Demystifying Determinism

[DBT]

How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?

I have no choice about what is on the menu; It was decided before I ever even heard of the restaurant, and nobody ever consulted me in any way.

Yet, when I arrive at the restaurant, the waiter bizarrely seems to hold the delusion that it's possible for me to choose from this menu, whose contents (and indeed, existence) are an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about.

What's wrong with that guy? No wonder he got a job as a waiter; He's obviously not cut out for philosophy.

Determinism:
''Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

Repeating someone else's iteration of an error doesn't make it less an error on either of your parts.

The determinists in this thread have repeatedly rejected, with reasons, the second part of this definition, which is the common error of conflating the mistaken 'could have made' with the accurate 'would have made'.

If your definition of determinism is wrong (and it is), then it's unsurprising that your reasons for rejecting it as compatible with free will are nonsensical.

Even the "indeterminists" in this thread, except Kylie, recognize that free will does not found itself on randomness or deviation but rather upon the fact that a very specific will is in some moment "free".

That's odd, at no point have I said or suggested that free will is, or is supposed to be founded on randomness. Apparently it's something you pulled out of your arse.....which, regardless of it being BS, you repeat because you think it makes a point. It doesn't. It's just a stupid thing to say.

 

[Jarhyn]

How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?

I have no choice about what is on the menu; It was decided before I ever even heard of the restaurant, and nobody ever consulted me in any way.

Yet, when I arrive at the restaurant, the waiter bizarrely seems to hold the delusion that it's possible for me to choose from this menu, whose contents (and indeed, existence) are an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about.

What's wrong with that guy? No wonder he got a job as a waiter; He's obviously not cut out for philosophy.

Determinism:
''Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

Repeating someone else's iteration of an error doesn't make it less an error on either of your parts.

The determinists in this thread have repeatedly rejected, with reasons, the second part of this definition, which is the common error of conflating the mistaken 'could have made' with the accurate 'would have made'.

If your definition of determinism is wrong (and it is), then it's unsurprising that your reasons for rejecting it as compatible with free will are nonsensical.

Even the "indeterminists" in this thread, except Kylie, recognize that free will does not found itself on randomness or deviation but rather upon the fact that a very specific will is in some moment "free".

That's odd, at no point have I said or suggested that free will is, or is supposed to be founded on randomness. Apparently it's something you pulled out of your arse.....which, regardless of it being BS, you repeat because you think it makes a point. It doesn't. It's just a stupid thing to say.

Yes you did.

No randomness or deviation in the development of the system negates

There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

You have no way around this.

I could keep digging them up. In this thread alone you reference randomness hundreds of times, bringing it up as if it matters time and again.

But you are right. It IS a stupid thing to say that you don't bring it up or imply that it matters when clearly your "no randomness or variation" clearly implies that compatibilists are relying on something that would require randomness.

But then, you couldn't find real randomness OR deviation in the description of a general compatibilist choice. If you could, you would have highlighted it in red.

 

[DBT]

Again, both you and Britannica are trying to limit what "can happen" to what "will happen". It is a standard error in the formulation of determinism to suggest that "we could not have done otherwise" when it is only the case that "we would not have done otherwise".

The distinction is meaningless. As there are no alternate actions within a deterministic system 'would not have' is equivalent to 'could not have' done otherwise. The relevant point here being: there are no alternate actions within a deterministic system. Which is not according to me or Brittanica, but how determinism is defined. Not as defined by me, or Brittanica, but just how determinism works by definition, which includes your own.....

Claiming that the distinction between "can" and "will", and between "actuality" and "possibility", are meaningless is nonsense. There are multiple things that we "can" do, but only one thing that we "will" do. We consider multiple possibilities before settling upon our actual vacation, or car, or home, or mode of transportation, or college, or career, or dinner, etc.

It's just how determinism works according to the given definition.

Your own definition.

The condition where all events are ''causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment'' (Marvin Edwards) - eliminates any possibility of alternate events happening at any given moment in time.

Given determinism, you can say that something is possible, that it can and does happen at some time.

But the point being, given determinism, when it happens, it happens necessarily. Whenever the 'possible' happens, it must happen.

