I disagree (you could always attempt to prove me wrong with an actual quote).
Or you could check for yourself.
So you can't provide a quote but don't have the intellectual honesty to admit you're mistaken.
I'm annoyed that you wasted my time for 2 weeks with your evasions.
I gave you a post number where I quoted from the article ''cold comfort in compatibilism'' - are you too tired to make the effort? Do I have point to the very post that you responded to?
Looks like I need to spoon feed:
From post #727
Cold comfort in Compatibalism;
''How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms. Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.''
Given that we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X.....How
is it supposed to work?''
What I said in post# 736;
The argument from semantics is shallow and flawed. To say 'set a bird free' describes relative conditions, superficial appearance, the prior state of the birds confinement compared to being set free from its cage.
The bird itself had no choice in its confinement in the first instance, nor subsequently being released into the wild. Whatever happened to the bird was determined by its environment, its captors and the world at large. The bird had no choice in what happened to it.
It was not a matter of decision making in terms of free will.
When the term free will is used in common language, the underlying states and conditions, environment,state of the mind/brain, etc, that put someone into a givven situation, are not generally considered, making it a mere figure of speech.
The nature of the decision making process is not being considered''
Post #738:
The Punch and Judy Puppet show.
The Puppets (or marionettes) are manipulated by a Puppeteer hidden behind the screen working the strings that bring his Puppets into action.
Judy, being annoyed by Punch's insensitive comments has a habit of hitting punch over the head with a stick, which she does quite often: Judy is free to hit Punch. Punch, apparently tired of getting constantly hit, grabs Judy and ties her up: Judy is no longer free to hit Punch.
Punch, apparently feeling sorry for Judy's plight, free's Judy from her ropes, whereupon Judy is freed and able to renew her attack on Punch with even greater vigour.
As the word ''free'' is commonly used, within the context of this little deterministic world of the Puppeteer and his stage play, the puppets may be said to freely perform actions upon stage. The Puppeter being the determinant and motor function of their actions.
Now apply this principle to the world at large, where the 'Puppeteer' is Determinism - ''when, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''
Again, without the possibility to choose otherwise in any given instance in time, where lies freedom of will?''
Post#755;
Word usage alone does not establish the reality of the thing in question.
God is love.
Love exists.
God is real.
Post #768
''Freedom of action is not free will for all the given reasons.
Random quantum events do not allow freedom of will for all the given reasons.
Absence of coercion does not equate to free will for all the given reasons.
The absence of external constraints does not equate to free will for all the given reasons.''
Post#770;
Why Compatibilism Is Mistaken.
here are some major difficulties in compatibilism, which I think damage it irreparably.
Take Hobbes’ claim, largely accepted by Hume, that freedom is to act at will while coercion is to be compelled to act by others. This does not give us a sure reason to choose this ‘freedom’.
Imagine that you were a free-floating spirit, equal to God in your capacity to choose. God gives you the unwelcome news that shortly you are to be placed on Earth, and that you will be endowed with a range of fundamental passions, chosen entirely at the caprice of God. Would you choose to be free, in Hobbes’sense of acting at will, or might you consent to being coerced?
It is very far from clear that you would automatically choose to be free. Much would depend on the nature of the coercion. If you did not know what your fundamental desires were going to be, you might well decide to hedge your bets and back the field. It might be far better to be coerced by others (perhaps most people are good) than to be free to pursue un-chosen but possibly dubious desires. A free-floating ethically-minded spirit that feared an imminent endowment of psychopathic desires would certainly wish for an alert constabulary and swift incarceration: this spirit would wish to be coerced.
This thought experiment makes it clear why coercion by others might be morally preferable to being caused to act upon one’s desires. It seems very odd, though, that we might have good reasons to choose what compatibilists define as coercion, and reject what they claim to be freedom.
Nor is it obvious that if we were on Earth with a range of un-chosen passions, we would choose to have the intellectual ability which Dennett thinks characterises human freedom, as opposed to the mindless behaviour of the Sphex wasp for instance. Imagine that, rather than for laying eggs, one had a disposition for random acts of extreme violence. Is one better off by having the wit to see that the .357 Magnum is overrated and that the 9mm is similarly effective, but with more shots? If one had the murderous impulses of an Eichmann or a Himmler, is one’s situation necessarily improved by being able to flexibly respond to the logistical problems of machine-gunning large numbers of people? Is the murderous intelligence involved in industrialising genocide ever a gain? Similarly, if we knew that we were going to have passions that we have not chosen, is it obvious that we would ask for the ability to pursue these passions flexibly and imaginatively? Perhaps if we knew that we were to have unknown passions and be held responsible for our actions, we would choose to be incompetent. Perhaps the priority would be first to do no harm: one could not risk being good at being bad.
It is not obvious then that we would choose to be caused by our own desires rather than coerced by others; and nor is it obvious that we would choose to be able to successfully pursue our desires if we did not know what those desires were to be.
As to Dennett’s claim that the planet has evolved ‘evitability’, it seems obvious that if strict determinism is true then human evolution is also one event after another, and the destruction of asteroids by humans follows inevitably from cause and effect, given the first composition of the universe. If we destroy an asteroid, for the strict determinist it was inevitable that we would. Indeed it is quite conceivable that humans are minor characters in a game played by the gods, involving striking planets with asteroids. Perhaps one of the moves in the game is to seed a target planet with humans to prevent your opponent successfully striking it with his asteroid. It is hard to think of an absolute reason why determinism might not be our lot. There seems to be no meaningful distinction to be drawn between what happens and what might have happened, on which we can hang some third theory of human existence to sit alongside determinism and libertarianism.
It seems that we are either caused, and our actions are caused events, or we are free. The middle, compatibilism, is excluded''
Post#793
''In other words, there is no definition of free will that is not seriously flawed, not compatibilism, not the 'ability to have chosen otherwise,' not 'that's how words are used/semantics,' not the ability to 'select from a set of realizable options,' not 'to act without external constraints' etc. etc.''
There is more, but this is sufficient. And once again: I was not dealing with compatibilism alone, but all definitions, common usage, semantics, etc....