Demystifying Determinism

[Marvin Edwards]

Action A was determined, yet action B happened.

Nope. Action B COULD HAVE happened, but it WOULD NOT happen. Therefore there was no deviation.

The possibility of a deviation within a sequence of deterministic events allows at least two events to happen, action A or action B.

Nope. The POSSIBILITY of a deviation is NOT an ACTUAL deviation. While two things CAN happen, only one thing WILL happen.

Get used to it. There are MANY possible futures, but there will be only ONE actual future.

Based on your own definition, determinism does not permit deviations,

And, there are no ACTUAL deviations, even though there are many POSSIBLE deviations.

consequently there are no alternate actions or deciding between action B or action A

Nope. Consequently there is NO ALTERNATIVE but to DECIDE between action B and action A.

- the latter must happen because it's entailed by the system as it evolves or develops.

Yes, but not just the latter (action A) the DECIDING was also entailed by the system as it evolves or develops.

Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

And Jarhyn is absolutely correct.

The undeniable consequence of a deterministic system is that there are no alternatives to select from.

But DBT is certainly NOT correct. The undeniable consequence of a deterministic system is that CHOOSING WILL HAPPEN and that when it does, there will ALWAYS be MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES to choose from.

Whatever happens must necessarily happen.

Indeed it must.

What must necessarily happen is not a matter of choice or free will.

Except, of course, all of the millions of times when it IS a matter of CHOICE and FREE WILL.

Like the guy said, DBT, "You don't have a leg to stand on."

Your interpretation of determinism negates the primary assumption of determinism, that ALL events will be reliably caused by preceding events. You keep trying to pretend that choosing is not one of those events. But it is!

 

[Kylie]

If you say Outcome A WILL happen, then outcome A has a probability of 100%.

If you say that, simultaneously, Outcome B CAN happen, then...

Hold on; Nobody is ever in a position to say those things simultaneously. That's the entire fucking point.

What CAN happen is a provisional claim about the unknowable future.

What WILL happen is a definitive claim about a known situation. It's impossible to know for sure what WILL happen, unless you are discussing a recording of past events.

Even then, there's a non-zero possibility that you might be wrong. If you are watching Star Wars, and you say "in a minute, Luke will decide to go off with Obi-Wan instead of staying on Tatooine", you are probably right - but there's a non-zero possibility that the power might go out, and he will never do that because the movie stops playing.

So if the future is by definition unknowable, how can you be justified in saying that what will happen in that future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now.

Such a claim - that the state of the universe (and don't quibble with the words here, you know what I mean) - is determined by some previous state implies that we can look at some particular state of the universe and extrapolate it to determine what will happen in the future. From what has been said in this thread, that's the core argument of determinism, that anything that happens is DETERMINED by what came before. If you are to claim that the future is inherently unknowable and can not be determined ahead of time, not because we lack sufficient knowledge, but because it is in principle unknowable, then determinism can not be true.

 

[Kylie]

If you say that, simultaneously, Outcome B CAN happen, then Outcome B MUST have some non-zero probability.

Nope. This is just an illusion. It can absolutely have a zero probability chance of happening from one initial state, for example, while having a 100% probability as the result of a different prior state.

The only time when probabilities become nonzero are in the models of the imagination, when we gamble on things we cannot, at that moment, know.

The probabilities are created by us being in a fun house mirror maze where we can't actually tell what future microstate our current microstate will advance to.

Of course, sometimes systems become rather chaotic as they progress, such as the order of a deck of cards. In this way, we cannot know without cheating and looking, or literally tracking the cards through the chaos, which hand we will be dealt, but there most certainly is only one order of cards in the deck.

It is the uncertainty that we play with, the path towards resolving what we cannot know into what everything inevitably would become, certain, determined, and singular in the past, which creates this illusion.

All the hard Determinist manages to say then is "probability is an illusion", but as we have, all of the compatibilists, pointed out: it is not about probabilistics or randomness, it is about recognizing that choice happens, exclusively in fact, by deterministic process.

If it has a 0% chance of happening, then it's wrong to say it CAN happen.

Nope. This is an illusion. We are talking a Deterministic system here, but one which nonetheless can be presented different states.

"Could" is not limited by that which immediately is happening. "Could" is limited by what evolves from some set of presented states, that are not necessarily "that which must happen ala deterministic process against the state of reality".

