Consciousness

[PyramidHead]

You are not even representing my 'ideas' - which are not my ideas - you only respond to your own version. A version that bears no resemblance to what I say.

I'm giving you the logical conclusions of your ideas.

You are claiming consciousness is passive. It can initiate no action, like a passive "camera" it can "see", it can experience the representations created by the brain.

A passive "camera" observes what is going on but can do nothing, initiate nothing, move nothing. This of course is a passive "camera" that not only can see but can experience sensations and thoughts.

You are saying the brain is a self contained "machine". It does not take any orders from consciousness. it just does what it does and consciousness is purely passive. A passive "camera".

But a self contained machine has no need of a passive "camera" to record it's activity.

Take the passive "camera" away and the machine works exactly the same.

If you attach a passive camera to your car it will not change the performance. And then taking it away will not change the performance either.

No self contained machine needs a passive "camera" observing its activity.

A passive consciousness is a consciousness that is not needed in the least.

This is the conclusion from the claim that consciousness is passive and not active. No matter who makes that claim.

I don't see anything implausible about any of that. There are many examples of vestigial or otherwise redundant systems in biology.

The implausible part is how something that cannot be found physically in the brain (nor anywhere in the physical universe for that matter) could exert a physical effect.

It comes down to temperament. As a scientist, I'm uncomfortable with believing in something that has no plausible mechanism and is incompatible with prevailing theoretical models of how things work on a basic level.

You may be more uncomfortable with believing something that is incompatible with your immediate sense experience, even while acknowledging that sense experience is only mostly accurate and optimized for our ancestral environments. I guess that's okay. But you're in for quite an uncomfortable life as science progressively reveals more and more about the universe that is frankly inconceivable if you take your sense experience at face value all the time.

 

[rousseau]

Can we control our thoughts?

Do a simple experiment. Try to control what you think next. You can't, it's a purely mechanical, reactionary process. If you can't control your own thoughts, how are you in control of your behavior? The answer: you're not, deep instinctual mechanisms are. We don't need to think about most of the things we do, they just happen.

How would 'controlling' our thoughts work? What is it that controls our thoughts? How does it choose what to think?

It makes much more sense that 'thinking' is a process that always happens in response to stimuli in our immediate environment, including our own thoughts.

 

[Speakpigeon]

For your viewing pleasure: start at 3:00

Interesting stuff.

First, please notice that we have here a bunch of, presumably, honourable scientists, all PhDs and all articulate and reasonably bright people, and having interesting things to say that you can only guess could be backed up by serious scientific research, and I dare say, all very nice people you would really enjoy having a chat with over a cup of coffee or a glass of wine, and absolutely no hint of the sort of manipulative intent that is sometimes apparent in such videos.

Yet, what is the conclusion?

Well, that they don't understand, and by implication nobody does, how consciousness could possibly be somehow produced by neurobiological processes, even though they clearly have a very good idea, a very detailed knowledge, of what neurobiological processes are and do.

Second, since many of them hinted at their own first-person perspective on their own subjective experience, one even using this particular expression so that you have to give them credit for having at least some understanding what the "hard problem" of consciousness is.

So, given the above, what is striking as the video moves on is that the focus shifts, without anyone acknowledging the shift, from the (hard) problem of explaining consciousness as subjective experience to explaining how the brain works so that we could start to understand the basis mechanisms that explain how human beings, and animals generally, can get an effective (but not a "true") representation of the world and of their environment so that we can survive an prosper.


This is absolutely typical of what I understand neuroscientists to be doing. Read any of their books and you'll be edified. They all start using the right words, "consciousness" at least, and end up looking at the minutia of the workings of the brain without so much as an iota of how you explain the first in terms of the second. And they seem oblivious to the fact. It's a bit like an engineer building a dam who would have no idea what the dam is used for.

Also, it should be said that they at least seem to feel confortable acknowledging the existence of the hard problem (though they don't use the expression). It is enough that they acknowledge the reality of our subjective experience. Many on this forum should normally feel challenged because they consistently denied over the years that there was such a thing as subjective consciousness. A lesson for you guys but I'm sure you will ignore it very effectively. No cognitive dissonance for the true hardcore materialists. Never.


Still, the conclusion has to be that all these bright scientists, who seem to not be short of technical means, have not a clue how to explain subjective consciousness.

