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Compatibilism: What's that About?

We can't do anything with it unless there are forces accompanying the stuff. That's two things needed beyond just there being. In fact there are possible existences of many kinds of stuff with there being no causal necessity there for the ride.

Fortunately, causal necessity is neither an object nor a force. It is a short generalization of the fact that every event appears to have some prior event that made it happen. The notion of causation is how we explain why something happened. Knowing why an event happens often gives us control over the event. It gives us the ability to make good things happen more often and to make bad things happen less often. We care about outcomes, especially those that affect us, because we literally "have skin in the game".

And we lack hard shells to protect us, you know, like those turtles.
 
guess what else is causally necessary: You've got to make the damn choice!
This central crux is I think the most important recognition here to make: that the choosing operation is also a demand of causality.

At some point in time in the dance, there is a conditional event. The state machine operates in that moment with itself acting as part of the condition. An event that in general form could go one way or the other depending on a constrained set of input events determines on the basis of the input.

Again we are back to the fact that it is not the same to watch a live play and a movie of that play. One is a "skill shot", and the other is "just pixels". The fact that we can capture the pixels of the skill shot does not make it any less skilled.

I have played Super Metroid many times, usually while watching a world record TAS playthrough and reproducing the sequence without the tool.

No matter how one may kick and scream and demand that the universe is not a general machine with general behavior and general rules and thus general strategies... It appears to us to be nothing more than some general architecture running in a fixed way.

The application of a general rule to a specific circumstance of a generalizable system. This is choice.
 
The impulse to act is called a reflex. The desire to act is a "want", not a "will".
Not quite.
Reflex action come in several forms, nerve loop response that does not involve the brain, ie, tapping the knee.....
Yes, I know.
Muscle memory is the act of committing a specific motor task into memory through repetition.
Yes. For example, learning to walk, or learning to play the piano. When you begin you are very conscious of your movements, but once you've acquired the skill you do so without thinking.
Psychological drives, urges, impulses, the desire to eat chocolate, the felt impulse to act, etc, is a matter of acting according to ones will.

No. There's a key distinction between simply doing whatever you feel like, versus doing what is appropriate. The inability to act appropriately is sometimes referred to as "a lack of impulse control". For example, you are at a friend's birthday party, you see the cake on the table, and you stick your hand into the cake and put a handful in your mouth. That's an example of a lack of impulse control.

Knowing what behavior is appropriate, or ethical, or legal gives us the ability to make moral choices, to do the right thing rather than the wrong thing. Such knowledge is not expected in a toddler, but it is expected at an appropriate stage of maturity.

So, the child who plays with a loaded gun is not held responsible if he accidentally kills his brother. Instead, his parents are held responsible for failing to secure the gun where the child cannot reach it. The child did not deliberately kill his brother, because he did not understand the consequences of his actions.

But a bank robber knows what he's doing and he knows that it's wrong, yet he deliberately chose to do it anyway, because he wanted the cash. So, the bank robber is held responsible for his deliberate actions.

Now, all of the events, in all of these examples, were all causally necessary from any prior point in time. There are no meaningful distinctions between any events with causal necessity. To say that it was causally necessary that the child would learn to walk, that someone would learn to play the piano, that another child would shoot his brother, or that the man would decide to rob a bank, tells us nothing useful. All of these events, without distinction, were equally causally necessary. So, if we want to distinguish these events in some useful way, we need to look at the details, at who caused what, and why they did what they did.

Free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. It makes a significant empirical distinction between the causes of specific events.


Okay, so I was wrong to equate "impulse" with "reflex". But you are wrong to equate "impulse" with "deliberate will".

Wants drive our will. Wants are formed through experience and memory, a sense of pleasure or desire driving our will to acquire or ppsses the object of our desire.....

Acting according to our wants without reflection or thought is a lack of impulse control. That is why I use the problem of rape to bring this to your attention. There is a strong physical attraction, and a strong desire, to have intercourse with a woman. And if we give into that desire, without considering the consequences, then we get rape. So, our wants and our desires cannot be allowed to govern what we will do. Instead, we need to choose our desire to do what is appropriate.