When the 'possible' happens, it must happen as determined, and nothing can happen in its stead.

That is why the Brittanica description is correct. That when can and do happen, they must necessarily happen.

So, obviously, if an event must happen as determined, it surely will happen.

The notion of multiple possibilities is essential to human creativity and invention as well as to choosing. And it continues to do its work in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, by shifting to a different language and logic specifically evolved to deal with such matters.

Multiple possibilities exist in the sense that these things can and do happen within the system. Which is not to say that any 'possibility' can be realized by anyone at any given instance in time.

That is the point.

That whatever possibility is realized in any given instance, must be realized in that instance because the evolving system brought events to that place and point in time where that 'possibility' is necessarily realized.

Space travel is possible, for instance, but was never possibly before the necessary technology was developed. It was not possible for the Greeks, Romans, etc, but it is for us because that is how history and it events unfolded.

Had things been different, it may not be possible. Given determinism, it could not have been different.

That is in accordance with your own definition.

 

[Jarhyn]

eliminates any possibility of alternate events happening at any given moment in time

Y=X^2+1 being the description of events eliminates the possibility of Y ever being 0, in the graph of that arbitrary function.

But it does not in any way limit the ability of functions to cross 0.

A function not "crossing zero" does not mean "functions cannot cross zero". It just means "this function will not cross zero"

Likewise A logically describable universe (this one, the one we are limited to) does not limit discussion of what universes can do. Note the plural there. Since we only have one real universe, it implies that these logical truths about other non-real universes don't create real deviation, just emulated deviation.

The thing is approximal emulated deviation, simulated deviation, is perfectly allowed and generates the essential artifacts for operating a choice.

The fact that it's simulated means that the statement "what actually happens will fall within the bounds of this scenario" will be either true or false. It is not necessarily true.

This truth value is whether the will is "free" or not.

The fact that the choice is effected by what we assume is a reliable machine with momentarily relevant fixed proclivities does not change or impact anything here: it is still the result of that process, which includes a choice from among these artifacts produced.

If one wishes to not be impacted by the choices of such a thing, one must open up that thing and change how it makes choices, modifying it's proclivities.

We can do this to ourselves, too. As evidenced by the fact that the guy who lifts sees gain.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Given determinism, you can say that something is possible, that it can and does happen at some time.

The problem is not with things that "can and do happen". Our issue involves things that "can and don't happen". Are things that "can" happen, but "will not" happen, to be considered real possibilities or not? That's what we're focusing on here.

In order for us to process matters of uncertainty in a rational manner, we require some logical token that refers to things that inevitably will not happen as well as the things that inevitably will happen. The notion of a "possibility" serves this purpose.

Something is possible if we are able to do it. It is not necessary for us to actually do it in order for it to be a real possibility.

But the point being, given determinism, when it happens, it happens necessarily. Whenever the 'possible' happens, it must happen.

Of course. But, again, what are we going to call the things that could happen but necessarily will not happen? My point is that we have already solved this problem. Possibilities remain possibilities whether they are determined to happen or determined not to happen.

When the 'possible' happens, it must happen as determined, and nothing can happen in its stead.

Nothing else will happen in its stead. However, other things could have happened in its stead. I chose the Salad, but I could have chosen the Steak instead.

This is why the Britannica description is incorrect, and other descriptions of determinism that claim that "we could not have done otherwise" are all incorrect.

I could have chosen the Steak is a fact. It is a fact because "could have" always implies (1) that it did not happen, which is a fact because I did not choose the Steak. And (2) that it only would have happened under different circumstance, which is also a fact, because it only would have happened if it had been determined that I would order the Steak rather than the Salad.


The notion of multiple possibilities is essential to human creativity and invention as well as to choosing. And it continues to do its work in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, by shifting to a different language and logic specifically evolved to deal with such matters.

Multiple possibilities exist in the sense that these things can and do happen within the system.

And many possibilities also exist in the sense that these things can happen but never will happen within the system.

That is the point. Multiple things "can" happen, even though only one thing inevitably "will" happen and the rest inevitably "will not" happen.

That fact that something will not happen does not mean that it is impossible.

