Free Will And Free Choice

[Marvin Edwards]

To me free will and free choice are two different things.

You go to buy a car and you choose one or another. It is a free choice mending no direct coercion.

Free will implies a deeper state of making completely unconditioned choices. I do not think it exists.

When you choose a car you are conditioned by advertising and what others have. You imagine what the car will make you look like.

We are all conditioned starting in the womb. There is genetic conditioning and characteristics.

There is a point at which sex drives over rides choice.

The link between them is that we often choose what we will do. For example, "Will I buy an electric car or will I buy a hybrid?" You are choosing what you will do. Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will".

I think you're right in that we are all influenced in our choices. We are influenced by the issue of climate change to seek a car that burns less gasoline. Still, if the hybrid were too expensive, we might decide instead to buy another gasoline vehicle, at least for now. The influence popular issues is not enough to "condition" our choice to the point where it compromises our free will.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I find the entire notion of free will to be incoherent. What is supposed to be making this "choice"? The brain is a complicated system to be sure but it is inherently responsive - it does nothing "on its own" but is bound to respond to external stimuli somehow, as is the function of any brain in any vertebrate organism. There is no apparatus for creating thoughts or opinions independent of one's surroundings. Derived, adapted, inferrred, or delayed, but never entirely invented. So by what definition of "free" could this process ever be defined?

Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence. The brain of intelligent species organizes sensory data into a model of reality consisting of things like objects and events. People use that tool to imagine new things, like the Wright brothers imagining an airplane.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

A little while ago I started a thread called "Compatibilism: What's That About?"

 

[WAB]

A little while ago I started a thread called "Compatibilism: What's That About?"

Where may we find it, Marvin?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Select Forum, then Other Philosophical Discussions.

 

[WAB]

Select Forum, then Other Philosophical Discussions.

D'oh!

I thought you meant "a little while ago" as in, like a couple years. I did a search for that thread title.

Welcome to the boards, Marvin. I trust you will fit in nicely.

I am the resident Touchstone, the merrie foole, and the town drunk, all in one neat little package.

 

[DBT]

I find the entire notion of free will to be incoherent. What is supposed to be making this "choice"? The brain is a complicated system to be sure but it is inherently responsive - it does nothing "on its own" but is bound to respond to external stimuli somehow, as is the function of any brain in any vertebrate organism. There is no apparatus for creating thoughts or opinions independent of one's surroundings. Derived, adapted, inferrred, or delayed, but never entirely invented. So by what definition of "free" could this process ever be defined?

Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence. The brain of intelligent species organizes sensory data into a model of reality consisting of things like objects and events. People use that tool to imagine new things, like the Wright brothers imagining an airplane.

That is common usage. The issue of free will goes deeper, to the means by which decisions are made and actions are taken,: to the neural mechanisms of decision making and motor action.

Processes that precede conscious awareness or conscious will.

Processes that shape and form our thoughts and actions, including our will.

Consequently, will is not free of the underlying elements that determine its expression.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

That is common usage. The issue of free will goes deeper, to the means by which decisions are made and actions are taken,: to the neural mechanisms of decision making and motor action.

Processes that precede conscious awareness or conscious will.

Processes that shape and form our thoughts and actions, including our will.

Consequently, will is not free of the underlying elements that determine its expression.

Luckily, my decisions do not need to be independent of those processes in order to be my decisions. I am, myself, a process running upon the neural infrastructure. What those processes have decided, I have decided.

Free will does not require freedom from causation. Free will does not require freedom from myself. Free will only requires that my choosing was free of coercion and undue influence.

 

[DBT]

That is common usage. The issue of free will goes deeper, to the means by which decisions are made and actions are taken,: to the neural mechanisms of decision making and motor action.

Processes that precede conscious awareness or conscious will.

Processes that shape and form our thoughts and actions, including our will.

Consequently, will is not free of the underlying elements that determine its expression.

Luckily, my decisions do not need to be independent of those processes in order to be my decisions. I am, myself, a process running upon the neural infrastructure. What those processes have decided, I have decided.

Free will does not require freedom from causation. Free will does not require freedom from myself. Free will only requires that my choosing was free of coercion and undue influence.

What exactly do you mean by "my decisions?"

 

[Marvin Edwards]

That is common usage. The issue of free will goes deeper, to the means by which decisions are made and actions are taken,: to the neural mechanisms of decision making and motor action.

Processes that precede conscious awareness or conscious will.

Processes that shape and form our thoughts and actions, including our will.

Consequently, will is not free of the underlying elements that determine its expression.

Luckily, my decisions do not need to be independent of those processes in order to be my decisions. I am, myself, a process running upon the neural infrastructure. What those processes have decided, I have decided.

Free will does not require freedom from causation. Free will does not require freedom from myself. Free will only requires that my choosing was free of coercion and undue influence.

What exactly do you mean by "my decisions?"

I mean that I performed the choosing operation myself. The Big Bang did not make the choice. Causal necessity did not make the choice. Physics did not make the choice. The prior causes of me did not make the choice. I made the choice myself. The physical operation of choosing was performed by me.

 

[WAB]

NM - thought better of it and deleted the post that was here.

Will try to get my thoughts in order again...later.

 

[DBT]

What exactly do you mean by "my decisions?"

I mean that I performed the choosing operation myself. The Big Bang did not make the choice. Causal necessity did not make the choice. Physics did not make the choice. The prior causes of me did not make the choice. I made the choice myself. The physical operation of choosing was performed by me.

I'm not clear on what you mean. Are you saying that this 'I'' who performs the 'choosing operation' is somehow conscious controller of the brain?

That there is an agent that's somehow independent of the brain, an agent who controls what the brain does?