Our will is our deliberate intent to do something specific. It is not a desire to do something, but an intention to actually do it.

What we think, feel and do is up to what the brain does with sensory information, which is determined by past experience/memory function, things that have brought us reward in the past, things to avoid, whether it is better to postpone pleasure now for greater reward in the future.

Correct.

1-You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.

Correct.
2-In order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects.

No. It is never necessary for a person to be personally responsible for their own birth or for the way they were raised. They are held responsible for the consequences of their deliberate actions, regardless of their past. Our interventions (arresting them, trying them, imprisoning them, offering them an opportunity for rehabilitation) are justified by the harm they have done to someone else. That harm, the consequence of their deliberate act, is all the justification that is required for our intervention.

It is not our philosophy of determinism and free will, but rather our philosophy of justice that controls here. It is in thinking about justice and what it means that we find the answers regarding what we should do and should not do, and what is and is not justified.

3-But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.

Ah. Hello Zeno. You're creating a new paradox for us. A paradox is a self-induced hoax created by making one or more false, but believable suggestions. The false suggestion here that if you have prior causes, then they must be held responsible rather than you. But we can see through this little hoax by extending it. How can we hold those prior causes responsible if they too have prior causes? So, we have to keep shifting responsibility back through the prior causes of the prior causes all the way back to the Big Bang. And then someone needs to explain how we are going to rehabilitate the Big Bang so that it ceases robbing our banks. The notion that we are not responsible because we have prior causes creates an absurdity.

4-So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do. - Galen Strawson.

Nope. We're not following you down that rabbit hole Galen.

The problem is this: if causal necessity is used to excuse anything, then it excuses everything. If it excuses the pickpocket who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who chops off the thief's hand. If it removes one person's responsibility, then it removes everyone's responsibility, including the sense of responsibility that motivates people to advocate for prison reform and other social progress.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability is a logical fact, but it is not a meaningful fact and it is not a relevant fact. It has absolutely no meaningful implications for any human scenario. The intelligent mind can simply acknowledge it, and then ignore it.

Unfortunately, those trapped in the paradox see it as a force that robs us of control and freedom. Ironically, it never seems to rob them of their control and their freedom, as they feel responsible for converting us to their way of thinking, by seducing us into the paradox.

Not knowing what is going on in your head means that you have no control or say on what happens in your head, yet what you think, feel and do - what you are - is the result of what is going on in your head.

But what is going on inside my head is a model of reality that includes: me being a process going on inside my head (let me know if you're getting dizzy, yet, but that's the correct empirical description). What I am saying is that I do not need to control what is going on inside my head in order to simply be what is going on inside my head. Some guy once said, "I think, therefore I am (or, at least I think I am)".

You're creating unnecessary puzzles that require no solution. Yet, solved it is.

Saying 'you made the choice for yourself' is deceptive because it gives the impression of self-control in the form of conscious or willed regulation of the decision making process, which is actually an unconscious interaction of information, inputs being integrated with memory through the agency of neural networks.

Like I said, it is not necessary for me to consciously control the neural activity in order for me to BE the neural activity.

The conscious self is not running the process.

But it must explain the process, because if my unconscious brain decides to rob a bank, without letting my conscious self know about it, then both parts will be arrested and jailed. Our deliberate decisions will involve both conscious and unconscious processes.

That's the point, one is no more an instance of free will than the other. The distinction lies in external factors Being free from externally applied force, a gun at your head, doesn't free you from the constriction of 'an action’s production by a deterministic process.'

Yes. The distinction lies in external factors, like the guy with the gun, or internal factors in the case of insanity. Determinism makes no distinctions.

However, determinism is not in any way a "constriction". No one experiences reliable cause and effect itself as a constriction. Only specific causes can prevent me from doing what I would normally do.

In fact, causal necessity is exactly identical to "me doing what I would normally do." So the notion that causal necessity is some kind of constraint is false.

If patterns cannot be recognized, distinctions cannot be made. Pattern recognition enables distinctions to be made, intelligence and memory function. Without memory function, patterns cannot be recognized and distinctions cannot be made.

