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Demystifying Determinism

Unlike compatibilism, which is based on carefully defining 'free will' in order to give it appearance of compatibility,

We're not going out of our way to carefully define 'free will'. We're simply using the first definition of free will that appears in most general dictionaries. It is the definition that most people understand and correctly use.

Free Will
Merriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'

Oxford English Dictionary:
1.a. Spontaneous or unconstrained will; unforced choice; (also) inclination to act without suggestion from others. Esp. in of one's (own) free will and similar expressions.

Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.

Free will is a voluntary, unforced choice that we make for ourselves. The opposite of a voluntary, unforced choice is a coerced or unduly influenced choice. And this definition is compatible with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.


incompatibilism is based on determinism as it is defined and its implications, entailment, a fixed past, present and future, no alternate options possible, etc, etc.....
The incompatibilists are using the second definition of free will:

Merriam-Webster on-line:
2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

Oxford English Dictionary:
2. The power of an individual to make free choices, not determined by divine predestination, the laws of physical causality, fate, etc.

Wiktionary:
2. (philosophy) The ability to choose one's actions, or determine what reasons are acceptable motivation for actions, without predestination, fate etc.

This "free will" is not compatible with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

So, the question for the incompatibilist is simple: Why choose a definition that you know is incompatible with reliable cause and effect?

The determinism "versus" free will debate rests entirely upon choosing a stupid definition of free will rather than a meaningful and relevant definition.
 
[[C]]ompatibilism... is based on carefully defining 'free will' in order to give it appearance of compatibility...

If this was merely the appearance of being compatible, you would be capable of ferreting out the supposed incompatibility in my presentation of a compatibilist choice process, and hilight it in red.
 
Unlike compatibilism, which is based on carefully defining 'free will' in order to give it appearance of compatibility,

We're not going out of our way to carefully define 'free will'. We're simply using the first definition of free will that appears in most general dictionaries. It is the definition that most people understand and correctly use.


Free Will
Merriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'

Oxford English Dictionary:
1.a. Spontaneous or unconstrained will; unforced choice; (also) inclination to act without suggestion from others. Esp. in of one's (own) free will and similar expressions.

Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.

Free will is a voluntary, unforced choice that we make for ourselves. The opposite of a voluntary, unforced choice is a coerced or unduly influenced choice. And this definition is compatible with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

Sorry, not good enough.

A dictionary definition doesn't resolve a debate on free will that has spanned centuries. Dictionaries just give a list of how words are currently being used.

Dictionaries don't delve into the nature of the world in relation to biology, cognition and the idea of free will.

They merely tell us how, generally speaking, people use words and phrases in every day language.

If a dictionary could resolve the issue, the issue of free will would be resolved and nobody would be arguing.
 
They [dictionaries] merely tell us how, generally speaking, people use words and phrases in every day language.
When you use words and phrases in ways, as you continually do, that do not reflect how they are used in everyday language, your anti-free will rhetoric simply makes no sense.
 
A dictionary definition doesn't resolve a debate on free will that has spanned centuries
No, the only way to do that is to look at something in reality apparently meeting that definition.

the issue as to this debate spanning centuries, however, is easy to explain insofar as there are certain errors that humans are primed to fall into. The modal fallacy is just one such error.

Other such errors include The Naturalistic Fallacy.

Indeed there are debates about the existence of God, when the only reasonable position there is that there are zero or more.

The point is that in equal parts we decided on the primary definition after seeing many things that satisfied it, and then seeing utility in discussing the implications of it being satisfied. Then, we developed things on purpose which satisfied the definition.

The second definition was in fact developed entirely around the application of the modal fallacy to the original concept.

Now I think there's a post somewhere upthread that IF you wish to maintain this nonsense about deviation and randomness then the least you can do is actually ferret out where you think my description of a compatibilist choice actually trips on either a real deviation or real randomness, or you can admit that these terms and conditions you offer don't actually enter into the discussion, and that they have about as much teeth as the orders Bilby gives to their dog.
 
Unlike compatibilism, which is based on carefully defining 'free will' in order to give it appearance of compatibility,

We're not going out of our way to carefully define 'free will'. We're simply using the first definition of free will that appears in most general dictionaries. It is the definition that most people understand and correctly use.


Free Will
Merriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'

Oxford English Dictionary:
1.a. Spontaneous or unconstrained will; unforced choice; (also) inclination to act without suggestion from others. Esp. in of one's (own) free will and similar expressions.

Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.