The mere fact that this extension is mathematically describable, is enough to recognize that the approximal process, "doing it in your head with macrophysical models" is exactly "me deciding for myself" to the same extent that I can in fact deterministically describe "me deciding for the dwarf". The fact is, "I decided" is all I need to demonstrate for "choice" and "will" and "freedom" -- though the dwarf in this example had none of those but "will". Sorry, Urist.

If it COULD happen, then there's no justification for saying it has a 0% chance, is there?

"Could" has nothing to do with "chance". They have absolutely nothing to do with one another.

Unsupported claim.

 

[Kylie]

You miss the point that it doesn't matter what we know. Our knowledge does not determine the way the universe is.

You miss the point that it DOES matter what we know. Probabilities are IRRELEVANT if we already KNOW that something will happen.

Absolute garbage.

Or are you suggesting that the universe was not deterministic when it was first created because there was no one around to have knowledge.

Our knowledge does not change reality.

It is only with we do not already KNOW what will happen that we consider different possibilities and the probability that one or the other will happen.

For example:

If I give you three boxes, tell you that keys to a new car are in one and then ask you to pick one, the fact that you don't know doesn't mean that each box has a non-zero probability. No matter what you say, one box has a 100% chance and the other two have a 0% chance.

The fact that I do not know which of three boxes holds the keys means that each box has a 33.3% probability of having the keys. None of the boxes have a 100% probability.

The fact that one of the boxes will inevitably hold the keys does not change any of the probabilities. We have the same situation with the horse race. We know that one of the horses will inevitably win the race, but we don't know which one. So, we calculate the odds of winning based upon the factors that we do know, like the age of the horse, its history of wins and losses, the conditions of the track, the experience of the jockey, etc.

Despite the fact that one of the horses will win and all of the others will not win, does not change the odds, because the only reason that we are computing the odds is because WE DON"T KNOW WHICH HORSE WILL WIN.

Probabilities are entirely about what we know and what we don't know. The same is true for possibilities.

So what if I know which box the keys are in? I can then safely say that you are incorrect when you say that each box has a 33.3...% chance of holding the keys, and tell you to keep trying.

If something WILL happen, then that thing has a probability of 100%.

Sorry, but that is incorrect.

Unsupported claim.

Please show how something that WILL DEFINITELY HAPPEN, ABSOLUTELY GUARANTEED TO HAPPEN NO DOUBT ABOUT IT WHATSOEVER can ever have a probability of less than 100%

 

[Kylie]

So the outcome can only be "set in stone" AFTER it has happened?

If you like the "set in stone" metaphor, then, yes, the outcome will be "set in stone" from any prior point in eternity. So what? How does that change anything?

We still don't know WHAT is "set in stone" to happen. And when we don't know the single thing that WILL happen, we consider the MULTIPLE things that CAN happen, compute the probability for each if you like, and place our bets.

That's how possibilities and probabilities work.

You fail to grasp the point that if it is "set in stone," then there's nothing we can do to change it, and thus we do not have free will.

 

[bilby]

So if the future is by definition unknowable, how can you be justified in saying that what will happen in that future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now.

The condition the universe is in now is also unknowable. Ask Heisenberg.

And, YET AGAIN, I don't believe that what will happen in the future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now. But I accept it for the sake of this discussion, because it makes no difference to this discussion whether it is or not.

I believe that's the fourth of fifth time you have demanded to know why I think determinism is true, and the sixth or seventh time in this thread that I have mentioned that I don't think that determinism is true.

Could you perhaps stop demanding that I demonstrate the truth of something I explicitly say I believe to be false? It's making me question your psychiatric well being.

 

[bilby]

If you are to claim that the future is inherently unknowable and can not be determined ahead of time, not because we lack sufficient knowledge, but because it is in principle unknowable, then determinism can not be true.

There are other, better reasons why determinism cannot be true. But I don't make that claim.

The future is (even assuming determinism), inherently unknowable because we inherently lack sufficient knowledge of its current (or past) configuration.

You appear to be labouring under the misapprehension that knowing every detail of the state of the universe, is somehow a trivial exercise that can be simply hand-waved into existence.

 

[Kylie]

So if the future is by definition unknowable, how can you be justified in saying that what will happen in that future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now.

The condition the universe is in now is also unknowable. Ask Heisenberg.

And, YET AGAIN, I don't believe that what will happen in the future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now. But I accept it for the sake of this discussion, because it makes no difference to this discussion whether it is or not.

