Demystifying Determinism

[ramoss]

a test to show which it is.

Yet we can absolutely say facts about deterministic systems!

One such fact is that "predetermination" of the kind you are proposing is only possible if there is a god ("fate" requires intent).

Secondly, we have established that all systems are representable as dererministic systems (non-disprovability of superdeterminism).

So if we can just show that any deterministic system allows wills, freedom, and choice, hard determinism is disproven.

Thirdly compatibilism is, quite thankfully,  also compatible with stochastic systems (it has to be because re: superdeterminism, those systems are also deterministically modelable).
[/QUOTE]

Not at all. You don't need a deity for any of those. All you need for predetermination is that if you rewound the universe to the very beginning of inflation, with the exact same conditions, it would repeat in exactly the same way.

Other than that, all is word salad.

 

[Jarhyn]

Yet we can absolutely say facts about deterministic systems!

One such fact is that "predetermination" of the kind you are proposing is only possible if there is a god ("fate" requires intent).

Secondly, we have established that all systems are representable as dererministic systems (non-disprovability of superdeterminism).

So if we can just show that any deterministic system allows wills, freedom, and choice, hard determinism is disproven.

Thirdly compatibilism is, quite thankfully,  also compatible with stochastic systems (it has to be because re: superdeterminism, those systems are also deterministically modelable).

Not at all. You don't need a deity for any of those. All you need for predetermination is that if you rewound the universe to the very beginning of inflation, with the exact same conditions, it would repeat in exactly the same way.

Other than that, all is word salad.

And yet while your quote tags were kind of salad shaped I was able to parse it out.

You are conflating predetermination with "determiniation by course", the normal course of determinism.

Your bar for predetermination in this syntactic structure is much higher for to prove.

Again, focus on the difference between "12 volcanoes" and "volcano at 205,312" or whatever. One is a result of a declaration and the other is the result of the cogitation.

 

[fromderinside]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

The Limits of Mathematics

Some mathematical facts can't be compressed into a theory because they are too complicated.

www.sciencenews.org

snip

In the 1930s, Kurt Gödel (1906–1978), followed by Alan Turing (1912–1954) and others, proved that no such decision procedure is possible for any system of logic made up of axioms and propositions sufficiently sophisticated to encompass the kinds of problems that mathematicians work on every day

In Gödel’s realm, no matter what the system of axioms or rules is, there will always be some assertion that can be neither proved nor invalidated within the system. Indeed, mathematics is full of conjectures–assertions awaiting proof–with no assurance that definitive answers even exist.

snip

Turing’s argument involved mathematical entities known as real numbers. Suppose you happen upon the number 1.6180339887. It looks vaguely familiar, but you can’t quite place it. You would like to find out whether this particular sequence of digits is special in some way, perhaps as the output of a specific formula or the value of a familiar mathematical constant.

For example, it’s possible that if the mystery number were available to an extra decimal place, the final digit would no longer match the decimal digits of the golden ratio. You would have to conclude that the given number is not an approximation of the golden ratio. Indeed, the extended string of digits could represent the output of a completely different expression or formula, or even part of a random sequence. It’s impossible to tell for sure. There isn’t enough information available.

snip

Chaitin proved that no program can generate a number more complex than itself. In other words, “a 1-pound theory can no more produce a 10-pound theorem than a 100-pound pregnant woman can birth a 200-pound child,” he likes to say.

Conversely, Chaitin also showed that it is impossible for a program to prove that a number more complex than the program is random. Hence, to the extent that the human mind is a kind of computer, there may be a type of complexity so deep and subtle that the intellect could never grasp it. Whatever order may lie in the depths would be inaccessible, and it would always appear to us as random.

At the same time, proving that a sequence is random presents insurmountable difficulties. There’s no way to be sure that we haven’t overlooked a hint of order that would allow even a small compression in the computer program that produces the sequence.

From a mathematical point of view, Chaitin’s result suggests that we are far more likely to find randomness than order within certain domains of mathematics. Indeed, his complexity version of Gödel’s theorem states: Although almost all numbers are random, there is no formal axiomatic system that will allow us to prove this fact.

