Consciousness

[George S]

A computer chip contains thousands of transistors.

Each of these, apparently, has the ability to say 'no', because otherwise computers couldn't control anything.

Apparently the concept of software is one that untermensche has never encountered.

I hesitate to even suggest that software, when running, is a dynamic pattern of the states of the various hardware components of a computer, in case his head explodes - being exposed to new ways of thinking about reality appears to be a frightening experience for him.

But it's OK - doubtless his trusty defence mechanism of calling me stupid and telling me that I don't understand anything, followed by a repetitive demand for proof of something only he believes to be of any relevance to my analogy, will see him through without the need to apply thought to a situation in which he might not be the authority he imagines himself to be.

And yes, I am aware that there are many dissimilarities between brains and computers. None of which are actually relevant to the point I am making here.

That is a good analogy. A complete, functioning general Turing machine can be built by NAND gates. A NAND gate takes in two inputs A and B and creates 1 output if it is not true that both A and B are 1. NotAnd. All other logical functions can be implemented by combinations of NAND gates. (Source: Me, a professor of computer science.)

It is also true that neurons can function as NAND gates. Some neurons take a threshold level of inputs to inhibit (says no to) output. That threshold level can be provided by two inputs from other neurons. Therefore it is possible for a portion of the neurology to be a Turing machine -- a computer -- a biological computer.

Does that mean it does? It is certainly plausible. Orgel's second rule: Evolution is cleverer than you are. He said this before the discovery that certain biological processes use quantum mechanics. If it were a survival advantage to have an on-board computer we could expect to find one.

I think you are closer than you think, bilby. It is plausible that consciousness is that digital computer. In fact it may well implement a quantum computer for fast information retrieval (See Shor's algorithm).

Consciousness may be what it is like to be a hybrid of digital, analog and quantum computation.

 

[untermensche]

Well, I called it.

Yes, I am claiming that the brain is a computer chip. Square, black, loads of little metallic legs. You got me.

So once again, you say absolutely NOTHING!!!!

 

[untermensche]

So there's that. Still not holding my breath for a retraction.

You're due no retraction for making bad conclusions.

Nobody ever said an MRI can induce a current.

Nobody ever said it caused harm.

People in this very thread claimed consciousness was some electrical "pattern".

And I said that an electrical "pattern" would be distorted in a strong magnetic field.

You can apologize at any time.

- - - Updated - - -

This is not an explanation of anything.

It is not an understanding of anything.

We both use the word "understanding" the same way.

Well, I tried.

Explaining absolutely nothing is not trying very hard.

 

[bilby]

Well, I called it.

Yes, I am claiming that the brain is a computer chip. Square, black, loads of little metallic legs. You got me.

So once again, you say absolutely NOTHING!!!!

Well, you started it.

Apart from contradicting everything anyone else says (or rather, your own idiosyncratic belief about what they ought to have said), exactly what have you contributed to this discussion?

Clue - it begins with an 'N'.

You have successfully denied a claim nobody made, that consciousness is 'some electrical "pattern"'. You have also denied everything else anyone else has said. That's the sum total of your achievements. You could be replaced by an index card with 'No' written on it.

 

[untermensche]

So once again, you say absolutely NOTHING!!!!

Well, you started it.

Apart from contradicting everything anyone else says, exactly what have you contributed to this discussion?

Clue - it begins with an 'N'.

You don't think it's important in a thread about consciousness to point out there is no physiological explanation?

And to counter claims there are with argument?

We have different definitions of utility.

 

[ryan]

To understand anything first of all means knowing what it is.

In all the activity we see in the brain, which is the specific activity that results in consciousness?

I know what consciousness is. It is an emergent property of the neurology. We consider a human not to be able to experience consciousness if they are brain-dead.

I do not know exactly which neurons must be excised to remove consciousness. But certain sensory (conscious) experiences (sight, sound, pain, etc.) do have identifiable regions activated.

In a not so specific way, I think untermensche is trying to say that correlations between consciousness and neural activity is just the tip of a much more mysterious iceberg.

The "how" question is about how this subjective presence of awareness comes from matter, if it even comes from matter at all. The emergence from the matter is not at all an explanation of how it emerges. If we want to know how a baby comes from a mother, nobody would be happy with the answer "it emerges from the womb". The how question is part of "the hard problem".

The "what" question is even more mysterious. We only know that it exists, but we nothing about it objectively, if that's even possible.

The "why" question is about what function/effect it has in the overall cognitive process. There is debate on whether or not the "why" question is even physically relevant. Does it only have a psychological effect or does it have an actual physical effect?

 

[bilby]

Well, you started it.

Apart from contradicting everything anyone else says, exactly what have you contributed to this discussion?

Clue - it begins with an 'N'.

You don't think it's important in a thread about consciousness to point out there is no physiological explanation?