Okay. That's not a problem then. I have no issues with any of the facts of neuroscience. On the other hand, I may take issue with any philosophical or semantic problems that they introduce into their interpretation of the evidence.
 
The impulse to act is called a reflex. The desire to act is a "want", not a "will".
Not quite.
Reflex action come in several forms, nerve loop response that does not involve the brain, ie, tapping the knee.....
Yes, I know.
Muscle memory is the act of committing a specific motor task into memory through repetition.
Yes. For example, learning to walk, or learning to play the piano. When you begin you are very conscious of your movements, but once you've acquired the skill you do so without thinking.
Psychological drives, urges, impulses, the desire to eat chocolate, the felt impulse to act, etc, is a matter of acting according to ones will.

No. There's a key distinction between simply doing whatever you feel like, versus doing what is appropriate. The inability to act appropriately is sometimes referred to as "a lack of impulse control". For example, you are at a friend's birthday party, you see the cake on the table, and you stick your hand into the cake and put a handful in your mouth. That's an example of a lack of impulse control.

Knowing what behavior is appropriate, or ethical, or legal gives us the ability to make moral choices, to do the right thing rather than the wrong thing. Such knowledge is not expected in a toddler, but it is expected at an appropriate stage of maturity.

So, the child who plays with a loaded gun is not held responsible if he accidentally kills his brother. Instead, his parents are held responsible for failing to secure the gun where the child cannot reach it. The child did not deliberately kill his brother, because he did not understand the consequences of his actions.

But a bank robber knows what he's doing and he knows that it's wrong, yet he deliberately chose to do it anyway, because he wanted the cash. So, the bank robber is held responsible for his deliberate actions.

Now, all of the events, in all of these examples, were all causally necessary from any prior point in time. There are no meaningful distinctions between any events with causal necessity. To say that it was causally necessary that the child would learn to walk, that someone would learn to play the piano, that another child would shoot his brother, or that the man would decide to rob a bank, tells us nothing useful. All of these events, without distinction, were equally causally necessary. So, if we want to distinguish these events in some useful way, we need to look at the details, at who caused what, and why they did what they did.

Free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. It makes a significant empirical distinction between the causes of specific events.


Okay, so I was wrong to equate "impulse" with "reflex". But you are wrong to equate "impulse" with "deliberate will".

Wants drive our will. Wants are formed through experience and memory, a sense of pleasure or desire driving our will to acquire or ppsses the object of our desire.....

Acting according to our wants without reflection or thought is a lack of impulse control. That is why I use the problem of rape to bring this to your attention. There is a strong physical attraction, and a strong desire, to have intercourse with a woman. And if we give into that desire, without considering the consequences, then we get rape. So, our wants and our desires cannot be allowed to govern what we will do. Instead, we need to choose our desire to do what is appropriate.

Our will is our deliberate intent to do something specific. It is not a desire to do something, but an intention to actually do it.

What we think, feel and do is up to what the brain does with sensory information, which is determined by past experience/memory function, things that have brought us reward in the past, things to avoid, whether it is better to postpone pleasure now for greater reward in the future.

Correct.

1-You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.

Correct.
2-In order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects.

No. It is never necessary for a person to be personally responsible for their own birth or for the way they were raised. They are held responsible for the consequences of their deliberate actions, regardless of their past. Our interventions (arresting them, trying them, imprisoning them, offering them an opportunity for rehabilitation) are justified by the harm they have done to someone else. That harm, the consequence of their deliberate act, is all the justification that is required for our intervention.

It is not our philosophy of determinism and free will, but rather our philosophy of justice that controls here. It is in thinking about justice and what it means that we find the answers regarding what we should do and should not do, and what is and is not justified.

3-But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.

Ah. Hello Zeno. You're creating a new paradox for us. A paradox is a self-induced hoax created by making one or more false, but believable suggestions. The false suggestion here that if you have prior causes, then they must be held responsible rather than you. But we can see through this little hoax by extending it. How can we hold those prior causes responsible if they too have prior causes? So, we have to keep shifting responsibility back through the prior causes of the prior causes all the way back to the Big Bang. And then someone needs to explain how we are going to rehabilitate the Big Bang so that it ceases robbing our banks. The notion that we are not responsible because we have prior causes creates an absurdity.