FDI note: All the authority of Plato and all the evidence of Jesus. Time to leave doctrine school and attend university.

rah tah thud

 

[Jarhyn]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

 

[ramoss]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

And ,what you fail to do is show a testable way to show it's true.

 

[Jarhyn]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

And ,what you fail to do is show a testable way to show it's true.

No, you're JAQing at this point. I've shown it's true. The test is to say "does this math work out?" And the answer is "yes, the system did not crash".

The system did not crash therefore the math works out in hard, crunchy, discrete binary.

The test is "can it be done" and the answer is "it already has, yes."

 

[ramoss]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

And ,what you fail to do is show a testable way to show it's true.

No, you're JAQing at this point. I've shown it's true. The test is to say "does this math work out?" And the answer is "yes, the system did not crash".

The system did not crash therefore the math works out in hard, crunchy, discrete binary.

The test is "can it be done" and the answer is "it already has, yes."

No, you haven't. You have made a declaration, based on word salad. You have not provided a testable and repeatable experiment. Unsupported claims, and redefining of words does not 'prove' anything.

 

[Jarhyn]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

And ,what you fail to do is show a testable way to show it's true.

No, you're JAQing at this point. I've shown it's true. The test is to say "does this math work out?" And the answer is "yes, the system did not crash".

The system did not crash therefore the math works out in hard, crunchy, discrete binary.

The test is "can it be done" and the answer is "it already has, yes."

No, you haven't. You have made a declaration, based on word salad. You have not provided a testable and repeatable experiment. Unsupported claims, and redefining of words does not 'prove' anything.

Proving math is not about an experiment. It's about showing an equation balances and operates without a contradiction.

I've in fact told you exactly where to find this experiment you insist you must see, but here is the really patronizing version, I guess go to Bay12 Games' website, navigate to the forums, find "starter pack", and download that.

Run it with all the default settings.

Select "Design New World with Advanced Parameters."

Open the folder it's in, and look in the "raws" folder, and observe all the pre-determined information of the system.

Open the advanced parameters and look at even more predetermined information about the system.

Look at the seed (a predetermined part of the system). In fact, enter 0 there.

Generate a pocket world without changing any parameters.

Then we can select a location (a predetermined value which will nonetheless not result in a selection on all seeds), and default starting parameters and we can each be running the system, and then set up another predetermined layout for the fortress and a predetermined set of actions to be input to the system which on this seed would result in building a fortress (strangely, not predetermined as to the result, just the fact that the keystrokes happen), and then we can each save the result at each season boundary. Or you can do as much and then forward me your image of the system at that frame state. Then I can open it up and point out to you the group extension of a given extension function on the system so you can see "can" (Urist CAN, IF he were to decide to X, do X), "won't" (Urist in this frame won't decide to X), Urist Choosing from all food the closest food, a series of actions unto a requirement coming into the object that defines Urist, and ultimately his failure to do so as a Kea has stolen the food he wished to eat, even as Rovod does similar and does succeed in eating his meal.

 

[SIB]

That is the issue with determinism, predetermination, and in determinism. No one can show which the universe actually is I have yet to see someone propose a test to show which it is.

The notion of reliable cause and effect is demonstrated in everything that happens and everything that we do. It is so common that we all take it for granted, until something breaks down and needs to be fixed. The ability to fix it assumes there is a cause and that the cause can be remedied. So, the notion that all events are reliably caused seems to be a reasonable assumption. Even if we have no clue what the cause is, we assume there is a cause.

The evidence against that assumption would be events that can be proven to be uncaused. But how could an uncaused event be demonstrated in any laboratory experiment? An experiment would need to reproduce the event under controlled conditions. But reproducing the event requires that we are able to "cause the uncaused event", a paradoxical notion.

Such events are generally called "spontaneous".

We have plenty of events observed that seem to happen spontaneously, that this is just a function of how stuff behaves between spontaneous vacuum fluctuations, to spontaneous tunneling events, to spontaneous decays.

Much of cosmology and QM is about discussing the probabilities of such spontaneous events.

The only model in which these are proposed as dererministic is Superdeterminism, and as discussed, this is an unfalsifiable proposition: it's useless for saying anything the system SHALL do, though it is useful for understanding what the system MAY contain (deterministic choice, wills, requirements, and freedom or lack thereof within the system towards the requirement).