And to counter claims there are with argument?

We have different definitions of utility.

No, I don't think that it's important or useful to point out that something is unexplained.

But if it were, once would suffice; then you can step back into your smug ignorance, while those with more to contribute go about finding an explanation.

It's absolutely certain that a physiological explanation exists; because consciousness demonstrably influences brains; and physiology is known to be all that there is that could influence the brain without being directly detectable by external observers.

It's only slightly less certain that you will deny the above claim. But then, nobody expects originality from you - you have made it very clear that you don't ever need to change your mind about anything, because you already know everything that can ever be known. Apparently.

Despite which, the only thing you have contributed to this discussion remains your uninformed opinion that there is nothing to contribute. Well, your non-contribution is noted; if that's all you have, then you can go now.

 

[untermensche]

I know what consciousness is. It is an emergent property of the neurology. We consider a human not to be able to experience consciousness if they are brain-dead.

I do not know exactly which neurons must be excised to remove consciousness. But certain sensory (conscious) experiences (sight, sound, pain, etc.) do have identifiable regions activated.

In a not so specific way, I think untermensche is trying to say that correlations between consciousness and neural activity is just the tip of a much more mysterious iceberg.

The "how" question is about how this subjective presence of awareness comes from matter, if it even comes from matter at all. The emergence from the matter is not at all an explanation of how it emerges. If we want to know how a baby comes from a mother, nobody would be happy with the answer "it emerges from the womb". The how question is part of "the hard problem".

The "what" question is even more mysterious. We only know that it exists, but we nothing about it objectively, if that's even possible.

The "why" question is about what function/effect it has in the overall cognitive process. There is debate on whether or not the "why" question is even physically relevant. Does it only have a psychological effect or does it have an actual physical effect?

Yes.

The actual physiology of consciousness is important.

Because I not only claim consciousness is that which experiences, but it is also that which can move the body, to an extent, and can organize thought and form expressions. It has active properties.

 

[DBT]

Well, I called it.

Yes, I am claiming that the brain is a computer chip. Square, black, loads of little metallic legs. You got me.

So once again, you say absolutely NOTHING!!!!

This is your stock standard response to anything that challenges your beliefs. When in doubt, rinse and repeat.

 

[untermensche]

So once again, you say absolutely NOTHING!!!!

This is your stock standard response to anything that challenges your beliefs. When in doubt, rinse and repeat.

Those that want to claim they understand something don't like being shown they don't.

You don't even know what consciousness is in terms of brain physiology and activity.

All you know about consciousness is your subjective experience of having one.

We have had people in this thread claim consciousness is a "pattern" of activity. We have had people that don't understand that consciousness is "that which experiences", not what it experiences.

We have had people claim that consciousness does not even exist.

I know some would rather that their claims were not challenged.

I understand that weakness in human psychology.

 

[George S]

This is your stock standard response to anything that challenges your beliefs. When in doubt, rinse and repeat.

Those that want to claim they understand something don't like being shown they don't.

You don't even know what consciousness is in terms of brain physiology and activity.

All you know about consciousness is your subjective experience of having one.

We have had people in this thread claim consciousness is a "pattern" of activity.
We have had people that don't understand that consciousness is "that which experiences", not what it experiences.

Why thank you. A positive claim of what consciousness is.

You apparently "understand" that consciousness is that which experiences.
That which experiences as a human does is a person.
How? Through neurology.
Why? Survival advantage.

I know some would rather that their claims were not challenged.

I understand that weakness in human psychology.

 

[untermensche]

Do you experience?

If you do there must be something capable of having experience.

Call it a person, call it consciousness, it doesn't matter.

It is the same thing. "Person" is just a label to show that an individual consciousness is unique.

In everyday usage "person" is also an agent, a thing that makes decisions and acts on them.

I am not saying there is nothing that can be said about the experience of consciousness.

I have said there is no physiological explanation for how consciousness arises out of a bunch of cells.

 

[George S]

Do you experience?

If you do there must be something capable of having experience.

Call it a person, call it consciousness, it doesn't matter.

It is the same thing. "Person" is just a label to show that an individual consciousness is unique.

In everyday usage "person" is also an agent, a thing that makes decisions and acts on them.

I am not saying there is nothing that can be said about the experience of consciousness.

I have said there is no physiological explanation for how consciousness arises out of a bunch of cells.

There are physiological explanations of how consciousness arises in people. Does a similar pattern of activity in the brain of a monkey result in the same experience of, say, red? We are closely related enough so that it is probably true. No one can really know. No one can really know that your red is my red -- conscious experience is that personal. There is no yellow on your screen. The pixels are red, blue, and green only. We know enough of how the brain generates color so we can fake it.

There are populations which can distinguish between two greens that are nearly the same, and other populations that cannot. The first have different words for those two greens, so to learn the language that distinction is necessary. The latter do not.