... Space travel is possible, for instance, but was never possibly before the necessary technology was developed. It was not possible for the Greeks, Romans, etc, but it is for us because that is how history and it events unfolded.

Good. The space travel example demonstrates what "impossible" means. If something is impossible at a given place and time, then it cannot happen. As you point out, space travel was impossible for the ancient Greeks and Romans. They could not fly to the moon even if they chose to. So, no one, except the mentally ill, chose to do so. It was not in their list of realizable alternatives. It was not on anyone's menu of options.

Something is "possible" if we are able to do it if we choose to. Something is "impossible" if we are unable to do it, even if we chose to.

While I cannot fly to the moon, I can walk to the kitchen. Walking to the kitchen is a real possibility, and it remains a real possibility even if it is deterministically inevitable that I will not choose to do so right now.

I know it is a real possibility, because earlier I walked to the kitchen and fixed a cup of coffee. It is always something that I can do, anytime that I choose to. Determinism does not change this.

That is in accordance with your own definition.

All of this, that I am saying right now, about possibilities and about what I could have done, is in accordance with my definition of determinism, and in accordance with the first sentence in the Britannica definition, and in accordance the the Tech definition (same inputs, same outputs).

I chose the Salad, but I could have chosen the Steak. Both parts are factual, and are also entirely consistent with the definition of determinism that I am using.

 

[Jarhyn]

Other than the fact that I disagree with Marvin describing "could" implies "NOT(!) did", I agree with all of this.

He could and so he did, thus, rejecting this implication validly reads as "he made the choice to do it and it worked out."

 

[pood]

The more I participate in or read these free will/determinism threads, the sillier I find hard determinism to be. If DBT is hoping to make any converts, he certainly isn’t going to make one out of me.

Let’s see how silly it is via a simple reductio.

Imagine a great architect. Let’s fall him Howard Roark, after the architect/hero of Ayn Rand’s “The Fountainhead.” I’m no fan of Rand’s demented politics and twisted ethical philosophy, but I do think the Fountainhead was a great novel.

We learn that Roark builds great buildings. How does he do that? Well, let’s see what he does with a commission. When he sits down at the drafting table, he has a bunch of choices to make. The choices won’t stop until the building’s pinnacle is crowned and construction is over.

But wait! Let’s examine Roark’s efforts from a hard determinist perspective. DBT has been telling us over and over that we have no choices at all — that anything that looks like a real choice is illusory.

Fine and dandy. Let’s accept this position arguendo to fuel this reductio. We’ll say that Roark doesn’t have choices. He has, instead, i-choices — illusory choices.

Let’s say that there are five thousand separate steps to bringing this building into being, from first draft on the drafting table to the final crowning of the pinnacle. The naive compatibilist, or the libertarian for that matter, imagines that each step will involve a choice by Roark. But they’re wrong, says DBT and other hard determinists. In fact, Roark only has i-choices.

Five thousand steps later, the building is crowned. Everyone is awed by it. Roarkd chose i-chose those steps flawlessly.

The question for DBT and other hard determinists is, how did this happen? How did this building get built, and not only built, but flawlessly and beautifully built?

Because clearly, under hard determinism, Roark deserves no praise for the building — in fact, he had nothing to do with it! Remember, he was making i-choices— illusory choices. This being the case, who, or what, under hard determinism, is responsible for this magnificent building?

Did the Big Bang build it? Is the BB sentient, and does it have some special interest in 20th century modernist architecture? No? Then how did Roark happen to make 5,000 consecutive correct i-choices, when he had no actual choice in the design or construction at all? Was it pure dumb luck that this building fell flawlessly into place? Just dumb luck that the initial conditions at the bang produced a flawless, beautiful building in a city on planet earth some 15 billion years later?

The absurdity is manifest. Of course Roark made choices, real choices, not i-choices. Otherwise the fact of the building is inexplicable — even the fact of evolved brains would be inexplicable under hard determinism, which I have pointed out in the past and which point DBT never adequately addressed. Brains evaluate options and make choices! Of what use would such an organ be in the puppetverse, the falling dominoes dystopia, of hard determinism?

