Downward Causation: Useful or Misguided Idea?

[untermensche]

A brain that converts some stimulation to red would not need to create red if it could experience.

So what's the red 'made of' if it isn't just 'stimulation' what other stuff is there? DO you think the experience of red has to be coloured red?

What is the mind made of?

That requires a model.

That is how scientific understandings of natural phenomena are reached. Using testable models.

No model = no understanding of the phenomena.

 

[ruby sparks]

If the brain turns some stimulation into red it knows what red is from the stimulation.

Exactly. And this is the prevalent theory. And I'm asking you what's wrong with it. You telling me that you personally think there has to be a mind and that the brain can't itself directly experience red is not explaining why that isn't possible. It's just you restating your personal opinion that there's a middleman.

The only way you can be right is if you say that the brain can't itself experience red. And you have no way of knowing that.

 

[untermensche]

If the brain turns some stimulation into red it knows what red is from the stimulation.

Exactly. And this is the prevalent theory. And I'm asking you what's wrong with it.

Why is the brain converting the stimulation into something else since it already knows reflexively what it is?

What is this conversion for?

The mind?

 

[ruby sparks]

Obviously, nobody here really thinks that the brain is a "mind".

I can't think of a good reason to rule it out as one possible option, quite a parsimonious and attractive one in certain ways, compared to some in fact.

Consciousness could be a property (or properties) of organisms just as life can be a property (or properties) of organisms. We don't tend to say that the life of an organism is a separate thing itself.

 

[ruby sparks]

Why is the brain converting the stimulation into something else since it already knows reflexively what it is?

What is this conversion for?

The mind?

The brain could be converting the stimuli to an experience of red in order to have an experience of red. How do you know the brain 'already knows reflexively' what red is without converting the stimuli? Surely the stimuli entering the brain are just electromagnetic waves. A computer could read the same, non-coloured stimuli and print out the word 'red' without having experienced it. Ergo, something needs to experience it and it could be the brain that does that. And you haven't explained why not. You just keep repeating your rather unusual personal belief that the brain has to create a 'middle thing' first. Your middleman is not necessary if the brain itself can experience red and you haven't yet explained how that is not possible.

 

[untermensche]

Why is the brain converting the stimulation into something else since it already knows reflexively what it is?

What is this conversion for?

The mind?

The brain could be converting the stimuli to an experience of red in order to have an experience of red. How do you know the brain already 'knows reflexively' what red is without converting the stimuli? Surely the stimuli entering the brain are just non-red electromagnetic waves. A computer could read the same, non-coloured stimuli and print out the word 'red' without having experienced it.

There is no need of a brain to experience "red" if it can convert some stimulation into "red".

If it can convert the stimulation then it has "recognition" of the stimulation.

If it could experience it would just experience the stimulation and be done with it.

Since it can't experience it converts the stimulation into something the mind can experience.

 

[ruby sparks]

There is no need of a brain to experience "red" if it can convert some stimulation into "red".

If it can convert the stimulation then it has "recognition" of the stimulation.

If it could experience it would just experience the stimulation and be done with it.

Since it can't experience it converts the stimulation into something the mind can experience.

Why can the brain not experience red itself? Because all you're basically repeating over and over is that it can't, because you personally believe there has to be a middleman. Repetition isn't an argument. Please explain why the brain itself could not experience red. Which is what most relevant, non-god bothering experts think by the way, as far as I am aware. And I certainly don't consider you an expert.

 

[untermensche]

There is no need of a brain to experience "red" if it can convert some stimulation into "red".

If it can convert the stimulation then it has "recognition" of the stimulation.

If it could experience it would just experience the stimulation and be done with it.

Since it can't experience it converts the stimulation into something the mind can experience.

Why can the brain not experience red itself? Because all you're basically repeating over and over is that it can't. Why can't it?

Why does it have to experience "red" since it already has what it knows is "red"?

Why does it make the conversion from stimulation that isn't "red" to "red"?

It does not need this conversion.

But a mind does.

 

[ruby sparks]

Why does it have to experience "red" since it already has what it knows is "red"?.

How do you know that it "has what it already knows is red" before it 'converts' the electromagnetic waves to an experience of red? The waves hitting the retiuna are not red and the electro-chemical impulses along the optic nerve are not red.

I do believe I've asked you that question before. An answer this time would be good, instead of you just endlessly repeating your personal conviction. If personal convictions were sufficient I'd just go and ask the local priest what he thinks about god, for instance

So, again, why couldn't it be the brain experiencing red? Hint: you need a reason. Merely repeating a personal conviction over and over and over when asked to explain something is getting very close to quasi-religious dogma.

 

[untermensche]

If the brain can make a consistent presentation of "red" from stimulation that has nothing to do with "red" then it knows it has "red" before it makes the conversion.

If the brain experienced it wouldn't be wasting energy converting something it recognized already into something else.

The only reason to have "red" is so a mind can experience it.

And the only reason a mind needs to experience it is if the mind can act on the experience.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

I evaded nothing.

If something experiences a dream there is the thing that experiences and the dream.

Two things.

As always when there is experience.