As noted, we have observed MANY spontaneous events that appear absolutely stochastically as far as we can tell.

Superdeterminism only offers a model for allowing one to describe a stochastic system of apparently infinite extent as deterministic rather than merely a finite system.

It means for "freedom", "choice" and "will" to exist in stochastic systems it must exist in deterministic ones.

may be. "spontaneous" is really more about "I didn't see that coming" more than spontaneous. Like a pink unicorn popping out of my kitchen floor. The math says its can happen. The reality is that it will never happen under the conditions we are at right now.

QM is based on probability so it has to add up to one.

We don't even know what space-time is. My guess is that when we do, one step closer to "predetermined" we will be. Like life was predetermined the moment it went "bang". Even though before it did, we couldn't tell. After we look back, the simplest we can say is "Life was inevitable".

As I've pointed out, no matter what it is, you cannot say with any certainty that life was pre-determined. It was inevitable, but inevitability is not predetermination.

Predetermination in mathematical systems means that it was specified, as part of the initial condition.

Again, you conflate "determination by course" and predetermination.

In many ways, "predetermination" is mostly the thing that may be said to be the illusion. Obviously, not always. All predeterminations seem to flow back to a determination by course, of our world.

100% deterministic = predetermination to me. There is no difference ' xcept that maybe "predetermine" implies an agent thinking about the final outcome and there is no need for me to entertain that as of yet. I think we all said that we aren't certain.

 

[SIB]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

And ,what you fail to do is show a testable way to show it's true.

No, you're JAQing at this point. I've shown it's true. The test is to say "does this math work out?" And the answer is "yes, the system did not crash".

The system did not crash therefore the math works out in hard, crunchy, discrete binary.

The test is "can it be done" and the answer is "it already has, yes."

No, you haven't. You have made a declaration, based on word salad. You have not provided a testable and repeatable experiment. Unsupported claims, and redefining of words does not 'prove' anything.

Proving math is not about an experiment. It's about showing an equation balances and operates without a contradiction.

I've in fact told you exactly where to find this experiment you insist you must see, but here is the really patronizing version, I guess go to Bay12 Games' website, navigate to the forums, find "starter pack", and download that.

Run it with all the default settings.

Select "Design New World with Advanced Parameters."

Open the folder it's in, and look in the "raws" folder, and observe all the pre-determined information of the system.

Open the advanced parameters and look at even more predetermined information about the system.

Look at the seed (a predetermined part of the system). In fact, enter 0 there.

Generate a pocket world without changing any parameters.

Then we can select a location (a predetermined value which will nonetheless not result in a selection on all seeds), and default starting parameters and we can each be running the system, and then set up another predetermined layout for the fortress and a predetermined set of actions to be input to the system which on this seed would result in building a fortress (strangely, not predetermined as to the result, just the fact that the keystrokes happen), and then we can each save the result at each season boundary. Or you can do as much and then forward me your image of the system at that frame state. Then I can open it up and point out to you the group extension of a given extension function on the system so you can see "can" (Urist CAN, IF he were to decide to X, do X), "won't" (Urist in this frame won't decide to X), Urist Choosing from all food the closest food, a series of actions unto a requirement coming into the object that defines Urist, and ultimately his failure to do so as a Kea has stolen the food he wished to eat, even as Rovod does similar and does succeed in eating his meal.

we have to be careful with math expressions. They are a bit like art. There can be no contractions in the math, no rules broken, and it still not able to make anything useful in the real world. Like 2.5 kids in the average household. there is no rule violations in that math and there is no contradictions. There is no .5 person. well, maybe my brother.

And math models are an experiment in any way shape or form. They can lead to them. That is true enough.

 

[SIB]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

And ,what you fail to do is show a testable way to show it's true.

No, you're JAQing at this point. I've shown it's true. The test is to say "does this math work out?" And the answer is "yes, the system did not crash".

The system did not crash therefore the math works out in hard, crunchy, discrete binary.

The test is "can it be done" and the answer is "it already has, yes."

No, you haven't. You have made a declaration, based on word salad. You have not provided a testable and repeatable experiment. Unsupported claims, and redefining of words does not 'prove' anything.