No surprise here.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

You are saying the brain is a self contained "machine". It does not take any orders from consciousness. it just does what it does and consciousness is purely passive. A passive "camera".

But a self contained machine has no need of a passive "camera" to record it's activity.

Take the passive "camera" away and the machine works exactly the same.

I don't see anything implausible about any of that. There are many examples of vestigial or otherwise redundant systems in biology.

Your argument doesn't work. It's a kind of infinite regress paradox.

Vestigial organs are all remnants of proper organs that were fully functional in some extinct species. So your argument would require you to explain what the "passive camera" untermensche is talking about could have been useful for in any species. The answer is that a passive organ cannot be an organ at all and that it cannot be useful.

One point for untermensche.

Who badly needs them.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't see anything implausible about any of that. There are many examples of vestigial or otherwise redundant systems in biology.

Your argument doesn't work. It's a kind of infinite regress paradox.

Vestigial organs are all remnants of proper organs that were fully functional in some extinct species. So your argument would require you to explain what the "passive camera" untermensche is talking about could have been useful for in any species. The answer is that a passive organ cannot be an organ at all and that it cannot be useful.

One point for untermensche.

Who badly needs them.
EB

It was less an argument and more an analogy, but you're right, not a particularly apt one. The term I should have used was 'by-product'. Gould called them 'spandrels'. Same idea.

 

[PyramidHead]

Can we control our thoughts?

Do a simple experiment. Try to control what you think next. You can't, it's a purely mechanical, reactionary process. If you can't control your own thoughts, how are you in control of your behavior? The answer: you're not, deep instinctual mechanisms are. We don't need to think about most of the things we do, they just happen.

How would 'controlling' our thoughts work? What is it that controls our thoughts? How does it choose what to think?

It makes much more sense that 'thinking' is a process that always happens in response to stimuli in our immediate environment, including our own thoughts.

Some thoughts are definitely a response to stimulus, but it's actually pretty easy to pick something to think about. Is it really so hard for you? Like, if you just decide to think about what you ate for dinner yesterday, you can't do it?

 

[rousseau]

Can we control our thoughts?

Do a simple experiment. Try to control what you think next. You can't, it's a purely mechanical, reactionary process. If you can't control your own thoughts, how are you in control of your behavior? The answer: you're not, deep instinctual mechanisms are. We don't need to think about most of the things we do, they just happen.

How would 'controlling' our thoughts work? What is it that controls our thoughts? How does it choose what to think?

It makes much more sense that 'thinking' is a process that always happens in response to stimuli in our immediate environment, including our own thoughts.

Some thoughts are definitely a response to stimulus, but it's actually pretty easy to pick something to think about. Is it really so hard for you? Like, if you just decide to think about what you ate for dinner yesterday, you can't do it?

How did you decide to think about what you ate for dinner yesterday?

 

[PyramidHead]

Some thoughts are definitely a response to stimulus, but it's actually pretty easy to pick something to think about. Is it really so hard for you? Like, if you just decide to think about what you ate for dinner yesterday, you can't do it?

How did you decide to think about what you ate for dinner yesterday?

I don't know how, but the fact remains that I could. You originally said I can't. I'm not disagreeing with your overall point here, as I am a determinist. But the impression I get from trying your experiment is that I can control what I think next.

 

[rousseau]

How did you decide to think about what you ate for dinner yesterday?

I don't know how, but the fact remains that I could. You originally said I can't. I'm not disagreeing with your overall point here, as I am a determinist. But the impression I get from trying your experiment is that I can control what I think next.

When you concertedly think, the most pressing things rise to the top. That's it. There is no neural mechanism that 'picks' from an unlimited number of options. The mind is oriented to remind you of immediate issues, people, problems, etc. So when you decide to look at your thoughts, what comes up has a random component to it, but it will likely be some aspect of your immediate environment and life. So you *can* think about whatever, but you don't *decide* what you think, you just think about what comes to mind.

Consider this question: if you were to 'pick' something to think about, what is the substance you'd use to pick? How is this substance used to decide amongst various options? I'd argue, in actuality, what's relevant here is neural pathways and potentiation. Memories that have more relevance to our immediate life will be more prominent in our brain and more likely to be brought into our conscious awareness.

