Could I have been born as someone else?

[bilby]

A million alternate worlds with versions of 'you' in various states and conditions are not actually you. A mad scientist steals a sample of your DNA and grows a hundred clones, but none of them are actually you, nor each other. None are absolutely identical in body or mind and they all diverge with time and experience.

We can just change the thought experiment to say that they are absolutely identical, though. What then? I gave an example of an alternate world where the only difference was a tiny acceleration in the axial precession of a planet thousands of light years away. If that alternate universe exists, not as a concept but as an actual physical reality, there is someone on their version of earth (which we have every reason to believe is exactly identical to ours) with the same genetic and experiential history as me. But I exist in this universe, and not that one. This difference between the two universes with respect to the person in question is all that I mean by "me" in this thread. It's not a physical difference, because the only physical variant is causally isolated from earth. Let me see if I can formulate it as a syllogism:

P1. I am no more than the specific combination of my genetic code, my life history, and my physical origins.

P2. If a person exists with the specific combination of my genetic code, my life history, and my physical origins, I am that person. (from P1)

P3. I am only one person and can never be multiple people simultaneously.

P4. It is possible for more than one person with the specific combination of my genetic code, life history, and physical origins to exist.

C. If multiple people exist with the specific combination, I am all of those people (contradicts P3!)

This is an apparent paradox, isn't it? The only way to resolve it is to either drop P3, which seems like a fundamental fact about identity, or drop P1 and its corollary, P2. If we drop those, the paradox is resolved, but where does that leave personal identity?

P4 is false. Life history includes location; two people cannot simultaneously occupy one location. Two identical people cannot exist.

 

[PyramidHead]

That's a good question which I've never been asked before. I guess it seemed obvious to me. Walking from one location to another has continuity. To better explain I need to tie it to the rest of my philosophy which says that the basis of all knowledge (ie, epistemology), and actually all existence (ontology), is in how things are related to other things. Even the words that make up languages are defined by other words. We talk in metaphors whenever we find the chance. So if you recognize the importance of relatedness in understanding reality then it follows that to simply recreate some thing out of something else breaks all of those relationships. You create a new thing. This a useful perspective in both the epistemological sense that atoms and molecules are known by how they interact with other things, and also in the ontological sense that every object exists uniquely within some larger context, whether it interacts with it or not. Why flirt with dualism when this way of reasoning avoids the existential paradox?

Ya, it used to seem obvious to me as well until I asked myself why and couldn't come up with a decent reason. I now think that it's just an artifact of the way we perceive ourselves and not really anything real in and of itself.

What I don't see from your example, though, is why breaking and recreating the relationships would create a new thing as opposed to simply remaking the old thing. If all we are is the sum total of our (for lack of a better phrase) neural patterns, then I don't see why it would matter if the existence of those neural patterns is continuous or staggered.

Derek Parfit has a fun thought experiment about this, where unbeknownst to you, you are actually a "serial person"; every night, your body is disintegrated completely while you sleep, and a new one is formed from new particles to pick up where the old one left off. The question he poses is, if you knew for a fact that this was true, and that your current body began to exist last night, would you be afraid to go to sleep tonight? I am leaning towards agreement with your position, but I find that I'd still be afraid.

 

[The AntiChris]

We can just change the thought experiment to say that they are absolutely identical, though. What then? I gave an example of an alternate world where the only difference was a tiny acceleration in the axial precession of a planet thousands of light years away. If that alternate universe exists, not as a concept but as an actual physical reality, there is someone on their version of earth (which we have every reason to believe is exactly identical to ours) with the same genetic and experiential history as me. But I exist in this universe, and not that one. This difference between the two universes with respect to the person in question is all that I mean by "me" in this thread. It's not a physical difference, because the only physical variant is causally isolated from earth. Let me see if I can formulate it as a syllogism:

P1. I am no more than the specific combination of my genetic code, my life history, and my physical origins.

P2. If a person exists with the specific combination of my genetic code, my life history, and my physical origins, I am that person. (from P1)

P3. I am only one person and can never be multiple people simultaneously.

P4. It is possible for more than one person with the specific combination of my genetic code, life history, and physical origins to exist.