Proving math is not about an experiment. It's about showing an equation balances and operates without a contradiction.

I've in fact told you exactly where to find this experiment you insist you must see, but here is the really patronizing version, I guess go to Bay12 Games' website, navigate to the forums, find "starter pack", and download that.

Run it with all the default settings.

Select "Design New World with Advanced Parameters."

Open the folder it's in, and look in the "raws" folder, and observe all the pre-determined information of the system.

Open the advanced parameters and look at even more predetermined information about the system.

Look at the seed (a predetermined part of the system). In fact, enter 0 there.

Generate a pocket world without changing any parameters.

Then we can select a location (a predetermined value which will nonetheless not result in a selection on all seeds), and default starting parameters and we can each be running the system, and then set up another predetermined layout for the fortress and a predetermined set of actions to be input to the system which on this seed would result in building a fortress (strangely, not predetermined as to the result, just the fact that the keystrokes happen), and then we can each save the result at each season boundary. Or you can do as much and then forward me your image of the system at that frame state. Then I can open it up and point out to you the group extension of a given extension function on the system so you can see "can" (Urist CAN, IF he were to decide to X, do X), "won't" (Urist in this frame won't decide to X), Urist Choosing from all food the closest food, a series of actions unto a requirement coming into the object that defines Urist, and ultimately his failure to do so as a Kea has stolen the food he wished to eat, even as Rovod does similar and does succeed in eating his meal.

we have to be careful with math expressions. They are a bit like art. There can be no contractions in the math, no rules broken, and it still not able to make anything useful in the real world. Like 2.5 kids in the average household. there is no rule violations in that math and there is no contradictions. There is no .5 person. well, maybe my brother.

And math models are not an experiment in any way shape or form. They can lead to them. That is true enough.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

100% deterministic = predetermination to me. There is no difference ' xcept that maybe "predetermine" implies an agent thinking about the final outcome and there is no need for me to entertain that as of yet. I think we all said that we aren't certain.

Either way, it is causally necessary from any prior point in time that you would choose for yourself what you would fix for breakfast. The Big Bang wasn't in the room.

From a practical viewpoint, we really only care about the most meaningful and relevant causes of an event. A meaningful cause efficiently explains why something happened. A relevant cause is one we can do something about. The Big Bang is doesn't qualify. And Causal Necessity also does not qualify. Neither is a relevant cause, because there is nothing that can be done about either of them. And causal necessity is not a meaningful cause because it never actually causes anything. It's a concept. And concepts do not walk around in the world making things happen.

On the other hand, we are meaningful and relevant causes. If we do something wrong, then we can be held responsible and are subject to correction. And, unlike abstract concepts, we do go about in the world causing stuff to happen, and doing so to achieve our own goals according to our own reasons and to satisfy our own interests.

But causation never causes anything and determinism never determines anything They just describe how the actual objects and forces interact to bring about events. And we happen to be one of those actual objects that can exert force that causes events to happen.

 

[Jarhyn]

That is the issue with determinism, predetermination, and in determinism. No one can show which the universe actually is I have yet to see someone propose a test to show which it is.

The notion of reliable cause and effect is demonstrated in everything that happens and everything that we do. It is so common that we all take it for granted, until something breaks down and needs to be fixed. The ability to fix it assumes there is a cause and that the cause can be remedied. So, the notion that all events are reliably caused seems to be a reasonable assumption. Even if we have no clue what the cause is, we assume there is a cause.

The evidence against that assumption would be events that can be proven to be uncaused. But how could an uncaused event be demonstrated in any laboratory experiment? An experiment would need to reproduce the event under controlled conditions. But reproducing the event requires that we are able to "cause the uncaused event", a paradoxical notion.

Such events are generally called "spontaneous".

We have plenty of events observed that seem to happen spontaneously, that this is just a function of how stuff behaves between spontaneous vacuum fluctuations, to spontaneous tunneling events, to spontaneous decays.

Much of cosmology and QM is about discussing the probabilities of such spontaneous events.

The only model in which these are proposed as dererministic is Superdeterminism, and as discussed, this is an unfalsifiable proposition: it's useless for saying anything the system SHALL do, though it is useful for understanding what the system MAY contain (deterministic choice, wills, requirements, and freedom or lack thereof within the system towards the requirement).

