For a scientific concept of consciousness

[fromderinside]

Ok, I'd like to move on a bit with a 152-character version of your definition:

Consciousness is an

Show

wakeful

arousal state,

Show

with the

awareness, motivated

Show

ion

​ to treat

Show

respond to

self and external

Show

lnvironmental

events. Arousal is the overall level of responsiveness to stimuli.​

I put aside for now the last part after "responsiveness to environmental stimuli", which seems essentially like going into the small prints.

I can't reduce it to 144 characters as I initially required but it will be good enough for what we have to do.

So, thank you to review it and bring any change to it you deem necessary.
EB

OK This reflects to make statement old tweet sized. I changed the bit about awareness because it is a state of arousal. I agree that the last bit isn't needed especially since I made it explicit that awareness is an arousal state.

Of course we leave hanging what is meant by awareness as an arousal state and by what is meant by motivation. The most troublesome is motivations since there are various theories about motivation not all of which are physically based. I also see why you inserted wakefulness, since your reasoning mirrors my concerns about motivation.

Still your defintion is about as helpful as are the. let's call them scientifico-legal definitions written by a famous professor trying to be inclusive about a point in Chinese history.

 

[fromderinside]

And I'll will bring to the pot the definition I've given:

Consciousness is knowledge of the state of specific neuronal structures in the human brain.​

I think it's a reasonable bet and honest contender for your votes.
EB

... except what does the state of neuronal structures tell us about consciousness. If it were what specific neuronal structures are reporting then I'd be on board. I always put 'sample' tap on the state of those structures. The state of the structures themselves is relatively unimportant considering it's the state of what they are processing that is important.

 

[fromderinside]

I would also like to get your position balloted.

So, here is my rephrasing of it, to get it down from 168 characters to less than 144 characters:

Consciousness is known subjectively to the conscious organism. The task of science is to discover the objective process generating the subjective experience.​

Personally, I think it's a very good position to have.


EB

I sense a circle forming.

 

[Speakpigeon]

OK This reflects to make statement old tweet sized. I changed the bit about awareness because it is a state of arousal. I agree that the last bit isn't needed especially since I made it explicit that awareness is an arousal state.

Right, so apparently we have:

Consciousness is an arousal state, awareness, motivated to treat self and environmental events. Arousal is the overall level of responsiveness to stimuli.​

We're down to 132, which is good.

Of course we leave hanging what is meant by awareness as an arousal state and by what is meant by motivation. The most troublesome is motivations since there are various theories about motivation not all of which are physically based.

Yeah, I think both 'awareness' and 'motivation' are ambiguous between the physical and the not at all physical.

I would rephrase as follows:

Consciousness is a state of responsiveness to stimuli from self and environmental events.​

The three terms 'arousal', 'awareness' and 'motivation' have disappeared, but 'responsiveness' seems to be enough on its own, without the non-physical ambiguity.

What do you think?

Also, I would specify of what consciousness is a state of responsiveness. Neurological systems? Brains? Humans?

I also see why you inserted wakefulness, since your reasoning mirrors my concerns about motivation.

No I didn't insert 'wakefulness'. You did. I assumed you wanted to distinguish consciousness from our altered experience during dreams. We can put it back if you want.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

And I'll will bring to the pot the definition I've given:

Consciousness is knowledge of the state of specific neuronal structures in the human brain.​

I think it's a reasonable bet and honest contender for your votes.
EB

... except what does the state of neuronal structures tell us about consciousness.

It says consciousness is entirely knowledge of the state of specific neuronal structures and of nothing else. Isn't that really something? I think it is.

And then I don't want to introduce any suggestion about the function, purpose, usefulness, finality etc., of consciousness, like, say, represent our environment. That's what it does most of the time but even when it doesn't it's still consciousness.

If it were what specific neuronal structures are reporting then I'd be on board. I always put 'sample' tap on the state of those structures. The state of the structures themselves is relatively unimportant considering it's the state of what they are processing that is important.

I was trying to evade potential dualist implications but your suggestion would bring them back!

I want only one kind of things. The state of neuronal structures is one. I don't want anything else, like what neuronal structures would be "reporting" or "representing" etc. because this bring back a potential dualist perspective, i.e. material neuronal structures and then something else, i.e. what these structures 'report'. And reporting is rather ambiguous.