Free will is a voluntary, unforced choice that we make for ourselves. The opposite of a voluntary, unforced choice is a coerced or unduly influenced choice. And this definition is compatible with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

Sorry, not good enough.

A dictionary definition doesn't resolve a debate on free will that has spanned centuries. Dictionaries just give a list of how words are currently being used.

Dictionaries don't delve into the nature of the world in relation to biology, cognition and the idea of free will.

They merely tell us how, generally speaking, people use words and phrases in every day language.

If a dictionary could resolve the issue, the issue of free will would be resolved and nobody would be arguing.
Both definitions, the one I'm using and the one you're using show up in the same three dictionaries. Only one of these definitions makes sense, and it's not the one you're using.

So, it is up to you to justify choosing "freedom from causal necessity". The argument against your chosen definition is simple. There is no freedom without reliable cause and effect. Thus, "freedom from cause and effect" (the basis of causal necessity) is an irrational notion. One cannot be free from that which freedom itself requires. Your notion of free will creates a paradox. And it is that silly paradox which is the cause of the interminable debate. Drop the silly definition and embrace the pragmatic definition, and the debate resolves itself.

And the same applies to your definition of determinism. Drop the Britannica definition and embrace the Technical definition and you can stop making silly statements claiming that choosing is not happening or that if there is only a single thing that we will do then there must only be a single thing that we can do. You've seen how that notion just creates another paradox.
 
They [dictionaries] merely tell us how, generally speaking, people use words and phrases in every day language.
When you use words and phrases in ways, as you continually do, that do not reflect how they are used in everyday language, your anti-free will rhetoric simply makes no sense.


Wrong, it's not my ''anti-free will rhetoric.'' Not at all. You say that as a means of defense, as if it's something I personally say, you invoke it as a means of dismissing incompatibilism

It is incompatibilism, the argument describing the reasons why any notion of free will is incompatible with determinism.

Nor is the idea of free will compatible with non-determinism, for that matter.
 
They [dictionaries] merely tell us how, generally speaking, people use words and phrases in every day language.
When you use words and phrases in ways, as you continually do, that do not reflect how they are used in everyday language, your anti-free will rhetoric simply makes no sense.
Wrong, it's not my ''anti-free will rhetoric.''

Then who's been posting on this thread using your username?
 
Unlike compatibilism, which is based on carefully defining 'free will' in order to give it appearance of compatibility,

We're not going out of our way to carefully define 'free will'. We're simply using the first definition of free will that appears in most general dictionaries. It is the definition that most people understand and correctly use.


Free Will
Merriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'

Oxford English Dictionary:
1.a. Spontaneous or unconstrained will; unforced choice; (also) inclination to act without suggestion from others. Esp. in of one's (own) free will and similar expressions.

Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.

Free will is a voluntary, unforced choice that we make for ourselves. The opposite of a voluntary, unforced choice is a coerced or unduly influenced choice. And this definition is compatible with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

Sorry, not good enough.

A dictionary definition doesn't resolve a debate on free will that has spanned centuries. Dictionaries just give a list of how words are currently being used.

Dictionaries don't delve into the nature of the world in relation to biology, cognition and the idea of free will.

They merely tell us how, generally speaking, people use words and phrases in every day language.

If a dictionary could resolve the issue, the issue of free will would be resolved and nobody would be arguing.
Both definitions, the one I'm using and the one you're using show up in the same three dictionaries. Only one of these definitions makes sense, and it's not the one you're using.

Regardless of what you claim doesn't make sense, or believe doesn't make sense, a dictionary doesn't - for the given reasons - resolve the ongoing debate on free will.

So, it is up to you to justify choosing "freedom from causal necessity". The argument against your chosen definition is simple. There is no freedom without reliable cause and effect. Thus, "freedom from cause and effect" (the basis of causal necessity) is an irrational notion. One cannot be free from that which freedom itself requires. Your notion of free will creates a paradox. And it is that silly paradox which is the cause of the interminable debate. Drop the silly definition and embrace the pragmatic definition, and the debate resolves itself.

Freedom from causal necessity, be it random or probabilistic events, no more supports the notion of free will than does determinism

Determinism is not merely a case of 'reliable causation,' it is a system where all events are fixed by the past state of the system.

Nothing is freely chosen or willed. There are no options to freely choose from in any given instance in time, and everything proceeds without deviation. Whatever is contemplated, thought or willed at any time, is necessarily willed

And the same applies to your definition of determinism. Drop the Britannica definition and embrace the Technical definition and you can stop making silly statements claiming that choosing is not happening or that if there is only a single thing that we will do then there must only be a single thing that we can do. You've seen how that notion just creates another paradox.