C. If multiple people exist with the specific combination, I am all of those people (contradicts P3!)

This is an apparent paradox, isn't it? The only way to resolve it is to either drop P3, which seems like a fundamental fact about identity, or drop P1 and its corollary, P2. If we drop those, the paradox is resolved, but where does that leave personal identity?

P4 is false. Life history includes location; two people cannot simultaneously occupy one location. Two identical people cannot exist.

I see no logical reason why this must be the case. Think hypothetical matter duplicator/teletransporter.

My objection is to P3. If you define "I" as the subjective experience of being "me", then a hypothetical matter duplicator could create multiple instances of of people self-identifying as the same "me".

 

[bilby]

P4 is false. Life history includes location; two people cannot simultaneously occupy one location. Two identical people cannot exist.

I see no logical reason why this must be the case. Think hypothetical matter duplicator/teletransporter.

I am thinking that. And I am asserting that the instant such a machine acts, it creates two DIFFERENT entities - at the very least, they must be in different locations.

My objection is to P3. If you define "I" as the subjective experience of being "me", then a hypothetical matter duplicator could create multiple instances of of people self-identifying as the same "me".

Sure. But you don't even need a duplicator/transformer for that. Just ask around - there are billions of people who all self identify as 'me'.

That's not as flippant as you might think, either. The fact that New York Riker and London Riker both believe themselves to be Riker is unimportant - the important thing is that they both deny that the other is really Riker. If they meet, then they don't say 'I'm me, and so are you'; They say 'I'm me, so you are not'. And they are right - if one of them stubs his toe, the other feels no pain.

 

[The AntiChris]

I see no logical reason why this must be the case. Think hypothetical matter duplicator/teletransporter.

I am thinking that. And I am asserting that the instant such a machine acts, it creates two DIFFERENT entities - at the very least, they must be in different locations.

Location isn't mentioned in P4. In any event I don't think location plays any role in defining personal identity (I don't become someone else merely by walking across the room).

My objection is to P3. If you define "I" as the subjective experience of being "me", then a hypothetical matter duplicator could create multiple instances of of people self-identifying as the same "me".

Sure. But you don't even need a duplicator/transformer for that. Just ask around - there are billions of people who all self identify as 'me'.

That's not as flippant as you might think, either. The fact that New York Riker and London Riker both believe themselves to be Riker is unimportant - the important thing is that they both deny that the other is really Riker. If they meet, then they don't say 'I'm me, and so are you';

I'm defining personal identity in terms of survival over time. Both Rikers believe they are the same person who entered the teletransporter and there's no test, either physical or psychological, that can distinguish them in terms of personal identity.

They say 'I'm me, so you are not'. And they are right - if one of them stubs his toe, the other feels no pain.

This is not a problem if one accepts the possibility of branching identity (hypothetical matter duplication/teletransportion etc.). The two are clearly not the same person but they are both 'valid' continuations of the person who entered the teletransporter.

 

[Treedbear]

... Why flirt with dualism when this way of reasoning avoids the existential paradox?

Ya, it used to seem obvious to me as well until I asked myself why and couldn't come up with a decent reason. I now think that it's just an artifact of the way we perceive ourselves and not really anything real in and of itself.

What I don't see from your example, though, is why breaking and recreating the relationships would create a new thing as opposed to simply remaking the old thing. If all we are is the sum total of our (for lack of a better phrase) neural patterns, then I don't see why it would matter if the existence of those neural patterns is continuous or staggered.

If this could actually happen such that I woke one day having been recreated in this manner and thinking nothing unusual had occurred while I was asleep I assume I would just be thinking and feeling the same as any other day and go on assuming I was the same person as before. But if today I found undeniable evidence that I'd been recreated and there was no actual continuity of existence, but that there was another original "me" still in existence I think I'd have to admit that I was not the original me. I was a new me, and therefore a different me. And I see no reason that this rationale would be effected by whether the original me still exists or was destroyed in the process, such as with that Greek ship. It would just be more apparent. And why would it be so important anyway? I'd still be the original copy (for all that it's worth ).

