Consciousness

[ryan]

You claimed they would not be able to experience color.

Once again you prove to be full of it.

You got that wrong. The content of consciousness, sensation, thought, motor action, perception of colours, etc, etc, is an experience. A subjective experience generated by a brain.

I've said this over and over throughout this thread and numerous others,,,,,yet you still misrepresent my position.

Someone is full of it, for sure. We know who.

But you say it's only physical. That is practically the same thing as saying it does not exist. Because, when we finally do find its exact physical embodiment, there will still be the same issue. The dualists will say that there is something more, namely the experience itself. But you will use its biological term and say that there is nothing more.

Other qualia will always have a physical "shell" that we will observe, but we will never observe it.

 

[DBT]

You got that wrong. The content of consciousness, sensation, thought, motor action, perception of colours, etc, etc, is an experience. A subjective experience generated by a brain.

I've said this over and over throughout this thread and numerous others,,,,,yet you still misrepresent my position.

Someone is full of it, for sure. We know who.

But you say it's only physical. That is practically the same thing as saying it does not exist. Because, when we finally do find its exact physical embodiment, there will still be the same issue. The dualists will say that there is something more, namely the experience itself. But you will use its biological term and say that there is nothing more.

Other qualia will always have a physical "shell" that we will observe, but we will never observe it.

I didn't say ''it's only physical'' which appears to diminish something that's quite marvelous. Consciousness is physical, a physical process effected by physical conditions, drugs, etc. What else can it be. The world/universe as a whole is quite marvelous, yet obviously it is physical.

 

[ryan]

But you say it's only physical. That is practically the same thing as saying it does not exist. Because, when we finally do find its exact physical embodiment, there will still be the same issue. The dualists will say that there is something more, namely the experience itself. But you will use its biological term and say that there is nothing more.

Other qualia will always have a physical "shell" that we will observe, but we will never observe it.

I didn't say ''it's only physical'' which appears to diminish something that's quite marvelous. Consciousness is physical, a physical process effected by physical conditions, drugs, etc.

I am talking about a certain level of classification. Like, I know you think mountains or trees exist that are more specific than just being physical.

What else can it be.

That is the "what" question of consciousness; it is hard to answer. If it doesn't affect anything yet somehow still exists, then it is not physical in the classical, relative or QM sense of "physical". Qualia is a feature of matter, and cannot even be indirectly observed.

 

[DBT]

I didn't say ''it's only physical'' which appears to diminish something that's quite marvelous. Consciousness is physical, a physical process effected by physical conditions, drugs, etc.

I am talking about a certain level of classification. Like, I know you think mountains or trees exist that are more specific than just being physical.

What else can it be.

That is the "what" question of consciousness; it is hard to answer. If it doesn't affect anything yet somehow still exists, then it is not physical in the classical, relative or QM sense of "physical". Qualia is a feature of matter, and cannot even be indirectly observed.

To say it doesn't effect anything isn't quite right. If consciousness is the brains self generated 'map' of the external world, as it appears to be, then it does something, it serves a useful, functional purpose, a means or a tool with which to negotiate the external world.

 

[ryan]

I am talking about a certain level of classification. Like, I know you think mountains or trees exist that are more specific than just being physical.

What else can it be.

That is the "what" question of consciousness; it is hard to answer. If it doesn't affect anything yet somehow still exists, then it is not physical in the classical, relative or QM sense of "physical". Qualia is a feature of matter, and cannot even be indirectly observed.

To say it doesn't effect anything isn't quite right. If consciousness is the brains self generated 'map' of the external world, as it appears to be, then it does something, it serves a useful, functional purpose, a means or a tool with which to negotiate the external world.

The physical aspect of the consciousness takes care of all navigation. The "what it's like to be x" is just some other kind of thing.

 

[DBT]

I am talking about a certain level of classification. Like, I know you think mountains or trees exist that are more specific than just being physical.

What else can it be.

That is the "what" question of consciousness; it is hard to answer. If it doesn't affect anything yet somehow still exists, then it is not physical in the classical, relative or QM sense of "physical". Qualia is a feature of matter, and cannot even be indirectly observed.

To say it doesn't effect anything isn't quite right. If consciousness is the brains self generated 'map' of the external world, as it appears to be, then it does something, it serves a useful, functional purpose, a means or a tool with which to negotiate the external world.

The physical aspect of the consciousness takes care of all navigation. The "what it's like to be x" is just some other kind of thing.

Saying that implies knowledge of what is or isn't physically possible. Matter/energy interactions may produce physical effects that are more subtle than you may think is possible.

 

[ryan]

I am talking about a certain level of classification. Like, I know you think mountains or trees exist that are more specific than just being physical.

