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Does "RIGHT & WRONG" mean anything, without God or Religion?

If it was subjective the doctor would have no idea what I 'meant' by pain level.


Oh, come on, it's not that difficult to grasp that you are reporting the level of pain that you feeling based on your own past experience with pain.

Level 10 being your own measure of the worst pain you have ever experienced. So if what you feel now is nowhere as bad as the worst pain you have ever experienced you tell the doctor that you are now experiencing level 3 pain, therefore the doctor is able to understand that - on your scale of pain - you are not experiencing the greatest level of pain that you have ever experienced, that your pain is manageable without intervention.

Pain being subjective, child who has never been seriously hurt may report a level 10 that could be comparable to your level 3, but there is no way to tell, just that the child feels in great pain and reports it as the greatest pain he or she has ever experienced.
 
We are not measuring the age of the person who experiences pain or the method used to inflict pain. We are measuring for a common denominator of pain and doing so objectively using a standard scale.

If it was a subjective scale I would have no idea what was meant by an 8 out of 10.

if it was a subjective scale, I could claim that my 8 out of 10 was more painful than your 8 out of 10. But that's what a 9 out of 10 on the scale is there for - so that we don't subjectively argue about who is in more pain.

Can you not see that this is an epistemic approach to arrive at an objective way of defining pain in terms that everyone can relate to without subjective argument or opinions. The doctor can ask various patients how 'much' pain they are in and get a meaningful answer - because they have an objective datum 0 to 10.

It's also an objective method insofar as the responses are not up for debate or misinterpretation. But if I told my doctor I'm in a "fair amount of pain" my doctor might think that was the same as another patient who said they were in "a pretty bad amount of pain". But what if my pain was 3/10 and theirs was 6/10?
 
if it was a subjective scale, I could claim that my 8 out of 10 was more painful than your 8 out of 10. But that's what a 9 out of 10 on the scale is there for - so that we don't subjectively argue about who is in more pain.

What makes you think everyone's 8/10 is the same?
 
If my 8 out of 10 was worse than your 8 out of 10 then it would be a 9/10
 
...oh but Lion IRC, what if you both report 10/10?

Then we BOTH know what the other is feeling. Which is what makes this scale an objective epistemic approach that removes the ambiguity or possibility of gainsaying.

My feeling of 8/10 pain doesn't depend on your opinion about whether or not a dentist needle is capable of causing an 8/10.
 
Lumpenproletariat's Op goes right to the heart of moral ontology/epistemology.

The doctors request to know how much pain I'm in (on a scale of 0 to 10) presumes that there is such a thing as measurable levels of pain experience. That such a thing exists. (Ontology)

The request for patients to rate their pain against an objective datum 0 to 10 (which all patients can universally relate to) is an attempt at, or an actual method of epistemology - that if it ontologically does exist, then we can measure it or circumscribe it.

Similarly, if there is no objective datum for morality (which transcends personal opinion or cultural zeitgeist) then objective concepts of right or wrong are as meaningless as this;

im-right-youre-wrong.jpg
 
Lumpenproletariat's Op goes right to the heart of moral ontology/epistemology.

The doctors request to know how much pain I'm in (on a scale of 0 to 10) presumes that there is such a thing as measurable levels of pain experience. That such a thing exists. (Ontology)

The request for patients to rate their pain against an objective datum 0 to 10 (which all patients can universally relate to) is an attempt at, or an actual method of epistemology - that if it ontologically does exist, then we can measure it or circumscribe it.

Similarly, if there is no objective datum for morality (which transcends personal opinion or cultural zeitgeist) then objective concepts of right or wrong are as meaningless as this;

View attachment 8684
When a doctor asks a patient, he or she is trying to get a handle on how much the pain hurts the person. The doctor is not comparing that answer to anyone else's. Some people are very sensitive to pain - others are not. One person's 8 out of 10 might be a 4 out of 10 for someone else.
 
And yet the doctor asks EVERY patient the same question and every answer is clinically meaningful irrespective of whether it's Arnold Schwarzenegger or Peewee Herman.

...which wouldn't be the case if patients used subjective descriptions like sorta, kinda, really really really hurts a lot or not that bad.

ETA - are you the same laughing dog from TR?
 
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We are not measuring the age of the person who experiences pain or the method used to inflict pain.


What I said was not related to age, but experience. The example of a child was meant to illustrate experience as the principle factor that determines your own scale of pain. Which is not equivalent to the scale of pain that someone else is reporting.....the perception of pain being subjective.
We are measuring for a common denominator of pain and doing so objectively using a standard scale.

That's nonsense. We don't even feel the same level of pain for the same injury from moment to moment. The feeling of pain may wax or wane, or we may be distracted for a moment and feel no pain during that moment.

There is no objective measurement of perceived level of pain, just your own estimate based on your own past experience of pain.

If you had never experienced pain before, you would have no scale. Nor could an observer tell you what your level of pain is based on their own scale.
If it was a subjective scale I would have no idea what was meant by an 8 out of 10.

It is their own scale they are reporting. The gradient of 1 to 10 relates to their own experience with pain.

By telling you that their pain level is now at 8, this tells you that they are approaching their limit.

You have no idea how their limit compares with yours or anyone elses. Their own/our own limit is not a constant throughout life.

Being subjective, pain threshold is variable.

