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Do animals perceive the same objects as humans perceive?

Apparently one thing most brain processes do is successfully group things sensed and perceived. I suggest just such processes resolve color. It has everything to do with the brain regenerating reality or an operable alternative and nothing with the brain providing 'color'.

Ask yourself why doesn't any group see rainbows in spectral order other than high low frequency bands.
 
Do animals perceive the same objects as humans perceive?

The answer will depend on what we want to mean by "object". I may think of objects as those things that my perceptions represent as possessing some degree of structural unity and continuity: mountains, buildings, cars, people, little bugs. Thus, such objects are percepts and depend on the perceivers. Similar kinds of beings, say, human beings, will naturally come to agree often enough on whatever objects there are.

And then, we get to the metaphysical notion of objects, whereby objects would be things that exists independently of any perceiver.

Yet, even then, this more metaphysical notion of objects will still depend on how we, as sentient beings, think of reality. When is it exactly that something becomes properly an object? When it lasts at least for a month and a day? Is the water in the sea an object? Is a collection of objects an object? Is a collection of collections of objects an object? The reality seems that the notion of object only really makes sense if you keep the perceivers into the picture. Something is an object for a given perceiver and what's an object to me may not be to a dog.

And a dog, I see as being an animal.

Perhaps dogs perceive themselves as being the real humans though.
EB
 
Dogs must perceive objects as having an existence independent of them since when you walk with them we both avoid the same potholes, fences etc.
Dogs alas perceive the same objects as having a different value to us. My dog insists on smelling the base every tree we met whereas I have no interest in smelling the base but might smell the flowers on said tree.
Though my original comment does not relate to Dalmatians. My sister's Dalmatian was incapable of avoiding fences, potholes. Stupidest dog i have every encountered.

Or was he/she partially blind? Probably partially/wholly deaf too? Dalmatians have a lot of DNA shit tied to their "pretty spots", that stupid humans admire and aim for in the breeding. And of course the breeders firmly deny that their dogs have this kind of DNA shit.
 
Dogs must perceive objects as having an existence independent of them since when you walk with them we both avoid the same potholes, fences etc.
Dogs alas perceive the same objects as having a different value to us. My dog insists on smelling the base every tree we met whereas I have no interest in smelling the base but might smell the flowers on said tree.
Though my original comment does not relate to Dalmatians. My sister's Dalmatian was incapable of avoiding fences, potholes. Stupidest dog i have every encountered.

Or was he/she partially blind? Probably partially/wholly deaf too? Dalmatians have a lot of DNA shit tied to their "pretty spots", that stupid humans admire and aim for in the breeding. And of course the breeders firmly deny that their dogs have this kind of DNA shit.

Truly, the road to Dalmatian is paved with good intentions...
 
Brains create color? Nay, they don't do that.

Strictly speaking they don't since brains are themselves objects and as such they won't do anything.
However, the idea of 'brains creating colours' is really the idea that whatever it is that exists which would be thinking of itself as being a brain is the immediate cause of our subjective impression that we have what we call a brain.
If that's at all understandable...
As you can see it's a pretty complicated idea to express in good English. If anybody can do a better job of it, I'll take it.
This may explain why we usually prefer to go along with the fictional objectivist account. It's just so much simpler to express in English. And this in itself may be a straightforward reflection of the fact that causality rests with whatever that exists in reality that somehow corresponds to what we call the physical world.
Another way to go about it is to keep talking the way we have always done, in terms of objects thought of as causally effective, and keep in mind that such descriptions, and the ideas we have always so expressed, including for example 'causality', 'reality', 'physical', etc., are indeed only descriptive intentions. The reality so described, if any, is, at least for now, inaccessible.
The difficulty with that is to keep in mind that every word that is used in such descriptions, and every idea so conveyed, refers in effect to impressions, percept, ideas, i.e. subjective contents, not any thing that's in existence at the fundamental level of reality (if any).
You'd be forgiven for recoiling at this horrifying perspective. :(
EB
 
I'm lenient with the idea that brains do things. I do make distinctions with "do," for instance the things objects do (with no presupposed intentionality) like trees swaying or balls rolling; also, there is the "do" with intentionality (like the frog jumped or the batter swung at the ball).

