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Demystifying Determinism

If you cannot see the difference between your ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity'' and my ''compatibilists ignore the implications of inner necessity'' there is something seriously wrong with your comprehension.

______________

I am pointing out your errors...which are based either on wishful thinking or poor comprehension. Try to do better.
So the best you can do is a couple of personal gibes without addressing a single point from my post.

Nothing changes.
 
It is necessary to identify the cause of the behavior in order to correct the behavior.
1. If the cause of the behavior is mental illness, then it is treated psychiatrically.
2. If the cause of the behavior is brain injury or a tumor, then it is treated medically.
3. If the cause of the behavior was coercion, then removing the threat removes the cause.
4. If the cause of the behavior was a deliberate choice by a healthy brain to achieve its desire at the expense of others, then rehabilitative counseling, education, is required, and participation is motivated by shortening the period of incarceration. If the offender is incorrigible, then life in prison may be justified to protect others from his harmful actions.

We do not smush together all of the distinct causes into one general notion of causation. We identify the nature of the cause, whether it was mental illness, brain injury, coercion, or a person's own deliberate choice (also known as "free will").

The cause of the behaviour is ultimately the state and condition of the brain.

Huh? You immediately respond by smushing all of the causes into a single useless generality again? Of course every thought and action is a product of the brain. But the methods we use to correct the brain (and thus correct the behavior) depends entirely upon the specific cause. Was mental illness the cause? Was a brain tumor the cause? Was coercion the cause? Was a deliberate choice the cause?

The goal is to correct the cause so that the offender might be safely released. How we go about correcting a brain tumor is very different than how we correct the deliberate choices of a healthy brain.

About inner necessity...
One form of inner necessity is simply us choosing what we will do. It is the essential element of free will that makes it compatible with a deterministic world, because choosing happens to be a deterministic operation. Our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, our own goals and reasons causally determine our choice.

The state and condition of the brain in any given instance is 'inner necessity.'

Sure. But the state of the brain is constantly changing due to what we are currently doing. For example, in the restaurant, we are reading the menu, and that is affecting the state of our brain as it considers the options and finally chooses what it will order.

State and condition is not subject to will. Will is an output of the brain.

Our intention (our will) is both an input and an output. Choosing to go to the restaurant sets our intent, and that intent motivates our subsequent thoughts and actions as we get in the car and drive to the restaurant. So, the intent was first an output of the brain's decision making, and then it became the input driving our subsequent behavior until we arrived at the restaurant.


Dude, you really need to show us the courtesy of testing your own links before posting them. Websites over time will reorganize their articles and store them in different folders. It gets really tiresome when we select a link to your source and get a message like:
This site can’t be reached
www.hnl.bcm.tmc.edu took too long to respond.

"And the electrical activity in these neurons is known to reflect the delivery of this chemical, dopamine, to the frontal cortex. Dopamine is one of several neurotransmitters thought to regulate emotional response, and is suspected of playing a central role in schizophrenia, Parkinson's disease, and drug abuse," Montague says. "We think these dopamine neurons are making guesses at likely future rewards. The neuron is constantly making a guess at the time and magnitude of the reward."

"If what it expects doesn't arrive, it doesn't change its firing. If it expects a certain amount of reward at a particular time and the reward is actually higher, it's surprised by that and increases its delivery of dopamine," he explains. "And if it expects a certain level (of reward) and it actually gets less, it decreases its level of dopamine delivery."

Thus, says Montague, "what we see is that the dopamine neurons change the way they make electrical impulses in exactly the same way the animal changes his behavior. The way the neurons change their predictions correlates with the behavioral changes of the monkey almost exactly."

Fascinating, but totally irrelevant. We all assume that the brain is responsible for performing the decision making function that leads from the restaurant menu to the dinner order. How it goes about this at the level of individual neuron activity does not alter the fact that decisions are being made in physical reality by the brain.

When the brain is not being coerced or unduly influenced, it is a freely chosen "I will". But when the brain is being coerced or unduly influenced, it is not a freely chosen "I will". These facts hold true regardless of how the brain goes about its business of decision making.


''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?'' - Van Inwagen

It's very simple, Van. You have no choice about having a brain which makes hundreds of choices every day. So, your notion that you must first choose your brain before your brain can make any choices, is forking ridiculous.
 
What I'm pointing out is that compatibilism ignores or brushes aside the reality of inner necessity.

That is not the same as saying ''compatibilism is relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity.''

It really is. You're attempting to make a distinction where none exists.