As noted, we have observed MANY spontaneous events that appear absolutely stochastically as far as we can tell.

Superdeterminism only offers a model for allowing one to describe a stochastic system of apparently infinite extent as deterministic rather than merely a finite system.

It means for "freedom", "choice" and "will" to exist in stochastic systems it must exist in deterministic ones.

may be. "spontaneous" is really more about "I didn't see that coming" more than spontaneous. Like a pink unicorn popping out of my kitchen floor. The math says its can happen. The reality is that it will never happen under the conditions we are at right now.

QM is based on probability so it has to add up to one.

We don't even know what space-time is. My guess is that when we do, one step closer to "predetermined" we will be. Like life was predetermined the moment it went "bang". Even though before it did, we couldn't tell. After we look back, the simplest we can say is "Life was inevitable".

As I've pointed out, no matter what it is, you cannot say with any certainty that life was pre-determined. It was inevitable, but inevitability is not predetermination.

Predetermination in mathematical systems means that it was specified, as part of the initial condition.

Again, you conflate "determination by course" and predetermination.

In many ways, "predetermination" is mostly the thing that may be said to be the illusion. Obviously, not always. All predeterminations seem to flow back to a determination by course, of our world.

100% deterministic = predetermination to me. There is no difference ' xcept that maybe "predetermine" implies an agent thinking about the final outcome and there is no need for me to entertain that as of yet. I think we all said that we aren't certain.

Again, "deterministic" doesn't actually satisfy pre. The issue here is that you can't get the result without the transform, without the determined.

It  requires operation. In some respects one may entertain all kinds of Cosmologies wherein certain aspects are considered "pre" determined.

In superdeterminism, all the probabilistic RNG results are considered predetermined, for example, since the values it produces aren't correlated with the system, but are merely imposed on it in the preordained order.

Even so, these are not the things making the choices! They aren't even necessary to the concept of choice in the simulation. It is the specific personality elements which determine which of the requirements get selected, or the proximity to the object being selected, or some other fixed process choice!

And because they cannot control the fixed process choices of other entities, it may end up that the Kea gets the cheese, not the dwarf, not by preordained chance but by just normal loss of a competition which the dwarf could not predict the result of, because he lacks "completeness", as every thing in his universe must.

If the dwarf had the power to predict the universe perfectly along an extension, between one moment and the next, he might have chosen a different thing, but this doesn't imply he lacks the freedom to choose, but rather would imply a lack of constraint.

Likewise he may discover some things he utterly lacks the freedom to do, on account of which limits of locality he is bound to, with respect to his natural system, such as to be a hundred "squares" away in a mere moment short of being made dead in the process, for example. This would be the set of "that which he cannot possibly do".

Even then he would be free attempt wills he knows are unfree. He could be unfree, freely.

What a marvelously silly thought that still somehow works!

There are some really interesting aspects to more than one dwarf having this power insofar as you observe: systems in the universe owing to QM end up "whole" one way or the other.

In fact, dwarves do have some limited power to do this owing to a "dibs" rule on things within a non-local element that operates in a preordained turn order.

And even so, it is not prederermined that Rovod would get his meal and the Kea would get Urist's meal, even were they to have this power, because it was not predetermined "thus on the fourth day of The Month of Sapphire, Urist shall lose to the Kea". What was "preordained" was merely "the seed of the RNG is 0".

If you want to extend the initial condition to stupid proportions by specifying a one-time-pad, you could say "the seven billionth roll shall be 123, the seven billionth and first shall be 253", but you can't even know without determining by course how those numbers will be evaluated. You have no way short of step... Step... Step... Through the process to know that. So it was again determined by course, not prederermined.

If you were to say ALL of it was pre-determined, this is equivalent of saying that every frame of the universe is like a painted frame, just so, and any frame is not correlated with it's neighbors, that just happens to be organized in a way that seems to have continuity of physics and does not, and thus the system would lack realism: the idea that the system has regular and reliable behavior.

 

[fromderinside]

Evidence depends on there being materiality at the base of propositions

This is what you fail to understand: you are proposing something that MUST be true of a whole family of mathematically isolated systems.

Which is to say, all I need is a system which behaves faithfully as mathematically isolated.