I often say falling isn't something people do. It's something that happens to us. That, of course, presupposes a sense of "do" that includes intentionality. On the other usage, people do fall. I've seen them do it.

The brain does things, but it does so in the same sense trees sway. People think. Brains do not.

When I said brains don't create color, I meant it in both usages, so while I'm glad you agree with me in that they don't do anything, neither do I think the brain creates color even in the sense that doesn't presuppose intentionality.
 
For a brain to transform something that has no connection to color into a color requires "programming".

It can't be done without it.

A tree does not sway by any programming. Pure reaction.
 
For a brain to transform something that has no connection to color into a color requires "programming".

It can't be done without it.

A tree does not sway by any programming. Pure reaction.

Sure, if by "programming" you mean like how a mountainside is "programmed" by wind and rain to have just the right texture to control a ball rolling down it to take a specific path, given specific start conditions.
 
For a brain to transform something that has no connection to color into a color requires "programming".

It can't be done without it.

A tree does not sway by any programming. Pure reaction.

Sure, if by "programming" you mean like how a mountainside is "programmed" by wind and rain to have just the right texture to control a ball rolling down it to take a specific path, given specific start conditions.

No. By programming I mean "algorithms" where preexisting "rules" for handling information must exist.

But the rules are not the product of some external force applied to something.

There are "design processes" not a designer, natural selection and things like sexual selection.
 
I'm lenient with the idea that brains do things. I do make distinctions with "do," for instance the things objects do (with no presupposed intentionality) like trees swaying or balls rolling; also, there is the "do" with intentionality (like the frog jumped or the batter swung at the ball).

I often say falling isn't something people do. It's something that happens to us. That, of course, presupposes a sense of "do" that includes intentionality. On the other usage, people do fall. I've seen them do it.

The brain does things, but it does so in the same sense trees sway. People think. Brains do not.

Well, I would make a distinction whereby a brain does things in the same sense that any mechanism does things, even though mechanisms typically need prompting. What is crucial here is that the prompting action is typically very simple compared to what a mechanism typically does, so that there is a sense that something is done that was not already somehow contained in the prompting action. Brains certainly do a lot of that kind of thing, and to a much greater extent than any known mechanical or even electronic mechanism.

I suppose that swaying in the wind for a tree is also a bit more complex than whatever the wind typically does to get a tree swaying, so I suspect we're a bit lenient in our usage because we're not so sure where the frontier between simple and complex lies. Language is a pragmatic process. We do what we can to express our ideas clearly and precisely enough but we do have our limits. And lost of people don't even carry their own weight.

When I said brains don't create color, I meant it in both usages, so while I'm glad you agree with me in that they don't do anything, neither do I think the brain creates color even in the sense that doesn't presuppose intentionality.

As to brains doing nothing, it was if 'strictly talking', i.e. within the perspective that brains are not actual material things but the subjective representation of them in our minds. So, in the ordinary usage, I will go along brains doing amazing things like creating colours although I might remind people that it's a manner of talking and is not strictly the case that brains do anything.

Clearly, this is fertile ground for being misunderstood...
EB
 
As to brains doing nothing, it was if 'strictly talking', i.e. within the perspective that brains are not actual material things but the subjective representation of them in our minds. So, in the ordinary usage, I will go along brains doing amazing things like creating colours although I might remind people that it's a manner of talking and is not strictly the case that brains do anything.

Clearly, this is fertile ground for being misunderstood...
EB
If I understand you, you purport that the brain is not an organ in the human body. I would love to be mistaken about what it is I think you think.
 
As to brains doing nothing, it was if 'strictly talking', i.e. within the perspective that brains are not actual material things but the subjective representation of them in our minds. So, in the ordinary usage, I will go along brains doing amazing things like creating colours although I might remind people that it's a manner of talking and is not strictly the case that brains do anything.