Hard determinism is not the same thing as causal determinism. Causal determinism describes a world in which events reliably follow causes — Hume’s constant conjunction. Hard determinism posits a mystical, quasi-religious world that is a secular version of Calvinism and predestination.

I think the original core mistake that DBT and other hard determinists make is to posit that there are actual laws of nature and that these laws “govern” the universe. In fact, such “laws” describe and do not prescribe what happens in the world. I’ve repeatedly asked DBT whether he thoughts the laws of nature were descriptive or prescriptive, and to my knowledge he has never given a straight, clear answer.

Think, everyone: under hard determinism, Roark had no choice but to make a beautiful and flawless building!

I challenge DBT to tell me: Where did this building come from?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Other than the fact that I disagree with Marvin describing "could" implies "NOT(!) did", I agree with all of this.

Yes. It is not uncommon to use "could" to include what "would" happen. After all, the thing that actually did happen was among the many things that could happen. The thing that did happen was one of the possibilities, in fact, the only one that was realized.

But when referring to past events, once we know what would happen, we would say it "did" happen, or in determinist terms, it is the only thing that "would" happen. It would sound strange to refer to what "did" happen as what "could have" happened. Normally, when we say something "could have" happened, we are speaking of something that "did not" happen. That it is the default meaning.

In a different context, such as when someone asks us, "What were all of the things that could have happened?", we would include the thing that did happen in that list.

So, I agree with your point.

 

[bilby]

It would sound strange to refer to what "did" happen as what "could have" happened.

Indeed.

It would be wrong to say "Geelong could have won the Grand Final", because that implies that they lost, but that this fate was avoidable. But in fact, they won (and this fate was inevitable, despite the fact that the Swans could have won if only they hadn't been utterly shit on the day*).

It would be even more wrong to say "Geelong could not have won the Grand Final", because they actually did win it.



*OK, it's really stretching the definition of 'could', given the Swans' woeful performance; But until the match was played, even the bookmakers, who have a financial interest, weren't 100% sure that they couldn't

 

[Jarhyn]

It would sound strange to refer to what "did" happen as what "could have" happened.

Indeed.

It would be wrong to say "Geelong could have won the Grand Final", because that implies that they lost, but that this fate was avoidable. But in fact, they won (and this fate was inevitable, despite the fact that the Swans could have won if only they hadn't been utterly shit on the day*).

It would be even more wrong to say "Geelong could not have won the Grand Final", because they actually did win it.



*OK, it's really stretching the definition of 'could', given the Swans' woeful performance; But until the match was played, even the bookmakers, who have a financial interest, weren't 100% sure that they couldn't

My point is that it's allowed, and much of the reason is literary and rhetorical suspense.

Edit: and abused for weasel purposes. Don't do that. It's mean.

 

[DBT]

eliminates any possibility of alternate events happening at any given moment in time

Y=X^2+1 being the description of events eliminates the possibility of Y ever being 0, in the graph of that arbitrary function.

But it does not in any way limit the ability of functions to cross 0.

A function not "crossing zero" does not mean "functions cannot cross zero". It just means "this function will not cross zero"

Likewise A logically describable universe (this one, the one we are limited to) does not limit discussion of what universes can do. Note the plural there. Since we only have one real universe, it implies that these logical truths about other non-real universes don't create real deviation, just emulated deviation.

The thing is approximal emulated deviation, simulated deviation, is perfectly allowed and generates the essential artifacts for operating a choice.

The fact that it's simulated means that the statement "what actually happens will fall within the bounds of this scenario" will be either true or false. It is not necessarily true.

This truth value is whether the will is "free" or not.

The fact that the choice is effected by what we assume is a reliable machine with momentarily relevant fixed proclivities does not change or impact anything here: it is still the result of that process, which includes a choice from among these artifacts produced.

If one wishes to not be impacted by the choices of such a thing, one must open up that thing and change how it makes choices, modifying it's proclivities.

We can do this to ourselves, too. As evidenced by the fact that the guy who lifts sees gain.

Not that old rationale again. It doesn't work. It's been well and truly shot down.

It's not hard to grasp why.

'The choice' is not merely 'effected' by the system as it evolves, it is fixed, set, unchangeable, no alternative actions, no choosing or doing otherwise.