Just as when you create a copy of a paper document you say there is an original as well as a copy, but they are different. And not due to some subsequent changes that may have occurred since the event, but because they have a separate existence. I've come to depend on the concepts that Darwin uncovered as they relate to many philosophical and moral issues. Principally the idea that existence and survival are intertwined. Things (especially living things) exist (we're talking metaphysics now so put on some boots) because they've survived. Existence has no meaning without a history of survival. Therefore that unique continuity defines something's existence. We tend to assign value to things on that basis. So it seems to be a useful way of understanding the world.

 

[bilby]

I am thinking that. And I am asserting that the instant such a machine acts, it creates two DIFFERENT entities - at the very least, they must be in different locations.

Location isn't mentioned in P4. In any event I don't think location plays any role in defining personal identity (I don't become someone else merely by walking across the room).

'Life history' includes location; and it is identified in P1 as one of the traits that define personhood. By walking across the room, you become someone different that you would have been had you remained in your original place.

My objection is to P3. If you define "I" as the subjective experience of being "me", then a hypothetical matter duplicator could create multiple instances of of people self-identifying as the same "me".

Sure. But you don't even need a duplicator/transformer for that. Just ask around - there are billions of people who all self identify as 'me'.

That's not as flippant as you might think, either. The fact that New York Riker and London Riker both believe themselves to be Riker is unimportant - the important thing is that they both deny that the other is really Riker. If they meet, then they don't say 'I'm me, and so are you';

I'm defining personal identity in terms of survival over time. Both Rikers believe they are the same person who entered the teletransporter and there's no test, either physical or psychological, that can distinguish them in terms of personal identity.

Your definition is unsuited to purpose. There is an easy test to distinguish between the Rikers - Stamp on one's toe, and it will be that one who says 'Ouch!'

They say 'I'm me, so you are not'. And they are right - if one of them stubs his toe, the other feels no pain.

This is not a problem if one accepts the possibility of branching identity (hypothetical matter duplication/teletransportion etc.). The two are clearly not the same person but they are both 'valid' continuations of the person who entered the teletransporter.

So you agree, they are not the same person. P3 is false.

 

[DBT]

A million alternate worlds with versions of 'you' in various states and conditions are not actually you. A mad scientist steals a sample of your DNA and grows a hundred clones, but none of them are actually you, nor each other. None are absolutely identical in body or mind and they all diverge with time and experience.

We can just change the thought experiment to say that they are absolutely identical, though. What then? I gave an example of an alternate world where the only difference was a tiny acceleration in the axial precession of a planet thousands of light years away. If that alternate universe exists, not as a concept but as an actual physical reality, there is someone on their version of earth (which we have every reason to believe is exactly identical to ours) with the same genetic and experiential history as me. But I exist in this universe, and not that one. This difference between the two universes with respect to the person in question is all that I mean by "me" in this thread. It's not a physical difference, because the only physical variant is causally isolated from earth. Let me see if I can formulate it as a syllogism:

P1. I am no more than the specific combination of my genetic code, my life history, and my physical origins.

P2. If a person exists with the specific combination of my genetic code, my life history, and my physical origins, I am that person. (from P1)

P3. I am only one person and can never be multiple people simultaneously.

P4. It is possible for more than one person with the specific combination of my genetic code, life history, and physical origins to exist.

C. If multiple people exist with the specific combination, I am all of those people (contradicts P3!)

This is an apparent paradox, isn't it? The only way to resolve it is to either drop P3, which seems like a fundamental fact about identity, or drop P1 and its corollary, P2. If we drop those, the paradox is resolved, but where does that leave personal identity?

I'd say P2 is false. If there are multiple copies, each copy including the original occupies a separate and distinct place in space/time. It is this distinction that makes each an entity/individual in his or her own right. So none can point to the other and say 'I am that person' - which is obvious to an independent, objective observer who sees the two standing in different locations, identical twins for example.

 

[bilby]

 

[The AntiChris]

By walking across the room, you become someone different that you would have been had you remained in your original place.

Sure but that's not the issue. The issue is, does who I am vary dependent on location?. Clearly not. I'm AntiChris wherever I am.

There is an easy test to distinguish between the Rikers - Stamp on one's toe, and it will be that one who says 'Ouch!'