"Inner necessity" is an element of determinism in exactly the same way as "external force" is. To accuse compatibilists of ignoring "inner necessity" is exactly that same as saying compatibilists are failing to fully take account of all elements of determinism.


Of course there is a distinction. I have never said or suggested that ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity''

What I have said is that compatibilists ignore inner necessity in their definition of free will

If you cannot see the difference between your ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity'' and my ''compatibilists ignore the implications of inner necessity'' there is something seriously wrong with your comprehension.


The compatibilist definition basically ignores it.

The AntiChris said:
Don't be silly. The central point of compatibilism is the proposition that free will is compatible with determinism. 'Inner necessity' is entailed by determinism.
Wake up, compatibilism defines free will as acting without external force, coercion or undue influence, yet inner necessity is just as much a problem for the idea of free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

Despite your protestations, you really don't understand compatibilism.

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are “outside” of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

I'm not protesting, I am pointing out your errors...which are based either on wishful thinking or poor comprehension. Try to do better.
You appear to be arguing for dualism; There's a bunch of stuff that's your brain, which is entirely deterministic; And then, in order for that stuff to exhibit 'free will', there would need to be a non-deterministic "you", that can intervene.

But the stuff of the first part IS the you. Inner necessity is just a fancy way of saying that brains are deterministic; But nobody here (apart from perhaps @Kylie) is suggesting otherwise.

There's no "inner", just necessity. And the "inner" part of that holistic necessity that's not being coerced, is us, and is as free as it needs to be - not free of determinism, but free of coercion.
 
If you cannot see the difference between your ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity'' and my ''compatibilists ignore the implications of inner necessity'' there is something seriously wrong with your comprehension.

______________

I am pointing out your errors...which are based either on wishful thinking or poor comprehension. Try to do better.
So the best you can do is a couple of personal gibes without addressing a single point from my post.

Nothing changes.

You had no point to address.

You got your accusation wrong.

Claiming that I said or implied that ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity' is absurd.

Even when the reason why it's absurd is pointed out, ie, ''ignoring inner necessity'' not being the same as 'relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity,'' you claim it hasn't been addressed.
 
If you cannot see the difference between your ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity'' and my ''compatibilists ignore the implications of inner necessity'' there is something seriously wrong with your comprehension.

______________

I am pointing out your errors...which are based either on wishful thinking or poor comprehension. Try to do better.
So the best you can do is a couple of personal gibes without addressing a single point from my post.

Nothing changes.

You had no point to address.

You got your accusation wrong.

Claiming that I said or implied that ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity' is absurd.

Even when the reason why it's absurd is pointed out, ie, ''ignoring inner necessity'' not being the same as 'relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity,'' you claim it hasn't been addressed.
:shrug:
 
What I'm pointing out is that compatibilism ignores or brushes aside the reality of inner necessity.

That is not the same as saying ''compatibilism is relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity.''

It really is. You're attempting to make a distinction where none exists.

"Inner necessity" is an element of determinism in exactly the same way as "external force" is. To accuse compatibilists of ignoring "inner necessity" is exactly that same as saying compatibilists are failing to fully take account of all elements of determinism.


Of course there is a distinction. I have never said or suggested that ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity''

What I have said is that compatibilists ignore inner necessity in their definition of free will

If you cannot see the difference between your ''compatibilists must be relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity'' and my ''compatibilists ignore the implications of inner necessity'' there is something seriously wrong with your comprehension.


The compatibilist definition basically ignores it.

The AntiChris said:
Don't be silly. The central point of compatibilism is the proposition that free will is compatible with determinism. 'Inner necessity' is entailed by determinism.
Wake up, compatibilism defines free will as acting without external force, coercion or undue influence, yet inner necessity is just as much a problem for the idea of free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

Despite your protestations, you really don't understand compatibilism.

A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are “outside” of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

I'm not protesting, I am pointing out your errors...which are based either on wishful thinking or poor comprehension. Try to do better.
You appear to be arguing for dualism; There's a bunch of stuff that's your brain, which is entirely deterministic; And then, in order for that stuff to exhibit 'free will', there would need to be a non-deterministic "you", that can intervene.

But the stuff of the first part IS the you. Inner necessity is just a fancy way of saying that brains are deterministic; But nobody here (apart from perhaps @Kylie) is suggesting otherwise.

There's no "inner", just necessity. And the "inner" part of that holistic necessity that's not being coerced, is us, and is as free as it needs to be - not free of determinism, but free of coercion.


In no way shape or form am I arguing for dualism.