Often, our immediate environment is the spur to which memories we access, so we can act effectively in the real world. Sometimes, when we explore our own mind, concepts prompt certain paths.

Regardless, there's always a spur.

- - - Updated - - -

How does a three year old, who lacks conscious awareness, exist in the world?

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't know how, but the fact remains that I could. You originally said I can't. I'm not disagreeing with your overall point here, as I am a determinist. But the impression I get from trying your experiment is that I can control what I think next.

When you concertedly think, the most pressing things rise to the top. That's it. There is no neural mechanism that 'picks' from an unlimited number of options. The mind is oriented to remind you of immediate issues, people, problems, etc. So when you decide to look at your thoughts, what comes up has a random component to it, but it will likely be some aspect of your immediate environment and life. So you *can* think about whatever, but you don't *decide* what you think, you just think about what comes to mind.

Consider this question: if you were to 'pick' something to think about, what is the substance you'd use to pick? How is this substance used to decide amongst various options? I'd argue, in actuality, what's relevant here is neural pathways and potentiation. Memories that have more relevance to our immediate life will be more prominent in our brain and more likely to be brought into our conscious awareness.

Often, our immediate environment is the spur to which memories we access, so we can act effectively in the real world. Sometimes, when we explore our own mind, concepts prompt certain paths.

Regardless, there's always a spur.

- - - Updated - - -

How does a three year old, who lacks conscious awareness, exist in the world?

I can't find fault in any of that. When I tried to come up with something to think about, I'm sure there was a set of topics that floated into my mind based on any number of factors beyond my conscious control. And I'm sure the one I picked was picked behind the scenes before I consciously knew about it. But at least from my perspective, it usually FEELS like I can choose what to think about. I say usually because there are times when I can notice my behavior flowing from previous states (generally speaking; this also applies to the specific case of thoughts). It's certainly true that I can't choose what NOT to think about, which may be telling.

Not sure where you're going with your last question, but I would guess that a three year-old human exists in the world in much the same way a non-human animal does, given the same level of conscious awareness.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Your argument doesn't work. It's a kind of infinite regress paradox.

Vestigial organs are all remnants of proper organs that were fully functional in some extinct species. So your argument would require you to explain what the "passive camera" untermensche is talking about could have been useful for in any species. The answer is that a passive organ cannot be an organ at all and that it cannot be useful.

One point for untermensche.

Who badly needs them.
EB

It was less an argument and more an analogy, but you're right, not a particularly apt one. The term I should have used was 'by-product'. Gould called them 'spandrels'. Same idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spandrel_(biology)

A main example used by Gould and Lewontin is the example of the human brain. It is explained that the human brain is the area in humans that is thought to have the most spandrels. So many secondary processes and actions come in addition to the human brain and its main functions. These secondary processes and thoughts are the spandrels of the human body, which eventually through thought and action can turn into an adaption or fitness advantage to humans. Just because something is a secondary trait or byproduct of an adaption does not mean it has no use because it may eventually be used as something beneficial to the animal.

Wiki suggests that Gould took human thoughts to be spandrels. Here untermensche is talking about something else, i.e. the subjective experience of human thoughts. Thinking eventually turned out to be an advantage and that's what Gould seemed to be interested in. But subjective experience doesn't seem be an advantage.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

It was less an argument and more an analogy, but you're right, not a particularly apt one. The term I should have used was 'by-product'. Gould called them 'spandrels'. Same idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spandrel_(biology)

A main example used by Gould and Lewontin is the example of the human brain. It is explained that the human brain is the area in humans that is thought to have the most spandrels. So many secondary processes and actions come in addition to the human brain and its main functions. These secondary processes and thoughts are the spandrels of the human body, which eventually through thought and action can turn into an adaption or fitness advantage to humans. Just because something is a secondary trait or byproduct of an adaption does not mean it has no use because it may eventually be used as something beneficial to the animal.

Wiki suggests that Gould took human thoughts to be spandrels. Here untermensche is talking about something else, i.e. the subjective experience of human thoughts. Thinking eventually turned out to be an advantage and that's what Gould seemed to be interested in. But subjective experience doesn't seem be an advantage.
EB

I agree. I think consciousness is a useless appendage at best, but in my more honest moments I acknowledge that it's really been a raw deal for those organisms who can harbor it. A universe without consciousness would be a vast improvement over this one.