Of course, everything we make is material because we live in a material reality, but many things can instantiate mathematically isolated systems among their material.

You cannot back up your claim that determinism does not allow the extension of "could" on a system, because as I've pointed out, I have an immediately accessible mathematically isolated system operating of material not only on which I can calculate the function of "could" exhaustively, for any given subset of the system, but in which I even point out objects holding wills unto requirements.

And of course you also don't seem to understand even as much as others do: that if you have some system operating in mathematical isolation, in our reality, our reality is satisfying, through inheritance, the required forms, much like if I have a bag inside a box inside a bag, I have proven that bags can hold bags, and I'd I can prove of some system that X > Y, and Y > 1, I have proven that X > 1 without needing to know what Y is.

... and Jarhyn crashes to the ground at the feet of Godel, Turing, etc.

And yet you completely fail to understand the implications of simplifications.

You don't need to be complete to understand the mathematical extension of deterministic systems.

I showed you a system that IS complete, in mathematical isolation, and proved it of that system operating in our system, which shows that bu whatever mechanism it operates in our system.

The hilarious part is that you can't seem to recognize that if I can establish of any system that fits the mathematical definition of determinism a "choice" of a way which satisfies the semantic application of choice (hint, compatibilist deterministic choice does satisfy the application), "will", "requirement" and "freedom" as well, I don't need to understand in completeness my own deterministic system so to understand deterministic systems in general do not exclude thus. It is convenient for me even that this deterministic system is hosting that deterministic system and in this system hosting that system, it hosts exactly what is described this in that system.

You might argue it is only possible in this system when it is simulating that exact system? But this counterexample shatters your claim of what determinism must imply.

We may live in a material reality yet we cannot sense it directly because our senses are deravitive of that reality. Looking inward to mind is similar to looking in from a derivative reality.

Apparently simplifications to you means ignoring what you can't defend.

Ramoss said that in response to you twice, joining Godol, Turing and Chaitin in peer reviewed articles on whether math proves propositions of the sort in which you engage. They even went so far as to say a subjective being has no access to experiments which could possibly demonstrate of that proposition.

You are in a being in a subjective world where you consider derivative notions to be real with no possibility for experimental proof thereof.

The philosophy of determinism is about reality, it not about how humans sense the world. Experimentally deterministic operations consistently replicate a reality more complete than what man experiences. All we can do is demonstrate the nature of reality by experiment. That man cannot construct an experiment proving that is so is our problem not the problem of the nature of the world. It's likely we'll never find all that is the real world so it's not likely we'll even prove the nature of the world.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

That is the issue with determinism, predetermination, and in determinism. No one can show which the universe actually is I have yet to see someone propose a test to show which it is.

The notion of reliable cause and effect is demonstrated in everything that happens and everything that we do. It is so common that we all take it for granted, until something breaks down and needs to be fixed. The ability to fix it assumes there is a cause and that the cause can be remedied. So, the notion that all events are reliably caused seems to be a reasonable assumption. Even if we have no clue what the cause is, we assume there is a cause.

The evidence against that assumption would be events that can be proven to be uncaused. But how could an uncaused event be demonstrated in any laboratory experiment? An experiment would need to reproduce the event under controlled conditions. But reproducing the event requires that we are able to "cause the uncaused event", a paradoxical notion.

Such events are generally called "spontaneous".

We have plenty of events observed that seem to happen spontaneously, that this is just a function of how stuff behaves between spontaneous vacuum fluctuations, to spontaneous tunneling events, to spontaneous decays.

Much of cosmology and QM is about discussing the probabilities of such spontaneous events.

The only model in which these are proposed as dererministic is Superdeterminism, and as discussed, this is an unfalsifiable proposition: it's useless for saying anything the system SHALL do, though it is useful for understanding what the system MAY contain (deterministic choice, wills, requirements, and freedom or lack thereof within the system towards the requirement).

As noted, we have observed MANY spontaneous events that appear absolutely stochastically as far as we can tell.

Superdeterminism only offers a model for allowing one to describe a stochastic system of apparently infinite extent as deterministic rather than merely a finite system.