I'm guessing they'd both react in exactly the same way so your "easy test" achieves nothing.

So you agree, they are not the same person. P3 is false.

They're not the same person in one trivially obvious sense - they exist as two separate individuals. But in the sense that they are both continuations of the Riker that entered the transporter they are the both same person who entered the transporter (just as I'm the same person as The AntiChris who joined Internet Infidels in 2002).

________________________

Much of this disagreement hangs on what PyramidHead means in P3.

If he's saying "I" can only ever experience being one person at one time. Then of course, it's trivially true.

The more interesting question is: can the subjective experience of PyramidHead's personal identity be instantiated in more than one physical body simultaneously? Given there are no unique immaterial souls, it seems to me that there is no logical reason this cannot be the case.

 

[PyramidHead]

All of this is getting at what my original question was from the opposite side, as it were. I'm not as interested in whether an identical copy of me in a parallel universe would be me. I'm just using that example to explore how, in principle, nothing about my physical origins or genetic makeup explains why I came into existence.

The "I" that I keep referring to is separate from the content of my actual life history, because as I said earlier, I can drastically change my life history and still be myself. That is, I will still experience (even if it's an illusion) the continuity of my first-person perspective over time. I think this "I" is also separate from the exact configuration of my DNA, because it's hard to see how changing it, a little or a lot, before I was born or after, would have any effect on this subjective continuity (assuming it doesn't damage the brain etc.). It doesn't seem to depend on there being a particular configuration of matter that cannot withstand any variation. The requirements for my "I" coming into existence are not obviously rigid.

From my perspective, there was nothing for billions of years, and then I found myself having conscious experiences and forming memories as a person in the world. Could that person have been anyone, essentially? After I die, what's stopping that from happening again?

 

[Tom Sawyer]

All of this is getting at what my original question was from the opposite side, as it were. I'm not as interested in whether an identical copy of me in a parallel universe would be me. I'm just using that example to explore how, in principle, nothing about my physical origins or genetic makeup explains why I came into existence.

The "I" that I keep referring to is separate from the content of my actual life history, because as I said earlier, I can drastically change my life history and still be myself. That is, I will still experience (even if it's an illusion) the continuity of my first-person perspective over time. I think this "I" is also separate from the exact configuration of my DNA, because it's hard to see how changing it, a little or a lot, before I was born or after, would have any effect on this subjective continuity (assuming it doesn't damage the brain etc.). It doesn't seem to depend on there being a particular configuration of matter that cannot withstand any variation. The requirements for my "I" coming into existence are not obviously rigid.

From my perspective, there was nothing for billions of years, and then I found myself having conscious experiences and forming memories as a person in the world. Could that person have been anyone, essentially? After I die, what's stopping that from happening again?

While that's true, you seem to be operating off of an implicit assumption that this "myself" in the alternate scenarios would bear some resemblance to the "myself" you have in your current scenario. If that other myself does not have the same personality, knowledge, experience, goals, values and all the other facets which make up your sense of identity, in what way is it a You instead of a Not You? If you were to pop into this alternate history and look around, is there a way that you could distinguish the myself you have there from the billions of not-yourselves who are also there?

 

[Speakpigeon]

There's equivocation here, on "me". Bad logic.

One "me" is the person you actually are. The other "me" is the counterfactual one. You should realise they can only be two different "me".

But it's up to you if you really want to call somebody else "me".

Suppose you meet this other "me". Suppose the King says only one of you will be allowed to survive. Only the real "me" will be allowed to live. Aren't you going to plead for your life? I bet you would, and you would say "My Lord, I'm me, the other one is not me. I'm the real me." Think of that.
EB

Fair enough, just call him PyramidHead-B or something. The point being that he is physically indistinguishable from PyramidHead-A (me), but despite that equivalence I am still just PyramidHead-A.

As far as science goes, the two couldn't possibly be physically identical. The mere fact of the two being in different locations and/or time implies they wouldn't be physically identical.

