A list of reason's why Psychology has fewer examples on that list:
1. The list is not remotely close to even trying to be comprehensive. There are tons of falsified psychological theories ranging from most of what Freud said to the Blank Slate to theories that assumed that file drawer type storage and retrieval are valid metaphors for how memory works, and radical behaviorism notion that there is nothing inside the head, only the observable stimulus and the observable response (the latter being falsified by mountain of experiments showing that the response to a stimulus is highly unpredictable, depending on who the person is, their past experiences, and their prior exposure to that stimuli. Without things in the head akin to attitudes, beliefs, and memories, the response of every person should always be the same to any specific stimuli.
2. A scientific approach to psychology is very new and several centuries younger than the natural sciences.
3. Many of the superseded "theories" in in the natural sciences did not come from science in the first place, but from religion and ideological/egoistic assumptions. If we count those, then there are countless other superseded theories in psychology such as Dualism, the existence of a "soul" as the place were higher thought comes from, sexual orientation as a choice, mental illness as a weakness of moral character or demon possession, Parenting as the primary determinant of a child's personality, etc..
4. Psychological theories are about things that everyone has lots of relevant evidence for, and lot's of competing motives to advance various ideas. This creates multiple issues. One is that while there are plenty of bad psychological ideas, there are few that really dominate cultural thinking and thus would make a like of prevailing but wrong theories. Two, once rational people decide to apply some actual science to the question, we have so much relevant experience to use that its unlikely we'd be completely wrong about it.
5. Related to #4 is that most psychological theories focus on cause-effect relations in terms of environment-behavior, leaving the underlying physical mechanism unspecified and referred to only in metaphorical terms as a mental concept, like a "belief" which refers to something people clearly have that impacts their actions and how they respond to a given stimulus, but what exactly it is in physical terms is not presumed. We don't need the concept to be fully specified for it to have explanatory utility. So, what usually happens is that instead of theories taking a stand on it only to be shown wrong, they specify the concept only of much as needed to explain the current data, then new data comes along and fills in the blanks or make modifications rather than a wholesale refutation similar to "Nope, the Earth is not hollow."