I use the same definition of determinism as you. As does Britannica. The only difference is that you add 'choose' to a system where no choice exists. This of course, as explained, doesn't mean that we cannot do different things at different times, just that anything done at any given moment must be done as determined, that in that moment (as in any given moment,) there are no alternatives.

What Britannica describes relates to the nature of determinism, therefore correct. If anyone can do something different at any given instance, it would not be determinism.
 
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They [dictionaries] merely tell us how, generally speaking, people use words and phrases in every day language.
When you use words and phrases in ways, as you continually do, that do not reflect how they are used in everyday language, your anti-free will rhetoric simply makes no sense.
Wrong, it's not my ''anti-free will rhetoric.''

Then who's been posting on this thread using your username?
Well, it's pretty clear that it isn't theirs because they don't understand a lick of it any more than Christians quoting Darwin on Darwin.

If DBT had a point, they would be able to make the only one argument that actually matters, they would pick up a compatibilist choice, and they would say "here is the reference to deviation and randomness" rather than assuming themselves right and crowing someone else's words that are wrong for the same reason all the other words they crow are wrong
 
Sorry, not good enough. A dictionary definition doesn't resolve a debate on free will that has spanned centuries. Dictionaries just give a list of how words are currently being used.

"Free will", to most people, simply means a choice they make for themselves.

Dictionaries don't delve into the nature of the world in relation to biology, cognition and the idea of free will.

Thank goodness. It is already bad enough that general dictionaries mention the abominable corruption of "free will" used in philosophical circles. What kind of freedom is "freedom from causal necessity"? How does such a freedom work? How would we recognize it if we saw it? Has anyone ever seen actually it?

But common sense is sufficient for understanding a person making a choice for themselves. As children, we objected when others made all the decisions for us. And that same reaction is experienced whenever we are forced by others to do something we don't want to do. It is a constraint that we wish to be free of.

Now, we can certainly add to this common notion of free will an understanding of the biological drives that motivate us. And we can certainly add the entirety of neuroscience to our understanding of our brains and how they go about performing the decision making function. None of these advances in knowledge destroys the notion of a person deciding for themselves what they will do.

Regardless of what you claim doesn't make sense, or believe doesn't make sense, a dictionary doesn't - for the given reasons - resolve the ongoing debate on free will.

Common understanding and common sense resolve the debate on free will. All that philosophy can, and should, provide is a better grasp upon the concepts we are using and how to use them in a logically consistent way.

For example, philosophy can explore the notions of "actuality" and "possibility" and how they are used in their proper contexts to allow logical operations to proceed, without fallacies.

So, it is up to you to justify choosing "freedom from causal necessity". The argument against your chosen definition is simple. There is no freedom without reliable cause and effect. Thus, "freedom from cause and effect" (the basis of causal necessity) is an irrational notion. One cannot be free from that which freedom itself requires. Your notion of free will creates a paradox. And it is that silly paradox which is the cause of the interminable debate. Drop the silly definition and embrace the pragmatic definition, and the debate resolves itself.

Freedom from causal necessity, be it random or probabilistic events, no more supports the notion of free will than does determinism

And as Jaryn keeps pointing out to you, we are not relying upon any notions of random or probabilistic or indeterministic events in this discussion. I have reinforced the notion of a world of perfectly reliable causation repeatedly. Since "hard" is already taken by the hard headed ones, I would suggest the term "perfect determinism" for what I am describing.

Determinism is not merely a case of 'reliable causation,' it is a system where all events are fixed by the past state of the system.

If things are not "fixed" by reliable causation, then please account for how you think the past state of the system is "fixing" the current state.

Nothing is freely chosen or willed. There are no options to freely choose from in any given instance in time, and everything proceeds without deviation. Whatever is contemplated, thought or willed at any time, is necessarily willed

We've already blown up that argument. Look around you in the restaurant. Choosing happens. Choosing proceeds to happen without deviation. There is no alternate path other than to consider the menu of alternatives, and choose what you will order for dinner. All of this was always going to happen, exactly as it is happening, right here in front of us. Determinism hasn't changed anything.

If anyone can do something different at any given instance, it would not be determinism.

We can, but we won't. Choosing logically requires at least two options that we can choose from, just like addition requires at least two numbers to be summed. When choosing between A and B, we start with two logical assumptions: "I can choose A" is true and "I can choose B" is also true. At the end of our choosing, we will have the single inevitable thing that we will choose, and the other single inevitable thing that we could have chosen, but didn't.

