite what other people have written and take it as received wisdom.

Your quote regarding "the law" is interesting, because it makes a prediction that "the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior." This is exactly the kind of nonsensical claim that free will eliminativists have been trying to make as a justification of their position. In reality, there are no signs that the legal system is being forced into any such position at all by "modern neuroscience" or ever will be. It is pure baloney--an example of scientism at its worst. The author seems to be aware of this, so he shifts to the excuse that "these issues can never be disentangled" and then goes on to ask a question that he fails to even propose an answer to: "what do we do from here?" Instead, he makes vague handwaving gestures at "customized sentencing, tailored rehabilition [sic], and refined incentive structuring'', leaving it up to the reader to make guesses about what that is supposed to mean.

I confess that I have no idea why you inserted that quote from the paywalled online article "On the neurology of morals", but I suppose that you feel the inaccessibility of its content absolves you from having to show its relevance to this discussion. We aren't talking about brain lesions or other pathological conditions. We are talking about free choices that people with healthy brains make.

Even people.with brain lesions and disconnected hemispheres have choices that are made from their own reference frame, their own locus, even if not all choices made by the meat they inhabit are made by that single locus; someone might be forced to play a two player game and not have awareness of the reasoning of player two, with player two not having access to communicative potential.

These are still choices, made freely by the localities that determine them.

Nobody has argued that people with brain damage fail to make choices or that choices are anything but physically determined behavior. Compatibilists see the problem as essentially a shift in the usage of expressions like "free will".

 

[Jarhyn]

...Nor is it a matter of me 'digging in my heels.'

In case you haven't noticed, there are two sides to this argument, compatibilism and incompatibilism. The reasons why compatibilism is inadequate to prove the proposition of free will have been explained and supported by quotes and references...

You simply prove my point in your reply. Nobody is denying that there are two sides to the argument, and your quote is nothing more than a reference to Pereboom's convoluted "manipulation argument", which has lots of critics and supporters in the literature. Like you, I don't see Pereboom seriously advocating the abolition of criminal law on the grounds that people don't actually have free will. It is really hard to argue for a conclusion that one does not take seriously, so I think that Pereboom deserves some credit for being really good at defending an absurd conclusion. Would you like references to some of his critics, or can you handle the Google search on your own?

Of course there are critics, everyone has a point of view. I have read what Pereboom's critics have to say. Just as there are critics of compatibilism.

What you say about ''advocating the abolition of criminal law on the grounds that people don't actually have free will'' indicates that you don't understand the issue.

Actions that are taken in terms of law, regulation, punishment, are made in response to human behaviour and are meant to modify or prevent undesirable activity, crime, etc.

The knowledge that there are consequences acts as a deterrent for most people, so of course nobody is suggesting abolition of the law.

Some are calling for a review.

Again;

The law
''Because most behavior is driven by brain networks we do not consciously control, the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior. In the light of modern neuroscience, it no longer makes sense to ask "was it his fault, or his biology's fault, or the fault of his background?", because these issues can never be disentangled. Instead, the only sensible question can be "what do we do from here?" -- in terms of customized sentencing, tailored rehabilition, and refined incentive structuring.''


On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

I did not respond to this earlier, because I was on vacation and had very limited time and internet connectivity, so I'll make my response now.

You aren't a philosopher, and I seriously doubt that you have any comprehensive grasp of the criticism that has been directed at Pereboom. Nor have I, for that matter, but it is easy to see that he has attracted a lot of commentary pro and con. You are using him here to bolster your position, because you sense that he is an authority, but arguments from authority are known to be invalid. You need to discuss arguments rather than just cite what other people have written and take it as received wisdom.

Your quote regarding "the law" is interesting, because it makes a prediction that "the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior." This is exactly the kind of nonsensical claim that free will eliminativists have been trying to make as a justification of their position. In reality, there are no signs that the legal system is being forced into any such position at all by "modern neuroscience" or ever will be. It is pure baloney--an example of scientism at its worst. The author seems to be aware of this, so he shifts to the excuse that "these issues can never be disentangled" and then goes on to ask a question that he fails to even propose an answer to: "what do we do from here?" Instead, he makes vague handwaving gestures at "customized sentencing, tailored rehabilition [sic], and refined incentive structuring'', leaving it up to the reader to make guesses about what that is supposed to mean.

I confess that I have no idea why you inserted that quote from the paywalled online article "On the neurology of morals", but I suppose that you feel the inaccessibility of its content absolves you from having to show its relevance to this discussion. We aren't talking about brain lesions or other pathological conditions. We are talking about free choices that people with healthy brains make.

Even people.with brain lesions and disconnected hemispheres have choices that are made from their own reference frame, their own locus, even if not all choices made by the meat they inhabit are made by that single locus; someone might be forced to play a two player game and not have awareness of the reasoning of player two, with player two not having access to communicative potential.

These are still choices, made freely by the localities that determine them.

Nobody has argued that people with brain damage fail to make choices or that choices are anything but physically determined behavior. Compatibilists see the problem as essentially a shift in the usage of expressions like "free will".

I am a compatibilist, nominally, for the sake of having useful language rather than useless language.

I, however, do not have any expectations that the "dice rollers" can be identified as creating an identifiable nonrandom result. It may be the case that the universe has an one-time-pad seed, as it were, and I accept this possibility.

I also accept that it may have a fixed and compressable seed. Both of these are hypotheses which have not been disproven ad to which of either is correct.

So while I am a compatibilist because why the hell not, and because I understand metaphysics to the point where I recognize that even if it was probabilistic and only semi-deterministic because of a one-time-pad seed of some kind (that the architecture can represent an arbitrary reality that is not this one) we may still have a statistical determinism that quickly ascends the quantum scale, and it is the locality precisely that drives concepts of contention; the metaphysics of representation in abstract of a world of those born ignorance demands that we will contend foolishly, and so we will need discussion and words to describe the contention as self-modifying processes.