The prior state of the system fixes every action in the present which in turn sets all future actions. Everything within the system proceeds as determined.

That, according to your own definition of it, is how determinism works.

Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

Which, it appears, you probably Googled without understanding its implications.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Which, it appears, you probably Googled without understanding its implications.

You guys really need to cut back on the personal insults.

 

[DBT]

Given determinism, you can say that something is possible, that it can and does happen at some time.

The problem is not with things that "can and do happen". Our issue involves things that "can and don't happen". Are things that "can" happen, but "will not" happen, to be considered real possibilities or not? That's what we're focusing on here.

As explained earlier.

A lot of things can and do happen within a complex deterministic system, in this instance, the World and its events, but whatever can and does happen within the system - the world - can only happen when an event has been determined to happen at a specific time and place,

An event that can and does happen, must necessarily happen at a specific time and place: the determined time an place.

The event can not only happen at that specific time and place, it must happen at that specific time and place.

Given that no alternate actions are possible within the system, nothing else can happen in that specific time and place.

Nor, given the condition of 'no deviation' in determinism, can the event that has been determined to happen at that specific time and place, happen at any other time if it has not been determined to happen.

That's the point, that when something has been determined to happen, it must happen as determined, and nothing else can happen in its stead.

Every action is fixed by antecedent states of the system, including what we feel, think and do.

All events fixed by antecedents is not a matter of being free to will or do otherwise.

Consequently, ''It's me doing it, therefore free will'' is not sufficient to establish the notion of free will.

 

[DBT]

Which, it appears, you probably Googled without understanding its implications.

You guys really need to cut back on the personal insults.

You are right.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

A lot of things can and do happen within a complex deterministic system, in this instance, the World and its events, but whatever can and does happen within the system - the world - can only happen when an event has been determined to happen at a specific time and place,
An event that can and does happen, must necessarily happen at a specific time and place: the determined time an place.

Like I said, we've covered the things that can and do happen. The issue is that you seem to be denying all of the things that can happen but never do happen.

The point I'm making is that most of the things that can happen will never happen. Yet we still refer to them and discuss them as things that "could have" happened. The phrase "could have" enables that discussion. For example, "What could we have done if the hurricane did not miss us?" The question motivates planning for the next hurricane.

And in the traffic light example, where we ask the driver: "Why did you slow down back there?" and he answers "Because the light could have remained red." I'm sure we can find countless examples where "could have" refers to possible events despite the fact that they inevitably would not happen.

Given that no alternate actions are possible within the system, nothing else can happen in that specific time and place.

Nothing else will happen in that specific time and place. But we must still recognize that other things could have happened, even though they never would have happened.

... That's the point, that when something has been determined to happen, it must happen as determined, and nothing else can happen in its stead.

But to say that "nothing else can happen instead" suggests that nothing else could have happened, even if it was determined that something else would happen.

Now, you may object, on the basis that we have already stated that something else has been determined to happen. But what do we do when we do not know what is determined to happen? We automatically switch to the context of possibilities, where multiple things can happen and could have happened instead, regardless of what is determined to happen.

The claim that nothing else could have happened builds a brick wall around such considerations. And, of course, insisting that what "can" happen is limited to what "will" happen creates the paradox of having to decide what we will do without first knowing what we can do.

So, we must retain the notion that something that is not determined to happen actually "could have" happened. And when speaking of determinism, we must limit ourselves to the claim that: what is not determined to happen will not happen, and stop insisting that what is not determined to happen cannot happen.

Back to free will...

Every action is fixed by antecedent states of the system, including what we feel, think and do.

Of course. And when it is fixed by antecedent states of the system that we will be choosing between the Salad and the Steak, then we will have no choice but to choose between the Salad and the Steak.

All events fixed by antecedents is not a matter of being free to will or do otherwise.

We are free to choose the Salad and we are free to choose the Steak. Both freedoms are true by logical necessity, just like it is true that we are free to subtract the subtrahend from the minuend to produce the difference. The parameters to a logical operation must be present if the operation is to take place.

Consequently, ''It's me doing it, therefore free will'' is not sufficient to establish the notion of free will.