Can you not see that this is an epistemic approach to arrive at an objective way of defining pain in terms that everyone can relate to without subjective argument or opinions. The doctor can ask various patients how 'much' pain they are in and get a meaningful answer - because they have an objective datum 0 to 10.

Wrong because pain thresholds vary over time, nor is memory perfect. So the report that you give is only valid in that instance in time.

Plus you equivocate your perception of pain, the fact that you do feel pain, with things that objective where 'objective' means something that anyone who cares to can access and measure at will.

Which is patently absurd because it is only you who is feeling pain. Being subjective, nobody can access your feelings, they can only ask how you feel.

It's also an objective method insofar as the responses are not up for debate or misinterpretation. But if I told my doctor I'm in a "fair amount of pain" my doctor might think that was the same as another patient who said they were in "a pretty bad amount of pain". But what if my pain was 3/10 and theirs was 6/10?

The response relates to the subjects own scale. The scales of other subjects have no relationship to your own, although some may be similar.

The Doctor could not ask the mother about the level of pain her child is experiencing, for example, because no one has direct objective access to another persons experience.
 
Put it this way: if pain was an objective, measurable thing, the doctor wouldn't need to ask you on a scale of 1 to 20, or any other scale, how much something hurt. He'd just tell you "the pain you experience/will experience is x/10", and there would be no gainsaying the assessment.

Objective = the same through all times and all places for all people.

Pain does not fit that criterion, neither does "good" and "evil". If they did, morality would have been the same in all the first societies of men and remained so from the earlieat times until now, and so on into the unending future. That's not the case, and probably never will be. Ergo, "good" and "evil" are not objective. End of discussion as far as I'm concerned. In fact, I'm surprised this thread is still live, because this was pointed out by myself and others several pages ago, and hasn't been reasonably countered yet, unless you include blunt refusal to accept it. Which I don't.

In its simplest terms: objective = true for all people in all places at all times. "Good" and "evil" or "right and "wrong" do not meet this standard. With or without "god".
 
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Our beliefs about "right" and "wrong" determine the social conventions and are not determined by the social conventions.

Such as our belief that "slavery" is wrong. This belief is not produced by social convention, but rather the social convention is produced from the belief.

For evidence that morality evolves and that religion is an (often deleterious) overlay, consider the Bible positions on any number of moral questions -- that today would be primitive and beneath even D. J. Trump:

> there are no passages on slavery that condemn the practice; just the opposite, there are verses giving the faithful the right to chattel slavery, to pass the slaves down to future generations, and to beat the living hell out of them

> death penalties for sassy teenage boys, for brides who can't demonstrate their virginity, for people working on the sabbath, for promoting a different god, for carrying on a Rudy Guiliani-style affair on one's spouse, for being gay, for touching or looking into a holy wooden box, for bitching about your monotonous diet....(catching my breath)

> genocide is portrayed as a heroic endeavor (see the entire book of Joshua), which makes bible god the most racist of deities (or maybe just hitting the standard of most tribal gods -- wouldn't want to overstate)

> rape of female war captives -- it's your right; do it

> eternal suffering (as the prince o' peace puts it, the wailing and gnashing of teeth) for anyone who didn't catch the correct dogma within a microsecond of expiring -- note the eternal, which means this moral teaching prescribes torment with no possible redeeming or transformative value...

I just realized that my final example is actually not considered primitive by most Christians today -- it's the norm. That's one that will have to evolve, although, because it's imaginary, it will be pointless in the end. People reject it when they conclude that deities are imaginary (although of course it did have real-world consequences when tribunals of the Dark Ages were torturing and executing heretics with the pretense of sparing them the hellfire.)

"morality evolves"?

You mean that it improves? that it gets better? What does that mean? What's better about it today, 2000 AD, than 50,000 years ago?

"religion is an (often deleterious) overlay"?

What's that? "deleterious"? something bad? How do you decide what is "deleterious"? Can you prove that it's "deleterious" to someone who has different feelings than yours?

. . . consider the Bible positions on any number of moral questions -- that today would be primitive and beneath even D. J. Trump:

Is it bad or wrong to be "primitive"? or "beneath" Trump? Is it right to be above and wrong to be "beneath"?


> there are no passages on slavery that condemn the practice; just the opposite, there are verses giving the faithful the right to chattel slavery, to pass the slaves down to future generations, and to beat the living hell out of them

Is it wrong that there are no such passages condemning it? Should it be condemned? Why? Is there something "wrong" or "evil" about slavery? How do you know? Are you just parroting back what you were programmed to parrot?


> death penalties for sassy teenage boys, for brides who can't demonstrate their virginity, for people working on the sabbath, for promoting a different god, for carrying on a Rudy Guiliani-style affair on one's spouse, for being gay, for touching or looking into a holy wooden box, for bitching about your monotonous diet....(catching my breath)

> genocide is portrayed as a heroic endeavor (see the entire book of Joshua), which makes bible god the most racist of deities (or maybe just hitting the standard of most tribal gods -- wouldn't want to overstate)

> rape of female war captives -- it's your right; do it

Are you saying it's NOT your right? or was not? How do you decide what is your right? Are you making moral judgments about the above items in your list? condemning those practices? saying there's something wrong about murder, racism, and rape? How have you decided these are wrong or bad?