 

[DBT]

1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
2. In order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects.
3. But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4. So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do. - Galen Strawson.

Strawson is talking about something he calls "ultimate" responsibility. Nobody on this thread has been arguing for ultimate responsibility - it's a nonsensical concept.

Strawson acknowledges that although ultimate responsibility cannot exist he has no problem with normal, everyday moral responsibility:

I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

Responsibility is tied to the notion of free will. Both require ultimate responsibility. If you act because of the way you are and you did not choose to be the way you are, you are ultimately not responsible for what you are or what you do, which means that what you do, flowing from what you are (not chosen), is not freely willed.

So there goes the argument for free will. Including, for the given reasons, compatibilism.

 

[The AntiChris]

1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
2. In order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects.
3. But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4. So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do. - Galen Strawson.

Strawson is talking about something he calls "ultimate" responsibility. Nobody on this thread has been arguing for ultimate responsibility - it's a nonsensical concept.

Strawson acknowledges that although ultimate responsibility cannot exist he has no problem with normal, everyday moral responsibility:

I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

Responsibility is tied to the notion of free will. Both require ultimate responsibility.

So, despite quoting him as support for your position, you disagree with Strawson?

 

[DBT]

Neural network response to stimuli is the decision maker. The action being 'chosen' being an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time.

"A decision in the true sense" is "an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time".

Which is true of all things that process information, computers, brains, simple organisms, microbes, etc. No free will necessary as an explanation or tag.

Not really a decision in the true sense because determinism doesn't allow an alternative choice.

Nope. A decision is a decision! The fact that it was inevitable changes nothing. Where it happened, specifically within my own neural network, means that it was I and no other object in the universe, that actually made that choice.

The fact that you squeeze the process into "a response to stimuli" doesn't change anything other than to remove the key distinction between the two different sets of stimuli: one set that includes the guy with a gun (coercion) and the other set without him (free will).

You can't go around destroying meaningful distinctions without losing significant information. That distorts the truth. So, stop doing that. And tell the people you are quoting to stop doing that.

A determined action is not a decision. There was never the possibility to choose otherwise. A real choose entails multiple realizable options. Determinism doesn't allow multiple realizable options.

The action that is taken is "an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time."

No free will involved.

The action that taken is the only possible action.

Wrong.
Literal Fact: The action that is taken is the only action that will be taken.
Figurative deception: It is AS IF it were the only action that can be taken. Which is literally false.

It is the only action that can be taken in any moment because it is "an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time" - which is clearly what I meant.....I have said it multiple times.

Nothing else is possible.

Wrong again.
Literal Fact: If things were different then other things could have happened instead.
Figurative deception: It was AS IF there were no other possibilities. Which is literally false.

Going by the standard definition of determinism, things can't be different within a determined system. Nothing can be different. You can hypothesize or lament past decisions, but they cannot have been different.

Outcomes are determined by how events interact and unfold.

Of course. And if things were different, then they would have interacted and unfolded differently. When anyone says "I could have done something else", it always carries the implication that (1) "I did not do something else" and that (2) "things would have had to be different in order for me to have done something else".

Things can't be different. We are talking about determined world, not a probabilistic world. Determined events are fixed by initial conditions and proceed as a matter of natural law.

Nobody can take a different option.

Wrong.
Literal fact: If things were different, then I would have chosen differently. That is what "I could have done otherwise" literally implies. It always carries two logical implications: (1) things would have had to be different and (2) they weren't, so, as a matter of fact, I did not do otherwise.
Figurative deception: Things were not different, so it is AS IF I could not have chosen differently under different circumstances.

You may be thinking of Libertarian free will.

Intelligence is about providing our species with behavioral adaptability. Unlike species that can only act upon instincts, we get to choose what we will do. We imagine new possibilities, like flying in the sky as birds do, and we imagine creating a machine that enables flight, and we imagine different ways to do this (propeller, jet, helicopter), and we choose which possibility we will actualize, and different people choose other possibilities. And that is how the single actual future comes about, by us deciding for ourselves what we will do.

Within the domain of human influence, the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

The point was that it is the neural architecture of a brain that enables information processing and its related mental functions and abilities, pattern recognition, cycles, trends, making predictions...which is not a matter of will, certainly not free will.


''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

​

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Neural network response to stimuli is the decision maker. The action being 'chosen' being an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time.

"A decision in the true sense" is "an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time".

Which is true of all things that process information, computers, brains, simple organisms, microbes, etc. No free will necessary as an explanation or tag.

Let's try to sort this out correctly so we nail it down:

1. We have machines like thermostats, computers, and robots, that can make decisions, but which lack a will of their own. They make decisions, for us, but have no interest of their own in the outcomes.

2. We have microbes and all other simple living organisms that have a biological "will of their own" to survive, thrive and reproduce, which can exhibit goal directed (purposeful) behavior, but which can only act upon instinct. They lack the evolved neurology required to imagine alternative actions and choose between them.

3. We have intelligent species with a highly evolved neurology capable of imagining multiple possibilities, evaluating the likely outcomes of each option, and choosing for themselves what they will do.

When a member of an intelligent species is free to choose for themselves what they will do, it is a freely chosen will.
But when they are prevented from choosing for themselves what they will do, it is not a freely chosen will.

A freely chosen will is never free from reliable causation, but then again, nothing ever is. So, the fact that the choice was causally necessary does not change the fact that it was free of coercion and other undue influences.

The fact that the choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism), is an insignificant, meaningless, and irrelevant fact, because it is always the case of every event.

The fact that the choice was free from coercion and undue influence is significant, because not all choices are free from such undue influences. It is meaningful because it sorts out the cause of the behavior, as deliberate versus coerced versus insane, etc. And the nature of the cause determines the method of correction. It is relevant, because in most cases we can actually do something about the cause.