We cannot break this rule without creating a paradox. There must always be multiple things that we CAN choose in order to get to the single thing that we WILL choose.

Waiter: "What will you have for dinner tonight?"
Diner: "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Given determinism, there is only a single possibility, only one thing that you CAN order."
Diner: "Okay, then what is that single thing that I CAN order?"
Waiter: "It is the same thing as what you WILL order."
Diner: "How do I decide what I WILL order if I don't know what I CAN order?"
Waiter: "That's not my problem. That's just how determinism works".

And, of course, determinism does not work that way, because it obviously cannot work that way.
 
Sorry, not good enough. A dictionary definition doesn't resolve a debate on free will that has spanned centuries. Dictionaries just give a list of how words are currently being used.

"Free will", to most people, simply means a choice they make for themselves.

That doesn't establish anything more than what people believe and what they say. 'God' to most people means the 'Creator of the Universe.' There are also some who point out that there is no evidence for the existence of a God.


Dictionaries don't delve into the nature of the world in relation to biology, cognition and the idea of free will.

Thank goodness. It is already bad enough that general dictionaries mention the abominable corruption of "free will" used in philosophical circles. What kind of freedom is "freedom from causal necessity"? How does such a freedom work? How would we recognize it if we saw it? Has anyone ever seen actually it?

But common sense is sufficient for understanding a person making a choice for themselves. As children, we objected when others made all the decisions for us. And that same reaction is experienced whenever we are forced by others to do something we don't want to do. It is a constraint that we wish to be free of.

Now, we can certainly add to this common notion of free will an understanding of the biological drives that motivate us. And we can certainly add the entirety of neuroscience to our understanding of our brains and how they go about performing the decision making function. None of these advances in knowledge destroys the notion of a person deciding for themselves what they will do.


The point was that words and terms as they are commonly used don't necessarily establish or prove a proposition. Believing that something is true and expressing it in words doesn't make it true regardless matter how often the belief is expressed, or widely held.


Regardless of what you claim doesn't make sense, or believe doesn't make sense, a dictionary doesn't - for the given reasons - resolve the ongoing debate on free will.

Common understanding and common sense resolve the debate on free will. All that philosophy can, and should, provide is a better grasp upon the concepts we are using and how to use them in a logically consistent way.

The appearance of the sun, moon and stars moving across the 'vault of the sky,' rising and setting, led to a widespread belief in a geocentric earth....for a long time it was taken to be a common-sense belief.


Freedom from causal necessity, be it random or probabilistic events, no more supports the notion of free will than does determinism

And as Jaryn keeps pointing out to you, we are not relying upon any notions of random or probabilistic or indeterministic events in this discussion. I have reinforced the notion of a world of perfectly reliable causation repeatedly. Since "hard" is already taken by the hard headed ones, I would suggest the term "perfect determinism" for what I am describing.

Jarhyn has been pointing out? :)

I understand the compatibilist definition well enough, which includes its flaws. The problems with the idea of compatibility have been described too many times to count. Not only by me, but numerous authors, whom I have quoted and cited.

For instance;
''Determinism (which I take to be Causal Determinism) posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. In a deterministic universe, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.'' - Bruce Silverstein.

Determinism is not merely a case of 'reliable causation,' it is a system where all events are fixed by the past state of the system.

If things are not "fixed" by reliable causation, then please account for how you think the past state of the system is "fixing" the current state.

Given that evolving system fixes all events and outcomes based on antecedents and has nothing to do freely willed decisions or actions.

Defining free will in such a way as to give the appearance compatibility in a system where will makes absolutely no difference to outcomes, where will itself is fixed by antecedents, is just a bad case of false labelling.
 
Believing that something is true and expressing it in words doesn't make it true regardless matter how often the belief is expressed, or widely held.
... Like your belief that choice requires the things you don't choose to have been chosen somehow somewhere in our immediate reality for anything to have been chosen at all.

That's just silly, though.

Of course when you choose something, you don't choose others, and at that point you never could have. If you didn't it wouldn't be a branch, it would be a fork, and it wouldn't have been a meaningful choice at all.

The fact that we can only approximate the future does not mean that we do not choose from the objects we produce! It just means that our choices actually have meaning in the existence of the opportunity cost.

If you wish to actually validate your beliefs about choice requiring deviation or randomness, you would be able to find the deviation and randomness in a compatibilist choice.
 
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That doesn't establish anything more than what people believe and what they say. 'God' to most people means the 'Creator of the Universe.' There are also some who point out that there is no evidence for the existence of a God.