> eternal suffering (as the prince o' peace puts it, the wailing and gnashing of teeth) for anyone who didn't catch the correct dogma within a microsecond of expiring -- note the eternal, which means this moral teaching prescribes torment with no possible redeeming or transformative value...

What do you mean by "redeeming or transformative value"? Is that something good? How do you know? Why do you think it's good? If someone said those are bad rather than good, would they be wrong?


I just realized that my final example is actually not considered primitive by most Christians today -- it's the norm. That's one that will have to evolve, although, because it's imaginary, it will be pointless in the end. People reject it when they conclude that deities are imaginary (although of course it did have real-world consequences when tribunals of the Dark Ages were torturing and executing heretics with the pretense of sparing them the hellfire.)

Were those consequences good or bad? Was it wrong for them to torture and execute the heretics?

Is "pretense" wrong?

What is your judgmentalism based on? Is there a standard or rule for good and bad behavior which entitles you to condemn the above and pass judgment on those who think or feel differently than you and thus do (or did) these things you're condemning here?

I know you think you are asking clever questions that point out the flaws in ideologyhunter's argument;

Then why don't you be clever and answer the questions. What is "deleterious" about religion? Is this judgmental? Does it mean something bad? Is this judgmentalism based on subjective values which ideologyhunter inherited from his culture and which are thus arbitrary?

. . . but you are really not.

But you ARE being clever by telling me I'm not supposed to ask him what he meant?

I'm only asking what he meant by saying something was "deleterious." It's wrong to ask that question? Are you trying to shelter ideologyhunter from being confronted with this question? You think he can't handle it? or shouldn't have to? Like a younger child can't handle an older child teasing him for believing in Santa Claus?


Morality is determined by culture.

Meaning we have no control over what we think is "moral" or "good" or "evil" or "deleterious" etc.? because any statement we make about it was programmed into us without our having made the choice to adopt the morality?

So in other words you're saying ideologyhunter can't be expected to explain what "deleterious" means because this is determined by his "culture," and he is only programmed by his culture to use this word without knowing what it means or being able to explain why something is "deleterious"? But rather, he just burps this out like a spontaneous chemical reaction he has no control over? because no one can explain why they make any judgments about anything, as these are nothing but outbursts from us which are automatic and without any explanation other than the programming over which we have no control?

How do you explain the misfits who reject the moralistic judgments of someone in their culture and disagree that something is "evil" or "good" or "deleterious"? If they're within the same culture, how can it be that they don't make the same moral judgments?

There's no objective reason for anyone within the culture to adopt that morality or practice it if they don't feel like it, is there? And so it's really pointless to ever tell someone their act is "immoral" or "deleterious" because this means nothing to those who don't have the same feeling about it and thus don't care whether you call it this word that means nothing to them but is only a subjective outburst from you.

So then what's the point of telling anyone that something is "wrong" or "evil" or "good" or "deleterious" etc.? If they don't already have the same subjective feeling about it, there's obviously no way to prove them wrong. Are you saying they are wrong because they are REQUIRED to accept the morality dictated by their culture? But who says which morality is the real one dictated by the culture? Do you take a vote, and the majority rules and forces the 49% to adopt the morality that won the popular vote?


It should go without saying that people subscribe to the morality of the culture in which they are raised.

But some do NOT subscribe to it.

And those who do subscribe to it make the CHOICE to subscribe to it. They make this choice for reasons, AND, they also reject some of the standard morality, don't they? This acceptance and sometimes rejection is a result of our choosing, and we have reasons for these choices. Which means we INDIVIDUALLY are choosing the morality, and when we accept the morality of the culture, it is an individual choice. And so we must explain why this is "good" and that is "bad" etc., and saying it's a "social norm" is no answer.


Ideologyhunter is not saying that slavery is objectively wrong.

He strongly rejects slavery as objectively wrong, even if he doesn't say it explicitly. He thinks IT MATTERS whether slavery is practiced, whereas if this was just some arbitrary subjective feeling he had about slavery, he would not think it matters whether slavery is practiced in some places. But he DOES think it matters. He is offended at the Bible writers for not condemning slavery. If he is not offended by it, then why does he even bring it up? If slavery does not matter, then why mention it? What is the point of mentioning something, and foaming at the mouth about it, if it's only something subjective which doesn't matter?


He is saying that we all agree that it is - because we are all a part of a 21st Century developed world culture in which that is one of the tenets.

No, that's NOT why we agree that it's wrong. We agree that slavery is objectively wrong because slavery produces net harm, a reduction of desire gratification, or net deprivation, and a net increase of suffering in the universe to all creatures (i.e., factoring in all creatures, not meaning that all creatures are harmed each time slavery happens). That's why it's objectively wrong.

But if it's only a subjective feeling, then there's no reason for us to "agree" that it's wrong -- i.e., if this judgment comes only from an arbitrary "social convention" and without any importance that can be shown to have an "evil" impact on us or leading to harm which can be demonstrated like empirical facts can be demonstrated.

So "we all agree" that its "wrong" just as we make judgments about disease and famine or climate disasters as something causing harm and needing to be responded to and/or prevented where possible, i.e., objectively harmful, not because our culture arbitrarily puts these feelings into our heads, but because there is pain or suffering, which is recognized as something existing in the world objectively, as empirical fact and requiring some corrective action.