However, philosophical imagination beats science every time. So, let's assume that the two would be physically identical and kept physically identical for long enough to ponder the issue at ease. First, let's still assume A and B would be in two different locations but somehow fed with exactly the same sensory inputs. So we have A and B absolutely identical. Each one has full awareness of being himself and yet A and B subjectively experience exactly the same thing. Ok. So what? I don't know that it should be impossible for another being like me to exist, if not on planet Earth then maybe in some parallel universe. If my being is defined as whatever I experience now, I can accept that there might be another being somewhere else having exactly the same subjective experience. It's probably physically impossible but conceivable. At least, I don't see that there would be any logical problem.

We could also imagine A and B being also in exactly the same place and time while still being distinct although absolutely physically identical to each other. Well, still physically impossible but still conceivable.

So, the impression we have of being ourselves is somewhat overrated. There's no physical difference in being oneself rather than another person, except in the trivial details of what makes our lives.
EB

 

[abaddon]

If that other myself does not have the same personality, knowledge, experience, goals, values and all the other facets which make up your sense of identity, in what way is it a You instead of a Not You?

I think the other “me” does not need all the same goals, values, knowledge and other facets. There’s just one central thing that could make two different bodies into the same “me”. They would need to have the very precise same experience of sitting-here-in-front-of-computer-right-now (or whatever behavior) and then labeling that experiencing “me”. They’d need very precisely the same perspective in any given moment.

In a movie called The Prestige, the inventor Tesla made a duplicating machine and sold it to a magician. The machine created a precise duplicate of the magician, the same in every detail but one. The magician entered the machine, got duplicated and then he fell through a trap door into a cage of water where he drowned (to prevent there being more than one of that magician walking around, which would give-away the secret). The newly duplicated magician appeared somewhere else and received the audience’s applause.

So the guy was murdering himself over and over again, but yet lived on. But was he murdering himself, or someone else? There was a continuity from one magician to the next, but after the duplication the multiple magicians had differing perspectives that were not shared.

Were they the same person for having all the same DNA, same life experiences, and for the one surviving magician feeling like he was still the same person?

No. The one above stage was not feeling the horror of drowning. That was the other guy… a different body regardless of all the same characteristics including “personality” and “memories”… that was drowning. It was another “me”, so it had become a “him”. And vice versa… the drowning man was not experiencing all the applause. That was another guy, another body, another “me”…. a “him”.

Their POV’s were different, and thus they were different persons. Because they were different bodies even though they shared absolutely everything except in-the-moment experiences.

However their sense of “me” formed, the “me” is just that particular body experiencing its experiences right now. And nothing more whatsoever. It’s not a continuing thing, it’s just a confluence of events… an organization of phenomenological events… within a single body at any given moment.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

All of this is getting at what my original question was from the opposite side, as it were. I'm not as interested in whether an identical copy of me in a parallel universe would be me. I'm just using that example to explore how, in principle, nothing about my physical origins or genetic makeup explains why I came into existence.

The "I" that I keep referring to is separate from the content of my actual life history, because as I said earlier, I can drastically change my life history and still be myself. That is, I will still experience (even if it's an illusion) the continuity of my first-person perspective over time. I think this "I" is also separate from the exact configuration of my DNA, because it's hard to see how changing it, a little or a lot, before I was born or after, would have any effect on this subjective continuity (assuming it doesn't damage the brain etc.). It doesn't seem to depend on there being a particular configuration of matter that cannot withstand any variation. The requirements for my "I" coming into existence are not obviously rigid.

From my perspective, there was nothing for billions of years, and then I found myself having conscious experiences and forming memories as a person in the world. Could that person have been anyone, essentially? After I die, what's stopping that from happening again?

Why place so many limits on who and what you are? Clearly you are the sum of your experiences, which includes thoughts. I see myself as lots of things and as part of everything. So I just don't ask so many questions I guess. It's all me.

 

[Speakpigeon]

All of this is getting at what my original question was from the opposite side, as it were. I'm not as interested in whether an identical copy of me in a parallel universe would be me. I'm just using that example to explore how, in principle, nothing about my physical origins or genetic makeup explains why I came into existence.

The "I" that I keep referring to is separate from the content of my actual life history, because as I said earlier, I can drastically change my life history and still be myself. That is, I will still experience (even if it's an illusion) the continuity of my first-person perspective over time. I think this "I" is also separate from the exact configuration of my DNA, because it's hard to see how changing it, a little or a lot, before I was born or after, would have any effect on this subjective continuity (assuming it doesn't damage the brain etc.). It doesn't seem to depend on there being a particular configuration of matter that cannot withstand any variation. The requirements for my "I" coming into existence are not obviously rigid.