However there is nothing that anyone can do about causal necessity. It is a background constant that is always the case of all events. It makes no meaningful distinctions between any events, and there's nothing at all that can be done about it, so it is irrelevant to any human scenario.

Determinism, being based upon the principle of causal necessity, is similarly insignificant, meaningless, and irrelevant.

A determined action is not a decision.

A decision is a determined action that "decides" something. The fact that the decision was inevitable does not change the fact that the deciding actually happened in physical reality.

There was never the possibility to choose otherwise.

We pick up the restaurant menu and are faced with many possibilities. It is necessary for us to select one of those possibilities or we'll have no dinner. And we will select one of those possibilities from among the many that we can choose.

One "I will" plus multiple "I can's" equals one "I did" plus multiple "I could have done's".

"I could have done otherwise" is clearly true. "I would have done otherwise" is clearly false.

A real choose entails multiple realizable options. Determinism doesn't allow multiple realizable options.

Look at the menu. Which of those items do you claim to be "unrealizable"? Although I will choose only one, I can choose any item that I want, and the chef will prepare it so that I can realize eating it.

It is the only action that can be taken in any moment because it is "an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time" - which is clearly what I meant.....I have said it multiple times.

But causal necessity cannot say that it is the only action that "can" be taken in any moment. Causal necessity may only say that it is the only action that will be taken in any moment.

Going by the standard definition of determinism, things can't be different within a determined system. Nothing can be different. You can hypothesize or lament past decisions, but they cannot have been different.

Well, things will never be different in a deterministic system. Nothing will be different. As to what can or cannot happen, causal necessity cannot say, because it has no context of uncertainty. Every event within a deterministic system certainly will happen.

The very notion of a possibility, something that may or may not happen, exists solely to deal with matters of uncertainty. It is a logical token that has no meaning in the context of certainty. The same is true for words like "can", "option", "alternative". When dealing with matters of certainty, these words have no meaning.

Whenever we use one of those words, we immediately shift the discussion back into the context of uncertainty. And for us humans, we spend a lot of our time in that context.

So, there is a logical error in the "standard definition of determinism". And that error creates cognitive dissonance when people are told that they "could not have done otherwise", because they know for a fact that they had another option, and that "I can choose that other option" was true as they entered the choosing operation. They were uncertain what they would do, but they were certain as to what they could do. Oh, and of course, they were logically correct. It is the standard definition that is logically incorrect.

Outcomes are determined by how events interact and unfold.

Of course. And if things were different, then they would have interacted and unfolded differently. When anyone says "I could have done something else", it always carries the implication that (1) "I did not do something else" and that (2) "things would have had to be different in order for me to have done something else".

Things can't be different.

No. Things won't be different, even though they can.

We are talking about determined world, not a probabilistic world. Determined events are fixed by initial conditions and proceed as a matter of natural law.

Yes, more or less (natural law is not a causal agent, but it is the common metaphor for reliable causation).
And, yes, given matters as they are at any prior point in time, all events will proceed reliably in precisely one single way.

But among these events (that will proceed reliably in precisely one single way) will be those events where we choose for ourselves what we certainly will do from among the many possibilities that we certainly will imagine.

There is no "freedom from causal necessity", but there certainly is "freedom from coercion and undue influence".

You may be thinking of Libertarian free will.

No. From what I hear, Libertarian free will views causal necessity as a threat to free will, so they reject the notion that their choices are deterministic.

The resolution to both the Hard Determinist position and the Libertarian position would be to stop viewing causal necessity as a causal agent, but rather to view it as a logical fact with no significant meaning or relevance to any human scenario. Causal necessity cannot be viewed as being responsible for any events. It is descriptive, not causative.

Intelligence is about providing our species with behavioral adaptability. Unlike species that can only act upon instincts, we get to choose what we will do. We imagine new possibilities, like flying in the sky as birds do, and we imagine creating a machine that enables flight, and we imagine different ways to do this (propeller, jet, helicopter), and we choose which possibility we will actualize, and different people choose other possibilities. And that is how the single actual future comes about, by us deciding for ourselves what we will do.

Within the domain of human influence, the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

The point was that it is the neural architecture of a brain that enables information processing and its related mental functions and abilities, pattern recognition, cycles, trends, making predictions...which is not a matter of will, certainly not free will.

Yes and no. Yes, it is our brain's neural architecture that enables information processing, etc. But information processing includes making decisions as to what the person will do. When faced with a decision that it must make, like choosing from the menu what the person will have for dinner, it will normally review several items that it can choose, and from that review choose what the person will do.

And, if someone is pointing a gun at the person, and ordering them to "Have the roast beef", when they would rather have a salad, then that is not them making the decision, but rather the guy with the gun forcing a decision upon them against their will.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

I'm guessing that the "No Choice Principle" is the same as the "Principle of Alternate Possibilities". My solution to the problem may appear novel: The possibilities that occur to us while making a decision are causally necessary mental events that inevitably will happen. And, if my choice is inevitable, then it is equally inevitable that it will be I, and no other object in the physical universe, that will be making the choice that causally determines what will happen next. It is inevitable that the control will rest within me.

Cool, huh?

 

[DBT]

The external world is the 'god' that acts upon the brain. The external world is the source of information that a brain responds to. Responding, not according to its will, but its unchosen neural architecture and information processing activity.

No, the external world is just a planet we live on. It doesn't care whether our species survives or not. The interests that motivate us are the biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce, that exist within us. The control that causally determines what we will deliberately do is a choosing operation performed by our own brains. Our fate is in our own hands and our future is one of our own choosing.

That is Libertarian Free Will. Determinism - the deterministic interactions of the world - necessitates/fixes brain structure, function and behavioural output.

Consequently, in a determined world, the future is not a matter of choice.

 

[Copernicus]

...
Nobody has argued that people with brain damage fail to make choices or that choices are anything but physically determined behavior. Compatibilists see the problem as essentially a shift in the usage of expressions like "free will".