4-So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do. - Galen Strawson.

Nope. We're not following you down that rabbit hole Galen.

The problem is this: if causal necessity is used to excuse anything, then it excuses everything. If it excuses the pickpocket who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who chops off the thief's hand. If it removes one person's responsibility, then it removes everyone's responsibility, including the sense of responsibility that motivates people to advocate for prison reform and other social progress.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability is a logical fact, but it is not a meaningful fact and it is not a relevant fact. It has absolutely no meaningful implications for any human scenario. The intelligent mind can simply acknowledge it, and then ignore it.

Unfortunately, those trapped in the paradox see it as a force that robs us of control and freedom. Ironically, it never seems to rob them of their control and their freedom, as they feel responsible for converting us to their way of thinking, by seducing us into the paradox.

Not knowing what is going on in your head means that you have no control or say on what happens in your head, yet what you think, feel and do - what you are - is the result of what is going on in your head.

But what is going on inside my head is a model of reality that includes: me being a process going on inside my head (let me know if you're getting dizzy, yet, but that's the correct empirical description). What I am saying is that I do not need to control what is going on inside my head in order to simply be what is going on inside my head. Some guy once said, "I think, therefore I am (or, at least I think I am)".

You're creating unnecessary puzzles that require no solution. Yet, solved it is.

Saying 'you made the choice for yourself' is deceptive because it gives the impression of self-control in the form of conscious or willed regulation of the decision making process, which is actually an unconscious interaction of information, inputs being integrated with memory through the agency of neural networks.

Like I said, it is not necessary for me to consciously control the neural activity in order for me to BE the neural activity.

The conscious self is not running the process.

But it must explain the process, because if my unconscious brain decides to rob a bank, without letting my conscious self know about it, then both parts will be arrested and jailed. Our deliberate decisions will involve both conscious and unconscious processes.

That's the point, one is no more an instance of free will than the other. The distinction lies in external factors Being free from externally applied force, a gun at your head, doesn't free you from the constriction of 'an action’s production by a deterministic process.'

Yes. The distinction lies in external factors, like the guy with the gun, or internal factors in the case of insanity. Determinism makes no distinctions.

However, determinism is not in any way a "constriction". No one experiences reliable cause and effect itself as a constriction. Only specific causes can prevent me from doing what I would normally do.

In fact, causal necessity is exactly identical to "me doing what I would normally do." So the notion that causal necessity is some kind of constraint is false.

If patterns cannot be recognized, distinctions cannot be made. Pattern recognition enables distinctions to be made, intelligence and memory function. Without memory function, patterns cannot be recognized and distinctions cannot be made.

Okay. That's not a problem then. I have no issues with any of the facts of neuroscience. On the other hand, I may take issue with any philosophical or semantic problems that they introduce into their interpretation of the evidence.
... and memory is there because ... uh, genetic evidence comes down on eyup.

Hard to get to choice from there.
 
We can't do anything with it unless there are forces accompanying the stuff. That's two things needed beyond just there being. In fact there are possible existences of many kinds of stuff with there being no causal necessity there for the ride.

Fortunately, causal necessity is neither an object nor a force. It is a short generalization of the fact that every event appears to have some prior event that made it happen. The notion of causation is how we explain why something happened. Knowing why an event happens often gives us control over the event. It gives us the ability to make good things happen more often and to make bad things happen less often. We care about outcomes, especially those that affect us, because we literally "have skin in the game".

And we lack hard shells to protect us, you know, like those turtles.
Appearances can be are deceiving.
 
... and memory is there because ... uh, genetic evidence comes down on eyup.

Hard to get to choice from there.

Choice is a simple empirical event. Walk into a restaurant. Watch the people come in, sit down, browse the menu and place their order. That's the event we call "choosing". The waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate action. And that's how free will works. Questions?
 
I suppose many people have been "seduced by the paradox", to use Marvin's phrase. Even my dear Spinoza was.

