Downward Causation: Useful or Misguided Idea?

[Subsymbolic]

For starters, to have a 'thing' which can experience something, you have to have an experiencing 'thing' in the first place, and the brain is demonstrably and objectively a 'thing'. This is not the case for a mind.

Ruby, I think that this kind of language is what concerned Sean Carroll. Minds have experiences, and they clearly do exist. You don't have to think too hard to know that is the case. All you have to do is think. However, we use metonymy all the time in language. We do it effortlessly and unconsciously. So it is possible to substitute "brain" for "mind" as the subject of the verb "experience", even though that leads to rather absurd statements about minds and thoughts being just illusions. Even physical objects can be construed as illusions, if you want to play the eliminatavist game. Every concept depends on the ontology it is embedded inside of.

That assumes that minds and brains are not the same thing. If that were the case we'd be looking at the old Russelian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Certainly, the problem of other minds, suggests that our only knowledge of other minds comes from description while our knowledge of our own minds comes by acquaintance. In On Denoting, Russell gives us rather a lot of examples of this sort of unification. For example when George iV wanted to know if Scott was the author of Waverley, he wasn't wondering if Scott was Scott and it was a discovery that Scott was in fact the author of Waverley. The same for Hesperus and Phosphorus or Chomolungma and Sagarmatha. The discovery that the mind is the brain is precisely the same even if we have to lose the possibility of Shangri-La in the discovery. In each case, the sceptic could assume this is simply metenomy, rather than discovery, but, at the very least, you have to concede it's a possibility that we might discover that the mind is simply the brain.

 

[untermensche]

Yes, possibly. Or it could be my brain which is doing the experiencing.

What evidence do you have of that thin speculation?

Has your brain told you about it's experiences?

Why should anybody think it is not pure fantasy?

For starters, in order to have a 'thing' which can experience something, then according to you, there has to be an experiencing 'thing' in the first place, and the brain is demonstrably and objectively a 'thing'. This is not the case for a mind (unless you have some objective evidence for what a mind is made of that you've been keeping from us). Ergo, the brain is arguably a better candidate for being the experiencer. One could even say that it literally has a head start.

Iow, instead of your brain-thing creating a mind-thing which then experiences thought-things in some sort of holy trinity, your brain could be experiencing. Much simpler.

I must admit though. It's tricky for me to decide for sure. On the one hand, there's the vast majority of non-god bothering experts, and then there's you, some anonymous amateur dogmatist on the internet with an odd posting style who seems to be trying to win this year's Dunning-Kruger Award and who doesn't even read the relevant clinical material enough to know what's in it.

If a mind is an effect it is a "thing".

It is not nothing.

And if the brain is going to all the trouble to make a mind and make things like "red" for it to experience that is strong evidence it needs the mind for there to be experience.

Otherwise why go to all the trouble.

- - - Updated - - -

It is a lie to say you can have awareness without both something capable of being aware and things it is capable of being aware of.

This dichotomy cannot be overcome.

Then how do you account for dreams? Rather, how do you account for the experiences of the first person observer (aka, the “I”) within dreamscapes?

I don't know what you're talking about.

The mind experiences dreams and sometimes remembers them.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

It is a lie to say you can have awareness without both something capable of being aware and things it is capable of being aware of.

This dichotomy cannot be overcome.

Then how do you account for dreams? Rather, how do you account for the experiences of the first person observer (aka, the “I”) within dreamscapes?

I don't know what you're talking about.

Curious, considering you then evaded the question with this:

The mind experiences dreams and sometimes remembers them.

You asserted: It is a lie to say you can have awareness without both something capable of being aware and things it is capable of being aware of. A dream is where you can have awareness without “something capable of being aware” and/or “things it is capable of being aware of.” Dreams are imbued, not experienced. You don’t actually fly when you dream of flying. You did not actually have sex with that person; or walk on that floor; or drive in that car; or come to any epiphany in spite of the sensation within the dream that you came to some epiphany; etc., etc., etc.

Hell, in a dream “you” can be both aware and completely oblivious—sometimes at the exact same time—but exactly what are you being aware of in a dream? Sometimes, it is that “you” are dreaming, but then it isn’t “you” that is dreaming; it is the brain that is in a particular mode, so what does it even mean to say, “I am aware that I am dreaming”?

Regardless, no matter your transient state of awareness, there are never any things that you are experiencing in a dream, unless you mean the brain experiencing the firing of neurons or reactions of chemicals or the like.

The best you could say about a dream is that sometimes “you” are capable of being aware that “you” are in a dreamscape, but that is typically rare and far between.

 

[untermensche]

I evaded nothing.

If something experiences a dream there is the thing that experiences and the dream.

Two things.

As always when there is experience.

 

[Copernicus]

For starters, to have a 'thing' which can experience something, you have to have an experiencing 'thing' in the first place, and the brain is demonstrably and objectively a 'thing'. This is not the case for a mind.