I am pointing out that inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

Bcause action production by a deterministic process is a problem for compatibilism, for the given reasons, acting without external force, coercion or undue influence is not sufficient to establish the reality of free will. Trying to define free will into existence - compatibilsm in this instanc - does not establish its reality.

That's all.
 
You had no point to address.
Yes they did. Either there is something in inner necessity that is violating your "no deviations no randomness" schtick or there is no violation there either.

They are asking you point blank to determine why "you can't change who you are now" would in any way make the person you are now incapable of being the driving force behind a decision.
''ignoring inner necessity'' not being the same as 'relying on exceptions to deterministic necessity,''
This is pish posh. Either inner necessity is being excepted or it isn't.

Ignoring a necessitation is the same as excepting it.

The issue is that we didn't do either. We discussed "inner necessity" and discovered it necessitates that we make the choice for ourselves when we make it.

Of course, you ignored the whole post where this was discussed.
for the given reasons
You gave no reasons.
An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents
This is a bald claim that falls into the genetic fallacy. It does not in any way satisfy the definition of a supported argument

It does not matter where something came from, it matters what it is.

It does not matter that a criminal has brain damage from being abused by their father.

It does it matter that their father had brain damage from being abused by theirs.

It does not matter that their home was full of lead pipes.

It does not matter that all their life they were tied to a radiator.

It does not matter that they were told that the only way out was to start murdering folks every Friday night.

How they became the psychopath they are does not matter to the fact that they are, now, a psychopath.

It is the fact that they are, immediately, right now a psychopath that warrants putting them in the jail, holding a trial, identifying them as a psychopath, and doing large amounts of psychological repair on them.

They didn't need to have chosen themselves for THEM to deserve the corrections.
 
I am pointing out that inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence.

Only someone who completely fails to understand compatibilism would make such a claim.
 
I am pointing out that inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence.

Only someone who completely fails to understand compatibilism would make such a claim.
The genetic fallacy: the idea that how something became what it is makes any difference to the fact that it is what it is now doing what those things do.
 
In no way shape or form am I arguing for dualism.
Sure you are.

You're arguing that "inner necessity" dictates how "my will" is enacted.

Which is only possible if "inner necessity" is somehow different from "my will"; That is, if there's a separate "me" or "soul" that supervises the thoughts in my brain.

But these are all just different ways of saying "me". My will is me. My thoughts are me. My reasoning is me. My "inner necessity" is me.

Unless you are arguing for dualism, saying "inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence", is synonymous with saying "I can't make choices, because all my choices are decided for me, by me".

Or to use your phrasing: "I am just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence."

Your argument boils down to "my soul
cannot act on my brain, because my brain acts deterministically", which is only a sane argument if you accept dualism as a premise. In the absence of dualism, your argument becomes "my brain cannot act, because my brain acts deterministically", which is clearly false.
 
I am pointing out that inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence.

Only someone who completely fails to understand compatibilism would make such a claim.


Only someone trying to justify compatibilism would deny its faults. Basically, carefully defining free will in a way to give an impression of compatibility. It's an ideology.

Again;

Determinism: What are the best arguments for compatibilism?

There are none.

''Compatibilists are unable to present a rational argument that supports their belief in the existence of free will in a deterministic universe, except by defining determinism and/or free will in a way that is a watered down version of one or both of the two concepts.''

''It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of Causal Determinism and Free Will. Or, as William James less generously observed, all efforts to harmonize Causal Determinism an Free Will are a “quagmire of evasion.” - Bruce Silverstein B.A. in Philosophy
 
In no way shape or form am I arguing for dualism.
Sure you are.

You're arguing that "inner necessity" dictates how "my will" is enacted.

Which is only possible if "inner necessity" is somehow different from "my will"; That is, if there's a separate "me" or "soul" that supervises the thoughts in my brain.

But these are all just different ways of saying "me". My will is me. My thoughts are me. My reasoning is me. My "inner necessity" is me.

Unless you are arguing for dualism, saying "inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence", is synonymous with saying "I can't make choices, because all my choices are decided for me, by me".

Or to use your phrasing: "I am just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence."

Your argument boils down to "my soul
cannot act on my brain, because my brain acts deterministically", which is only a sane argument if you accept dualism as a premise. In the absence of dualism, your argument becomes "my brain cannot act, because my brain acts deterministically", which is clearly false.


''Inner necessity'' just refers to the means and mechanisms by which your experience of self, consciousness, thoughts, feelings, actions, etc, is formed and generated, where the state and condition of the system - the brain - in any given instance is being expressed as you, your thoughts, feelings and actions.
 