We "agree" and do something about it just like we take corrective action to replace a light bulb or plug a leaky roof -- it's to prevent a harm, or create a benefit, not based on any social convention but on empirical observation and a utilitarian response, determined by us individually, not by culture.


If you had a time machine and travelled back to the 1st Century Middle East, you would find that everyone there would think you were an evil person if you went about freeing other men's slaves.

Probably most would, but not everyone. In many cases it would be a good thing to do, and those who say it's evil would be wrong. But perhaps it would have been wrong, in some or most cases, to free slaves at that time and place. It might have led to harmful consequences. It's difficult to make that calculation. Definitely it would have been right to do it in some cases, and those who thought otherwise would have been wrong.

It is more certain that slavery today is wrong, or would be, than that it was wrong 2000 years ago. But that doesn't mean it wasn't also wrong back then. It's just more complicated. Judging what is "right" or "wrong" is often complicated rather than simple.

But it would have been good to start an emancipation movement back then and try to change the thinking. Probably also to release slaves in some cases, even illegally, but not in all cases.


You would be considered to be stealing their lawful property.

It would have been illegal at that time and place. But even so it would have been right in some cases. Some "property" rules are wrong and should be violated, or at least changed. We always have to calculate the total costs and benefits in each case.


Your objection is based on your failure to believe that people disagree with you.

No, it's based on your (or ideologyhunter's) inability to explain what "deleterious" means without contradicting yourself. Define this word without making reference to the "culture" that programs the values into us. Say what it means without saying "'deleterious' means whatever society programs us to think is 'deleterious'" -- your inability to do this is the problem. I.e., to use a word as if it means something, but then saying, "Oh it means whatever social custom programs us to attach to that word, and it's not fair to ask someone what it means, because it's not their fault that society programmed them to use this word in this way."


This is particularly ironic in this context.

That morality is subjective does NOT imply that people from similar circumstances disagree about it.

It implies that when they do disagree, neither can prove the other wrong. So, you can't prove it's wrong to torture someone, to commit genocide, etc. You can't say the Nazis were wrong to murder Jews, but only that it violated an arbitrary social norm you choose to follow but which others reject, and their reasons for rejecting it are just as logical and legitimate as your reasons for adopting it, and you can give no reason why they should change their thinking and adopt yours instead.

But that morality is OBJECTIVE means there are reasons why it was wrong to murder or torture, regardless of one's social programming, and thus there are reasons why those who committed such crimes should have changed their thinking and adopted different rules of behavior, even why they should have rejected any "social norms" which drove them to do those acts.

But you disagree and think there was no reason for the murderers and torturers to change their minds and behave differently. And if you could have communicated with them, you would have had nothing to say to them to persuade them to think differently.


You and Ideologyhunter agree on what is moral, because you share a culture.

No, both of us reject some elements in the culture, as you do. It's not true that everyone automatically falls into line and submits to every "social norm" in the culture. We accept much of it because we see there are reasons to accept it and follow it. So we choose to accept what is moral based on reason, conforming to the culture when it appears to be right in its norms.

(This is not to deny that there is also blind acceptance of some norms due to conditioning. But that conditioning can be challenged, and no one can base their decisions/actions on claims that their social conditioning caused them to do it.)


NOT because you both base your morality on some mythical objective set of rules.

So you're saying if we had been born in Nazi Germany we would have eagerly agreed to murdering and torturing Jews because the culture planted that value into our minds and we would not have been capable of questioning that value.

No, your axiom that everyone automatically submits to the cultural norms without any ability to question them is refuted over and over again by endless examples from history.


Morality does evolve.

Yes, because we question it and change it. Usually for the better. Because we have reasons to change it in order to make life better, or improve our world.


That you think this means 'improve' just indicates that your grasp of evolution is as woeful as your grasp of the origins of morality, and your grasp of economics.

Is it "wrong" or "evil" for something to be "woeful"? How do you determine what is "woeful" and what is not? Is "woeful" a mortal sin while "deleterious" is only a venial sin?

Do people who GRASP something differently than you grasp it need to be re-programmed according to the proper social conventions? If they disagree with you about what is "woeful," how are they to be corrected? When other people are wrong, or "woeful" in what they think, is the solution to re-program them rather than give them reasons to change their thinking, which they cannot do because it's all a product of their social programming?

Definition of EVOLVE https://www.google.com/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=cgYoWIylGpHW8gegp6rIDw&gws_rd=cr&fg=1#q=evolve+definition :

develop gradually, especially from a simple to a more complex form.
"the company has evolved into a major chemical manufacturer"
synonyms: develop, progress, advance;

This says "evolve" is mostly about improvement. It leaves open a negative meaning, but the more common usages imply improvement. Nothing in the definition implies going to a worse condition.

So why is it "woeful" to take "evolve" to mean improvement?

Why is it "woeful" to consider the later life forms -- the more complex ones like mammals -- as an "improvement" over the microbes and insects, and these primitive forms as unequal and of lesser value than primates?

Is it "woeful" to want to save humans from diseases and to protect them by killing bacteria which threaten them? or protect their houses by killing thousands or millions of termites? Is it "woeful" to kill a million termites in order to protect the houses of a dozen humans? Isn't this done because the humans have more value or are an "improvement" over the termites and for whose interest it is worth sacrificing a few million termites?