But what has to be realized now is that this discussion has serious political ramifications. The age old epistemological and/or metaphysical argument is pointless, which is why precious few people even bother with it. Note that this thread largely consists of a repeating cycle. DBT, FDI, and Marvin, offering the same arguments, and the same rebuttals, and precious few people even care.

I do, because I understand that there are those (not naming names here) who do not oppose free will because they are "seduced by the paradox", but because it is their intention to wipe out the concept of freedom entirely. There are people who do not want people to be free, and who despise the very idea of freedom.

Now, naturally, the concept of free will and the broader concepts of free and freedom have serious and necessary distinctions. And Marvin et al have done a good job of pointing out those distinctions.

But unless the discussion is allowed to become political - as is necessary - this thread will continue and all the quaint and homely talk of eggs or pancakes will go for nothing.
 
I suppose many people have been "seduced by the paradox", to use Marvin's phrase. Even my dear Spinoza was.

But what has to be realized now is that this discussion has serious political ramifications. The age old epistemological and/or metaphysical argument is pointless, which is why precious few people even bother with it. Note that this thread largely consists of a repeating cycle. DBT, FDI, and Marvin, offering the same arguments, and the same rebuttals, and precious few people even care.

I do, because I understand that there are those (not naming names here) who do not oppose free will because they are "seduced by the paradox", but because it is their intention to wipe out the concept of freedom entirely. There are people who do not want people to be free, and who despise the very idea of freedom.

Now, naturally, the concept of free will and the broader concepts of free and freedom have serious and necessary distinctions. And Marvin et al have done a good job of pointing out those distinctions.

But unless the discussion is allowed to become political - as is necessary - this thread will continue and all the quaint and homely talk of eggs or pancakes will go for nothing.

What exactly did you have in mind?
 
I suppose many people have been "seduced by the paradox", to use Marvin's phrase. Even my dear Spinoza was.

But what has to be realized now is that this discussion has serious political ramifications. The age old epistemological and/or metaphysical argument is pointless, which is why precious few people even bother with it. Note that this thread largely consists of a repeating cycle. DBT, FDI, and Marvin, offering the same arguments, and the same rebuttals, and precious few people even care.

I do, because I understand that there are those (not naming names here) who do not oppose free will because they are "seduced by the paradox", but because it is their intention to wipe out the concept of freedom entirely. There are people who do not want people to be free, and who despise the very idea of freedom.

Now, naturally, the concept of free will and the broader concepts of free and freedom have serious and necessary distinctions. And Marvin et al have done a good job of pointing out those distinctions.

But unless the discussion is allowed to become political - as is necessary - this thread will continue and all the quaint and homely talk of eggs or pancakes will go for nothing.

What exactly did you have in mind?
If you don't know then you're hopeless. Have fun with your eggs or pancakes.
 
... and memory is there because ... uh, genetic evidence comes down on eyup.

Hard to get to choice from there.

Choice is a simple empirical event. Walk into a restaurant. Watch the people come in, sit down, browse the menu and place their order. That's the event we call "choosing". The waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate action. And that's how free will works. Questions?
The choice is voluntary. That it is voluntary is an empirical observation. It's on you.
 
I suppose many people have been "seduced by the paradox", to use Marvin's phrase. Even my dear Spinoza was.

But what has to be realized now is that this discussion has serious political ramifications. The age old epistemological and/or metaphysical argument is pointless, which is why precious few people even bother with it. Note that this thread largely consists of a repeating cycle. DBT, FDI, and Marvin, offering the same arguments, and the same rebuttals, and precious few people even care.

I do, because I understand that there are those (not naming names here) who do not oppose free will because they are "seduced by the paradox", but because it is their intention to wipe out the concept of freedom entirely. There are people who do not want people to be free, and who despise the very idea of freedom.

Now, naturally, the concept of free will and the broader concepts of free and freedom have serious and necessary distinctions. And Marvin et al have done a good job of pointing out those distinctions.

But unless the discussion is allowed to become political - as is necessary - this thread will continue and all the quaint and homely talk of eggs or pancakes will go for nothing.

What exactly did you have in mind?
A stronger whine than you make? WAB's not here for epistemology.
 