Also, by "neuronal structures", I didn't mean the structure of whole complex of neurons, but some part of the brain which would be the conscious part, whatever it is and may be it's only a minute part of the overall structure of the brain, who would know?

Still, I think your 'process' is better than my initial 'state'. So, I rephrase my candidate definition as follows:

Consciousness is knowledge of specific neuronal processes in the human brain.​

EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Consciousness is known subjectively to the conscious organism. The task of science is to discover the objective process generating the subjective experience.​

I sense a circle forming.

I think it's inevitable. The conscious subject knows itself as conscious subject.

But maybe UM will make it better.
EB

 

[untermensche]

I would also like to get your position balloted.

So, here is my rephrasing of it, to get it down from 168 characters to less than 144 characters:

Consciousness is known subjectively to the conscious organism. The task of science is to discover the objective process generating the subjective experience.​

Personally, I think it's a very good position to have.


EB

I sense a circle forming.

Where?

There is the subjective experience of having a consciousness.

And there are a few things known about the brain.

The object of science is to connect knowledge of the brain, and anything else that might be involved, to the experience of having a consciousness. Science is nowhere near this.

Connect the dots.

That is what understanding means.

 

[fromderinside]

... except what does the state of neuronal structures tell us about consciousness.

It says consciousness is entirely knowledge of the state of specific neuronal structures and of nothing else. Isn't that really something? I think it is.

Neural processes are neurons and associated material (sensors, biochemical processes) acting on external and internal information to an end,
like the continued existence of the being having that information and those processes, the solving of a particular problem, the moving of a limb for advantage or comfort, and the like. I suggest that end is executing actions toward sustaining the being's being fit.

And then I don't want to introduce any suggestion about the function, purpose, usefulness, finality etc., of consciousness, like, say, represent our environment. That's what it does most of the time but even when it doesn't it's still consciousness.

I was trying to evade potential dualist implications but your suggestion would bring them back!

Well, in aggregate, the presumptive state of the being is of it being fit as the result of it being alive so the purpose of this processing of information is to sustain the life of the being possessing presumed fitness gained through evolution as evidenced by it being alive.

If it were what specific neuronal structures are reporting then I'd be on board. I always put 'sample' tap on the state of those structures. I view those taps to be output like subvocalization, visual maps, etc. The state of the structures themselves is relatively unimportant considering it's the state of continued living for what they are processing that is important.

I want only one kind of things. The state of neuronal structures is one. I don't want anything else, like what neuronal structures would be "reporting" or "representing" etc. because this bring back a potential dualist perspective, i.e. material neuronal structures and then something else, i.e. what these structures 'report'. And reporting is rather ambiguous.

Also, by "neuronal structures", I didn't mean the structure of whole complex of neurons, but some part of the brain which would be the conscious part, whatever it is and may be it's only a minute part of the overall structure of the brain, who would know?

Still, I think your 'process' is better than my initial 'state'. So, I rephrase my candidate definition as follows:

Consciousness is knowledge of specific neuronal processes in the human brain.​

EB

I think the mods I made to my previous comments would releave your fear of some sort of dualist paradigm.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Neural processes are neurons and associated material (sensors, biochemical processes) acting on external and internal information to an end,
like the continued existence of the being having that information and those processes, the solving of a particular problem, the moving of a limb for advantage or comfort, and the like. I suggest that end is executing actions toward sustaining the being's being fit.

It's frightfully comical that it should be you to insist on re-introducing something as mysteriously idealistic as a purpose or an end into my effort at a very materialistically oriented definition.

A leg is made of easily identifiable parts, muscles, bones, ligaments and what not. Listing these parts and how they are connected to each other should be good enough to tell us what a leg is. What a leg normally is used for is also very interesting but it will still be a leg if you were to use it on occasion to scratch your head or wipe your bottom (or vice versa). Consciousness as you think of it may be there because we can use it to stay alive and reproduce but lots of people who choose not to stay alive any longer or not to reproduce ever are just as conscious as you are.

Well, in aggregate, the presumptive state of the being is of it being fit as the result of it being alive so the purpose of this processing of information is to sustain the life of the being possessing presumed fitness gained through evolution as evidenced by it being alive.