Clearly, this is fertile ground for being misunderstood...
EB
If I understand you, you purport that the brain is not an organ in the human body. I would love to be mistaken about what it is I think you think.

That's right.

The brain may at best be a subjective representation of X, caused, or formed, by X itself. Solve this equation, and you are the best.

You could claim that X is the brain. Well, I guess that what we mean. We think of the brain as whatever it is that really exists out there in the physical world. But, we can only think about brains using mental images and abstract concepts that all refer to these mental images. So, although our intention is to talk about the real, physical object, all we're able to think of in the theatre of our minds, are these mental images assorted with conceptual abstractions. And I'm absolutely certain that you take these mental images as the real, physical brain. It's a double trick that's performed here and we do like to be taken for a ride.
EB
 
We make the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and we make a distinction between epistemology and ontology. The key to a better understanding is to fuse these together and make further distinctions:

1) epistemic subjectivity
2) ontological subjectivity

3) epistemic objectivity
4) ontological objectivity

Once we grasp the distinction and relationship, we can move on to the nature of reality and the common mistakes of philosophers past.
 
We make the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and we make a distinction between epistemology and ontology. The key to a better understanding is to fuse these together and make further distinctions:

1) epistemic subjectivity
2) ontological subjectivity

3) epistemic objectivity
4) ontological objectivity

Once we grasp the distinction and relationship, we can move on to the nature of reality and the common mistakes of philosophers past.

Searle?
On Searle said:
Searle makes a distinction between epistemic subjectivity and ontological subjectivity, and a distinction between epistemic objectivity and ontological objectivity. Compare a pain and a mountain. A pain has a subjective mode of existence whereas a mountain has an objective mode of existence. The difference is that the appearing of the pain is identical to the being of the pain unlike the mountain whose appearing and being are distinct. A pain cannot exist unless it is experienced, whereas a mountain can exist without being experienced. Searle maintains that what is ontologically subjective can be studied by a science that is epistemically objective.

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad....1/12/searle-subjectivity-and-objectivity.html

EB
 
Searle?
On Searle said:
Searle makes a distinction between epistemic subjectivity and ontological subjectivity, and a distinction between epistemic objectivity and ontological objectivity. Compare a pain and a mountain. A pain has a subjective mode of existence whereas a mountain has an objective mode of existence. The difference is that the appearing of the pain is identical to the being of the pain unlike the mountain whose appearing and being are distinct. A pain cannot exist unless it is experienced, whereas a mountain can exist without being experienced. Searle maintains that what is ontologically subjective can be studied by a science that is epistemically objective.

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad....1/12/searle-subjectivity-and-objectivity.html

EB

I don't agree with all his views, but yeah.

(Do I need to go stand in the corner, lol)
 
Do animals perceive the same objects as humans perceive?

Yes. The objects humans perceive are the very same objects animals perceive. Of course, there is likely variation in the perceptions, but that's an answer to a different question.

The short answer is that humans are animals, and are mammals, and perceive as all mammals perceive, more or less.
 
Searle?


EB

I don't agree with all his views, but yeah.

(Do I need to go stand in the corner, lol)

I haven't taken the time to look to close at Searle's views but I would reverse the word order in those expression. So, I would make a distinction between subjective ontology and objective ontology (in terms of the subjective and the objective world), on the ground that we're unable, for the moment at least, to reduce one to the other. We in effect have no idea how it could go. And then, we can also make a distinction between subjective and objective epistemology (in terms of subjective knowledge and objective beliefs).

It's Ok, you can go now. :p
EB
 
Sure, if by "programming" you mean like how a mountainside is "programmed" by wind and rain to have just the right texture to control a ball rolling down it to take a specific path, given specific start conditions.

No. By programming I mean "algorithms" where preexisting "rules" for handling information must exist.

But the rules are not the product of some external force applied to something.

There are "design processes" not a designer, natural selection and things like sexual selection.

algorithms like these?:

E = MC^2
F = MA
V = D/T
 
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