 

[ryan]

It was less an argument and more an analogy, but you're right, not a particularly apt one. The term I should have used was 'by-product'. Gould called them 'spandrels'. Same idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spandrel_(biology)

A main example used by Gould and Lewontin is the example of the human brain. It is explained that the human brain is the area in humans that is thought to have the most spandrels. So many secondary processes and actions come in addition to the human brain and its main functions. These secondary processes and thoughts are the spandrels of the human body, which eventually through thought and action can turn into an adaption or fitness advantage to humans. Just because something is a secondary trait or byproduct of an adaption does not mean it has no use because it may eventually be used as something beneficial to the animal.

Wiki suggests that Gould took human thoughts to be spandrels. Here untermensche is talking about something else, i.e. the subjective experience of human thoughts. Thinking eventually turned out to be an advantage and that's what Gould seemed to be interested in. But subjective experience doesn't seem be an advantage.
EB

"Subjective experience of human thoughts"??? A thought is already a kind of subjectivity.

 

[ryan]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spandrel_(biology)

A main example used by Gould and Lewontin is the example of the human brain. It is explained that the human brain is the area in humans that is thought to have the most spandrels. So many secondary processes and actions come in addition to the human brain and its main functions. These secondary processes and thoughts are the spandrels of the human body, which eventually through thought and action can turn into an adaption or fitness advantage to humans. Just because something is a secondary trait or byproduct of an adaption does not mean it has no use because it may eventually be used as something beneficial to the animal.

Wiki suggests that Gould took human thoughts to be spandrels. Here untermensche is talking about something else, i.e. the subjective experience of human thoughts. Thinking eventually turned out to be an advantage and that's what Gould seemed to be interested in. But subjective experience doesn't seem be an advantage.
EB

I agree. I think consciousness is a useless appendage at best, but in my more honest moments I acknowledge that it's really been a raw deal for those organisms who can harbor it. A universe without consciousness would be a vast improvement over this one.

What does "improvement" mean in this context?

 

[PyramidHead]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spandrel_(biology)

A main example used by Gould and Lewontin is the example of the human brain. It is explained that the human brain is the area in humans that is thought to have the most spandrels. So many secondary processes and actions come in addition to the human brain and its main functions. These secondary processes and thoughts are the spandrels of the human body, which eventually through thought and action can turn into an adaption or fitness advantage to humans. Just because something is a secondary trait or byproduct of an adaption does not mean it has no use because it may eventually be used as something beneficial to the animal.

Wiki suggests that Gould took human thoughts to be spandrels. Here untermensche is talking about something else, i.e. the subjective experience of human thoughts. Thinking eventually turned out to be an advantage and that's what Gould seemed to be interested in. But subjective experience doesn't seem be an advantage.
EB

I agree. I think consciousness is a useless appendage at best, but in my more honest moments I acknowledge that it's really been a raw deal for those organisms who can harbor it. A universe without consciousness would be a vast improvement over this one.

What does "improvement" mean in this context?

No suffering and no possibility of future suffering.

 

[ryan]

What does "improvement" mean in this context?

No suffering and no possibility of future suffering.

But what about all the people alive that would rather have had their experiences so far instead of not having them?

What if the "good qualia force" wins in the end?

 

[PyramidHead]

No suffering and no possibility of future suffering.

But what about all the people alive that would rather have had their experiences so far instead of not having them?

What if the "good qualia force" wins in the end?

I'm positing a hypothetical universe in which consciousness never arose, not saying we should wipe it out in this one. If you were never born you wouldn't care that you were never born, so that's not really a negative that can be stacked against the positive of there being no suffering. But this isn't a thread about the relative merits and pitfalls of having consciousness, so we can discuss it elsewhere.

 

[rousseau]

When you concertedly think, the most pressing things rise to the top. That's it. There is no neural mechanism that 'picks' from an unlimited number of options. The mind is oriented to remind you of immediate issues, people, problems, etc. So when you decide to look at your thoughts, what comes up has a random component to it, but it will likely be some aspect of your immediate environment and life. So you *can* think about whatever, but you don't *decide* what you think, you just think about what comes to mind.