I am a compatibilist, nominally, for the sake of having useful language rather than useless language.

I, however, do not have any expectations that the "dice rollers" can be identified as creating an identifiable nonrandom result. It may be the case that the universe has an one-time-pad seed, as it were, and I accept this possibility.

I also accept that it may have a fixed and compressable seed. Both of these are hypotheses which have not been disproven ad to which of either is correct.

So while I am a compatibilist because why the hell not, and because I understand metaphysics to the point where I recognize that even if it was probabilistic and only semi-deterministic because of a one-time-pad seed of some kind (that the architecture can represent an arbitrary reality that is not this one) we may still have a statistical determinism that quickly ascends the quantum scale, and it is the locality precisely that drives concepts of contention; the metaphysics of representation in abstract of a world of those born ignorance demands that we will contend foolishly, and so we will need discussion and words to describe the contention as self-modifying processes.

Jahryn, we can certainly agree that it is better to have useful language rather than useless language. Beyond that, I think that you are trying too hard to push a computational metaphor. If there is a substantive claim in that confusing ramble that is relevant to what I have been posting, I confess that I have missed it.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The external world is the 'god' that acts upon the brain. The external world is the source of information that a brain responds to. Responding, not according to its will, but its unchosen neural architecture and information processing activity.

No, the external world is just a planet we live on. It doesn't care whether our species survives or not. The interests that motivate us are the biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce, that exist within us. The control that causally determines what we will deliberately do is a choosing operation performed by our own brains. Our fate is in our own hands and our future is one of our own choosing.

That is Libertarian Free Will. Determinism - the deterministic interactions of the world - necessitates/fixes brain structure, function and behavioural output.

Consequently, in a determined world, the future is not a matter of choice.

Choosing is the causal mechanism that necessitates the choice. Choosing happens, all the time. It is a real event in the real world. Determinism does not prevent choosing. It asserts that the event will certainly happen.

You're still trying to prove that although choosing does happen, it is somehow "not really choosing". But empirically it is an actual event and it is actually happening and we're actually doing it. So your claim is actually only that it is AS IF choosing wasn't happening. That will not hold.

 

[Jarhyn]

...
Nobody has argued that people with brain damage fail to make choices or that choices are anything but physically determined behavior. Compatibilists see the problem as essentially a shift in the usage of expressions like "free will".

I am a compatibilist, nominally, for the sake of having useful language rather than useless language.

I, however, do not have any expectations that the "dice rollers" can be identified as creating an identifiable nonrandom result. It may be the case that the universe has an one-time-pad seed, as it were, and I accept this possibility.

I also accept that it may have a fixed and compressable seed. Both of these are hypotheses which have not been disproven ad to which of either is correct.

So while I am a compatibilist because why the hell not, and because I understand metaphysics to the point where I recognize that even if it was probabilistic and only semi-deterministic because of a one-time-pad seed of some kind (that the architecture can represent an arbitrary reality that is not this one) we may still have a statistical determinism that quickly ascends the quantum scale, and it is the locality precisely that drives concepts of contention; the metaphysics of representation in abstract of a world of those born ignorance demands that we will contend foolishly, and so we will need discussion and words to describe the contention as self-modifying processes.

Jahryn, we can certainly agree that it is better to have useful language rather than useless language. Beyond that, I think that you are trying too hard to push a computational metaphor. If there is a substantive claim in that confusing ramble that is relevant to what I have been posting, I confess that I have missed it.

It's more an intersection of discrete math and linear algebra, as performed by impossibly autistic meat.

I'm weird. I'm not even really talking to you, per SE. I'm thinking it through for myself and I expect that my insights may change when I learn more. I'm not particularly interested in knowing what will happen when, for sure; I like not being able to know the certain future, in fact.

But I like pondering "the basic architecture", and what forms it may take.

Fundamentally I use a computational model, not metaphor, because we have reduced basic quantum events to computational models that require certain probabilistic assignments over the course of their events, though some factors of these models elude is, like gravity.

If we may express the universe in part using pure computational models, the universe is expressible by a computer of sufficient dimension, so it's more discussing metaphysics.

 

[DBT]

The external world is the 'god' that acts upon the brain. The external world is the source of information that a brain responds to. Responding, not according to its will, but its unchosen neural architecture and information processing activity.

No, the external world is just a planet we live on. It doesn't care whether our species survives or not. The interests that motivate us are the biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce, that exist within us. The control that causally determines what we will deliberately do is a choosing operation performed by our own brains. Our fate is in our own hands and our future is one of our own choosing.

That is Libertarian Free Will. Determinism - the deterministic interactions of the world - necessitates/fixes brain structure, function and behavioural output.

Consequently, in a determined world, the future is not a matter of choice.

Choosing is the causal mechanism that necessitates the choice. Choosing happens, all the time. It is a real event in the real world. Determinism does not prevent choosing. It asserts that the event will certainly happen.

You're still trying to prove that although choosing does happen, it is somehow "not really choosing". But empirically it is an actual event and it is actually happening and we're actually doing it. So your claim is actually only that it is AS IF choosing wasn't happening. That will not hold.

It is an actual event. It is really happening, but the wording of your reply is phrased in a way that gives the impression of realizable alternative options, that there is a choice where no choice exists within a determined system. Rather than being a matter of choice, it's a matter of inputs acting upon brain architecture that determines thought and response. That is not choice, nor is it free will.

A real choice requires the ability to have done otherwise. Determinism does not permit one to do otherwise, only what is determined from moment to moment.

 

[DBT]

Neural network response to stimuli is the decision maker. The action being 'chosen' being an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time.

"A decision in the true sense" is "an inevitable action based on the state of the system in that moment in time".

Which is true of all things that process information, computers, brains, simple organisms, microbes, etc. No free will necessary as an explanation or tag.

Let's try to sort this out correctly so we nail it down:

1. We have machines like thermostats, computers, and robots, that can make decisions, but which lack a will of their own. They make decisions, for us, but have no interest of their own in the outcomes.