 

[untermensche]

We know enough of how the brain generates color so we can fake it.

Not true at all.

All we know about that effect is what people have reported. We don't understand the physiology behind it one bit.

We only know about the experience of "yellow" because people have reported it.

What the brain does and how it does it when it creates the experience of color is not understood at all.

We know a little about how the eye transforms light into a neural "signal". We can even follow "activity".

But understanding how the brain creates anything that is experienced is not understood at all.

 

[George S]

We know enough of how the brain generates color so we can fake it.

Not true at all.

All we know about that effect is what people have reported. We don't understand the physiology behind it one bit.

Speak for yourself. You may not understand the physiology, but others do.

We only know about the experience of "yellow" because people have reported it.

What the brain does and how it does it when it creates the experience of color is not understood at all.

We know a little about how the eye transforms light into a neural "signal". We can even follow "activity".

But understanding how the brain creates anything that is experienced is not understood at all.

We are back to "understand." We understand how. What you are distinguishing is your personal experience of yellow which may be different from mine. So what? The same area in your brain is activated by yellow as it is in mine. What it appears to you is probably what I experience too given we are both human. So what? There is an experiencer. A brain. That's nice. A brain experiences color. Nothing new here. What more do you want? We know rods and cones and what part of the brain activates. The brain forms a useful "picture" of the world. So what are you lacking? We know "how," physically, and we know personal experience. That it has a particular quality is simply what the brain generates internally. There is no separate experiencer other than that brain generating the "feel" of experience. What is missing? What is not understood?

 

[untermensche]

Not true at all.

All we know about that effect is what people have reported. We don't understand the physiology behind it one bit.

Speak for yourself. You may not understand the physiology, but others do.

No they do not.

Nobody understands how the brain creates one aspect of experience.

When people look at brain activity they cannot say which activity is creating experience. They can disrupt activity and create a new experience.

And they most certainly cannot say how.

 

[PyramidHead]

Do you experience?

If you do there must be something capable of having experience.

Call it a person, call it consciousness, it doesn't matter.

It is the same thing. "Person" is just a label to show that an individual consciousness is unique.

In everyday usage "person" is also an agent, a thing that makes decisions and acts on them.

I am not saying there is nothing that can be said about the experience of consciousness.

I have said there is no physiological explanation for how consciousness arises out of a bunch of cells.

If consciousness is just the experiencer, how does it make sense to say 'an individual consciousness is unique'? The things that are experienced by consciousness are not part of consciousness, as you always say. So, the inherent nature of consciousness--separate from its content--must be the same in every instance.

 

[untermensche]

Do you experience?

If you do there must be something capable of having experience.

Call it a person, call it consciousness, it doesn't matter.

It is the same thing. "Person" is just a label to show that an individual consciousness is unique.

In everyday usage "person" is also an agent, a thing that makes decisions and acts on them.

I am not saying there is nothing that can be said about the experience of consciousness.

I have said there is no physiological explanation for how consciousness arises out of a bunch of cells.

If consciousness is just the experiencer, how does it make sense to say 'an individual consciousness is unique'? The things that are experienced by consciousness are not part of consciousness, as you always say. So, the inherent nature of consciousness--separate from its content--must be the same in every instance.

It is not just experiencing.

It is experiencing in a certain way.

But that goes without saying.

But to experience in a certain way you still need both that which is capable of experiencing in a certain way and the things it can experience in it's way.

 

[PyramidHead]

If consciousness is just the experiencer, how does it make sense to say 'an individual consciousness is unique'? The things that are experienced by consciousness are not part of consciousness, as you always say. So, the inherent nature of consciousness--separate from its content--must be the same in every instance.

It is not just experiencing.

It is experiencing in a certain way.

But that goes without saying.

But to experience in a certain way you still need both that which is capable of experiencing in a certain way and the things it can experience in it's way.

How does the way your consciousness experiences something differ from the way my consciousness experiences something? We can talk about how our brains differ, how they process information in different ways depending on their current state. But you're talking about something apart from the brain, so that probably doesn't apply. How do you know that your consciousness is different from mine, with regards to the way it experiences things?

 

[untermensche]

It is not just experiencing.

It is experiencing in a certain way.

But that goes without saying.

But to experience in a certain way you still need both that which is capable of experiencing in a certain way and the things it can experience in it's way.

How does the way your consciousness experiences something differ from the way my consciousness experiences something? We can talk about how our brains differ, how they process information in different ways depending on their current state. But you're talking about something apart from the brain, so that probably doesn't apply. How do you know that your consciousness is different from mine, with regards to the way it experiences things?

You start with a human has to experience as a human. It cannot experience as a horse.

And experience has an effect on consciousness. Consciousness is a living thing and it ages and grows and if it lives too long it begins to deteriorate.

A different set of experience will create a different human consciousness.