The debate is about two worldviews, a (roughly speaking) naturalistic one according to which the existence of reality (and other questions) requires no supernatural cause or explanation, and a (roughly speaking) supernaturalistic view according to which existence is best explained in terms of a transcendent entity.
- I believe that a god is the most plausible explanation.
Why? Because when I compare the two worldviews, I find many arguments in favor of a god to be cogent and sound. On the other hand, I find that the arguments in support of the naturalistic view are not cogent or sound.
Let me try to give a short overview. Take P1 (that all finite things, those things that begin to exist, were brought into existence by something else). If P1 were false, as Dr. Carrier argues, I would have to believe that it is possible that some of these things, sometimes, can come into being by nothing and from nothing. Dr. Carrier has a point here. He says, “Why not?” My problem is that I have excellent reasons to doubt his “Why not”.
The first reason is that it seems metaphysically absurd that something just materialize without reason—regardless of whether we are talking about events or objects within our universe or anywhere else.
- The second reason is that we have empirical evidence that finite objects and events are always brought into being by something else.
- The third reason is that given the complexity of the universe, I highly doubt that it came into being by nothing (here I am referring to truth, logic, morality, the fine tuning, etc).
- The fourth reason applies to P2. Namely, I doubt that the universe can be past eternal. Here I am surprised that Dr. Carrier did not mention the B-theory, or static view, of time. I am surprised because the B-theory of time is the best argument against P2 because if time is an illusion, then there is no temporal sequence about which to worry. But I understand that this might have opened a bigger philosophical can of worms.
[...] [H]uman knowledge is incomplete and, maybe, as weird as it seems, we might not have 100% certainty of P1 and P2. But this is not strong enough an argument to make me doubt the truth of P1 and P2—just like solipsism is not enough to seriously make me doubt that there is an external world and other minds besides mine exist.
- Therefore, in the end, I believe that my arguments tilt the scale on the side of P3, i.e., the universe was brought into existence by something else.
How do I then go from P3 to the existence of a deistic god? That is not simple. However, if one accepts that the universe is not eternal, and thus it was brought into being by something else, it would seem to me that the “something else” in question must be outside the causal chain, it must not be an event or a material object, it must not be a temporal object, and it must be endowed with a significant degree of freedom such that it can start a causal series. I think Dr. Carrier here ask me the following, “Assuming for the sake of argument that P3 is true, why does it have to be a god? There are other options.” Fair enough, but we did not even get there, and I think that a god is the best explanation.
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Dr. Alvaro on March 27, 2024 at 11:51 am
COMMENT BY Chris Miller on March 27, 2024
Speaking strictly for myself, I would still disagree on several points, but they could be prompts for discussion rather than obstacles to it. To summarize:
- The Kalam itself, as you presented and defended it, does not get one to supernaturalism nor any transcendent entity. Reaching such a conclusion would definitely take additional steps.
If P1 is false, yes, the alternative is that some things can come into existence from nothing. So? Dr. Carrier’s argument was not merely “why not?” (although that’s a valid question—why is that objectionable?); he offered links and citations, including to a published scientific article specifically defining a nothing-state from which a “something” could emerge, on the grounds (to oversimplify a bit) that “nothing” is a precarious and unstable condition that’s liable to collapse. You don’t take up this argument in any fashion.
Instead, you object that something-from-nothing “seems metaphysically absurd.” That’s not an argument. That’s just personal intuition, which is notoriously unreliable and, for that matter, inconsistent from one individual to the next.
Any empirical evidence based on objects and events within our spacetime is, of course, limited to our spacetime, not generalizable beyond it (e.g., to its origins).
Complexity is also not an argument, especially when (again) grounded only in intuition. We have countless examples of more complex systems emerging from less-complex ones even within our spacetime. It’s worth noting in passing, however, that morality is not one of them (it’s a purely human construct, not a natural force), and also that arguments about “fine tuning” for human life tend to be grounded on flawed assumptions.
Yes, Dr. Carrier casts doubt on P1 and P2. That’s why he wins: because the way you framed the problem, you set yourself the burden of foreclosing all doubt. As long as there is any credible doubt about P1 and P2, the Kalam fails. It must be logically necessary under all circumstances in order for P3 to follow. Merely “tilting the scale” is (as often noted) to offer an inductive argument rather than a deductive one, which moves the goalposts.
Circling back around… even if the Kalam gets us to “something else,” further arguments grounded on “it would seem to me” are obviously open to objections in the form of “what about these other alternatives”? IOW, one could stipulate “something else” for the sake of argument, and still propose that Occam’s Razor leaves us with nothing more than some logically prior state of being, set of conditions, or combination of forces. As noted upthread by commenter Ash Bowie, for instance, these could include “either an eternal past (e.g. Sean Carroll, CIT), a multiverse (e.g. David Deutsch, Oxford), a cyclic model of big bangs and big crunches (Roger Penrose, Oxford), or some kind of quantum initial state (e.g. Alexander Vilenkin, Tufts).” On what basis can you dismiss those possibilities (or others!) in favor of something more complex (which any form of consciousness certainly is)?
I wish the debate had worked its way through those points. |
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