In all of these areas you demonstrate a disinclination to accept the existence of complexity, . . .

I was wrong if I said somewhere that complexity doesn't exist. Explaining how "slavery" has been an "evil" in human history, overall, and yet also was "necessary" in some earlier civilizations, is very complex and requires studying the many forms of "slavery" throughout the ancient world and asking, e.g., how they could have produced enough food to feed millions without the use of forced labor.


. . . and a tendency to build long-winded but repetitive arguments. A good argument recognises that reality is rarely simple; but a good argument is nevertheless brief.

No, quickie sloganistic jingles like "'good' is whatever the culture says 'good' is" or "Make America great again!" or "slavery is 'bad' if your culture says it's 'bad' but 'good' if your culture says it's 'good'" or "Deutschland ueber alles" or "people before profit" and so on are not "good" arguments.

It's better to take the trouble to ask the questions and look at the ambiguous cases and figure out what the goal is or what is best for the greater number of those who will be affected, even if it requires a few extra sentences in order to account for the ambiguities. A "good argument" is not about dismissing the issue with a mindless slogan in order to please a mindless mob while whining that the other guy's rhetoric isn't short and snappy enough.

(You waste space here whining about how many words are used. I use extra words in order to respond to EVERY point in your post. Are you telling me most of your points are not worth responding to?

Now that I've told you where you're wasting space, giving you a specific example you should have edited out, why don't you do the same and quote a specific sentence of mine which was irrelevant to the topic and thus a waste of space.)


Your arguments are the exact reverse of this principle.

I agree that my effort to explain how slavery is "evil" and yet was also necessary (or seemingly necessary) or expedient in some periods of history is difficult to do briefly in one or two snappy slogans, while your cliché that "good" is whatever the culture dictates is much easier for a demagogue to present to a screaming mob.

It was common to kill enemy war prisoners. Doesn't it seem that offering them slavery as an option was reasonable, and not as harsh as killing them?

Do we know that no one ever spoke out against slavery in the ancient world? Even if no quotes from the written record can be found, does that really prove no one ever had negative thoughts about it or questioned the practice?

When slavery was abolished in high-profile cases, Russia and the U.S. in the 1860s, it surely resulted in economic disaster in both cases, over several decades following. But there's plenty of reason to believe the long-term result was a net benefit to the vast majority, though it's difficult to prove with empirical data. Abolishing it in 200 or 300 BC would probably have been even worse for the economy at that time, over many generations.

Obviously you could publish a lengthy book on the pros and cons of slavery in the ancient world and what philosophers and others thought about it. Ideas about merit and being rewarded for good work did exist and must have caused some doubts about the arbitrary slave raids and damage this inflicted. We are capable of judging whether slavery really was necessary, or only a temporary expedient, and even people living back then were capable of raising the questions, or of being confronted with the questions and reconsidering the justice of it.

But you're right -- it's more pleasing to the mob and saves time and effort to just dismiss it all with your simplistic slogans about one's "culture" being the only source for any values or beliefs about "good" and "evil" etc.

So I can't fault you for congratulating yourself on your superior talent for snappy simplistic slogans. If your audience is a mindless mob you want to whip up, that could explain your preference for sloganism and snappiness.
 
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I said that a good argument is brief.

That you misinterpreted this as implying that a brief argument is necessarily good, is typical of your gross errors in judging almost everything.

You are constantly wrong. And that's obvious to anyone who bothers to read your screeds. So I need say no more.
 
Put it this way: if pain was an objective, measurable thing, the doctor wouldn't need to ask you on a scale of 1 to 20, or any other scale, how much something hurt. He'd just tell you "the pain you experience/will experience is x/10", and there would be no gainsaying the assessment.
That's rather like saying that if brightness was an objective, measurable thing, Hipparchus wouldn't have needed to ask the other astronomers on a scale of 1 to 6, or any other scale, how bright Saturn looked to them. He'd just tell them "the brightness you experience is 1.47 magnitude", and there would be no gainsaying the assessment. Should we all take for granted that the state of measurement technology in 2016 is a valid basis for judging whether something is an objective, measurable thing?

Objective = the same through all times and all places for all people.
That's not what "objective" means. The brightness of Saturn varies a lot over time, from a low of 1.47 to a high of -0.49. Do you think that's a good reason to conclude that its brightness is subjective and/or not measurable?

Pain does not fit that criterion, neither does "good" and "evil". If they did, morality would have been the same in all the first societies of men and remained so from the earlieat times until now, and so on into the unending future. That's not the case, and probably never will be. Ergo, "good" and "evil" are not objective. End of discussion as far as I'm concerned.
We have a definitional problem here. What's the right thing to do depends on local conditions. For example, whether it's right for you to shoot someone often depends on the immediate circumstance of whether he's shooting at you. So if Alice should shoot Bob today because he's trying to kill her, but Charlie shouldn't have shot Debby yesterday because she wasn't trying to kill him, are you going to call that "Morality was different yesterday and it's different for Alice from what it is for Charlie."? Or are you going to call that "It's okay to shoot someone in self defense, whether it's yesterday or today and whether you're Alice or Charlie."?