Ruby, I think that this kind of language is what concerned Sean Carroll. Minds have experiences, and they clearly do exist. You don't have to think too hard to know that is the case. All you have to do is think. However, we use metonymy all the time in language. We do it effortlessly and unconsciously. So it is possible to substitute "brain" for "mind" as the subject of the verb "experience", even though that leads to rather absurd statements about minds and thoughts being just illusions. Even physical objects can be construed as illusions, if you want to play the eliminatavist game. Every concept depends on the ontology it is embedded inside of.

That assumes that minds and brains are not the same thing. If that were the case we'd be looking at the old Russelian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Certainly, the problem of other minds, suggests that our only knowledge of other minds comes from description while our knowledge of our own minds comes by acquaintance. In On Denoting, Russell gives us rather a lot of examples of this sort of unification. For example when George iV wanted to know if Scott was the author of Waverley, he wasn't wondering if Scott was Scott and it was a discovery that Scott was in fact the author of Waverley. The same for Hesperus and Phosphorus or Chomolungma and Sagarmatha. The discovery that the mind is the brain is precisely the same even if we have to lose the possibility of Shangri-La in the discovery. In each case, the sceptic could assume this is simply metenomy, rather than discovery, but, at the very least, you have to concede it's a possibility that we might discover that the mind is simply the brain.

If I were to concede that possibility, I would have to understand better what you think it would mean to say that the mind is simply the brain. The identity operator only works when one ignores the differences.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

I evaded nothing.

If something experiences a dream there is the thing that experiences and the dream.

Two things.

As always when there is experience.

So you’re merely defining “thing” to be any placeholder you desire it to be to fit your argument.

 

[untermensche]

I evaded nothing.

If something experiences a dream there is the thing that experiences and the dream.

Two things.

As always when there is experience.

So you’re merely defining “thing” to be any placeholder you desire it to be to fit your argument.

Not any "thing".

To experience the "thing" needs to be a "thing" capable of experiencing.

We only know of one such "thing".

The mind.

 

[Subsymbolic]

That assumes that minds and brains are not the same thing. If that were the case we'd be looking at the old Russelian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Certainly, the problem of other minds, suggests that our only knowledge of other minds comes from description while our knowledge of our own minds comes by acquaintance. In On Denoting, Russell gives us rather a lot of examples of this sort of unification. For example when George iV wanted to know if Scott was the author of Waverley, he wasn't wondering if Scott was Scott and it was a discovery that Scott was in fact the author of Waverley. The same for Hesperus and Phosphorus or Chomolungma and Sagarmatha. The discovery that the mind is the brain is precisely the same even if we have to lose the possibility of Shangri-La in the discovery. In each case, the sceptic could assume this is simply metenomy, rather than discovery, but, at the very least, you have to concede it's a possibility that we might discover that the mind is simply the brain.

If I were to concede that possibility, I would have to understand better what you think it would mean to say that the mind is simply the brain. The identity operator only works when one ignores the differences.

ETA: Regarding Russell's George IV example, one could argue that he was wondering whether Scott was Scott, if Scott was indeed the author of Waverly. He just didn't know whether he was Scott or someone else. Maybe even someone else who was also named "Scott", because the meaning of "Scott" can just be "person named 'Scott'".

God knows, I've gone on about it enough. Actually, that's not quite my position. As you know, I suggest a bicameral account of the mind. Only a madman would think that, for example, a skein of narrative in the mind's eye was type identical with an instantiating neural type. However, when it comes to, in the simplest form, the experience of a pain or most perceptions, yeah I think that they are type identical: the information bearing states in the brain are the same information bearing states in the mind, that's what it feels like. Language falls under Davidson's AM but is some sort of token token supervenience. That, relation, if you ask me is The Hard Problem, not qualia.

By sharply dividing the two you get a distinction between conceptual and non conceptual content that avoids the problems that bedevilled Smart and Place back in the day, you preserve the distinction between private biological events and public linguistic events and you make conceptualisation of internal states matter of judgment that fits my perspective on Wittgenstein's private language - the private is underpinned by biology, the public by public criteria. It's all very tidy.

Obviously, in practice the two sides are hopelessly intertwined, but that's not really the point.

 

[Subsymbolic]

I evaded nothing.

If something experiences a dream there is the thing that experiences and the dream.

Two things.

As always when there is experience.

So you’re merely defining “thing” to be any placeholder you desire it to be to fit your argument.

Not any "thing".

To experience the "thing" needs to be a "thing" capable of experiencing.

We only know of one such "thing".

The mind.

You can't even objectively prove your thing exists. Go on, it's the standard you insist on for everyone else. Give me some objective proof you have a thing.

Or a mind for that matter.

You can't can you?

 

[ruby sparks]

And if the brain is going to all the trouble to make a mind and make things like "red" for it to experience that is strong evidence it needs the mind for there to be experience.

Otherwise why go to all the trouble.

Why should I accept it goes to to all that trouble if, unlike you, I'm not a fan of begging the question?

It's a much simpler explanation that the brain experience things itself, without the supposed middleman.

 

[untermensche]

I know my mind exists.