From my perspective, there was nothing for billions of years, and then I found myself having conscious experiences and forming memories as a person in the world. Could that person have been anyone, essentially? After I die, what's stopping that from happening again?

I don't see the difference between what you seem to accept as other possible you(s) and anybody not you. Assuming there's another you, say a B one, you, the A one, won't have the subjective experience this B version would have of himself, and vice versa. Whether or not you are nearly, or even entirely physically identical, whether or not your minds have the same informational contents, wouldn't affect this aspect of the situation. The specific contents of my mind don't matter to my impression of being myself except, as is very possible if not very likely, if this impression is itself a content. We can sometimes still have the experience of being even without much mental content. This experience is only different in terms of the range of contents experienced. So, it's at least conceivable, and possibly likely, that the core of what is our experience is identical. We have probably the same basic experience. It is very nearly as if we were all the same people but all in different places. We take other people to be different people when we could just as well take them to be versions of ourselves in other places and possibly dressed differently, and, yes, all inhabiting different-loking bodies. According to this, you are you merely by virtue of being in one place rather than another. You are you not because you are the child of your parents but merely because all the sensory information which is available to you is obtained from a unique ventage point and different people have different ventage points. You just happen to believe all the piece of this sensory information belong to a unique organism that you think of as a person. And for most of us, our mental contents appear coherent with this one-person perspective. So it's all down to essentially how our sensory information is organised, and obviously for good reasons I suppose.
EB

 

[ryan]

... This difference between the two universes with respect to the person in question is all that I mean by "me" in this thread. It's not a physical difference, because the only physical variant is causally isolated from earth. ...

I'm not sure what "the only physical variant is causally isolated from earth" means exactly or why it is relevant. But if your concern has nothing to do with consciousness, why not simplify the problem and say we have two identical circles. Are they the same circle? I'd say no. Perhaps you'd object that they're uniqueness comes from their physical location in space. But we could place them on separate but identical pieces of paper. Still the pieces of paper wouldn't be identical in location with respect to the larger world. The point is that even if there are two identical you's in two identical universes there is always a larger context which makes them unique and therefore not the same.

But those are irrelevant extrinsic properties.

 

[untermensche]

The only "you" right now is the "you" that followed the contingent path you followed and was exposed to everything you were exposed to.

Any other path creates a different "you".

 

[ryan]

Ya, it used to seem obvious to me as well until I asked myself why and couldn't come up with a decent reason. I now think that it's just an artifact of the way we perceive ourselves and not really anything real in and of itself.

What I don't see from your example, though, is why breaking and recreating the relationships would create a new thing as opposed to simply remaking the old thing. If all we are is the sum total of our (for lack of a better phrase) neural patterns, then I don't see why it would matter if the existence of those neural patterns is continuous or staggered.

Derek Parfit has a fun thought experiment about this, where unbeknownst to you, you are actually a "serial person"; every night, your body is disintegrated completely while you sleep, and a new one is formed from new particles to pick up where the old one left off. The question he poses is, if you knew for a fact that this was true, and that your current body began to exist last night, would you be afraid to go to sleep tonight? I am leaning towards agreement with your position, but I find that I'd still be afraid.

Or even worse, aliens replace you with a perfect clone of you somehow without disrupting anything in the environment. "You" get taken away to be tortured and experimented on while your clone wakes up not knowing anything is wrong. Moreover, people would know no physical difference, yet there is a difference. Unique subjectivity escapes materialism.

 

[ryan]

The only "you" right now is the "you" that followed the contingent path you followed and was exposed to everything you were exposed to.

Any other path creates a different "you".

The question is, what is the difference between the original and the duplicate? There is no physical difference at any moment in time during the existence of the clone and into the future. So physically speaking, where I came from does not matter as long as the copy remains exactly what it would be if I wasn't recreated. There is no physical difference moving forward, yet somehow there is still a difference. My subjective "I" is no longer.