Well, I guess this shows you take consciousness to be something more than what your own definition suggests. Maybe you think consciousness is not something individual humans have. That it is just a way of describing a global property of the human species, like being gregarious for example.

Me, I take consciousness seriously as something a human being has, on his own, including in very degraded circumstances such as being in a coma, and irrespective of why we got to possess this capability. I possess consciousness.

I think the mods I made to my previous comments would releave your fear of some sort of dualist paradigm.

I think you're not fully aware of the import of the words you use.

The question of the purpose of consciousness can only concern the species as a whole, at least if we think consciousness plays an essential role in the survival of the species. As an individual, you just have consciousness or you don't have it. No question of purpose. And the question was, if you have consciousness, then how would you define it?
EB

 

[fromderinside]

I stepped and you jumped. I used purpose to indicate the reason for a physical process. As far as I can see I refer to consciousness as a state of awareness, a theoretical construct. One can note a process, evolution, has consequences, fitness, and to that relationship functional consequence, purpose of. Consciousness cannot even be imagined as having a purpose since it isn't among those things to which I ascribe function.

As to simplicity of structure, neurons are obviously grouped into lobes and neural structures, like cerebrum, thalamus, pons, and those into such as association cortex, cingulate gyrus, inferior olive,and the like. So they are just as well known, probably better known to physiologists than are legs, arms, etc. And as with legs nervous system structures don't change just because you wipe your bottom. The real difference is that legs can be seen and used by all, including scientists, while nervous systems are known and used by sceicialists (physiologists, anatomists, and neuroscientists). Just because function is a bit harder to get at, requires a few more degrees, and very specialized tools, does not make the NS magic nor it's function alien.

I don't deny that some scientists believe consciousness is like a leg. It is not. It is the processing of information by the nervous system under very special circumstances. So it is no more correct to say that legs serve the function of walking which can be seen as serving the purpose of engine of a being's transportation.

The nervous system of a woman can be described similarly. Neurons function by taking in and processing information to the end generating outputs sustaining life of the being.

In fact In the post to which you refer I mentioned consciousness only once to tie that term to the functions and purpose of neural processing. That is executing processes essential to a being's continued survival. Obviously that purpose is a bit more than what consciousness, as I understand it, provides which is only an awareness of doing those things.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Right...

Well, I just don't understand most of what you say here and I don't want to spend time reading the runes so, we'll go back to the last wording you seemed to agree with:

Consciousness is an arousal state, awareness, motivated to treat self and environmental events. Arousal is the overall level of responsiveness to stimuli.

If you like it, good!

Maybe I can try to proceed with the vote.

If only UM could be explicit as to whether he agrees with my rephrasing of what he said?

Consciousness is known subjectively to the conscious organism. The task of science is to discover the objective process generating the subjective experience.

And, also, I'm a bit disappointed that so few people would or could articulate their view... Is this a retirement home here or what?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

And, DBT, I'd like to include your position:

''Consciousness'' appears to represent the ability of a brain to construct a virtual model of the external world and self, our place within our environment during any given moment of conscious experience. The content of consciousness being composed of a collection of features and abilities, sensory awareness, recognition/ memory function, feelings relating to internal conditions, hunger, thirst, etc, thoughts relating to external conditions with the drive, the will or impulse to act, a set of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours developed over a lifetime of experience.

I propose to reduce it like this:

Consciousness is the brain’s model of the world and self, made of sense awareness, memory, feelings of internal conditions, thoughts about external conditions, and the drive to act adaptatively.​

What do you think?

It's already 165, so shorter would be better.

Thanks.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

First we need to define terms such as the I, and person (which I've bolded in the quote). We can easily come up with some objective definiton of these things, but that still doesn't necessarily explain the subjective experience in scientific terms. I still won't know what you mean when you say something appears to be "red". We may understand why one color appears to be distinct from another. But why is red "red"??

I think what we call the "I" is just a model of the self. That is, a concept that the brain creates in order to understand and adapt to its environment. But it's only a concept. In principle it can't have subjective experience. It can only have such things attributed to it. Perhaps this occurs as a way of explaining the behavior exhibited by other persons it encounters from earliest childhood on. And in learning to identify one's own personhood with these others we imbue the "I" with a kind of first-person awareness. Perhaps conscious experience is a sort of myth in that it's another concept formed from the various ways cultures have found to deal with individual responcibility and the necessity of some sort of soul for which to base accountability (another Platonic form?).