The brain is a biological mechanism evolved to respond to its inputs from the environment. How the brain responds is a matter of architecture, inputs and memory function (which acts as the software)

Will is not the driver, that is the role of neural architecture...will plays the role of the prompt or urge to act. We have will, but for the given reasons, it is not Free Will.

2. We have microbes and all other simple living organisms that have a biological "will of their own" to survive, thrive and reproduce, which can exhibit goal directed (purposeful) behavior, but which can only act upon instinct. They lack the evolved neurology required to imagine alternative actions and choose between them.

Driven by Biology, not will or free will.

3. We have intelligent species with a highly evolved neurology capable of imagining multiple possibilities, evaluating the likely outcomes of each option, and choosing for themselves what they will do.

When a member of an intelligent species is free to choose for themselves what they will do, it is a freely chosen will.
But when they are prevented from choosing for themselves what they will do, it is not a freely chosen will.

None are free to choose. Actions are necessitated/determined. All attributes, abilities and features are brain functions. What any species or any individual can or can't do is determined by their neural architecture and brain state from moment to moment as determined events within and without the system unfold.

This is neither willed or freely willed. It's just brain function. Complexity doesn't negate the principle.

A freely chosen will is never free from reliable causation, but then again, nothing ever is. So, the fact that the choice was causally necessary does not change the fact that it was free of coercion and other undue influences.

The phrase 'reliable causation' is carefully crafted to soften determinism, to give the impression of choice. That somehow the agent has control of this 'reliable causation' where no control exists.

Determinism as 'reliable causation' - by definition - fixes all outcomes.

I'm guessing that the "No Choice Principle" is the same as the "Principle of Alternate Possibilities". My solution to the problem may appear novel: The possibilities that occur to us while making a decision are causally necessary mental events that inevitably will happen. And, if my choice is inevitable, then it is equally inevitable that it will be I, and no other object in the physical universe, that will be making the choice that causally determines what will happen next. It is inevitable that the control will rest within me.

Cool, huh?

If it is you, it must necessarily be you. It can't be anyone else. There is no choice in the form of alternatives. The option taken is determined by neural information state. You as a conscious entity have no say or input. 'You' -your thoughts and actions - are the outcome.

1. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the past, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.
2. If A causes B, we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.
3. All of our actions and thoughts are consequences of past events and the laws of nature.
4. Assuming responsibility requires control, we are not responsible for what we do or think (2, 3).

History of the Free Will Problem
''From its earliest beginnings, the problem of "free will" has been intimately connected with the question of moral responsibility. Most of the ancient thinkers on the problem were trying to show that we humans have control over our decisions, that our actions "depend on us", and that they are not pre-determined by fate, by arbitrary gods, by logical necessity, or by a natural causal determinism.

Almost everything written about free will to date has been verbal debate about the precise meaning of philosophical concepts like causality, necessity, and other dogmas of determinism.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It is an actual event. It is really happening, but the wording of your reply is phrased in a way that gives the impression of realizable alternative options,

Which item on the menu is not a realizable alternative option? The chef is prepared to fix any item that we choose.

The fact that we "will" choose the salad does not imply we "cannot" choose the steak. We can choose any item on the menu, and the waiter will bring it to us. This is what "I can do" is all about. To say that "I can" do something does not imply that I "will" do it, but only the possibility that I will do it. To say that something "can" happen does not imply that it "will" happen. And even if it was causally necessary that I "would" choose the salad, that does not imply that I "could not" have chosen the steak.

In fact, to say that I "could have" done something logically implies that I definitely did not do it. And to say that "it could have happened" definitely implies that it "did not happen". So, "could have" is a true statement, even as a counterfactual, because it implies that something did not happen, and, sure enough, it didn't.

that there is a choice where no choice exists within a determined system.

It should be obvious by now that the "no choice exists within a determined system" claim is false. Within a deterministic system happens, choices happened. And because it is a deterministic system, they necessarily will happen. They are not eliminated, but rather guaranteed.

Rather than being a matter of choice, it's a matter of inputs acting upon brain architecture that determines thought and response. That is not choice, nor is it free will.

Are you suggesting that the menu forced my brain to order the salad? I can assure you that's not the case. I gave that steak some serious consideration, and might have chosen it had I not had eggs and bacon for breakfast. So, this was indeed a choice of my own, not a result of the menu's influence. The menu neither coerced nor unduly influenced me. I chose the salad of my own free will.

A real choice requires the ability to have done otherwise.

Of course. I was able to choose the steak, but, due to my own goals and reasons, I chose the salad instead. An "ability" to do something does not imply that one "will" do it. It only implies that one "can" do it.

Again, a deterministic system does not remove any ability to do something. It only means that if, in fact, I "did not" order the steak, that, under those specific circumstances, I "would not" order the steak. So, if we were to roll back time to the spot where I faced this choice, I never "would" do otherwise. I "would" always order the salad, and ordering the steak "would" never happen, despite that fact that it "could" have happened.

Determinism does not permit one to do otherwise, only what is determined from moment to moment.

I never "do otherwise than what I do". That's just silly.

However, I "could have" done otherwise than what I did, even though I never "would have" done otherwise in those circumstances. In order to have "actually done" otherwise, things would have had to be different. And that is why we use "could have" when re-examining our past choices, to learn from them, because "could have" implies that either us or the circumstances were different.

When evaluating past events, we are putting ourselves back into the context of uncertainty, we are imagining what might have happened had we made a different choice. For example, if the salad was made with lettuce that carried the e coli bacteria, and made me sick, then I will remember that I "could have had the steak instead", and in this case I probably "should have".