The difference is that we can demonstrate free will and its opposite. For example, the child in the restaurant wants to order ice cream for lunch, but his mother does not allow it. Instead, she chooses what her child will have for lunch. The child is not free to make that choice for himself.

In a court of law, a person is not held responsible if they were forced to participate in a crime against their will, or if their crime was caused by something that was beyond their control, such as a significant mental illness that subjected them to hallucinations and delusions, or impaired their ability to reason, or that subjected them to an irresistible impulse. These will be matters of hard evidence, legal precedents, and expert testimony.

So, no, the analogy that believing in free will is the like believing in gods is bogus. Free will is an empirical event that we all observe every day. Hey, I've got an idea. Let's go out to a restaurant, and you can actually see people reading the menu and choosing for themselves what they will order for dinner.

The point was that words and terms as they are commonly used don't necessarily establish or prove a proposition. Believing that something is true and expressing it in words doesn't make it true regardless matter how often the belief is expressed, or widely held.

I totally agree. That's why we've made so many trips to the restaurant, so that you can see free will with your own eyes. Here, take a seat, browse the menu, choose for yourself what you will have for dinner. I must say that it is really surprising that you've never done this before.

The appearance of the sun, moon and stars moving across the 'vault of the sky,' rising and setting, led to a widespread belief in a geocentric earth....for a long time it was taken to be a common-sense belief.

And it is still a useful belief if you become lost in the woods without a compass. But we learn in school that the Earth is simply rotating.

The knowledge of cause and effect is acquired before we ever enter a school room. If a baby cries, his mother will come to feed, change his diaper, or simply comfort him. Cause and effect. If the toddler moves her legs and keeps her balance, she can walk and eventually run through the house. Cause and effect. The notion of cause and effect is so fully grounded by our ordinary life experiences that we all take it for granted.

The knowledge of free will is also acquired prior to school. We give our children good choices, like "would you like carrots or string beans with your lunch?". This introduces them to the notion of making choices that control events in their own lives. Eventually they will be choosing which college to attend.

Reliable causation and free will are naturally compatible, because we can observe them both in everyday life. Two objective observations cannot contradict each other. The only way to make them incompatible is by constructing a paradox, a self-induced hoax created by one or more false, but believable suggestions.

The human mind, unfortunately, is subject to false beliefs by simple suggestion. Hypnosis is built upon this suggestibility. Another example of suggestibility was the riot on January 6th, 2021 at the U.S. Capitol.

I understand the compatibilist definition well enough, which includes its flaws. The problems with the idea of compatibility have been described too many times to count.

The problem is that when we resolve these "flaws" right in front of you, you continue repeating them over and over as if you were deaf.

Not only by me, but numerous authors, whom I have quoted and cited.

It really doesn't matter how many authors make the same mistakes. Even Albert Einstein was unable to present a coherent argument. Instead, he ended up in self-contradictions, just like you. Here is a quote that demonstrates the problem:

Albert Einstein said:
"In a sense, we can hold no one responsible. I am a determinist. As such, I do not believe in free will. ... Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed. If I wish to live in a civilized community, I must act as if man is a responsible being."

Page 114 of "The Saturday Evening Post" article "What Life Means to Einstein" "An Interview by George Sylvester Viereck" (Oct 26, 1929)

He does not believe in free will, yet he must act as if free will exists!
He can hold no one responsible, yet he must act as if they are responsible!

This is the confusion we get when speaking from within a paradox. The solution, for Einstein, and everyone else, is simply to drop the paradoxical definition of free will, "freedom from causal necessity", and revert back to the original operational meaning of free will, "freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence".

Freedom from coercion and undue influence is a free will that Einstein can believe exists. He can believe in this free will and act consistent with that belief. He can believe that people are responsible for their choices, if they were not coerced or insane, and he can act consistent with that belief.

But, while trapped in the paradoxical definition, "freedom from causal necessity", even Albert Einstein becomes a blubbering idiot.

For instance;
''Determinism (which I take to be Causal Determinism) posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. In a deterministic universe, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.'' - Bruce Silverstein.

It's much simpler than that Bruce. Causal determinism simply asserts that all activity is the effect of prior activity. All events are reliably caused by prior events. We could, at least in theory, trace the current state and its events back to any prior state and its events. There will be a reliable history of causation that inevitably leads from one to the other.

This is not "mandated activity", but simply the way that all things work. And people usually have no problem with this notion of causal necessity when presented to them under its more common name, "history".