The term "person" is perhaps just a broader more inclusive way to characterize oneself and others and so includes more general attributes such as physical particulars and even one's associations, values, and possessions (when taken in a legal sense). Still, these also become incorporated into one's self image and have their particular influence over how the brain shapes the "I".

I don't think what you say here qualifies as a definition of consciousness but we can try it with this little bit here that I reworded somewhat:

Consciousness is perhaps just a concept formed to deal with individual responsibility.​

What do you think? Can you improve?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

And for good measure, I'll include a trimmed-down version of Koch's view, without attribution:

Consciousness is a notoriously ineffable and ethereal stuff that can’t even be rigorously defined, let alone measured.​

EB

From:

It is a little out of date, but Dr. Koch still thought in 2009 at least that a good definition of consciousness remained elusive: "But how can consciousness—the notorious ineffable and ethereal stuff that can’t even be rigorously defined—be measured?" and "Instead of arguing with people about whether or not they are conscious of grammatical rules or when these rules are violated, wagering means that we can study consciousness without having an agreed-on formal definition of consciousness." <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/understanding-consciousness-measure-more-argue-less/>
Peez

 

[Speakpigeon]

And that's about it.

So, I'll wait for DBT, UM and Treedbear to manifest themselves and I'll try to proceed with a vote.

Those who would still want to contribute a position should act now.

Thanks.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

First we need to define terms such as the I, and person (which I've bolded in the quote). We can easily come up with some objective definiton of these things, but that still doesn't necessarily explain the subjective experience in scientific terms. I still won't know what you mean when you say something appears to be "red". We may understand why one color appears to be distinct from another. But why is red "red"??

I think what we call the "I" is just a model of the self. That is, a concept that the brain creates in order to understand and adapt to its environment. But it's only a concept. In principle it can't have subjective experience. It can only have such things attributed to it. Perhaps this occurs as a way of explaining the behavior exhibited by other persons it encounters from earliest childhood on. And in learning to identify one's own personhood with these others we imbue the "I" with a kind of first-person awareness. Perhaps conscious experience is a sort of myth in that it's another concept formed from the various ways cultures have found to deal with individual responcibility and the necessity of some sort of soul for which to base accountability (another Platonic form?).

The term "person" is perhaps just a broader more inclusive way to characterize oneself and others and so includes more general attributes such as physical particulars and even one's associations, values, and possessions (when taken in a legal sense). Still, these also become incorporated into one's self image and have their particular influence over how the brain shapes the "I".

I don't think what you say here qualifies as a definition of consciousness but we can try it with this little bit here that I reworded somewhat:

Consciousness is perhaps just a concept formed to deal with individual responsibility.​

What do you think? Can you improve?
EB

Thanks for waiting.
I'd like to include that idea:
"Consciousness is perhaps just a concept formed to deal with individual responsibility."
But ... I need to fall back on some basic definitions. It is certainly conceptual in nature and as such is one of the attributes of the model of self that each of us forms over a lifetime. But consciousness should really just mean the state of being conscious; like fullness is the state of being full. It's not a thing in itself. I define conscious to mean the awareness of one thing with respect to another. That is, there needs to be some context. I define awareness as something more rudimentary and strictly speaking preconscious (or subconscious). Awareness is simply a state of arousal based on particular perceptions. And perceptions are combinations of sensory inputs. A computer can easily be made to sense, perceive, and be aware things in its environment. With a bit more effort it can be made to be conscious of the relationships that exist between two or more things. In this way it might also be made to create models and calculate future outcome probabilities.

But consciousness has come to mean more than that when associated with human beings. It seems to indicate the specific case of an awareness of the self in relation to something other. And since the self is the thing the brain tends to be most intensely and intimately aware of it's reasonable to think that a significant portion of our awareness involves the self. At least the part that we refer to as the conscious self. It seems reasonable to think that many animals also have an image of the self because it needs to calculate its relationship to various obstacles it encounters. And social animals probably acquire some knowledge of what they are by learning it from their comrades. More complex brains provide more adaptability and more independence, and therefore increasing responsibility for decisions. So yes, consciousness seems to be an advantage in humans as a way to provide the individual responsibility necessary for communal interactions. That's as far as I get with my objective "scientific" perspective. I don't know if it gets any closer to the subjective experience. And it too should be within the capability of computers.