In no way shape or form am I arguing for dualism.
Sure you are.

You're arguing that "inner necessity" dictates how "my will" is enacted.

Which is only possible if "inner necessity" is somehow different from "my will"; That is, if there's a separate "me" or "soul" that supervises the thoughts in my brain.

But these are all just different ways of saying "me". My will is me. My thoughts are me. My reasoning is me. My "inner necessity" is me.

Unless you are arguing for dualism, saying "inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence", is synonymous with saying "I can't make choices, because all my choices are decided for me, by me".

Or to use your phrasing: "I am just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence."

Your argument boils down to "my soul
cannot act on my brain, because my brain acts deterministically", which is only a sane argument if you accept dualism as a premise. In the absence of dualism, your argument becomes "my brain cannot act, because my brain acts deterministically", which is clearly false.


''Inner necessity'' just refers to the means and mechanisms by which your experience of self, consciousness, thoughts, feelings, actions, etc, is formed and generated, where the state and condition of the system - the brain - in any given instance is being expressed as you, your thoughts, feelings and actions.
Yes, that's what I said.

Inner necessity is me. I am inner necessity. Inner necessity isn't a barrier to my freedom of choice, it IS me with my freedom of choice.

I have no choice but to act according to my will. That's "inner necessity".
 
In no way shape or form am I arguing for dualism.
Sure you are.

You're arguing that "inner necessity" dictates how "my will" is enacted.

Which is only possible if "inner necessity" is somehow different from "my will"; That is, if there's a separate "me" or "soul" that supervises the thoughts in my brain.

But these are all just different ways of saying "me". My will is me. My thoughts are me. My reasoning is me. My "inner necessity" is me.

Unless you are arguing for dualism, saying "inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence", is synonymous with saying "I can't make choices, because all my choices are decided for me, by me".

Or to use your phrasing: "I am just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence."

Your argument boils down to "my soul
cannot act on my brain, because my brain acts deterministically", which is only a sane argument if you accept dualism as a premise. In the absence of dualism, your argument becomes "my brain cannot act, because my brain acts deterministically", which is clearly false.


''Inner necessity'' just refers to the means and mechanisms by which your experience of self, consciousness, thoughts, feelings, actions, etc, is formed and generated, where the state and condition of the system - the brain - in any given instance is being expressed as you, your thoughts, feelings and actions.
Yes, that's what I said.

Inner necessity is me. I am inner necessity. Inner necessity isn't a barrier to my freedom of choice, it IS me with my freedom of choice.

I have no choice but to act according to my will. That's "inner necessity".
Or in other words, it doesn't matter where you came from as to what you are. The only thing that matters as to what you are is your immediate state, which funny enough can satisfy the compatibilist definition of free will.

Anything else is falling into the genetic fallacy.

DBT sees this as "watering down" but it is in fact cleaning them up and removing problematic and paradoxical parts.

The only thing those paradoxes did was confuse DBT and Kylie and a lot of other philosophers besides, or perhaps it acts as a prop so they can just call the whole thing silly.

They serve no practical purpose but to allow a straw-man to be constructed against free will by incompatibilists.

I just wish that DBT would quit their bullshit with this straw-man prop everyone says isn't even germane and actually talk about this "watered down version" rather than continually throwing tantrums that they can't be free of sanity.
 
In no way shape or form am I arguing for dualism.
Sure you are.

You're arguing that "inner necessity" dictates how "my will" is enacted.

Which is only possible if "inner necessity" is somehow different from "my will"; That is, if there's a separate "me" or "soul" that supervises the thoughts in my brain.

But these are all just different ways of saying "me". My will is me. My thoughts are me. My reasoning is me. My "inner necessity" is me.

Unless you are arguing for dualism, saying "inner necessity is just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence", is synonymous with saying "I can't make choices, because all my choices are decided for me, by me".

Or to use your phrasing: "I am just as much a problem for compatibilism as external force, coercion and undue influence."

Your argument boils down to "my soul
cannot act on my brain, because my brain acts deterministically", which is only a sane argument if you accept dualism as a premise. In the absence of dualism, your argument becomes "my brain cannot act, because my brain acts deterministically", which is clearly false.


''Inner necessity'' just refers to the means and mechanisms by which your experience of self, consciousness, thoughts, feelings, actions, etc, is formed and generated, where the state and condition of the system - the brain - in any given instance is being expressed as you, your thoughts, feelings and actions.
Yes, that's what I said.

Inner necessity is me. I am inner necessity. Inner necessity isn't a barrier to my freedom of choice, it IS me with my freedom of choice.