I believe that's the fourth of fifth time you have demanded to know why I think determinism is true, and the sixth or seventh time in this thread that I have mentioned that I don't think that determinism is true.

Could you perhaps stop demanding that I demonstrate the truth of something I explicitly say I believe to be false? It's making me question your psychiatric well being.

Then let me ask you this...

Out of the three options that are available - determinism, compatibilism, and free will, two of those involve determinism in some way, and thus you don't hold them to be true. That leaves only free will.

So why are you arguing with me? What position do I hold that you disagree with?

 

[Kylie]

If you are to claim that the future is inherently unknowable and can not be determined ahead of time, not because we lack sufficient knowledge, but because it is in principle unknowable, then determinism can not be true.

There are other, better reasons why determinism cannot be true. But I don't make that claim.

The future is (even assuming determinism), inherently unknowable because we inherently lack sufficient knowledge of its current (or past) configuration.

You appear to be labouring under the misapprehension that knowing every detail of the state of the universe, is somehow a trivial exercise that can be simply hand-waved into existence.

Where did I make that claim?

I said that IF THE UNIVERSE WAS DETERMINISTIC, then knowing perfectly the state of the universe at any particular point in time would allow us to extrapolate and know perfectly the state of the universe at any later point in time.

I was clear that the universe being deterministic was being given purely as a hypothetical in this situation, and I made no claims as to how possible gaining such knowledge was. I was simply presenting it as a hypothetical: IF the universe was deterministic and IF we had perfect knowledge of it's state at one particular point in time, we could so extrapolate and determine its state at any later point in time.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So if the future is by definition unknowable, how can you be justified in saying that what will happen in that future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now.

Such a claim - that the state of the universe (and don't quibble with the words here, you know what I mean) - is determined by some previous state implies that we can look at some particular state of the universe and extrapolate it to determine what will happen in the future. From what has been said in this thread, that's the core argument of determinism, that anything that happens is DETERMINED by what came before. If you are to claim that the future is inherently unknowable and can not be determined ahead of time, not because we lack sufficient knowledge, but because it is in principle unknowable, then determinism can not be true.

First, we don't presume the universe is deterministic enough to predict the distant future. We presume that causes and their effect are reliable enough to believe that when we turn the steering wheel to the right, the car will go to the right. That is a prediction based upon events behaving deterministically, where the event of the car moving to the right is reliably caused by our turning the steering wheel. Determinism asserts a "theoretical predictability" of distant future events, but can claim no practical ability to do so.

Second, we believe that we behave deterministically as well. We think about things. Thinking, like walking and chewing gum, is one of the things we do. When we run into a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision (such as what to order in the restaurant), we consider our options and choose the one that we think will turn out best. Choosing is a deterministic operation that reliably causes our choice.

Third, our thinking and choosing are the prior causes of our deliberate acts. The final responsible prior cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation in which we chose to do it.

Fourth, who and what we are, right now, is part of the "current state" of the universe. Our choices and actions are part of what reliably causes the state of the universe to change to its next state. Most of the universe does not get to choose what happens next. But we do.

Finally, within the domain of human influence (things we can cause to happen if we choose to do so), the single inevitable future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

 

[bilby]

two of those involve determinism in some way, and thus you don't hold them to be true.

That doesn't follow at all.

As I have repeatedly and specifically said several times, determinism doesn't matter. It's irrelevant to the question of free will. Demonstrating the falsity of determinism therefore has no effect whatsoever of the truth or falsity of these positions.

Your 'thus' is poorly thought through nonsense.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... are you suggesting that the universe was not deterministic when it was first created because there was no one around to have knowledge. Our knowledge does not change reality.

I am simply explaining the proper function of the notion of possibility (and probability). The notion of possibility is part of the causal mechanism that enables choosing.

Choosing is the causal mechanism that determines our choice. Our choice is the causal mechanism that determines our actions. Our actions are the causal mechanism that determines what will happen next. This is causal determinism.

It is only with we do not already KNOW what will happen that we consider different possibilities and the probability that one or the other will happen.

For example:

If I give you three boxes, tell you that keys to a new car are in one and then ask you to pick one, the fact that you don't know doesn't mean that each box has a non-zero probability. No matter what you say, one box has a 100% chance and the other two have a 0% chance.

The fact that I do not know which of three boxes holds the keys means that each box has a 33.3% probability of having the keys. None of the boxes have a 100% probability.