What I really think is that it is indeed a category error in that it's built into our system of knowledge to understand the world (including our selves and others) as inherently heirarchycal in nature, rather than relational. We ignore the fact that things are defined in terms of other things. This leads to our need to imbue the self with the subjective experience in order to make it the focal point of our existence. So maybe the best definition is that:

Consciousness is a misinterpretation of the relationship of the self to the external world in order to conform to a hierarchycal epistemology of reality.​

 

[DBT]

And that's about it.

So, I'll wait for DBT, UM and Treedbear to manifest themselves and I'll try to proceed with a vote.

Those who would still want to contribute a position should act now.

Thanks.
EB

Nothing fancy. To be conscious is to experience an awareness of the world and ones position in it. To recognize objects and their relationships, (which may or may not include self awareness) by means of a subjective mental representation being generated by a functional brain.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Thanks for waiting.
I'd like to include that idea:
"Consciousness is perhaps just a concept formed to deal with individual responsibility."
But ... I need to fall back on some basic definitions. It is certainly conceptual in nature and as such is one of the attributes of the model of self that each of us forms over a lifetime. But consciousness should really just mean the state of being conscious; like fullness is the state of being full. It's not a thing in itself.

Thanks for the bit of 'thinking aloud' and I can try to comment on the various ideas you express here just in case it can help.

I think that 'conceptual in nature' implies that it's just a concept, i.e. an idea in our mind, and one which is abstract, i.e. definitely not a sensation, a perception etc. It's more akin to ideas such as the concepts of even numbers and parliamentary democracy. And so not a 'thing' in itself, but a description, a model, of some abstract property of some actual thing, such as perhaps our brain or our mind.

I define conscious to mean the awareness of one thing with respect to another. That is, there needs to be some context. I define awareness as something more rudimentary and strictly speaking preconscious (or subconscious).

To avoid any contradiction here, I think that your 'consciousness means awareness' really means that consciousness implies and requires some form of awareness but it is not just an awareness. There's something else.

Awareness is simply a state of arousal based on particular perceptions. And perceptions are combinations of sensory inputs. A computer can easily be made to sense, perceive, and be aware things in its environment.

Different people on this board use the word 'awareness' in a completely materialistic way. I accept that it can be used in this sense, essentially meaning that you possess information about some other thing, but sometimes it can also be used as a synonym for consciousness, which may or may not include subjective experience! So, I think it's somewhat ambiguous. And I'm not sure why you all seem to prefer 'awareness' to 'having information about'. Your choice.

With a bit more effort it can be made to be conscious of the relationships that exist between two or more things. In this way it might also be made to create models and calculate future outcome probabilities.

So, here you seem to equate consciousness to awareness (or having information about) completed with the capability of building models of the world and make predictions about it. So, basically, we have your definition, no?

But consciousness has come to mean more than that when associated with human beings. It seems to indicate the specific case of an awareness of the self in relation to something other. And since the self is the thing the brain tends to be most intensely and intimately aware of it's reasonable to think that a significant portion of our awareness involves the self. At least the part that we refer to as the conscious self. It seems reasonable to think that many animals also have an image of the self because it needs to calculate its relationship to various obstacles it encounters. And social animals probably acquire some knowledge of what they are by learning it from their comrades. More complex brains provide more adaptability and more independence, and therefore increasing responsibility for decisions. So yes, consciousness seems to be an advantage in humans as a way to provide the individual responsibility necessary for communal interactions. That's as far as I get with my objective "scientific" perspective.

Obviously the self is an important part of the question but I don't see why it would be more that just an aspect of what you have already identified, certainly an aspect which is privileged in our everyday choices and decisions but not different in nature from our consciousness of the rest of the world. It seems to be basically a functional distinction between different clusters of information.

I don't know if it gets any closer to the subjective experience.

Well, clearly, you're staying clear of that entirely.

I guess you'll be aware that it's precisely the point UM has been making here about science, I think.

So, should we deny subjective experience exists at all? Or just accept we're unable of investigating subjective experience in a scientific way, at least for now?