It is only when it is suggested to them that causal necessity robs them of all their freedom and control that they strongly object. So, for God's sake, let's stop lying to them about that. They have exactly the same freedom and control within a deterministic universe that they always had.
 
That doesn't establish anything more than what people believe and what they say. 'God' to most people means the 'Creator of the Universe.' There are also some who point out that there is no evidence for the existence of a God.

The difference is that we can demonstrate free will and its opposite. For example, the child in the restaurant wants to order ice cream for lunch, but his mother does not allow it. Instead, she chooses what her child will have for lunch. The child is not free to make that choice for himself.

Wording and surface appearance don't necessarily represent how the world works.

If the world is deterministic, just as you have defined determinism, whatever the mother and the child does has no alternatives. There was never a possibility of them doing anything other than what must happen, precisely as determined, no deviation.

It's not a matter of freely chosen actions or free will.

In a court of law, a person is not held responsible if they were forced to participate in a crime against their will, or if their crime was caused by something that was beyond their control, such as a significant mental illness that subjected them to hallucinations and delusions, or impaired their ability to reason, or that subjected them to an irresistible impulse. These will be matters of hard evidence, legal precedents, and expert testimony.

So, no, the analogy that believing in free will is the like believing in gods is bogus. Free will is an empirical event that we all observe every day. Hey, I've got an idea. Let's go out to a restaurant, and you can actually see people reading the menu and choosing for themselves what they will order for dinner.

Anyone with a functional brain and an understanding of the law understands the consequences of breaking the law.

Society works on rationality. The brain is a rational system, an information processor. Determinism entails what happens according to an interaction of inputs - the law of the land and the penalties for not complying - in relation to the state that acquires and processes this information.

The rational thing to do is comply for safety reasons, regardless of the penalties. Some folk have no regard for the law or the penalties...perhaps considering themselves too clever to get caught.

Each according to their state, condition and proclivities, be it rational or irrational.

Nothing to do with free will.

Sorry.
 
The brain is a rational system, an information processor
If you really understood that, you would understand that information processors REQUIRE a branch command, an "if".

There are in fact OISC, one instruction set computers. The one instruction always does two things: a math operation and a jump-if (there's an architecture that only uses "move" by cleverly hiding instructions inside places in which to move, and therefore it's not a pure OISC, as addresses serve as additional opcodes).

Processing information requires a choice to be made.

There's no way to squeeze that out of the equation.

There's no way to design any informational process without the "if".

Single neurons are all IF operations: if conditions are right, spit chemicals.

Now if you want to actually get around to desert responsibility, you have some highlighting in red to do, if you want to actually support your position on deviation and randomness.

I find it facile, in fact, that someone is trying to tell at least two software engineers that "if" doesn't exist.
 
For example, the child in the restaurant wants to order ice cream for lunch, but his mother does not allow it. Instead, she chooses what her child will have for lunch. The child is not free to make that choice for himself.

Wording and surface appearance don't necessarily represent how the world works.

Well, if we see something, and we accurately describe what we see, then that usually tells us what is actually happening. For example, we see people in the restaurant choosing from the menu what they will order for dinner. We know that free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and undue influence, so we say that the people in the restaurant are placing orders that they chose of their own free will.

However, the child is not free to choose for himself what he will have for dinner. He wants ice cream for dinner. So his mother knows that he is too young to make that choice for himself, and she orders an appropriate meal for him. His mother controls that choice. He is not allowed to make that choice for himself.

If the world is deterministic, just as you have defined determinism, whatever the mother and the child does has no alternatives. There was never a possibility of them doing anything other than what must happen, precisely as determined, no deviation.

The mother was able to order anything she wanted from the restaurant menu, for herself and for her child. Every item on the menu was a real possibility. Determinism simply asserts that only two of those possibilities, one for herself and one for her child, would become the actual dinners that she would order.

It's not a matter of freely chosen actions or free will.

Of course it was a matter of freely chosen actions. No one was forcing the mother to choose one thing rather than another. She made that choice for herself, according to her own dietary goals for herself and the child. It was clearly a choice of her own free will, causally determined by her own goals and her own reasons. But her child, who wanted nothing but ice cream for dinner, was not allowed to make that choice for himself. Being a child, his will was subject to her will, and was not free.

And it was also a matter of causal determinism. She had acquired those dietary goals and reasons through her own past experiences, which would likely include what she learned as a child from her own parents, anything she was taught in school, perhaps books she had read, discussions with her doctor and the pediatrician, etc. Our goals and reasons are deterministically caused by prior events.

We have both. We have determinism and we have free will, both exhibited within the same event of choosing from the menu what we will order for dinner.