The point is, the first societies of men were up against a different set of constraints from the ones current societies face; in the unending future societies will again find themselves in different circumstances from ours. The consequent changes in what responses to these circumstances are most reasonable for the respective societies no more make morality subjective than a change in whether one is being shot at makes the morality of killing subjective. For example, can we at least agree that it's moral for governments to tax their subjects to pay for socially useful services? Well, it used to be common practice for them to tax the people by means of "corvee", i.e., making citizens do community service work. This would generally be considered morally unacceptable in this day and age; but what were governments supposed to do back when they had no ability to measure income and most economic activity wasn't even paid for with money? Governments telling people "Do whatever work you want and give us 10% of the proceeds." was impractical; "Work for us 10% of the time." was the closest feasible approximation. So to say "Corvee was moral in 1400 AD; today it isn't." is not a good reason to think morality isn't objective.

The flip-side of the definitional problem is that we separately need to distinguish between what's moral and what's believed to be moral. Al Capone may well have believed it was moral for him to rub out other gangsters for competing on his turf in the booze business, but his opinion on the matter is no more evidence that it really was moral than William Jennings Bryan's opinion that God made the world 6,000 years ago is evidence that humans didn't evolve from monkeys millions of years ago. People often believe things that aren't true.

So when you say morality would have been the same in all the first societies of men and remained so from the earliest times until now, and so on into the unending future, and that's not the case, what sort of changes are you referring to? If what you mean is "Corvee was moral in 1400 and now it isn't.", the counterargument is "Conditions change.". But if what you mean is "Burning heretics at the stake was moral in 1400 and now it isn't.", you get a very different counterargument. "Burning heretics at the stake was moral in 1400 and now it isn't." really would be a good reason to think morality isn't objective, but first you'd need to prove burning heretics at the stake was moral in 1400. All you're going to be able to prove is that a lot of people believed it was moral. Whoop de do. A lot of people believed the world was a few thousand years old. Believing stuff doesn't make it so.

In its simplest terms: objective = true for all people in all places at all times. "Good" and "evil" or "right and "wrong" do not meet this standard. With or without "god".
As argued above, you're setting goalposts for objectivity that are unreasonably high. You've set them so high that not even astronomy can meet them, unless you want to claim that the properties of astronomical bodies somehow changed from subjective to objective when we invented the light meter. But never mind that. For the sake of discussion, let's say you're right that objective = true for all people in all places at all times.

I say it's wrong for a person to rape another person for fun. So if right and wrong do not meet this standard for objectivity, then tell me, what person at what time was doing right when he raped another person for fun?
 
what person at what time was doing right when he raped another person for fun?
If it were subjective, it would surely depend on from whose perspective the act was viewed? On the other hand, the notion that right and wrong are independent of individual opinion would be assuming objectivity (and therefore question-begging).

The only way your question makes sense to me, is if you actually reject the possibility that someone, somewhere might not find the rape of another person for fun 'wrong'. Unlikely but not, I'd have thought, impossible.
 
If it were subjective, it would surely depend on from whose perspective the act was viewed? On the other hand, the notion that right and wrong are independent of individual opinion would be assuming objectivity (and therefore question-begging).
Huh? You can prove anything is question-begging that way. The notion that stellar brightnesses are independent of individual opinion would be assuming objectivity and therefore question-begging. The notion that people are descended from monkeys would be assuming evolution and therefore question-begging. What exactly are you trying to say here?

The only way your question makes sense to me, is if you actually reject the possibility that someone, somewhere might not find the rape of another person for fun 'wrong'. Unlikely but not, I'd have thought, impossible.
Huh? Why would I have to reject that for my question to make sense? Of course it's not only possible that someone doesn't find it wrong, it's a certainty. Lots of people have raped others for fun and gone right on thinking of themselves as good people. What's that got to do with it?

CMS said "right and "wrong" do not meet the "true for all people in all places at all times" standard. That looks like a claim that every "right" and "wrong" proposition is false for somebody, somewhere, at some time. It's not a claim that every "right" and "wrong" proposition is believed to be false by somebody, somewhere, at some time. If being believed to be false by somebody, somewhere, at some time were enough to make a proposition subjective, then whether people are descendants of monkeys would be subjective. This is not rocket science. CMS made an existence claim, so I asked him to produce an example of what he claimed existed. How does that not make sense?
 
And yet the doctor asks EVERY patient the same question and every answer is clinically meaningful irrespective of whether it's Arnold Schwarzenegger or Peewee Herman.
It is meaningful in the sense that helps the doctor assess the patient's view of his or her pain. But the doctor does not compare the answer of one patient with the answer of another.
...which wouldn't be the case if patients used subjective descriptions like sorta, kinda, really really really hurts a lot or not that bad.
According to the physicians I know, patients do say things like "sort a 5", or "maybe a 4".
ETA - are you the same laughing dog from TR?
Yes.
 
That's not what "objective" means. The brightness of Saturn varies a lot over time, from a low of 1.47 to a high of -0.49. Do you think that's a good reason to conclude that its brightness is subjective and/or not measurable?

Variations in the brightness of Saturn, stars, etc, is objective, therefore measurable by anyone who has the means to measure it.
 
Has it not occurred to you that this entire line of argument is wildly incompatible with the observed fact that people, for the most part, are not utilitarians?