The fact that one of the boxes will inevitably hold the keys does not change any of the probabilities. We have the same situation with the horse race. We know that one of the horses will inevitably win the race, but we don't know which one. So, we calculate the odds of winning based upon the factors that we do know, like the age of the horse, its history of wins and losses, the conditions of the track, the experience of the jockey, etc.

Despite the fact that one of the horses will win and all of the others will not win, does not change the odds, because the only reason that we are computing the odds is because WE DON"T KNOW WHICH HORSE WILL WIN.

Probabilities are entirely about what we know and what we don't know. The same is true for possibilities.

So what if I know which box the keys are in? I can then safely say that you are incorrect when you say that each box has a 33.3...% chance of holding the keys, and tell you to keep trying.

No, you can't safely say that I am incorrect in my estimate of probabilities, because my estimate is based upon what I know, not what you know. I am the one with a vested interest in computing the probabilities, because I am the one who wants the car keys.

So, from my perspective, which is the only perspective available to me, each of the 3 boxes has a 33.3% probability of holding the keys. And there is no argument that would convince me otherwise.

Please show how something that WILL DEFINITELY HAPPEN, ABSOLUTELY GUARANTEED TO HAPPEN NO DOUBT ABOUT IT WHATSOEVER can ever have a probability of less than 100%

Sure. That's what I just did. From the perspective of any human being who does not know which box holds the car keys, each of the 3 boxes has the exact same 33.3% probability, and not one of them has a 100% probability. Not even the box that is actually holding the keys and was always inevitably going to be the one with the keys. It still has a 33.3% probability.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So the outcome can only be "set in stone" AFTER it has happened?

If you like the "set in stone" metaphor, then, yes, the outcome will be "set in stone" from any prior point in eternity. So what? How does that change anything?

We still don't know WHAT is "set in stone" to happen. And when we don't know the single thing that WILL happen, we consider the MULTIPLE things that CAN happen, compute the probability for each if you like, and place our bets.

That's how possibilities and probabilities work.

You fail to grasp the point that if it is "set in stone," then there's nothing we can do to change it, and thus we do not have free will.

We can hold the view that both our choice and our choosing are "set in stone".

And, we can hold the view that either it will be
(A) "set in stone" that our choice would be coerced or unduly influenced (unfree will),
OR
(B) "set in stone" that our choice would be free of coercion and undue influence (free will).

The fact that the choice is "set in stone" does not preclude it from being free of coercion and undue influence, which is commonly known as "free will".

 

[Kylie]

So if the future is by definition unknowable, how can you be justified in saying that what will happen in that future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now.

Such a claim - that the state of the universe (and don't quibble with the words here, you know what I mean) - is determined by some previous state implies that we can look at some particular state of the universe and extrapolate it to determine what will happen in the future. From what has been said in this thread, that's the core argument of determinism, that anything that happens is DETERMINED by what came before. If you are to claim that the future is inherently unknowable and can not be determined ahead of time, not because we lack sufficient knowledge, but because it is in principle unknowable, then determinism can not be true.

First, we don't presume the universe is deterministic enough to predict the distant future. We presume that causes and their effect are reliable enough to believe that when we turn the steering wheel to the right, the car will go to the right. That is a prediction based upon events behaving deterministically, where the event of the car moving to the right is reliably caused by our turning the steering wheel. Determinism asserts a "theoretical predictability" of distant future events, but can claim no practical ability to do so.

Second, we believe that we behave deterministically as well. We think about things. Thinking, like walking and chewing gum, is one of the things we do. When we run into a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision (such as what to order in the restaurant), we consider our options and choose the one that we think will turn out best. Choosing is a deterministic operation that reliably causes our choice.

Third, our thinking and choosing are the prior causes of our deliberate acts. The final responsible prior cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation in which we chose to do it.

Fourth, who and what we are, right now, is part of the "current state" of the universe. Our choices and actions are part of what reliably causes the state of the universe to change to its next state. Most of the universe does not get to choose what happens next. But we do.

Finally, within the domain of human influence (things we can cause to happen if we choose to do so), the single inevitable future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

It's either deterministic or it's not. How can you have something that's only partially deterministic?

 

[Kylie]

two of those involve determinism in some way, and thus you don't hold them to be true.

That doesn't follow at all.

As I have repeatedly and specifically said several times, determinism doesn't matter. It's irrelevant to the question of free will. Demonstrating the falsity of determinism therefore has no effect whatsoever of the truth or falsity of these positions.