Oh, and it is my own brain and my own choices that are determining what I do from moment to moment. Determinism itself has no brain, no arms and legs, and cannot causally determine anything at all, at any moment, ever.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The brain is a biological mechanism evolved to respond to its inputs from the environment. How the brain responds is a matter of architecture, inputs and memory function (which acts as the software)

Yes, the brain is a biological mechanism, with an architecture that provides many functions. One of these functions is speech. And, although we are still studying the architecture, we have already learned a lot about the brain by observing the behavior and by, well, simply asking the brain, "Hey, why did you choose the salad instead of the steak? I know you really like steak."

And that biological mechanism will tell us, "Well, you see, I had bacon and eggs for breakfast, and I'm trying to cut back on my fat intake to lower my cholesterol, so I chose the salad, you know, to balance out the bacon and eggs."

Will is not the driver, that is the role of neural architecture...will plays the role of the prompt or urge to act. We have will, but for the given reasons, it is not Free Will.

Us: "Say, brain, did anyone force you to order the salad?"
Brain: "No, I chose the salad of my own free will."
Us: "What do you mean by 'your own free will'?"
Brain: "I mean that it was my own dietary goals and my own reasoning that caused me to order the salad, even though I could have ordered the steak instead."
Us: "Okay. That makes sense."

Driven by Biology, not will or free will.

Thinking is a different causal mechanism. It runs upon the neural infrastructure, just like programs run upon computers, but it works by imagining possibilities, estimating their likely outcomes, and choosing what it will do. The rational causal mechanism uses the brain's internal model of reality to create imaginary scenarios, to try out things mentally before choosing to act upon them in reality.

The rational causal mechanism is very different from biological drives and physical forces. Our choices override our biological drives, just like our biological drives can override physical forces.

None are free to choose. Actions are necessitated/determined.

If nothing prevents me from choosing, then I am obviously free to choose.
And, yes, all actions are causally necessitated, which means that my choosing was not only possible, but also necessary. Choosing is quite real, and we actually perform the function of choosing in physical reality.

All attributes, abilities and features are brain functions.

Yep. Choosing is a brain function. So, we may assume that it is built into the firmware of the neural architecture. Thus, we come with the ability to choose.

What any species or any individual can or can't do is determined by their neural architecture and brain state from moment to moment as determined events within and without the system unfold.

Among those events are our thoughts and our feelings, you know, the functions that enable us to consider the different things that we can do, and select the single thing that we will do.

This is neither willed or freely willed. It's just brain function.

But brain function is how a choice of my own free will actually happens. What my brain has deliberately chosen, I have deliberately chosen. There's no dualism.

Complexity doesn't negate the principle.

Right. All events are reliably caused. Some are caused by physical forces alone. Some are caused by biological drives employing physical forces. Some are caused by considering several realizable alternatives and deciding to realize one of them. But, all events are still reliably caused, by some causal mechanism or some combination of them.

The phrase 'reliable causation' is carefully crafted to soften determinism, to give the impression of choice. That somehow the agent has control of this 'reliable causation' where no control exists.

No. The reason I use "reliable" in front of causation is to distinguish determinism from indeterminism. Reliable causation is when you do one thing and consistently get the same result. Unreliable causation is when you do that same thing and you have no clue as to what might happen next. In one case, determinism, the effect of the cause is reliable. In the other case, indeterminism, the effect of the cause is unreliable.

Determinism as 'reliable causation' - by definition - fixes all outcomes.

No. Determinism doesn't "do" anything. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe can be said to cause events. Gravity, for example, causes things to fall. People, for example, cause the waiter to bring them a salad rather than a steak. Only the actual objects and the actual forces cause things.

Causation never causes anything. Determinism never determines anything. These notions are used to describe events, they cannot cause events. The notion that they are doing the causing is a "reification fallacy", which is the source of the delusion that we are not the causes of our own choices and actions.

1. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the past, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.

Wrong!

What I am doing right now, in the present moment, along with what the rest of the world is doing right now, in the present moment, is causally determining the past. Can you see it?

And where do you find the "laws of nature", in the law library? No. You find them in the living organisms, the flowers, the trees, the frogs, the squirrels, oh, and of course, in us. Each of us is a distinct package of the laws of nature. And everything we do turns out to be legal within those laws. One of the things we do is to choose from among the many things that we can do, the single thing that we will do. And guess what. Hey! It's legal!

The past is the creation of us, and all the other objects and forces in the universe. The laws of nature are in us, and in all the other objects. And when we act, we are forces of nature. (Yes, I am speaking metaphorically. I'm simply extending the existing metaphor of the "laws of nature" to include the many things it leaves out).

2. If A causes B, we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.

Yeah, except in all of those many cases where we happen to be A, and we are causing B, where we definitely do have control over B!

3. All of our actions and thoughts are consequences of past events and the laws of nature.

And why should that bother me? I embody the laws of nature, so, what I do, they have done. I have also directly participated in the creation of those past events (well, at least all those within my sphere of influence).

4. Assuming responsibility requires control, we are not responsible for what we do or think (2, 3).

Obviously we exercise control, every time we decide what we will do and then do it. That which decides what will happen next is exercising control! And that is why we are held responsible for our deliberate acts.

History of the Free Will Problem
''From its earliest beginnings, the problem of "free will" has been intimately connected with the question of moral responsibility. Most of the ancient thinkers on the problem were trying to show that we humans have control over our decisions, that our actions "depend on us", and that they are not pre-determined by fate, by arbitrary gods, by logical necessity, or by a natural causal determinism.

Almost everything written about free will to date has been verbal debate about the precise meaning of philosophical concepts like causality, necessity, and other dogmas of determinism.''

Well, I hope that I have helped to straighten all that out for you.

If there is any specific issue regarding free will or determinism that you would like to address, please bring it to the table and we'll see what we can do to figure it out.

 

[DBT]

The brain is a biological mechanism evolved to respond to its inputs from the environment. How the brain responds is a matter of architecture, inputs and memory function (which acts as the software)

Yes, the brain is a biological mechanism, with an architecture that provides many functions. One of these functions is speech. And, although we are still studying the architecture, we have already learned a lot about the brain by observing the behavior and by, well, simply asking the brain, "Hey, why did you choose the salad instead of the steak? I know you really like steak."