Actually they are, whenever they argue a good case. You're right that they don't invoke the "utilitarian" label, which is rejected, but they do use the utilitarian logic to prove they're right. They always use the cost vs. benefit reasoning, and similar utilitarian reasoning.
You mean whenever they aren't using cost vs. benefit and similar utilitarian reasoning, they aren't making a good case? I disagree. I've seen lots of good moral arguments that weren't cost/benefit reasoning. For instance, here are some that instead appeal to symmetry.

Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then be trusted with the government of others? - Thomas Jefferson

If any man is for slavery, he should first have it tried on himself. - Abraham Lincoln

He's probably right all the time, or virtually all the time. And when we're right, our logic is always utilitarian logic, even if we don't use the "utilitarian" label. So if God is a utilitarian, then he agrees with us when we're right.
Well, sure, God's right all the time, assuming we define the criteria for "God" to include omniscience. But that's not "God agrees with us." That's "God agrees with utilitarianism." When you add the "when we're right" clause, that means you're de facto declaring human views to be an incidental irrelevance. Which is fine; and God's views are likewise an incidental irrelevance -- He's just serving as a glorified stenographer, taking dictation from moral truth. God's and man's opinions no more matter than the opinions of a computer programmed to randomly append "is good" or "is bad" to descriptions of actions -- an omniscient God also agrees with that computer, whenever the computer is right. What's relevant is the truth, or otherwise, of utilitarianism. So why bring God, man or their supposed agreement into it in the first place? Just make the case for utilitarianism.

There probably isn't one person in a thousand who sincerely believes in utilitarianism, . . .

But they all follow the utilitarian logic whenever they're right. Most people recognize that cost vs. benefit calculations are necessary to make many of the decisions.
Many of the decisions, yes. But not all of the decisions. As Atheos asked,

"If there are 50 Muslims who habitually worship at a place in the heart of a metropolis where 2 million Christians believe it is in the best interest of everyone for them to destroy the place these people worship, does the self-righteous pleasure of 2 million Christians effecting the destruction of what they perceive to be an abomination outweigh the loss suffered from 50 Muslims?"​

No, it doesn't. And a cost benefit calculation is not necessary to figure that out. That's the whole point. Suppose, contrariwise, that a cost benefit calculation were necessary. Suppose you measure the pain of the Muslims and the joy of the Christians, multiply the one by 50 and the other by 2,000,000, and compare, and it's only then that you know that the destruction is immoral. Then it's a simple matter to algebraically rearrange the inequality, divide through by the amount of joy a bigot takes in destroying a mosque, and derive a formula for computing the minimum number of bigots it takes to make it moral to destroy 50 Muslims' place of worship. Well, tell us, Mr. Utilitarian. How many bigots joyfully destroying abominations against Jesus does it take to make religious oppression moral?

. . . (as opposed to claiming to believe in it because he thinks it's what all the best people believe in), and even the rare Peter Singer types, the folks who apparently really do believe in it, make no serious attempt to live by its dictates.

They need someone like you to preach a sermon to them.
I'm sure he's heard one. Hell if I know why it hasn't persuaded him. I have to wonder how he lives with the guilt of knowing he does a better job of living up to his utilitarian ideals than 99.9% of the population, and by utilitarian standards still falling outrageously short.

Anyone who disagrees and thinks it's good to commit such an act must believe that the total pleasure to be gained by someone is greater than the suffering inflicted onto the victims. Or that the pleasure gained by some is greater than that which is lost by the victims.
Why on earth would you imagine that if someone disagrees with you about whether it's good to do some particular harm, it must be because he's disagreeing with you about the magnitude of the harm relative to the magnitude of the benefit, as opposed to disagreeing with you about whether toting up harms and benefits and doing an arithmetic operation is the correct way to judge right and wrong?

I "imagine" it (correctly) because that kind of reasoning is all they ever offer.
That's nonsense. You can believe this is all they ever offer only because either you aren't paying attention when they offer other kinds of reasoning, or else because you're prejudiced and you've preemptively decided not to classify anything else you hear from them as "reasoning".

Even if you completely ignored all of secular moral philosophy from Confucius to Kant, you're a Christian, so you're bound to have been exposed for years to Christian moral reasoning, which means you can't help but have heard people say some harm was good because God commanded it.

If it's a real argument, it finally boils down to whose numbers are correct. Give an example of an argument about what's right/wrong which does not finally boil down to the total numbers of those harmed or benefited and the total net pleasure or pain which would result, to all those who are affected. This must be the final basis for what's right/wrong or good/evil because every real argument finally comes down to that calculation one way or another.
See above. The mosque should not be destroyed no matter how many anti-Muslim bigots want to destroy it. The bigots have no right to destroy it. It's not their mosque. Property rights are good. Religious freedom is good. Abolishing property rights and abolishing religious freedom are bad. The total joy derived from doing so is irrelevant because taking joy in such a thing is disgraceful and catering to that sort of joy is dishonorable.

You got me. I'm doing something like that. Prove me wrong -- What's an argument which does not finally boil down to the total harm vs benefit or suffering vs pleasure calculation?
Lots of arguments don't. From the Christian side, why should you obey God? Usually, it's either because God is the potter and you're the clay, and a potter owns his clay and has the right to shape his clay as he pleases; or else it's because God gave you life and you owe it to Him to try to be worthy of His gift.