... and memory is there because ... uh, genetic evidence comes down on eyup.

Hard to get to choice from there.

Choice is a simple empirical event. Walk into a restaurant. Watch the people come in, sit down, browse the menu and place their order. That's the event we call "choosing". The waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate action. And that's how free will works. Questions?
The choice is voluntary. That it is voluntary is an empirical observation. It's on you.

Yes, exactly. The choice is voluntary. And it's not just me and you. We could bring in physicists, biologists, and psychologists who would all confirm that the choice is voluntary.

According to the OED Voluntary means "A. adj. 1. Characterized by free will or choice; freely done or bestowed."
 
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Pereboom is pretty much on the ball. It's just the basics, If the world is determined, we cannot be responsible for the events that make us what we are mentally and physically - yet in 'order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects.' (Strawson)

"Ultimate" responsibility is a red herring.

I've pointed this out before, but it bears repeating:

Strawson is talking about something he calls "ultimate" responsibility. Nobody on this thread has been arguing for ultimate responsibility - it's a nonsensical concept.

Strawson acknowledges that although ultimate responsibility cannot exist he has no problem with normal, everyday moral responsibility:

Strawson (in an interview in March 2003) said:
I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

The word 'ultimate' need not be used - it makes no difference to the fact that we are not responsible for the way we are, genetics, environment, culture, life experiences, etc.

You can phrase it without including 'ultimate'....in 'order to be responsible for what you do, you have to be responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects,' and it's still valid.

So, on the contrary, to be fixated on the word 'ultimate' - as if that makes a difference - is the Red Herring.

Point as many times as you like, you are still wrong.
 
Hard determinists believe that volunteers don't really exist. They are just deluded slaves to causal necessity who thought they were free to refuse service.

Who is a hard determinist? Are we not talking about compatibilism, which accepts determinism but claims that freedom of will is compatible with determinism?

Compatibilists don't claim that multiple options can be realized in any given instance.
 
Psychological drives, urges, impulses, the desire to eat chocolate, the felt impulse to act, etc, is a matter of acting according to ones will.

No. There's a key distinction between simply doing whatever you feel like, versus doing what is appropriate. The inability to act appropriately is sometimes referred to as "a lack of impulse control". For example, you are at a friend's birthday party, you see the cake on the table, and you stick your hand into the cake and put a handful in your mouth. That's an example of a lack of impulse control.

Whether one acts appropriately or inappropriately is not a matter of will. The state of the system determines output. You say that it is ''the empirical event in which you made that choice for yourself, while free of coercion and undue influence'' - the problem being that there is no choice on the matter of brain condition in the moment of necessitated action realization. Therefore no absence of 'influence' (think necessitated), consequently it is not a free will choice.


Knowing what behavior is appropriate, or ethical, or legal gives us the ability to make moral choices, to do the right thing rather than the wrong thing. Such knowledge is not expected in a toddler, but it is expected at an appropriate stage of maturity.

Of course, a functional brain with the necessary information should generate appropriate behaviour, empathy, ethics, law, societal expectations, etc. Not always perfectly, sometimes not even ideal, which is a matter of condition, not free will.

Free Will as a Matter of Law
''This chapter confronts the issue of free will in neurolaw, rejecting one of the leading views of the relationship between free will and legal responsibility on the ground that the current system of legal responsibility likely emerged from outdated views about the mind, mental states, and free will. It challenges the compatibilist approach to law (in which free will and causal determinism can coexist). The chapter argues that those who initially developed the criminal law endorsed or presupposed views about mind and free will that modern neuroscience will aid in revealing as false. It then argues for the relevance of false presuppositions embedded in the original development of the criminal law in judging whether to revise or maintain the current system. In doing so, the chapter shares the view that neuroscientific developments will change the way we think about criminal responsibility.''

So, the child who plays with a loaded gun is not held responsible if he accidentally kills his brother. Instead, his parents are held responsible for failing to secure the gun where the child cannot reach it. The child did not deliberately kill his brother, because he did not understand the consequences of his actions.