And it too should be within the capability of computers. What I really think is that it is indeed a category error in that it's built into our system of knowledge to understand the world (including our selves and others) as inherently heirarchycal in nature, rather than relational. We ignore the fact that things are defined in terms of other things. This leads to our need to imbue the self with the subjective experience in order to make it the focal point of our existence.

Ok, I disagree but at least you're being very clear that subjective experience doesn't exist as such, that it's just a part of the model of the self our consciousness maintains.

So maybe the best definition is that:

Consciousness is a misinterpretation of the relationship of the self to the external world in order to conform to a hierarchycal epistemology of reality.​

???

I think you are being very awkward here.

Surely, we would expect you to start with the idea of consciousness as an awareness (or 'the possession of information about something'?), and then the capability of building models of the world and making predictions, and finally the fact that this model normally include a model of the self. And then, I don't really understand why this bit would be a "misinterpretation". Even if the model of the self is somehow privileged in an epistemological hierarchy, how would that be a 'misinterpretation'? It's just the way the model works.

This suggests to me that you're trying to explain away the bit about subjective experience, essentially as a sort of bias built into one's model of the world.

I'm not sure how anybody could believe that but it's your choice here.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

And that's about it.

So, I'll wait for DBT, UM and Treedbear to manifest themselves and I'll try to proceed with a vote.

Those who would still want to contribute a position should act now.

Thanks.
EB

Nothing fancy. To be conscious is to experience an awareness of the world and ones position in it. To recognize objects and their relationships, (which may or may not include self awareness) by means of a subjective mental representation being generated by a functional brain.

Alright.

Maybe you could explain why 'awareness' is your default word here?

Why not talk of 'information'? The word 'awareness', and perhaps even more so the phrase "to experience an awareness", is somewhat ambiguous in that it can suggest subjective experience, which presumably you would rather interpret entirely in terms of a functional and informational model of the world. So why not consciousness as an informational and functional model of the world, including or not the self as the part of the model used to represent the organism itself?
EB

 

[Treedbear]

...
Thanks for waiting.
I'd like to include that idea:
"Consciousness is perhaps just a concept formed to deal with individual responsibility."
But ... I need to fall back on some basic definitions. It is certainly conceptual in nature and as such is one of the attributes of the model of self that each of us forms over a lifetime. But consciousness should really just mean the state of being conscious; like fullness is the state of being full. It's not a thing in itself.

Thanks for the bit of 'thinking aloud' and I can try to comment on the various ideas you express here just in case it can help.

What, may I ask, are you implying with 'thinking aloud'? Are you also thinking aloud or is it just me? You invited me to comment on your proposal and I gave a well considered reply.

I think that 'conceptual in nature' implies that it's just a concept, i.e. an idea in our mind, and one which is abstract, i.e. definitely not a sensation, a perception etc. It's more akin to ideas such as the concepts of even numbers and parliamentary democracy. And so not a 'thing' in itself, but a description, a model, of some abstract property of some actual thing, such as perhaps our brain or our mind.

Well yeah, That's what I said. Should not require any clarification.

To avoid any contradiction here, I think that your 'consciousness means awareness' really means that consciousness implies and requires some form of awareness but it is not just an awareness. There's something else.

Agreed. That's why I went on to say:

... the awareness of one thing with respect to another. That is, there needs to be some context.

There is an active process going on between the two concepts (or models) in how they compare and contrast and in any other ways they might relate to each other. Being conscious of means to be in that state.

Awareness is simply a state of arousal based on particular perceptions. And perceptions are combinations of sensory inputs. A computer can easily be made to sense, perceive, and be aware things in its environment.

Different people on this board use the word 'awareness' in a completely materialistic way. I accept that it can be used in this sense, essentially meaning that you possess information about some other thing, but sometimes it can also be used as a synonym for consciousness, which may or may not include subjective experience! So, I think it's somewhat ambiguous. And I'm not sure why you all seem to prefer 'awareness' to 'having information about'. Your choice.