And that biological mechanism will tell us, "Well, you see, I had bacon and eggs for breakfast, and I'm trying to cut back on my fat intake to lower my cholesterol, so I chose the salad, you know, to balance out the bacon and eggs."

All of which results from information processing, not will, not free will.

Its a matter of input, your questions, act upon networks that process the information and spit out the reply in the conscious form, thoughts, urges, actions. You are asked a question, thoughts emerge fully formed into consciousness in response. Inputs interacting with Memory Function enabling recognition and conscious thoughts as they come to mind, driven by information processing, not will, not free will.

Will is not the driver, that is the role of neural architecture...will plays the role of the prompt or urge to act. We have will, but for the given reasons, it is not Free Will.

Us: "Say, brain, did anyone force you to order the salad?"
Brain: "No, I chose the salad of my own free will."
Us: "What do you mean by 'your own free will'?"
Brain: "I mean that it was my own dietary goals and my own reasoning that caused me to order the salad, even though I could have ordered the steak instead."
Us: "Okay. That makes sense."

Determinism is not force.

Response is not a matter 'force' or free will but neuronal necessity: information acting upon neural networks necessitates or determines output: your thoughts and actions.

You are not being forced. Your thoughts and actions are neither forced or the result of Will or Free Will. Will is a result of neural information processing, as are thoughts and actions.

We have an intelligent, responsive parallel information processor in the form of a brain. The brain does not function on the principle of free will, it processes information and responds according to its 'software,' which is memory function:


Quote;
''People suffering from Alzheimer's disease are not only losing their memory, but they are also losing their personality.[/B] In order to understand the relationship between personality and memory, it is important to define personality and memory. Personality, as defined by some neurobiologists and psychologists, is a collection of behaviors, emotions, and thoughts that are not controlled by the I-function.

Memory, on the other hand, is controlled and regulated by the I-function of the neocortex. It is a collection of short stories that the I-function makes-up in order to account for the events and people.

Memory is also defined as the ability to retain information, and it is influenced by three important stages. The first stage is encoding and processing the information, the second stage is the storing of the memory, and the third stage is memory retrieval.

There are also the different types of memories like sensory, short-term, and long-term memory. The sensory memory relates to the initial moment when an event or an object is first detected. Short-term memories are characterized by slow, transient alterations in communication between neurons and long-term memories (1). Long-term memories are marked by permanent changes to the neural structure''

Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior''

Free Will? Nope.

That'll do for now, for the sake of keeping it brief and to the point.

 

[DBT]

Well, I hope that I have helped to straighten all that out for you.

If there is any specific issue regarding free will or determinism that you would like to address, please bring it to the table and we'll see what we can do to figure it out.

Missed this bit. The free will debate has been about definitions, determinism, necessity, etc.....but now we have the evidence from neuroscience and a better understanding of how our thoughts and actions are produced. Definitions alone are not sufficient. A carefully crafted definition of compatibilism, for instance, does not account for inner necessity or the mechanisms of thought and action. That is its point of failure.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

 

[Marvin Edwards]

All of which results from information processing, not will, not free will.

You keep pretending that information processing does not include choosing!

Its a matter of input, your questions, act upon networks that process the information and spit out the reply in the conscious form, thoughts, urges, actions.

And one of those thoughts is, "Should I have the salad or the steak? Well, I had bacon and eggs for breakfast, so I should have the salad now" resulting in the action, "Waiter, I will have the salad, please." (which I try to say without spitting).

Choosing is a function of information processing! If I fail to choose between the salad and the steak, there's no dinner for me. Choosing must happen if I wish to eat.

You are asked a question, thoughts emerge fully formed into consciousness in response. Inputs interacting with Memory Function enabling recognition and conscious thoughts as they come to mind, driven by information processing, not will, not free will.

The events are driven by my awareness that I need to answer the waiter, who just asked me, "And what will you be having tonight, sir?" If I have not yet "made up my mind", if my "urges" to have the steak are still competing with my judgment that the salad will be better for me, then my response would be, "Uh, could you get DBT's order first, I'm still trying to decide".

So, you order the steak. (You claims you do this without conscious awareness, and are a little surprised later when the waiter shows up with the steak and a bill you must pay. You explain this to yourself, after the fact. "Gee, I must have ordered this, so I must have deliberately chosen it, so now I guess I'll have to pay for it").

And now it's my turn again. I decide to curb my urge for the steak and order the salad instead. "I will have the chef salad, please".

This particular "information processing" is commonly known as "choosing what I will do". Perhaps you've heard of it?

Free will is a freely chosen "I will". "Freely chosen" means I did the choosing myself, without coercion or undue influence.

It's a simple, but very essential concept. Both the waiter and I understand it. The waiter brings the bill to me, because I am responsible for ordering the chef salad.

There, now you understand what free will is actually about.

Determinism is not force.

Exactly. Determinism simply asserts that all of the events, including my thoughts and my feelings, were causally necessary, one event reliably causing the next event, in a chain that stretches back (forward) as far as we can imagine. Each thought that popped into my head was caused by preceding events: The choice to eat at the restaurant led to my reading the menu, which led to my narrowing down my choice to just the steak and the salad, which led to my recalling the bacon and eggs for breakfast and having a bad feeling about the cholesterol, which led my attention to the salad and a good feeling that this was the right choice, which led to me deciding "I will have the salad", which led to me telling the waiter, "I will have the salad please", which led the waiter to bring me a salad and later bring me the bill.

Each event was reliably determined by prior causes. And we could extend our research into prior causes to cover the prior causes of me, and why I happened to be concerned with my cholesterol, and when I was born, and so on, back to the big bang.

But, instead of all that research, why don't we just presume that every event that ever happens is always reliably caused by prior events. We presume that determinism is correct in this assertion.