What else can it be.

That is the "what" question of consciousness; it is hard to answer. If it doesn't affect anything yet somehow still exists, then it is not physical in the classical, relative or QM sense of "physical". Qualia is a feature of matter, and cannot even be indirectly observed.

To say it doesn't effect anything isn't quite right. If consciousness is the brains self generated 'map' of the external world, as it appears to be, then it does something, it serves a useful, functional purpose, a means or a tool with which to negotiate the external world.

The physical aspect of the consciousness takes care of all navigation. The "what it's like to be x" is just some other kind of thing.

Saying that implies knowledge of what is or isn't physically possible. Matter/energy interactions may produce physical effects that are more subtle than you may think is possible.

The ability to have a physical effect is a physical property. So even if qualia has physical properties, then that would be at least 2 properties. The physically of qualia would not negate its "what It's like" property of matter.

 

[PyramidHead]

What do you people mean when you say "physical"? Does it only include the constituents of matter and energy we currently know about (and if so, why)? If not, and if it could potentially encompass any phenomenon that has a measurable impact on something, why bother with the word "physical" at all?

 

[ryan]

What do you people mean when you say "physical"? Does it only include the constituents of matter and energy we currently know about (and if so, why)? If not, and if it could potentially encompass any phenomenon that has a measurable impact on something, why bother with the word "physical" at all?

There are different kinds of physicalism, see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#FraForDis . From what I have read, generally speaking I think the physical is based on an objective account of nature and is reducible to elementary constituents, their properties and behaviors.

I think observation came first, and really, physicalism seems to be an inductive assumption that everything is and always will be what we have learnt about nature.

 

[PyramidHead]

What do you people mean when you say "physical"? Does it only include the constituents of matter and energy we currently know about (and if so, why)? If not, and if it could potentially encompass any phenomenon that has a measurable impact on something, why bother with the word "physical" at all?

There are different kinds of physicalism, see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#FraForDis . From what I have read, generally speaking I think the physical is based on an objective account of nature and is reducible to elementary constituents, their properties and behaviors.

As opposed to what? What would be a non-objective account of nature that is nonetheless true without being objectively true? What would something look like if it doesn't have properties and behaviors that follow from what it's made of? I think these are just aspects of observation per se, not features of one kind of substance.

I think observation came first, and really, physicalism seems to be an inductive assumption that everything is and always will be what we have learnt about nature.

Who the heck says that? Do you think there are any physicalists who would reject new scientific discoveries because they add to what we have learned about nature?

My point is that if there are mental properties or mental substances, our calling them mental instead of physical is just an artifact of language, not a reflection of some deep ontological divide. Stuff that can push other stuff around can just be called stuff without qualification. If the stuff you're talking about can't push anything around, it's not even stuff. It's a way of looking at stuff, or a particular description of stuff from a perspective, but it's not new stuff.

 

[ryan]

I think observation came first, and really, physicalism seems to be an inductive assumption that everything is and always will be what we have learnt about nature.

Who the heck says that? Do you think there are any physicalists who would reject new scientific discoveries because they add to what we have learned about nature?

Not specifics, but major generalizations about nature must remain constant like conservation and causality, and most importantly inductive reasoning that nothing else will ever happen. It's not perfect, but it has been working so far.

My point is that if there are mental properties or mental substances, our calling them mental instead of physical is just an artifact of language, not a reflection of some deep ontological divide. Stuff that can push other stuff around can just be called stuff without qualification. If the stuff you're talking about can't push anything around, it's not even stuff. It's a way of looking at stuff, or a particular description of stuff from a perspective, but it's not new stuff.

Are you talking about intentionality/aboutness? That is a huge metaphysical mystery. Our mind appears to select physical things to represent its own thoughts. It just so happens that physical objects/terms like "mind" and "thoughts" exist for us to "fill" them with an intentional meaning.

We know that there is nothing special about the terms "mind" and "thoughts" because other people with other languages could have used them to mean something physical like "tree" or "lake".

 

[PyramidHead]

Who the heck says that? Do you think there are any physicalists who would reject new scientific discoveries because they add to what we have learned about nature?

Not specifics, but major generalizations about nature must remain constant like conservation and causality, and most importantly inductive reasoning that nothing else will ever happen. It's not perfect, but it has been working so far.

That's not physicalism, that's just science. The longer a theory goes without any inconsistent observations, the higher the bar for it to be overturned by something new. Doesn't say anything about physical or non-physical, it just means any new paradigm has a lot of ground to cover.