Most of the time I spend with philosophy is in sorting out the contradictions in the words people use to describe things and eliminate the ambiguities. At least in my own mind. It's seems to me it's the major reason people are confused in their own minds and in these discussions. Things like "meaning" and "purpose". They seem to get used interchangeably. But no two words mean the same thing in my book. That's why I took the effort to explain how they differ. The brain can perceive something without being aware of it, and be aware of something without being conscious of (i.e.; consciously aware of). "Have information about" is too generic. Where have you seen that used in discussing brain function?

With a bit more effort it can be made to be conscious of the relationships that exist between two or more things. In this way it might also be made to create models and calculate future outcome probabilities.

So, here you seem to equate consciousness to awareness (or having information about) completed with the capability of building models of the world and make predictions about it. So, basically, we have your definition, no?

But consciousness has come to mean more than that when associated with human beings. It seems to indicate the specific case of an awareness of the self in relation to something other. And since the self is the thing the brain tends to be most intensely and intimately aware of it's reasonable to think that a significant portion of our awareness involves the self. At least the part that we refer to as the conscious self. It seems reasonable to think that many animals also have an image of the self because it needs to calculate its relationship to various obstacles it encounters. And social animals probably acquire some knowledge of what they are by learning it from their comrades. More complex brains provide more adaptability and more independence, and therefore increasing responsibility for decisions. So yes, consciousness seems to be an advantage in humans as a way to provide the individual responsibility necessary for communal interactions. That's as far as I get with my objective "scientific" perspective.

Obviously the self is an important part of the question but I don't see why it would be more that just an aspect of what you have already identified, certainly an aspect which is privileged in our everyday choices and decisions but not different in nature from our consciousness of the rest of the world. It seems to be basically a functional distinction between different clusters of information.

It was all as a way of addressing your suggestion that I might want to define consciousness as means of fostering responsibility in social groups. Sorry if it was an inconvenient diversion.

I don't know if it gets any closer to the subjective experience.

Well, clearly, you're staying clear of that entirely.

I guess you'll be aware that it's precisely the point UM has been making here about science, I think.

So, should we deny subjective experience exists at all? Or just accept we're unable of investigating subjective experience in a scientific way, at least for now?

And it too should be within the capability of computers. What I really think is that it is indeed a category error in that it's built into our system of knowledge to understand the world (including our selves and others) as inherently heirarchycal in nature, rather than relational. We ignore the fact that things are defined in terms of other things. This leads to our need to imbue the self with the subjective experience in order to make it the focal point of our existence.

Ok, I disagree but at least you're being very clear that subjective experience doesn't exist as such, that it's just a part of the model of the self our consciousness maintains.

So maybe the best definition is that:

Consciousness is a misinterpretation of the relationship of the self to the external world in order to conform to a hierarchycal epistemology of reality.​

???

I'm sorry again, but I have to agree with unter that the only problem in understanding consciousness is "the hard problem" of the subjective experience. The rest is neurobiology and way too specialized to entertain outside of a scientific journal. I will never be able to explain how the brain produces awarenesses or perceptions, or even sensations; let alone creating models. But I still don't see it ever explaining the hard problem. That's why I had to add the last definition.

If you really want something that summarizes the easy part it might say:

Consciousness is the brain's awareness of something perceived in its environment in relation to the model of the self, and involves the adaptation of one or both for the purpose of minimizing the conflicts that arise between them.​

I think you are being very awkward here.

Surely, we would expect you to start with the idea of consciousness as an awareness (or 'the possession of information about something'?), and then the capability of building models of the world and making predictions, and finally the fact that this model normally include a model of the self. And then, I don't really understand why this bit would be a "misinterpretation". Even if the model of the self is somehow privileged in an epistemological hierarchy, how would that be a 'misinterpretation'? It's just the way the model works.

This suggests to me that you're trying to explain away the bit about subjective experience, essentially as a sort of bias built into one's model of the world.

I'm not sure how anybody could believe that but it's your choice here.
EB

It's like asking why anyone would want to accept the theory of relativity when Newtonian mechanics has been working fine for hundreds of years. It works, up to a point. But then you run into new situations where contradictions arise and out comes the dualism. In this case the problem has extremely fundamental roots going back to Plato and his theory of the Ideal Forms, in that it has become the structural basis for our system of understanding nature and the human condition. But it has also given rise to monotheism and bigotry over the centuries and it leads to all manner of outlandish theories. But you are correct that it's just the way the model works.