The same is true of free will in legal matters. In a court of law, a person is not held responsible if they were forced to participate in a crime against their will, or if their crime was caused by something that was beyond their control, such as a significant mental illness that subjected them to hallucinations and delusions, or impaired their ability to reason, or that subjected them to an irresistible impulse. These will be matters of hard evidence, legal precedents, and expert testimony.

Anyone with a functional brain and an understanding of the law understands the consequences of breaking the law.

Ah, yes. Those consequences are what society believes the person justly deserves ("basic deserts") for their harmful actions. Ideally, society would believe that the offender also justly deserves an opportunity to change themselves through rehabilitation.

Society works on rationality. The brain is a rational system, an information processor. Determinism entails what happens according to an interaction of inputs - the law of the land and the penalties for not complying - in relation to the state that acquires and processes this information.

Yes. Rationality is a deterministic causal mechanism. In the same way that we think and choose and plan how to build a house, we also think and choose and plan how we will cope with the practical issue of criminal behavior. And the robber thinks and chooses and plans how to commit the robbery. The deterministic behavior of choosing for ourselves what we will is also called "free will" when there is no coercion or other types of undue influence (for example: hypnosis, significant mental illness, authoritative command as between parent and child, or commander and soldier, etc.).

Free will is a deterministic process. It happens through good ol' reliable cause and effect (also known as "causal necessity").

The rational thing to do is comply for safety reasons, regardless of the penalties. Some folk have no regard for the law or the penalties...perhaps considering themselves too clever to get caught.

Well, that's the thing about rational thought. Different people, with different prior life experiences, may have different goals and reasons than we do.

Each according to their state, condition and proclivities, be it rational or irrational.

Yes. The irony is that irrational choices are also produced rationally, but reliably produced using bad information and/or bad logic.

Nothing to do with free will.

Every choice that a person or a society makes for itself while free of coercion and undue influence is, by definition, free will. What we need to keep straight is that free will is not freedom from causal necessity, but only freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more and nothing less.

Causal necessity, itself, is neither coercive nor undue. Only specific causes are coercive, like the guy holding a gun to our head. Only specific causes are undue influences, influences so strong that they remove our normal control of our choices. So, causal determinism itself does not violate a person's free will. Only specific causes can do that.

Free will is a deterministic event within a world of deterministic events. Whenever we make a choice for ourselves of our own free will, it will be causally necessary from any prior point in time that we would be doing exactly that, and nothing else, at that new point in time.
 
For example, the child in the restaurant wants to order ice cream for lunch, but his mother does not allow it. Instead, she chooses what her child will have for lunch. The child is not free to make that choice for himself.

Wording and surface appearance don't necessarily represent how the world works.

Well, if we see something, and we accurately describe what we see, then that usually tells us what is actually happening. For example, we see people in the restaurant choosing from the menu what they will order for dinner. We know that free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and undue influence, so we say that the people in the restaurant are placing orders that they chose of their own free will.

However, the child is not free to choose for himself what he will have for dinner. He wants ice cream for dinner. So his mother knows that he is too young to make that choice for himself, and she orders an appropriate meal for him. His mother controls that choice. He is not allowed to make that choice for himself.

If the world is deterministic, just as you have defined determinism, whatever the mother and the child does has no alternatives. There was never a possibility of them doing anything other than what must happen, precisely as determined, no deviation.

The mother was able to order anything she wanted from the restaurant menu, for herself and for her child. Every item on the menu was a real possibility. Determinism simply asserts that only two of those possibilities, one for herself and one for her child, would become the actual dinners that she would order.

It's not a matter of freely chosen actions or free will.

Of course it was a matter of freely chosen actions. No one was forcing the mother to choose one thing rather than another. She made that choice for herself, according to her own dietary goals for herself and the child. It was clearly a choice of her own free will, causally determined by her own goals and her own reasons. But her child, who wanted nothing but ice cream for dinner, was not allowed to make that choice for himself. Being a child, his will was subject to her will, and was not free.

And it was also a matter of causal determinism. She had acquired those dietary goals and reasons through her own past experiences, which would likely include what she learned as a child from her own parents, anything she was taught in school, perhaps books she had read, discussions with her doctor and the pediatrician, etc. Our goals and reasons are deterministically caused by prior events.

We have both. We have determinism and we have free will, both exhibited within the same event of choosing from the menu what we will order for dinner.