Your 'thus' is poorly thought through nonsense.

1. Determinism
2. Compatiblism
3. Free will

Which ones do you think are true? If the position you hold is not there, please feel free to add the name of whatever position you hold.

 

[Kylie]

... are you suggesting that the universe was not deterministic when it was first created because there was no one around to have knowledge. Our knowledge does not change reality.

I am simply explaining the proper function of the notion of possibility (and probability).

You have explained nothing. Unless you think repeating a claim is the same thing as explaining it.

The notion of possibility is part of the causal mechanism that enables choosing.

Choosing is the causal mechanism that determines our choice. Our choice is the causal mechanism that determines our actions. Our actions are the causal mechanism that determines what will happen next. This is causal determinism.

It is only with we do not already KNOW what will happen that we consider different possibilities and the probability that one or the other will happen.

For example:

If I give you three boxes, tell you that keys to a new car are in one and then ask you to pick one, the fact that you don't know doesn't mean that each box has a non-zero probability. No matter what you say, one box has a 100% chance and the other two have a 0% chance.

The fact that I do not know which of three boxes holds the keys means that each box has a 33.3% probability of having the keys. None of the boxes have a 100% probability.

The fact that one of the boxes will inevitably hold the keys does not change any of the probabilities. We have the same situation with the horse race. We know that one of the horses will inevitably win the race, but we don't know which one. So, we calculate the odds of winning based upon the factors that we do know, like the age of the horse, its history of wins and losses, the conditions of the track, the experience of the jockey, etc.

Despite the fact that one of the horses will win and all of the others will not win, does not change the odds, because the only reason that we are computing the odds is because WE DON"T KNOW WHICH HORSE WILL WIN.

Probabilities are entirely about what we know and what we don't know. The same is true for possibilities.

No, it means from your limited point of view, you can only reach a certain conclusion. It does not mean that conclusion is correct. The boxes don't contain a third of a key each.

So what if I know which box the keys are in? I can then safely say that you are incorrect when you say that each box has a 33.3...% chance of holding the keys, and tell you to keep trying.

No, you can't safely say that I am incorrect in my estimate of probabilities, because my estimate is based upon what I know, not what you know. I am the one with a vested interest in computing the probabilities, because I am the one who wants the car keys.

So, from my perspective, which is the only perspective available to me, each of the 3 boxes has a 33.3% probability of holding the keys. And there is no argument that would convince me otherwise.

Please show how something that WILL DEFINITELY HAPPEN, ABSOLUTELY GUARANTEED TO HAPPEN NO DOUBT ABOUT IT WHATSOEVER can ever have a probability of less than 100%

Sure. That's what I just did. From the perspective of any human being who does not know which box holds the car keys, each of the 3 boxes has the exact same 33.3% probability, and not one of them has a 100% probability. Not even the box that is actually holding the keys and was always inevitably going to be the one with the keys. It still has a 33.3% probability.

Only because you have limited information.

Just because you do not know certain information doesn't mean that information doesn't exist.

 

[Kylie]

So the outcome can only be "set in stone" AFTER it has happened?

If you like the "set in stone" metaphor, then, yes, the outcome will be "set in stone" from any prior point in eternity. So what? How does that change anything?

We still don't know WHAT is "set in stone" to happen. And when we don't know the single thing that WILL happen, we consider the MULTIPLE things that CAN happen, compute the probability for each if you like, and place our bets.

That's how possibilities and probabilities work.

You fail to grasp the point that if it is "set in stone," then there's nothing we can do to change it, and thus we do not have free will.

We can hold the view that both our choice and our choosing are "set in stone".

And, we can hold the view that either it will be
(A) "set in stone" that our choice would be coerced or unduly influenced (unfree will),
OR
(B) "set in stone" that our choice would be free of coercion and undue influence (free will).

The fact that the choice is "set in stone" does not preclude it from being free of coercion and undue influence, which is commonly known as "free will".

Geez, you might as well say that a circle can have four straight sides that meet at right angles, it makes about as much sense.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So if the future is by definition unknowable, how can you be justified in saying that what will happen in that future is solely the result of the condition the universe is in now.

Such a claim - that the state of the universe (and don't quibble with the words here, you know what I mean) - is determined by some previous state implies that we can look at some particular state of the universe and extrapolate it to determine what will happen in the future. From what has been said in this thread, that's the core argument of determinism, that anything that happens is DETERMINED by what came before. If you are to claim that the future is inherently unknowable and can not be determined ahead of time, not because we lack sufficient knowledge, but because it is in principle unknowable, then determinism can not be true.

