We may think we can order something else.
We know for certain that we "can" order anything on the menu. That's one of the benefits of "can". There are multiple things that we "can" order, even though there is only one thing that we "will" order.
"Will" I order the juicy Steak or "will" I order the Salad? That is something that I cannot know yet. I can make no assertions as to what I "will" order until
after I make my choice.
But before I make my choice I can know for certain that I "can" order the Steak. And I can know for certain that I "can" order the Salad. In fact, I know for certain that I "can" order everything listed on the menu.
Having two or more items that I "can" select is
logically required by the choosing operation. Just like having two or more numbers that I can add together is
logically required by the addition operation.
Yet through a process of necessitation, none of the alternative items are a possibility in the instance of fulfilling the determined decision...
The "process of necessitation" is not a magic trick that makes possibilities disappear. Possibilities are logical tokens within the decision making process. Decision making does not work without them. In fact, decision making logically insists upon having at least two real possibilities before it will even begin.
Because possibilities are logically necessary, we must presume that they are also causally necessary events, because here they are, in black and white, on the restaurant menu. There is no deciding what we will order for dinner without them. And without the deciding what we will order there will be no dinner.
So, the "deciding" and the "possibilities" must be seen as part of deterministic causal necessity. Otherwise, the chain of causation breaks.
...a decision that is necessitated rather than freely chosen. Free choice cannot exist within a deterministic system.
There is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". We never need such a freedom because causal necessity is just us being us, doing what we choose to do. And that is not a meaningful constraint. It is basically "what we would have done anyway".
However, there is such a thing as "freedom from coercion". And there is such a thing as "freedom from significant mental illness" and "freedom from hypnosis" and "freedom from the commands of authority" and "freedom from other forms of undue influence that might reasonably prevent us from choosing for ourselves what we will do".
Those are the freedoms that are implied by the "free" in "free will" and the "free" in "freely chosen" and the "free" in "free choice". Nothing more. Nothing less.
And these freedoms can and do exist within a deterministic system.
"Freedom from causal necessity" cannot exist within a deterministic system, of course. But there is no need for such a freedom, because causal necessity is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that anyone can or needs to be free of.
It's a matter of time and fixed events. Things that can be done, generally speaking, cannot happen if not determined to happen in a given set of circumstances.
That is an example where it becomes clear why we need to clarify the difference between things that "can" happen versus things that "will" happen. And we should start breaking the habit of saying "cannot" when what we actually mean is "will not".
It is as simple correction to what you just said and should be viewed by determinists as a "
friendly amendment":
"It's a matter of time and fixed events. Things that can be done, generally speaking, will not happen if not determined to happen in a given set of circumstances."
That's the point. It doesn't matter what 'can' be done when whatever happens, being necessitated, must happen, and in that moment in time, nothing else can happen in its stead.
And again:
That's the point. It doesn't matter what 'can' be done when whatever happens, being necessitated, must happen, and in that moment in time, nothing else will happen in its stead.
As to whether "what 'can' be done" matters, it matters a lot. What "can" be done constrains what "will" be done. If it cannot be done then it will not be done. However, the reverse, the notion that what "will" be done constrains what "can" be done, is false and paradoxical.
'No alternate action or choice' is not figurative: that is how determinism works and how it is defined.
It cannot be taken literally in view of the restaurant menu. The menu is actually there in empirical reality (which implies it was always causally necessary to be there), and it actually lists all of the items that we actually "can" choose to order. But it is not a list of what we actually "will" order, but only what we "can" order.
'Without deviation' is not figurative: that is how determinism works and how it is defined.
And the menu is there, exactly as it was determined (your metaphor) to be, without deviation. The only reason I use "(your metaphor)" is because the notion that some entity actually planned out all of the events in advance is a metaphor for reliable causation, the sequence of events caused by the natural interaction of the physical objects in the universe and the forces between them (we happen to be one of those objects and we can exert force upon other objects).