I know it better than any other thing.

So does anyone else with a mind.

All else is suspect.

 

[untermensche]

And if the brain is going to all the trouble to make a mind and make things like "red" for it to experience that is strong evidence it needs the mind for there to be experience.

Otherwise why go to all the trouble.

Exactly. If you're a brain, why not just experience things yourself? Cut out the middleman.

The brain creates "red" for a mind to experience.

If the brain itself was experiencing there would be no need to create "red".

The stimulation that causes the brain to create "red" would suffice for the brain to know red was there.

 

[ruby sparks]

I evaded nothing.

If something experiences a dream there is the thing that experiences and the dream.

Two things.

As always when there is experience.

So you’re merely defining “thing” to be any placeholder you desire it to be to fit your argument.

Not any "thing".

To experience the "thing" needs to be a "thing" capable of experiencing.

We only know of one such "thing".

The mind.

Or the brain.

- - - Updated - - -

The brain creates "red" for a mind to experience.

Just repeating over and over what you strongly believe is not an argument. It's dogma.

If the brain itself was experiencing there would be no need to create "red".

Why not? How would the brain experience red in that case?

 

[Subsymbolic]

I know my mind exists.

I concede it might seem that way to you, but you have no objective proof of it, do you. So no, you don't know, because knowledge is justified true belief and your belief isn't justified and the truth of it can't be objectively tested.

I know it better than any other thing.

No, you don't. you may well feel it really strongly in your soul, but you don't have any objective evidence.

So does anyone else with a mind.

You don't even have any subjective evidence, let alone objective evidence, for this.

You insist on objective proof from everyone else. Why doesn't that standard apply to you?

- - - Updated - - -

And if the brain is going to all the trouble to make a mind and make things like "red" for it to experience that is strong evidence it needs the mind for there to be experience.

Otherwise why go to all the trouble.

Exactly. If you're a brain, why not just experience things yourself? Cut out the middleman.

The brain creates "red" for a mind to experience.

If the brain itself was experiencing there would be no need to create "red".

The stimulation that causes the brain to create "red" would suffice for the brain to know red was there.

Yup, and that just happens to feel like something. no more no less. Finally you get it.

 

[ruby sparks]

The stimulation that causes the brain to create "red" would suffice for the brain to know red was there.

Exactly. And this is, of course, the widely accepted explanation.

Or to put it another way, the stimulation causes the brain to experience red.

You may not agree with or like that explanation, but there's nothing wrong with its viability. You can't say, 'no it can't be that way'. It is in fact more parsimonious.

 

[untermensche]

The stimulation that causes the brain to create "red" would suffice for the brain to know red was there.

Exactly. And this is, of course, the widely accepted explanation.

Then red would not be experienced. The stimulation that led to the creation of red would be experienced.

If a brain as opposed to a mind experienced.

A mind needs finished products, like red, to experience.

A brain that converts some stimulation to red would not need to create red if it could experience.

The stimulation would suffice for the brain to know red is there.

 

[ruby sparks]

Then red would not be experienced. The stimulation that led to the creation of red would be experienced.

If a brain as opposed to a mind experienced.

A mind needs finished products, like red, to experience.

A brain that converts some stimulation to red would not need to create red if it could experience.

Not following. Please clarify. At this point, that looks like gibberish, or at best your personal subjective opinion.

The stimulation would suffice for the brain to know red is there.

Exactly. And what's the problem with that model?

 

[Subsymbolic]

A brain that converts some stimulation to red would not need to create red if it could experience.

So what's the red 'made of' if it isn't just 'stimulation' what other stuff is there? DO you think the experience of red has to be coloured red?

 

[Copernicus]

I suspect that we would all achieve a great deal more insight in this discussion if people stopped using the word "brain" to mean so many different things while all acting as if we were talking about the same thing. Obviously, nobody here really thinks that the brain is a "mind". The brain has to be doing something in order for a mind to exist, but it can't just be doing anything. And it does a lot of things that are excluded from conscious attention. What is the physical basis for pain when you can block it from conscious experience in so many ways? There are local and general anesthesias. There is heroine, opium, and nitrous oxide. What about pain in a phantom limb? It only makes sense to talk of pain in the context of a state of mind, because multiple physical events come together to cause the experience. Emergent systems of behavior can have different underlying components. They don't even always have to have a single physical origin.

 

[untermensche]

Then red would not be experienced. The stimulation that led to the creation of red would be experienced.

If a brain as opposed to a mind experienced.

A mind needs finished products, like red, to experience.

A brain that converts some stimulation to red would not need to create red if it could experience.

Not following. Please clarify. At this point, that looks like gibberish, or at best your personal subjective opinion.

The stimulation would suffice for the brain to know red is there.

Exactly. And what's the problem with that model?

You are saying "exactly" to my point that the creation of "red" is only necessary if there is a mind to experience it.

If there is just a brain experiencing there is no reason to create "red".

If the brain turns some stimulation into red it knows what red is from the stimulation. It has no reason to convert the stimulation into a presentation for the mind.