First, we don't presume the universe is deterministic enough to predict the distant future. We presume that causes and their effect are reliable enough to believe that when we turn the steering wheel to the right, the car will go to the right. That is a prediction based upon events behaving deterministically, where the event of the car moving to the right is reliably caused by our turning the steering wheel. Determinism asserts a "theoretical predictability" of distant future events, but can claim no practical ability to do so.

Second, we believe that we behave deterministically as well. We think about things. Thinking, like walking and chewing gum, is one of the things we do. When we run into a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision (such as what to order in the restaurant), we consider our options and choose the one that we think will turn out best. Choosing is a deterministic operation that reliably causes our choice.

Third, our thinking and choosing are the prior causes of our deliberate acts. The final responsible prior cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation in which we chose to do it.

Fourth, who and what we are, right now, is part of the "current state" of the universe. Our choices and actions are part of what reliably causes the state of the universe to change to its next state. Most of the universe does not get to choose what happens next. But we do.

Finally, within the domain of human influence (things we can cause to happen if we choose to do so), the single inevitable future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

It's either deterministic or it's not. How can you have something that's only partially deterministic?

Everything is always deterministic, including our thoughts and feelings and choices.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... are you suggesting that the universe was not deterministic when it was first created because there was no one around to have knowledge. Our knowledge does not change reality.

I am simply explaining the proper function of the notion of possibility (and probability).

You have explained nothing. Unless you think repeating a claim is the same thing as explaining it.

The notion of possibility is part of the causal mechanism that enables choosing.

Choosing is the causal mechanism that determines our choice. Our choice is the causal mechanism that determines our actions. Our actions are the causal mechanism that determines what will happen next. This is causal determinism.

It is only with we do not already KNOW what will happen that we consider different possibilities and the probability that one or the other will happen.

For example:

If I give you three boxes, tell you that keys to a new car are in one and then ask you to pick one, the fact that you don't know doesn't mean that each box has a non-zero probability. No matter what you say, one box has a 100% chance and the other two have a 0% chance.

The fact that I do not know which of three boxes holds the keys means that each box has a 33.3% probability of having the keys. None of the boxes have a 100% probability.

The fact that one of the boxes will inevitably hold the keys does not change any of the probabilities. We have the same situation with the horse race. We know that one of the horses will inevitably win the race, but we don't know which one. So, we calculate the odds of winning based upon the factors that we do know, like the age of the horse, its history of wins and losses, the conditions of the track, the experience of the jockey, etc.

Despite the fact that one of the horses will win and all of the others will not win, does not change the odds, because the only reason that we are computing the odds is because WE DON"T KNOW WHICH HORSE WILL WIN.

Probabilities are entirely about what we know and what we don't know. The same is true for possibilities.

No, it means from your limited point of view, you can only reach a certain conclusion. It does not mean that conclusion is correct. The boxes don't contain a third of a key each.

So what if I know which box the keys are in? I can then safely say that you are incorrect when you say that each box has a 33.3...% chance of holding the keys, and tell you to keep trying.

No, you can't safely say that I am incorrect in my estimate of probabilities, because my estimate is based upon what I know, not what you know. I am the one with a vested interest in computing the probabilities, because I am the one who wants the car keys.

So, from my perspective, which is the only perspective available to me, each of the 3 boxes has a 33.3% probability of holding the keys. And there is no argument that would convince me otherwise.

Please show how something that WILL DEFINITELY HAPPEN, ABSOLUTELY GUARANTEED TO HAPPEN NO DOUBT ABOUT IT WHATSOEVER can ever have a probability of less than 100%

Sure. That's what I just did. From the perspective of any human being who does not know which box holds the car keys, each of the 3 boxes has the exact same 33.3% probability, and not one of them has a 100% probability. Not even the box that is actually holding the keys and was always inevitably going to be the one with the keys. It still has a 33.3% probability.

Only because you have limited information.

Just because you do not know certain information doesn't mean that information doesn't exist.

Well, if I don't have that information, and there is no way that I can get that information, then for me that information does not exist.
Uncertainty is a logical condition within the realm of human reasoning. Why are you pretending that it does not exist?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Geez, you might as well say that a circle can have four straight sides that meet at right angles, it makes about as much sense.

If that is all you have to say, then why waste my time?