Exactly, rather than 'free will,' brain condition is the key. The expectation being that the average citizen has brain capable of understanding consequences, a functional brain with the necessary information/experience to determine right from wrong and be aware of the consequences, be they legal, moral, social.

It is not free will that enables thought, consideration or understanding. Jus because the term 'free will' doesn't apply to the cognitive process doesn't mean that we are not able to think or understand the consequences of our actions.




But a bank robber knows what he's doing and he knows that it's wrong, yet he deliberately chose to do it anyway, because he wanted the cash. So, the bank robber is held responsible for his deliberate actions.

A robber of any sort is motivated by things other than consideration for the law, other people's livelihood or property

Motivation is formed through needs and wants developed through circumstances and life experience, not will. How many children decide to take up bank robbery as a career path? Or decide to become a murderer or sex offender when they grow up?

What brings a person to that state? Rational decision making? Will?

Life is far more complicated than that. The term 'free will' tells us nothing about human behaviour or its drivers.
 
Point as many times as you like, you are still wrong.

No, it's quite clear that despite repeatedly quoting him, Strawson disagrees with you and accepts that "you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.".
 
The word 'ultimate' need not be used - it makes no difference to the fact that we are not responsible for the way we are, genetics, environment, culture, life experiences, etc.

I would agree with DBT on this. Responsibility is responsibility. When we experience a bad event, like a car hitting a pedestrian at an intersection, we want to know all the causes, so that each can be corrected. To say that the malfunctioning traffic signal was "responsible" for the accident would lead us to ask "who is responsible for assuring that our traffic signals work correctly?" So, responsibility ultimately involves a person, someone who can do something about the problem, someone who perhaps needs to do a better job.

But all responsible causes must each be corrected if we are to achieve our ultimate goal of reducing the risk of future harm. The traffic light, the procedure for detecting the malfunction, and those responsible for the design and maintenance, would all be responsible causes and subject to appropriate correction.

The same would be true for the criminal who robs the bank. A responsible society would seek to correct any problems within the community that might "breed" criminal behavior, like bad schools, racial discrimination, drug trafficking, poverty, lack of employment opportunities, lack of supervised afterschool recreation, etc. But they would also have to correct the responsible offender, the person who thought it was a good idea to commit the robbery and actually did it.

You can phrase it without including 'ultimate'....in 'order to be responsible for what you do, you have to be responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects,' and it's still valid.

Galen Strawson was confusing "ultimate" cause with "first" cause. But the "ultimate" cause would, I believe, be more like Aristotle's "final cause" which refers to the deliberate purpose that is responsible for, and which meaningfully explains why the event happened.

And Strawson's error, espoused by DBT, is the notion that the criminal offender's responsibility should be shifted to his prior causes, as if they, and not he, had planned and committed the robbery.
 
Hard determinists believe that volunteers don't really exist. They are just deluded slaves to causal necessity who thought they were free to refuse service.

Who is a hard determinist? Are we not talking about compatibilism, which accepts determinism but claims that freedom of will is compatible with determinism?

Compatibilists don't claim that multiple options can be realized in any given instance.
Well, your view of determinism is classified as "hard determinism" because you assert that free will is incompatible with determinism. That is what distinguishes "hard determinism" from other versions of determinism.

My version of determinism is that every event is reliably caused by prior events, and that we ourselves are the most meaningful and relevant prior causes of our choices (when we are free of coercion and undue influence). When we are not free of coercion and undue influence, then our choices are constricted by those extraordinary influences. But reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive nor extraordinary, so causal necessity (a string of individual instances of reliable causes and their effects) poses no threat to our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do.

Reliable cause and effect enable every freedom we have to do anything at all, including our ability to decide for ourselves what we will do. There is no freedom in an indeterministic universe, because our ability to control what happens requires that the consequences of our actions are reasonably predictable. Without reliable causation, nothing is predictable, and everything is out of our control.

Thus, free will and determinism are compatible. The ability to choose for ourselves what we will do, for example, requires a brain that operates reliably. A brain that operates reliably includes the function of imagining alternate possibilities, and choosing from among those possible futures the one future that will become actual.
 
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