I have no choice but to act according to my will. That's "inner necessity".

Being 'me' - I can act, therefore free will - is not sufficient to establish the reality of free will. It is the system that determines an action in relation to inputs, environment, external and internal circumstances, electrochemical processing, etc....a matter of functionality, not free will.

''At this point certain questions need to be asked: Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''
 
which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”
Let's imagine someone releases an autonomous drone into the world that starts killing people.

There are a few things that can be done with this drone. Finding and catching the person who released it will not stop it from murdering folks, however: it is autonomous.

It doesn't really matter who built and released it except to prevent more drones from going out. Catching them wouldn't end the killing.

It's almost like the origins, the "genetics" of the drone don't matter. What matters is what the drone is, right now.

Ethically speaking, this is one of the reasons that the "genetics" of who you are, have nothing to do with the fact that when YOU make choices, no matter how you happened, it is YOU who are responsible for them.

Of course, YOU do have the power to change your own mind, same as the soldier who chooses to improve their aim...
 
The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,
No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

The AntiChris said:
A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.
 
The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,
No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

The AntiChris said:
A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.
I would say morally significant influences are ones which we take into account when determining additional responsible parties.

The agent is ALWAYS responsible for doing the things they did and receiving any additional education that is recommended by that exact fuckup (which may not be very much depending on what, exactly they did).

The question is where the buck stops. They might not be the only one who fucked up -- someone may have behaved in a far worse way, in fact.
 
Being 'me' - I can act, therefore free will - is not sufficient to establish the reality of free will.

All that is required to establish the reality of free will is to observe in the real world the conditions required in its definition. Free will is a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence. Do we observe people making choices for themselves in the restaurant? Yes, we do. Therefore we have established the reality of free will.

It is the system that determines an action in relation to inputs, environment, external and internal circumstances, electrochemical processing, etc....a matter of functionality, not free will.

The only system that is capable of deciding what we will do is located within our own brain. Choosing is the functionality, and it is performed by the brain. The external circumstances are the restaurant. The internal circumstances are our desire to have dinner and the need to make a choice from the menu in order to have a dinner to eat. The "electrochemical processing" does not provide a useful description of the event in the restaurant. It may help the neuroscientist to describe the details of a single neuron's behavior, but it will not help us to explain why we chose the Salad when we could have had the Steak.

All you've done is used a carefully crafted description which excludes our participation in the event. It is not an accurate or useful depiction of what is happening.

''At this point certain questions need to be asked: Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

And hello again, Trick Slattery! To clear up your confusion, the "ability" is choosing, and it comes with every normal human brain. Free will refers to the conditions of that choosing, specifically whether the person was coerced or otherwise unduly influenced, or whether the person was free to make the choice for themselves. Normally, a person is free to decide for themselves what they will order for dinner from the restaurant menu. But if the person is a child, who wants to order a banana split for dinner, his mother will step in and choose a nutritious meal. This is not what the child wants. But he is not free to make this choice for himself. His mother has control of what he will eat in the restaurant.

As to what "the compatibilist might say", all you need to do is ask. We have no problem with normal genetic dispositions, a person's tastes, their hunger at breakfast time, etc. But there are internal conditions that are not normal, such as a brain tumor or a significant mental illness that causes hallucinations and delusions, or that impairs the ability to reason. Such internal conditions can prevent the person from making a reasonable choice for themselves. So, it is indeed an issue of control, as it was in the case of the child wanting to order the banana split for dinner, in which case the mother exercised her control. But in most cases, a person has sufficient control to make the choice themselves, you know, of their own free will.
 
The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person,
No they wouldn't. I explained this to you in post #876:

The AntiChris said:
A compatibilist would not say "because those are influences that are 'outside' of the person". A compatibilist would point out that certain influences are morally significant and some aren't. Morally significant influences are ones that we take into account, for instance, when determining the degree to which an agent may be held responsible (morally or legally) for an action (or inaction).

But of course you ignored it.
I would say morally significant influences are ones which we take into account when determining additional responsible parties.

The agent is ALWAYS responsible for doing the things they did and receiving any additional education that is recommended by that exact fuckup (which may not be very much depending on what, exactly they did).

The question is where the buck stops. They might not be the only one who fucked up -- someone may have behaved in a far worse way, in fact.
Not sure what you mean here.

All I'm saying is that coercion, for instance, is nearly always deemed to be a morally significant influence in that that it mitigates culpability whereas ambient temperature, for instance, is rarely an influence that factors into our deliberations over culpability.
 
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