My point is that if there are mental properties or mental substances, our calling them mental instead of physical is just an artifact of language, not a reflection of some deep ontological divide. Stuff that can push other stuff around can just be called stuff without qualification. If the stuff you're talking about can't push anything around, it's not even stuff. It's a way of looking at stuff, or a particular description of stuff from a perspective, but it's not new stuff.

Are you talking about intentionality/aboutness? That is a huge metaphysical mystery. Our mind appears to select physical things to represent its own thoughts. It just so happens that physical objects/terms like "mind" and "thoughts" exist for us to "fill" them with an intentional meaning.

We know that there is nothing special about the terms "mind" and "thoughts" because other people with other languages could have used them to mean something physical.

Not sure what your last sentence means, but yes, I'm saying that the immediacy/subjectivity of consciousness, the "here, mine, now" of the internal perspective, is just that: a perspective, an aspect of a thing, not a thing in itself. I'm currently of the mind (heh) that this perspective is not reducible to a description from a third-person perspective. It just doesn't seem possible as a matter of principle, not because we don't have the right technology. It's a perspective that doesn't have any external features that we can attach words to; anything we come up with would just be a comparison to some other internal state.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You say qualia are somehow "imagined", which usually means non-existent, as in "an imagined god", whereas I say I know my qualia and qualia are all that I know, which logically entails that qualia exist for real, whereas I don't know whether there's anything like a world out there, even if there is actually one.
EB

Again. Yet again. You misrepresent what I write so you can screed about qualis as if ignoring what is the actual case makes your continued use of useless jargon OK.

You experience redness. Indeed. We all do. Then, expectedly, you drawl off into classical BS to construct a circular 'explain' for your experience. There is no domain for your 'I''. There is no nest of qualities floating out there waiting for you to interpret what is happening as your experience. Your experience has a physical base, can be explained by referencing that base as you experience. It arises because nervous systems are formed and constructed IAC with what we experience. My little cookbook on experience explains experience better than your shopworn babel and place holders. Full Stop. Saying quale adds nothing, leads nowhere, reflects your ignorance and your bias toward dualism.

More of the same irrelevant philosophy.

Your just ignore what people say and you deny by ignorance the reality of what they know. What's the point of that?!

Qualia exists and it's the only thing I know exists. Qualia might be some day somehow explained but I doubt it and I see not an iota of a beginning of an explanation under the current scientific paradigm. When AI machines take over, your gang will have a great time agreeing with them.

To insist that talking about qualia is pointless is pointless. So be my guest.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Color is hue, saturation and brightness.
What fromderinside says is that some creatures only see brightness, not hue or saturation.
This is normally express as "only see shades of grey".

White and black are not hues, only max and min brighness.

So a creature having two different receptors would definitely not see just different shades of grey.
But a creature with only one type of receptor would.

What Juma wrote!.

Let me finish your sentence: What Juma wrote is irrelevant.
EB

 

[Juma]

What Juma wrote!.

Let me finish your sentence: What Juma wrote is irrelevant.
EB

Just writing something doesnt make it so.
I thank you that acknowledge that my post is correct.

 

[ryan]

Not specifics, but major generalizations about nature must remain constant like conservation and causality, and most importantly inductive reasoning that nothing else will ever happen. It's not perfect, but it has been working so far.

That's not physicalism, that's just science. The longer a theory goes without any inconsistent observations, the higher the bar for it to be overturned by something new. Doesn't say anything about physical or non-physical, it just means any new paradigm has a lot of ground to cover.

Scientific theory is inherently married with an ontological assumption, namely scientific realism. A theory goes into philosophy (induction) by saying that some understangings of an experiment might represent an absolute truth of an aspect of the universe in general. It is a theory of absolute truth of a characteristic of the universe.

My point is that if there are mental properties or mental substances, our calling them mental instead of physical is just an artifact of language, not a reflection of some deep ontological divide. Stuff that can push other stuff around can just be called stuff without qualification. If the stuff you're talking about can't push anything around, it's not even stuff. It's a way of looking at stuff, or a particular description of stuff from a perspective, but it's not new stuff.

Are you talking about intentionality/aboutness? That is a huge metaphysical mystery. Our mind appears to select physical things to represent its own thoughts. It just so happens that physical objects/terms like "mind" and "thoughts" exist for us to "fill" them with an intentional meaning.

We know that there is nothing special about the terms "mind" and "thoughts" because other people with other languages could have used them to mean something physical.

Not sure what your last sentence means

Intentionality is a very important part of linguistics. To say that a symbol is "about" something is a very strange thing don't you think? It is a metaphysical concern because science has no way of explaining it using observable phenomena.