All that determinism may say about free will, is that it will not be free of causal necessity. Fortunately, free will never requires freedom from causal necessity. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence, nothing more and nothing less.

 

[Jarhyn]

it is fixed, set, unchangeable, no alternative actions

Except from our perspective it's not fixed by anything but our actions in the present.

no choosing

This is YOUR insertion. IF you wish to defend this view, you need to play the following game and win: Highlight it in red.

I presented you with a compatibilist choice. It involves zero actual deviations or randomness. It is a compatibilist choice and is a description of a particular process.

It does not require deviation, nor Randomness. It is perfectly compatible with Determinism. It is a choice that the chooser can be held responsible for.

You haven't touched it though and we all know why: because you don't actually understand your position the way you think you do.

Alternatives don't have to exist in physical space. All they have to be is "logically valid". They can exist in simulation and emulation and most importantly, they can exist in approximation.

 

[DBT]

it is fixed, set, unchangeable, no alternative actions

Except from our perspective it's not fixed by anything but our actions in the present.

If it doesn't relate to how the world actually works, our perspective is irrelevant. If the world is deterministic and its events are fixed by prior states of the system, neither freely willed or freely chosen, a perspective that contradicts that reality is an illusion.

You neglect to consider that our thoughts and actions do not happen in isolation, that it is the past events of our environment and lives - everything that shaped and formed us and our thoughts and actions - that determine who we are and what we think and do.

 

[Jarhyn]

If it doesn't relate to how the world actually works, our perspective is irrelevant

We are part of the world. How we work, as a consequence, relates to how the world works. How we work is we work by doing this stuff that quite often conforms to the compatibilist definition of choice.

Your assertion continues to be of the form "how can the X that didn't Y itself Y something else?"

It is a problem of your own making, and it's pretty painfully obvious to everyone here but you and FDI.

 

[DBT]

A lot of things can and do happen within a complex deterministic system, in this instance, the World and its events, but whatever can and does happen within the system - the world - can only happen when an event has been determined to happen at a specific time and place,
An event that can and does happen, must necessarily happen at a specific time and place: the determined time an place.

Like I said, we've covered the things that can and do happen. The issue is that you seem to be denying all of the things that can happen but never do happen.

I have described when and why something can happen and when it cannot happen. An event can and does happen if conditions within the system develop in a way that determines that it does happen. Where not only can it happen, it must happen.

That in that moment where event A must happen, events, B, C, D, E, etcetera, cannot happen in its stead. That the point when event A happens, nothing else can happen.

That's your no deviation clause in action;

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards

The point I'm making is that most of the things that can happen will never happen. Yet we still refer to them and discuss them as things that "could have" happened. The phrase "could have" enables that discussion. For example, "What could we have done if the hurricane did not miss us?" The question motivates planning for the next hurricane.

It doesn't matter what we think can happen. It doesn't matter what can happen. Determinism means that whatever happens must necessarily happen, and in that moment of the inevitable event happens - there being no deviation in determinism - nothing else can happen.

It doesn't matter what can happen in other places or other times.


Everything that does happen, happens necessarily and without deviation or possible alternate actions or events in that moment in time.

Something else can happen a moment later, but whatever happens a moment late is bound by the same rules of determinism: no alternative, no deviation as the event unfolds.

That's determinism.

No freedom to choose otherwise, no deviation, all events fixed by the prior state of the system.

Sorry, no free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

I have described when and why something can happen and when it cannot happen

No, you asserted it without evidence, and a definition without usefulness, in an obvious attempt to pretend that you aren't actually responsible for the things you do: "that which can happen is that which does happen".

This of course abandons the fact that when normal people talk about can, they are talking about "can, in last-thursday-land, the mathematical operation of macrophysics in emulated approximation, where antecedent events assume the prior of the decision."

It CAN be possible entirely of the only-approxomally-accurate emulation.

When it is ONLY true of the emulation and not also true of reality that will is unfree. By definition.

This is because images CAN depict or represent or approximate reality accurately and they can also represent or approximate reality inaccurately, and whether it is accurate or inaccurate there is real value in recognizing it.