It means for "freedom", "choice" and "will" to exist in stochastic systems it must exist in deterministic ones.

may be. "spontaneous" is really more about "I didn't see that coming" more than spontaneous. Like a pink unicorn popping out of my kitchen floor. The math says its can happen. The reality is that it will never happen under the conditions we are at right now.

QM is based on probability so it has to add up to one.

We don't even know what space-time is. My guess is that when we do, one step closer to "predetermined" we will be. Like life was predetermined the moment it went "bang". Even though before it did, we couldn't tell. After we look back, the simplest we can say is "Life was inevitable".

As I've pointed out, no matter what it is, you cannot say with any certainty that life was pre-determined. It was inevitable, but inevitability is not predetermination.

Predetermination in mathematical systems means that it was specified, as part of the initial condition.

Again, you conflate "determination by course" and predetermination.

In many ways, "predetermination" is mostly the thing that may be said to be the illusion. Obviously, not always. All predeterminations seem to flow back to a determination by course, of our world.

100% deterministic = predetermination to me. There is no difference ' xcept that maybe "predetermine" implies an agent thinking about the final outcome and there is no need for me to entertain that as of yet. I think we all said that we aren't certain.

Again, "deterministic" doesn't actually satisfy pre. The issue here is that you can't get the result without the transform, without the determined.

It  requires operation. In some respects one may entertain all kinds of Cosmologies wherein certain aspects are considered "pre" determined.

In superdeterminism, all the probabilistic RNG results are considered predetermined, for example, since the values it produces aren't correlated with the system, but are merely imposed on it in the preordained order.

Even so, these are not the things making the choices! They aren't even necessary to the concept of choice in the simulation. It is the specific personality elements which determine which of the requirements get selected, or the proximity to the object being selected, or some other fixed process choice!

And because they cannot control the fixed process choices of other entities, it may end up that the Kea gets the cheese, not the dwarf, not by preordained chance but by just normal loss of a competition which the dwarf could not predict the result of, because he lacks "completeness", as every thing in his universe must.

If the dwarf had the power to predict the universe perfectly along an extension, between one moment and the next, he might have chosen a different thing, but this doesn't imply he lacks the freedom to choose, but rather would imply a lack of constraint.

Likewise he may discover some things he utterly lacks the freedom to do, on account of which limits of locality he is bound to, with respect to his natural system, such as to be a hundred "squares" away in a mere moment short of being made dead in the process, for example. This would be the set of "that which he cannot possibly do".

Even then he would be free attempt wills he knows are unfree. He could be unfree, freely.

What a marvelously silly thought that still somehow works!

There are some really interesting aspects to more than one dwarf having this power insofar as you observe: systems in the universe owing to QM end up "whole" one way or the other.

In fact, dwarves do have some limited power to do this owing to a "dibs" rule on things within a non-local element that operates in a preordained turn order.

And even so, it is not prederermined that Rovod would get his meal and the Kea would get Urist's meal, even were they to have this power, because it was not predetermined "thus on the fourth day of The Month of Sapphire, Urist shall lose to the Kea". What was "preordained" was merely "the seed of the RNG is 0".

If you want to extend the initial condition to stupid proportions by specifying a one-time-pad, you could say "the seven billionth roll shall be 123, the seven billionth and first shall be 253", but you can't even know without determining by course how those numbers will be evaluated. You have no way short of step... Step... Step... Through the process to know that. So it was again determined by course, not prederermined.

If you were to say ALL of it was pre-determined, this is equivalent of saying that every frame of the universe is like a painted frame, just so, and any frame is not correlated with it's neighbors, that just happens to be organized in a way that seems to have continuity of physics and does not, and thus the system would lack realism: the idea that the system has regular and reliable behavior.

When we presume everything is determined by the normal course of events, it is AS IF events were predetermined. But, of course, they are not. No one sat down and drew up a master plan that we are all following. No one carved out the paths that we would walk. No one looked ahead to see what decisions we would have to make and made them for us in advance.

Events simply occur, one event after another, each event changing things either in a big way or a little way, such that the state of everything is continually becoming new, and different from what it was.

A causes B. B causes C. But A can never directly cause C. Things must be A, then they must be B, and only then can they become C.

