Just what it says. The effect is not identical to its cause. It has several notable properties that are lacking in its cause.
If consciousness is an electrochemical activity, as it appears to be, then it is identical in composition but different in form, patterns of firings, information recognition processing.
Aye. But if all we can say with any confidence is that consciousness is
the result of electrochemical activity, we cannot make that assumption. If we're talking about appearances, the subjective experience of consciousness feels nothing at all like electrochemical activity. It feels like whatever is being experienced at the time. Thus it may be overreaching to say consciousness appears to BE electrochemical activity.
Just like the pixel patterns on a screen that pictures and other systems form sounds, the brain interprets its own signals from its eyes as patterns of firing forming 'pictures' of the external world and pressure wave information via ears as sounds.
But where are these pixels? In the case of a screen, I can point to them. With the right program, I can even zoom in and distinguish individual pixels. They are tangible, publicly observable entities with a definite location in space. The same cannot be said of the smell of burning rubber. No examination of the microscopic rubber particles that enter my nostrils, nor of the receptors on my nostrils themselves, will ever reveal the actual smell of burning rubber. No external observation of the entire olfactory process, taking every detail into account, will yield the actual sensation. Which is why I have to call bullshit when you say:
The qualities of conscious experience are different but still composed of the same stuff, brain matter and brain activity.
1. It's incoherent to say something is 'composed of' activity. Activity isn't a substance. Nothing is made of action.
2. That just leaves brain matter. If you honestly believe that the smell of burning rubber is actually made of neurons and their connective tissues, you should be able to find it somewhere in the brain. You should be able to isolate this slimy object, put it on a microscope slide, and say "here is the smell of burning rubber." Do you not see how ridiculous that sounds?
We have some understanding of physics, matter energy characteristics, principles, etc....but we have no understanding of what 'non material' means.
At the moment it's just undefinable term for an undetectable proposition.
I agree, hence I try to avoid the terms 'material' and 'physical' as much as I can because I don't think they mean anything in opposition to 'non-material' etc. There is only what can be experienced, directly or indirectly. Whatever we choose to call its constituent parts is just a linguistic convenience. We have names for the particles that make up the objects of our experience, but none for experience itself. It's irrelevant whether we call one physical and the other not, or say both are made of the same anomalous substance whose complete nature we have yet to grasp.
All that matters for the purposes of this conversation is the logical relationship of identity and non-identity. For two things to be identical they must have all the same properties, and only those properties. In such a case, we can say they are not two things, but just one and the same thing, without needing to comment on what it's made of or if it's material or whatever. The final word on qualia is simply the inverse proposition: regardless of what metaphysical position one chooses to adopt, it is an unavoidable fact that subjective phenomena are not identical to anything we have so far found in the brain. Can we at least agree on that point?