The same is true of free will in legal matters. In a court of law, a person is not held responsible if they were forced to participate in a crime against their will, or if their crime was caused by something that was beyond their control, such as a significant mental illness that subjected them to hallucinations and delusions, or impaired their ability to reason, or that subjected them to an irresistible impulse. These will be matters of hard evidence, legal precedents, and expert testimony.

Anyone with a functional brain and an understanding of the law understands the consequences of breaking the law.

Ah, yes. Those consequences are what society believes the person justly deserves ("basic deserts") for their harmful actions. Ideally, society would believe that the offender also justly deserves an opportunity to change themselves through rehabilitation.

Society works on rationality. The brain is a rational system, an information processor. Determinism entails what happens according to an interaction of inputs - the law of the land and the penalties for not complying - in relation to the state that acquires and processes this information.

Yes. Rationality is a deterministic causal mechanism. In the same way that we think and choose and plan how to build a house, we also think and choose and plan how we will cope with the practical issue of criminal behavior. And the robber thinks and chooses and plans how to commit the robbery. The deterministic behavior of choosing for ourselves what we will is also called "free will" when there is no coercion or other types of undue influence (for example: hypnosis, significant mental illness, authoritative command as between parent and child, or commander and soldier, etc.).

Free will is a deterministic process. It happens through good ol' reliable cause and effect (also known as "causal necessity").

The rational thing to do is comply for safety reasons, regardless of the penalties. Some folk have no regard for the law or the penalties...perhaps considering themselves too clever to get caught.

Well, that's the thing about rational thought. Different people, with different prior life experiences, may have different goals and reasons than we do.

Each according to their state, condition and proclivities, be it rational or irrational.

Yes. The irony is that irrational choices are also produced rationally, but reliably produced using bad information and/or bad logic.

Nothing to do with free will.

Every choice that a person or a society makes for itself while free of coercion and undue influence is, by definition, free will. What we need to keep straight is that free will is not freedom from causal necessity, but only freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more and nothing less.

Causal necessity, itself, is neither coercive nor undue. Only specific causes are coercive, like the guy holding a gun to our head. Only specific causes are undue influences, influences so strong that they remove our normal control of our choices. So, causal determinism itself does not violate a person's free will. Only specific causes can do that.

Free will is a deterministic event within a world of deterministic events. Whenever we make a choice for ourselves of our own free will, it will be causally necessary from any prior point in time that we would be doing exactly that, and nothing else, at that new point in time.

Inner necessity is persistently ignored or dismissed, the underlying events, information input, distribution, processing, etc - unconscious activity - that generate thought and action is not freely chosen, yet our thoughts and actions are determined/fixed/set by that process.

Which is just as problematic for the idea of free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

There is no way around this. The compatibilist definition of free will is not sufficient.
 
the underlying events, information input, distribution, processing, etc - unconscious activity - that generate thought and action is not freely chosen
This is not true. There are many aspects of events, information input, distribution, and processing that are freely chosen.

This does not have to be false for wills to exist, for choices to be made by the resulting object.

The computer needed no hand in it's creation to be the object that transacts the branch.

It needs no hand in it's creation to make a choice of its own based on what it is now.

Otherwise you commit the genetic fallacy: where something came from nor how it got there actually restrict it from being what it is now.

The fact that I created urist, that Urist had no hand in their creation nor personality does not change the fact that it is Urist's personality driving their decisions, not Rovod's.

They may not freely will to be different, but they are making decisions for themselves as the dwarf they are.
 
Inner necessity is persistently ignored or dismissed, the underlying events, information input, distribution, processing, etc - unconscious activity - that generate thought and action is not freely chosen, yet our thoughts and actions are determined/fixed/set by that process.

Inner necessity is not being ignored or dismissed. Our unconscious events that generate our thoughts and actions are still our own unconscious events.

Whether I ordered the salad consciously, or while sleepwalking, the waiter is still going to present me with the bill. It was my brain that decided to order the salad, and my own voice that told the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

Which is just as problematic for the idea of free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

Apparently not. There is a clear distinction between a choice that I am free to make for myself versus a choice forced upon me by coercion or insanity or authoritative command or hypnosis or transcranial magnetic stimulation or any other undue influence.

The normal brain is not an undue influence. Rather than eliminating our free will, it is the very source of our ability to decide for ourselves what we will do. Free will does not require freedom from our own brain. Nor does it require freedom from causal necessity. Free will simply requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

This has been thoroughly dealt with above. Determinism eliminates neither free will nor responsibility. It will inevitably be I, myself, that chooses to order the Chef Salad. It will inevitably be I, myself, to whom the waiter presents the bill. Determinism changes nothing.
 
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