In the mind, there is a metaphysical connection between the word car and an actual car. Our mind does this, but there is no physical reason why. This is one of the main mysteries of the consciousness and especially how these metaphysical connections relate to matter.

, but yes, I'm saying that the immediacy/subjectivity of consciousness, the "here, mine, now" of the internal perspective, is just that: a perspective, an aspect of a thing, not a thing in itself.

Yeah, I know that the more popular philosophical consensus is that the consciousness is not a thing in of itself, but I have a very very hard time believing that.

Qualia sure seems like a thing to me. It may be inherently related to matter somehow, but it sure seems like a thing in of itself to me.

I'm currently of the mind (heh) that this perspective is not reducible to a description from a third-person perspective. It just doesn't seem possible as a matter of principle, not because we don't have the right technology. It's a perspective that doesn't have any external features that we can attach words to; anything we come up with would just be a comparison to some other internal state.

Yes I agree because physical properties may exist with no conscious awareness. But once we claim the existence of conscious awareness, we have to say that it is not interchangeable with just physical properties.

 

[untermensche]

But you say it's only physical. That is practically the same thing as saying it does not exist. Because, when we finally do find its exact physical embodiment, there will still be the same issue. The dualists will say that there is something more, namely the experience itself. But you will use its biological term and say that there is nothing more.

Other qualia will always have a physical "shell" that we will observe, but we will never observe it.

I didn't say ''it's only physical'' which appears to diminish something that's quite marvelous. Consciousness is physical, a physical process effected by physical conditions, drugs, etc. What else can it be. The world/universe as a whole is quite marvelous, yet obviously it is physical.

Being able to disrupt something does not tell you anything about what it is.

Reaching out and stopping a moving fan does not tell you one thing about why it was spinning.

Having consciousness disrupted by alcohol does not tell you one thing about what it is, beyond saying it can be disrupted by alcohol.

Yes consciousness can be disrupted by alcohol and by fever and by damage.

This does not explain in any way what consciousness is.

It does not limit the explanation of consciousness in any way, except to say that consciousness works better without these things.

Radios work better when not filled with water. This tells us nothing about how a radio works.

 

[DBT]

What do you people mean when you say "physical"? Does it only include the constituents of matter and energy we currently know about (and if so, why)? If not, and if it could potentially encompass any phenomenon that has a measurable impact on something, why bother with the word "physical" at all?

'Physical' is just a reference to the 'stuff' that the world and its objects appear to composed of. What that 'stuff' ultimately is, wave/particles or whatever (semantics), is probably impossible to define...at least currently.

 

[DBT]

I didn't say ''it's only physical'' which appears to diminish something that's quite marvelous. Consciousness is physical, a physical process effected by physical conditions, drugs, etc. What else can it be. The world/universe as a whole is quite marvelous, yet obviously it is physical.

Being able to disrupt something does not tell you anything about what it is.

The concern here is not to try to guess the essence of consciousness, electrical impulses somehow forming mental imagery, however it may be done, but that the brain is the mechanism responsible for consciousness formation....which the evidence supports but you reject in favour of something far more explicable without evidential support, autonomous, disembodied consciousness. That is the stuff of faith.

Having consciousness disrupted by alcohol does not tell you one thing about what it is, beyond saying it can be disrupted by alcohol.

Nonsense. Alcohol as with any chemical or structural change to the brain effects consciousness in very specific ways because it is the brain that is forming consciousness. Vision being related to information from the eyes being processed and formed as visual imagery, and so on. A direct relationship between information input, processing and vision.

 

[untermensche]

Being able to disrupt something does not tell you anything about what it is.

The concern here is not to try to guess the essence of consciousness, electrical impulses somehow forming mental imagery, however it may be done, but that the brain is the mechanism responsible for consciousness formation....which the evidence supports but you reject in favour of something far more explicable without evidential support, autonomous, disembodied consciousness. That is the stuff of faith.

Having consciousness disrupted by alcohol does not tell you one thing about what it is, beyond saying it can be disrupted by alcohol.

Nonsense. Alcohol as with any chemical or structural change to the brain effects consciousness in very specific ways because it is the brain that is forming consciousness. Vision being related to information from the eyes being processed and formed as visual imagery, and so on. A direct relationship between information input, processing and vision.

You have made no argument. You have merely repeated an irrational idea as if it were a magic spell.

Disrupting consciousness with alcohol does not tell you one thing about consciousness beyond the fact that it can be disrupted by alcohol.

It does not tell you what consciousness is or limit it's explanation at all, beyond the side note that it can be disrupted by alcohol.

Consciousness could be some spirit using the brain for enjoyment and it would still be disrupted by alcohol.

You haven't limited the explanation of consciousness in any way with this.