A lot of necessary stuff had to happen between the Big Bang and my deciding what to have for breakfast. The Big Bang could not decide for me. Only when the state of things included me, and it was morning, and I needed to fix breakfast could the decision be made. And only I would be making that choice.

None of my prior causes could make that choice without first becoming an integral part of who and what I am. And once that happened, it was truly I, myself, and not my prior causes, that was making the choice.

 

[SIB]

You picking what you eat today was inevitable. If I am playing the deterministic side of the game. Please keep in mind ... I want to repeat that I have no idea, I am just talking now.

There is no "direct" contact between your plate and the big bang. I can see saying it like that. Now I like to hit things from other angles also so I change it to there is no disconnect between your breakfast taco and the big bang.

In forming a line of logic, what one would be a more reliable starting point?

1) there is no connection between "now" and the big bang so I feel ...
or
2)there is no disconnect between the bang that went "BIG" so I feel ...

 

[Marvin Edwards]

You picking what you eat today was inevitable. If I am playing the deterministic side of the game. Please keep in mind ... I want to repeat that I have no idea, I am just talking now.

There is no "direct" contact between your plate and the big bang. I can see saying it like that. Now I like to hit things from other angles also so I change it to there is no disconnect between your breakfast taco and the big bang.

In forming a line of logic, what one would be a more reliable starting point?

1) there is no connection between "now" and the big bang so I feel ...
or
2)there is no disconnect between the bang that went "BIG" so I feel ...

As a Pragmatist, I would suggest that the most meaningful and relevant starting point of my breakfast is my waking up hungry. If we start from the Big Bang, we will never get around to the breakfast.

With determinism, one starting point is exactly as reliable as any other. Personally, I believe that the most recent Big Bang also had prior causes, and that there is no "first cause", but rather that "stuff in motion and transformation" is the eternal state of things.

So, with an infinite number of starting points, which one should we choose?

 

[SIB]

You picking what you eat today was inevitable. If I am playing the deterministic side of the game. Please keep in mind ... I want to repeat that I have no idea, I am just talking now.

There is no "direct" contact between your plate and the big bang. I can see saying it like that. Now I like to hit things from other angles also so I change it to there is no disconnect between your breakfast taco and the big bang.

In forming a line of logic, what one would be a more reliable starting point?

1) there is no connection between "now" and the big bang so I feel ...
or
2)there is no disconnect between the bang that went "BIG" so I feel ...

As a Pragmatist, I would suggest that the most meaningful and relevant starting point of my breakfast is my waking up hungry. If we start from the Big Bang, we will never get around to the breakfast.

With determinism, one starting point is exactly as reliable as any other. Personally, I believe that the most recent Big Bang also had prior causes, and that there is no "first cause", but rather that "stuff in motion and transformation" is the eternal state of things.

So, with an infinite number of starting points, which one should we choose?

yup, I handle that by saying we don't know what started it. So we could say something started it or nothing started it. I mean nothing nothing, not quantum foam or totals zero. they are something. Nothing freaks me out more than nothing, besides its a real buzz kill so I lean toward something myself.

It has been my experience that pragmatist tend to tackle the issue head on. When they don't, there is something other than pragmatist-ing going on.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

yup, I handle that by saying we don't know what started it. So we could say something started it or nothing started it. I mean nothing nothing, not quantum foam or totals zero. they are something. Nothing freaks me out more than nothing, besides its a real buzz kill so I lean toward something myself.

It has been my experience that pragmatist tend to tackle the issue head on. When they don't, there is something other than pragmatist-ing going on.

Yeah, it's kinda spooky the first time we ask ourselves, "Why is there something rather than just nothing?".

There are no answers to why things are as they are, they just are. So, we may as well feel okay with that, because its better to feel okay than not okay.

And, if we didn't take it for granted, gravity might be called "spooky action at a distance".

 

[fromderinside]

Given it takes some mastery of language and associated equipment to form coherent thoughts - yes coherent - one doesn't expect to have to explain how a baby categorizes what it sees, hears, smells, tastes, orients or feels early on. But explaining how one does is at the root of conscious perception. Talk about "spooky action at a distance ... " puleez.

No. I don't presume we are at the stone in Athens visualizing caves. That was Plato. It wasn't convenient for him to get into such trivia. He had propositions to push.

Sounds familiar ....