From the secular side, the reasons some action is good are more varied. A lot of them come down to symmetry, such as the Lincoln/Jefferson examples above. Kant's categorical imperative to act only according to principles you will to be universal law is effectively an appeal to symmetry -- the alternative is to hold yourself and others to a double standard. Aristotle's ethics were about how being a good person would make you happy, not about how it would make the greatest number happy. An awful lot of ethics, particularly of non-western ethics, is about the virtue of ascetic self-denial. Pleasure is seen as an obstacle to goodness. Haidt has studied ethics anthropologically and identified five basic ethical drives, only one of which is cost-benefit analysis. The others -- fairness, loyalty, respect and purity -- are goals to be pursued whether this leads to increased total happiness or not.

And of course, even when some ethical argument does boil down to a pleasure/pain calculation, people don't put equal weight on everyone's pleasure and everyone's pain. How many mice were killed by agricultural equipment so you could eat bread?

Normal people care who gets the happiness and who gets the suffering.

You mean they want the happiness only for their friends or members of their tribe or clan? and for no one else? and they want the suffering for the other tribe or for ugly people or for some rival to them?
Sometimes. Sometimes it's for better reasons. Should an innocent person suffer in order to make guilty people happier? Should you neglect your responsibilities to a person you have an obligation to because you're busy making strangers happier? Should you let your son die when he needs an operation because for the same money you can save two children in the third world who have more easily treated problems? Of course not. You created your son; you didn't create the third world.

And what about your own happiness? Here's a example. Let's say it's centuries before vaccination. Your neighbor has smallpox. He's suffering, he's likely to die, and without a lot of care he will die. Nobody wants to catch smallpox from him, so finding someone to care for him is a problem. And then there's you. You've already had smallpox. You survived and now you're immune. So what to do? You go nurse him, right? Duh! The job falls to you, because it's you or no one. Never mind that you want to be an artist, not a nurse. Never mind that you have artistic talent but not much nursing talent. Art can wait; your neighbor can't. So go take care of the guy for a few weeks, until he dies or recovers. Right?

But now suppose it's not just your neighbor. Suppose smallpox is endemic throughout your country. At any given time there are hundreds of smallpox patients. Now it's not taking a few weeks off from painting; now it's a lifetime. Your masterpiece will never be. You're doomed to a life sentence in the smallpox ward, doomed by the misfortune of having survived smallpox and by the unlimited need of your countrymen. If you let them, if you never say "Enough", if you never walk away and let people die, then your countrymen will sacrifice all your own happiness on the altar of theirs. And according to utilitarian reasoning, that's what you have to do to be a good person. As Kant would characterize it, you have to use yourself as a mere means to an end. You have to choose slavery. To utilitarianism, you are a beast of burden.

Any reasonable moral theory has to allow you at some point to say "Enough", and go paint. Morality is not a slavery pact.

The amount of pleasure the two million bigots get from destroying the mosque does not weigh in the scales of justice against the suffering of the fifty people who lose their mosque, because the bigots don't deserve that pleasure.

All the pleasures and pains are factored in. You've already done the calculation, and you figure that there'd be more total suffering than benefit. You've factored in far more than the two million bigots, and after adding it all up you've decided against destroying the mosque, to get the optimum pleasure vs pain final result.
No, I haven't! I didn't do any such calculation! I have no capacity to make the required measurements, and even if I did I have no ideological commitment that would make me feel the urge to go the effort. This is just your morality trying to take credit for other moralities' work, much like those Christians who claim people can't do logic without presupposing Jesus. For me it's a simple matter of the Muslims' right to religious freedom and the bigots' lack of a right to oppress their outgroup.

And you can tell that's the case, because whatever all those other pleasures and pains you want to believe I've factored in are, my opinion on the matter remains unchanged even if we take those all away. If you're proposing that I'm taking into account the consequences of setting a precedent of allowing religious oppression by the majority, no, I'm not. Even if a meteorite is headed their way and the whole city will be destroyed a day later and everyone involved will die, it's still wrong to destroy the mosque.
 
Huh? You can prove anything is question-begging that way. The notion that stellar brightnesses are independent of individual opinion would be assuming objectivity and therefore question-begging.
Yes you're right. I explained myself badly.

It's not the notion of objectivity that was question-begging, it was the framing of your question that was question-begging - you implicitly embed the notion that the rightness of the action is independent of any individual perspective (you ask "at what time was he doing right?").

The only way your question makes sense to me, is if you actually reject the possibility that someone, somewhere might not find the rape of another person for fun 'wrong'. Unlikely but not, I'd have thought, impossible.
Huh? Why would I have to reject that for my question to make sense? Of course it's not only possible that someone doesn't find it wrong, it's a certainty. Lots of people have raped others for fun and gone right on thinking of themselves as good people. What's that got to do with it?
Because your question, "at what time was he doing right?", makes no sense when addressed to someone who does not believe the rightness of an action is independent of individual opinion.

If being believed to be false by somebody, somewhere, at some time were enough to make a proposition subjective, then whether people are descendants of monkeys would be subjective.
You're question-begging again.

The claim "I believe that X is not wrong" (ie that X is wrong is false), could mean one of (at least) two things. It could mean the speaker believes X is not wrong independent of any individual opinion or it could simply be the expression of approval for X by the speaker. You're assuming the former.

I don't think beliefs regarding evolution can be construed as expressions of approval or disapproval of the facts of evolution, so I don't think your analogy is apt.
 
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