However, this is probably the only assertion made by determinists that is correct. (For example, they are always incorrect when they claim that a person "could not have done otherwise" when there are two or more options on the table. Two options equals two "I can's". Two "I can's" will always result in one "I will" and one "I could have").

Response is not a matter 'force' or free will but neuronal necessity: information acting upon neural networks necessitates or determines output: your thoughts and actions.

Thoughts are also information that act upon the neural networks. Thoughts necessitate and determine other thoughts. Thoughts result in choosing what we will do. What we "will do" is a thought that necessitates and determines actions, for example, me telling the waiter "I will have the chef salad, please" is an action necessitated by my thoughts.

Thoughts necessitating other thoughts and actions is how the rational causal mechanism works. Neuroscience may eventually explain to us how the experience of these thoughts is reflected in the physical processes of the brain. But neuroscience will never tell us that these thoughts originate somewhere other than within our own brain.

You are not being forced. Your thoughts and actions are neither forced or the result of Will or Free Will.

Well, sometimes a person is actually forced to do something against their will, for example, by a guy with a gun or by a mental illness that prevents them from rationally deciding for themselves what they will do (e.g., hallucinations and delusions).

This is what free will is about. Free will is not the absence of necessity, it is the absence of coercion and undue influence. This is an empirical distinction, not an abstract issue.

Will is a result of neural information processing, as are thoughts and actions.

We know that. Thinking happens within the brain, our "information processor". We have internal information and we have external information that play a role in choosing what we will do. The guy with the gun is external information. Our thoughts and feelings are internal information. And a mental illness or injury can disrupt the information processing.

This is common knowledge that does not require constant repetition in this discussion.

The free will debate has been about definitions, determinism, necessity, etc.....but now we have the evidence from neuroscience and a better understanding of how our thoughts and actions are produced.

Neuroscience is demonstrating that our thoughts and feelings are functions that run upon the neural infrastructure of our own brains. Injure the brain in one area, and short term memory ceases. Injure it in another and you loose awareness of half of your visual field. Injure it somewhere else and your reasoning is impaired. Injure it in another and your inhibitions disappear.

Definitions alone are not sufficient. A carefully crafted definition of compatibilism, for instance, does not account for inner necessity or the mechanisms of thought and action. That is its point of failure.

But neuroscience will not resolve the debate for that very reason, because the debate IS about definitions. If determinism is defined as "the absence of free will", or, if free will is defined as "the absence of determinism", then we have an everlasting debate.

The only way to resolve such a debate is by getting our definitions straight.

This compatibilist defines determinism as the belief that every event is reliably caused by prior events. And, he finds this belief to be true.

This compatibilist defines free will as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other undue influences (such as mental illness, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.). And this is the free will that everyone uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

These two definitions are compatible.

 

[Copernicus]

Well, I hope that I have helped to straighten all that out for you.

If there is any specific issue regarding free will or determinism that you would like to address, please bring it to the table and we'll see what we can do to figure it out.

Missed this bit. The free will debate has been about definitions, determinism, necessity, etc.....but now we have the evidence from neuroscience and a better understanding of how our thoughts and actions are produced. Definitions alone are not sufficient. A carefully crafted definition of compatibilism, for instance, does not account for inner necessity or the mechanisms of thought and action. That is its point of failure.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Peter van Inwagen wrote a very clear argument against compatibilism called the Consequence Argument. It is explained very clearly in the following 17 minute video by Gordon Pettit, a former student of van Inwagen. Pettit also reveals the premise in the argument where he (and van Inwagen) think that the argument is weakest--the conditional statement that "If determinism is true, then we have no free will". Both Pettit and van Inwagen seem to treat "free will" as if it meant freedom from causal determinism. They conclude that people do have a kind of free will in the sense that moral responsibility implies "metaphysical freedom" (whatever that means).



A much clearer explanation of free will and compatibilism comes from Daniel Dennett (looking very much like Santa Claus in the following 6 minute video ). It is interesting that DBT makes much out of the role of biology in his denials of compatibilism, but biology is exactly what Dennett relies on to explain why compatibilism is the most sensible position on free will.



What Dennett's position comes down to is very similar to that taken by Marvin or myself regarding the way we choose to define the concept of free will. I would have liked Dennett to talk a little more about the various types of free will, but that would have made the discussion a bit longer and harder to follow. Basically, though, he says that we need to retain the definitions of the expression that most matter to us or have the greatest consequence for us--exactly what Marvin has been hammering away at in this thread. In a way, Dennett's conclusion is not all that different from van Inwagen's idea that moral responsibility implies a kind of metaphysical "freedom". That is, people can be held accountable for their actions, because they can imagine how they or others might have behaved differently in the past if they had known how their future would turn out. That is, the discrepancy between the reality that we know and the reality that we can imagine is what ultimately gives us free will in a deterministic universe. We choose to duck when a brick that was never going to hit us (because we were predetermined to duck) comes flying at us precisely because we have imagined the consequence of not ducking at flying bricks. Those who don't learn to duck don't tend to survive and produce offspring.

 

[fromderinside]

The reality we know or the reality we can imagine has nothing to do with the existence or non-existence of free will. Determinism is a material statement of things: "all things after time t = 0 are in accordance with natural law".

Our 'reality' is subjective, metaphysical, must be interpreted metaphysically. It, reality, cannot be arbitrated materially, except in relative, what if, terms. It can only allegorically be related to some determined network or system of determined networks by "what if" or "may be."* That's a piss poor way of of trying to treat the material world.

That formulation doesn't permit free will since free will isn't recognized as being a matter of natural law. Whatever the state of affairs at time t = 0 they are determined for all time thereafter.

Determinism is a material statement. It is not a metaphysical statement. It is a strictly material statement. Running through all the options does not change the material statement into a metaphysical statement (see above *). Since the definition of Determinism is materially explicit every possible outcome is determined.