So you’re merely defining “thing” to be any placeholder you desire it to be to fit your argument.

Not any "thing".

To experience the "thing" needs to be a "thing" capable of experiencing.

So you are now defining “thing” as “that which is capable of experiencing.”

We only know of one such "thing".

The brain.

The mind.

The “mind” is a construct of the brain, so you are necessarily defining “experiencing” as “that which the brain imbues.”

 

[ruby sparks]

If the brain can make a consistent presentation of "red" from stimulation that has nothing to do with "red" then it knows it has "red" before it makes the conversion.

The brain knows it has red even before the conversion to red? What does that even mean, apart from implying that brains know stuff, and indeed know it before it even happens? And I asked you, at least twice before, how could you possibly tell if it is the case anyway?

 

[untermensche]

Not any "thing".

To experience the "thing" needs to be a "thing" capable of experiencing.

We only know of one such "thing".

The mind.

So what is the “mind” experiencing when the brain shifts into sleep mode? Be specific.

The shift is an alteration of the mind. The sleeping mind is not the conscious mind.

But if the mind experiences anything we call it a dream.

A dream is what the mind experiences while asleep.

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If the brain can make a consistent presentation of "red" from stimulation that has nothing to do with "red" then it knows it has "red" before it makes the conversion.

The brain knows it has red even before the conversion? What does that even mean, apart from implying that brains know stuff, and indeed know it before it even happens? And I asked you, at least twice before, how could you possibly know if it is the case anyway?

How do I know what is the case?

If I hand you something and you always hand me the same thing out of many things in your bag in return that means you recognize what I hand you.

If the brain makes the same thing when exposed to some stimulation that means it recognizes the stimulation.

 

[ruby sparks]

If the brain makes the same thing when exposed to some stimulation that means it recognizes the stimulation.

But that's my point, not yours. I'm the one saying the brain can recognise things. You're the one saying it can't, despite now saying that the brain can both recognise and know things. Before they happen indeed.

 

[ruby sparks]

How do I know what is the case?

That the brain knows it has red even before the conversion to redness.

And even if that were true, it says nothing about whether it is or isn't the brain experiencing redness when redness is experienced.

Why can't the brain be the experiencing thing? Sooner or later you're going to need to answer that question.

Just repeating your personal belief that the brain first has to create a separate other thing to do the experiencing is not a reason or an argument. It's merely an unorthodox assertion, and arguably borderline woo dogma.

 

[untermensche]

If the brain makes the same thing when exposed to some stimulation that means it recognizes the stimulation.

But that's my point, not yours. I'm the one saying the brain can recognise things. You're the one saying it can't, despite now saying that the brain can both recognise and know things. Before they happen indeed.

If the brain recognizes it does not need to experience.

An experience of "red" is for something that cannot recognize that some stimulation means "red".

- - - Updated - - -

How do I know what is the case?

That the brain knows it has red even before the conversion to redness.

It has to know what it has to make something consistent from it.

And the only reason to make something of it is so a mind can experience it.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

To “experience” means “to directly interract with.” There is no other acceptable component to that definition.

“Mind” is nothing more than a construct of the brain. As such, it cannot “experience”; it can only be imbued with information in exactly the same way that an animated character in a Pixar film is imbued with information. In regard to such an animated analogue, it is meaningless and incoherent to say that it “experiences.”

The brain is isolated in the skull and therefore cannot directly experience anything other than the electrochemical impulses of the neural network (and the various other chemicals contained within the body).

Only the body can directly experience some “thing.” A “thing” is defined as only that which is constructed of the material of the macro physical universe.

Hey, this posting only in declarative is fun!

 

[DBT]

I evaded nothing.

If something experiences a dream there is the thing that experiences and the dream.

Two things.

As always when there is experience.

So you’re merely defining “thing” to be any placeholder you desire it to be to fit your argument.

Not any "thing".

To experience the "thing" needs to be a "thing" capable of experiencing.

We only know of one such "thing".

The mind.

Again, there is no mind without a brain forming and generating a mind. It is not the mind that forms and generated itself. Mind is composed of brain activity and information feed from multiple regions of the brain.

 

[DBT]

If the brain can make a consistent presentation of "red" from stimulation that has nothing to do with "red" then it knows it has "red" before it makes the conversion.

If the brain experienced it wouldn't be wasting energy converting something it recognized already into something else.

The only reason to have "red" is so a mind can experience it.

And the only reason a mind needs to experience it is if the mind can act on the experience.

The experience of colour is not arbitrary. The brain interprets wavelength of light (information transmitted from the eyes via the optic nerve), as a particular colour

 

[ruby sparks]

And the only reason to make something of it is so a mind can experience it.

Or the brain could be experiencing red. You personally believe otherwise. So, we know what your personal opinion is. That's all we know. You postulate that the brain needs to create an intermediary 'thing' that can perceive red, because presumably you believe that the brain itself can't experience red. That's basically a bald subjective, question-begging assertion. The valid alternative is that the brain can perceive red. That this is in fact the most widely accepted model should, I hope, at least make you slightly open to the possibility, even if it doesn't fit with what you yourself think.