Consider this question: if you were to 'pick' something to think about, what is the substance you'd use to pick? How is this substance used to decide amongst various options? I'd argue, in actuality, what's relevant here is neural pathways and potentiation. Memories that have more relevance to our immediate life will be more prominent in our brain and more likely to be brought into our conscious awareness.

Often, our immediate environment is the spur to which memories we access, so we can act effectively in the real world. Sometimes, when we explore our own mind, concepts prompt certain paths.

Regardless, there's always a spur.

- - - Updated - - -

How does a three year old, who lacks conscious awareness, exist in the world?

I can't find fault in any of that. When I tried to come up with something to think about, I'm sure there was a set of topics that floated into my mind based on any number of factors beyond my conscious control. And I'm sure the one I picked was picked behind the scenes before I consciously knew about it. But at least from my perspective, it usually FEELS like I can choose what to think about. I say usually because there are times when I can notice my behavior flowing from previous states (generally speaking; this also applies to the specific case of thoughts). It's certainly true that I can't choose what NOT to think about, which may be telling.

Not sure where you're going with your last question, but I would guess that a three year-old human exists in the world in much the same way a non-human animal does, given the same level of conscious awareness.

If living things can survive without conscious awareness, then behavior is primarily driven by the unconscious, and instinct.

Then, when we believe we've become 'consciously aware', what we actually are is 'aware of so many things, including ourselves, that we call ourselves self-aware'. In reality flowing from a non-conscious to a conscious state is a false dichotomy if the neural wiring is the same, it's impossible. The difference is that we become aware of more things as our life progresses, to a point that we can feasibly become fully aware of ourselves and the universe.

 

[PyramidHead]

I can't find fault in any of that. When I tried to come up with something to think about, I'm sure there was a set of topics that floated into my mind based on any number of factors beyond my conscious control. And I'm sure the one I picked was picked behind the scenes before I consciously knew about it. But at least from my perspective, it usually FEELS like I can choose what to think about. I say usually because there are times when I can notice my behavior flowing from previous states (generally speaking; this also applies to the specific case of thoughts). It's certainly true that I can't choose what NOT to think about, which may be telling.

Not sure where you're going with your last question, but I would guess that a three year-old human exists in the world in much the same way a non-human animal does, given the same level of conscious awareness.

If living things can survive without conscious awareness, then behavior is primarily driven by the unconscious, and instinct.

That would follow if living things with conscious awareness behaved no differently than without. It could still be true, but this syllogism doesn't demonstrate it.

Then, when we believe we've become 'consciously aware', what we actually are is 'aware of so many things, including ourselves, that we call ourselves self-aware'. In reality flowing from a non-conscious to a conscious state is a false dichotomy if the neural wiring is the same, it's impossible. The difference is that we become aware of more things as our life progresses, to a point that we can feasibly become fully aware of ourselves and the universe.

Is the neural wiring of a 3 year-old really the same, though?

 

[Speakpigeon]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spandrel_(biology)

A main example used by Gould and Lewontin is the example of the human brain. It is explained that the human brain is the area in humans that is thought to have the most spandrels. So many secondary processes and actions come in addition to the human brain and its main functions. These secondary processes and thoughts are the spandrels of the human body, which eventually through thought and action can turn into an adaption or fitness advantage to humans. Just because something is a secondary trait or byproduct of an adaption does not mean it has no use because it may eventually be used as something beneficial to the animal.

Wiki suggests that Gould took human thoughts to be spandrels. Here untermensche is talking about something else, i.e. the subjective experience of human thoughts. Thinking eventually turned out to be an advantage and that's what Gould seemed to be interested in. But subjective experience doesn't seem be an advantage.
EB

"Subjective experience of human thoughts"??? A thought is already a kind of subjectivity.

Not necessarily and not in the perspective of Gould, at least according to Wikipedia.

Like consciousness and mind, thought and thinking can be seen as either subjective or objective things, depending on who's talking. Scientists talking about consciousness will usually mean objective consciousness, i.e. cognitive capabilities like memory, language, rationality etc. But we can also take consciousness to be a subjective things, for example as whatever qualia we are experiencing in the moment. It's a fact that people use these word according to these two perspectives without usually specifying which they have in mind, and I can only guess that's because they think these are two aspects of the same thing, which is precisely why people seem to expect that we will one day be able to explain subjective consciousness in terms of what the objective brain does.
EB