 

[Bomb#20]

Maybe Bomb#20 and/or Angra Mainyu could be invited to lend a hand. Or Copernicus? I've no idea where they stand on compatibilism, but I warrant their input would be valuable.

Compatibilism seems correct to me, but I doubt if anyone unconvinced by Hume would be convinced by any argument I could make. Hume was pretty good at this.

I cannot deny determinism

It's just quantum randomness that resulted in your neurons being unable to deny determinism.

If we can put any kind of a time line on the universe, like this 13.7 billion years-old number, then how do we reconcile that with the notion that the universe has existed eternally, without beginning?

That's a very common example of mistaking the map for the territory.

To say the universe has existed eternally without beginning is simply to say that for every event there were earlier events. If that's true, that's a fact of the territory we call "time" which puts no constraint on how we humans choose to label those events with numbers -- for the numbering is a property of our map, not a property of the territory. Consider an infinite sequence of prior events trailing into the past, events A, B, C, D, etc. I.e., event A was the most recent in the sequence, and B preceded A, and C preceded B, and so on. We can map out those events in time, if we choose, by calling event A "T=1" and calling B "T = 0" and calling C "T = -1" and calling D "T = -2" and so on. Then our mathematical model will say the universe is infinitely old. Alternately, we can map out time, if we choose, by calling that same event A "T=1" and calling B "T = 0.1" and calling C "T = 0.001" and calling D "T = 0.0001" and so on. Then our mathematical model will say the universe is only finitely old, with all those infinitely many events crammed into the range 0 < T <= 1. But there's no contradiction to reconcile here any more than there's a contradiction between water freezing at 0 Celsius and 273 Kelvin and 32 Fahrenheit. All that's different is the names. That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

Once more into the abyss, dear friends!

Near the top of windy Mt. Evans in Colorado, the visitor center has an outhouse bolted onto the steeply sloped bare rock, for there's no soil into which a pit could have been dug. The consequences are predetermined, as a woman who has used that outhouse informs me:

If you pee into the abyss, the abyss will pee back into you.​

 

[Marvin Edwards]

What exactly do you mean by "my decisions?"

I mean that I performed the choosing operation myself. The Big Bang did not make the choice. Causal necessity did not make the choice. Physics did not make the choice. The prior causes of me did not make the choice. I made the choice myself. The physical operation of choosing was performed by me.

I'm not clear on what you mean. Are you saying that this 'I'' who performs the 'choosing operation' is somehow conscious controller of the brain?

That there is an agent that's somehow independent of the brain, an agent who controls what the brain does?

I am saying as David Eagleman does, that "we are our brains". It is not necessary for me to control my brain in order to control other things, I only need to BE my brain. There is no such thing as "freedom from oneself". We are who we are. And our brain is the most significant part of who and what we are. What our brain decides, we have decided. Otherwise, you get dualism.

 

[WAB]

Compatibilism seems correct to me, but I doubt if anyone unconvinced by Hume would be convinced by any argument I could make. Hume was pretty good at this.

I cannot deny determinism

It's just quantum randomness that resulted in your neurons being unable to deny determinism.

If we can put any kind of a time line on the universe, like this 13.7 billion years-old number, then how do we reconcile that with the notion that the universe has existed eternally, without beginning?

That's a very common example of mistaking the map for the territory.

To say the universe has existed eternally without beginning is simply to say that for every event there were earlier events. If that's true, that's a fact of the territory we call "time" which puts no constraint on how we humans choose to label those events with numbers -- for the numbering is a property of our map, not a property of the territory. Consider an infinite sequence of prior events trailing into the past, events A, B, C, D, etc. I.e., event A was the most recent in the sequence, and B preceded A, and C preceded B, and so on. We can map out those events in time, if we choose, by calling event A "T=1" and calling B "T = 0" and calling C "T = -1" and calling D "T = -2" and so on. Then our mathematical model will say the universe is infinitely old. Alternately, we can map out time, if we choose, by calling that same event A "T=1" and calling B "T = 0.1" and calling C "T = 0.001" and calling D "T = 0.0001" and so on. Then our mathematical model will say the universe is only finitely old, with all those infinitely many events crammed into the range 0 < T <= 1. But there's no contradiction to reconcile here any more than there's a contradiction between water freezing at 0 Celsius and 273 Kelvin and 32 Fahrenheit. All that's different is the names. That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

Once more into the abyss, dear friends!

Near the top of windy Mt. Evans in Colorado, the visitor center has an outhouse bolted onto the steeply sloped bare rock, for there's no soil into which a pit could have been dug. The consequences are predetermined, as a woman who has used that outhouse informs me:

If you pee into the abyss, the abyss will pee back into you.​

Thank you Bomb#20! I was hoping you might drop in.

Re: Hume: I have no beef with Hume with respect to compatibilism. The reason I think Reid "leveled Hume and Berkeley flat" was because of Reid's refutation of Berkeley's Idealism and various, other aspects of Hume's thought. I also think Reid, though I don't agree with his theism, or all aspects of his "common sense" approach" (though I do like a lot of it), was funny as hell! I have several posts at TFT praising Reid for his humour.

I accept your explanation of my trouble with eternity/versus age of the universe. I can never wrap my head around that, despite your explanation. Like I always say, I am a numbnuts.

Thanks for dropping by. Now we need fast, Speakpigeon, Angra Mainyu, and maybe Copernicus to lend assistance.

Although I think Marvin has things well in hand.

Once more into the ...er... the bleach, dear Nirvana fans!

 

[DBT]

I'm not clear on what you mean. Are you saying that this 'I'' who performs the 'choosing operation' is somehow conscious controller of the brain?

That there is an agent that's somehow independent of the brain, an agent who controls what the brain does?

I am saying as David Eagleman does, that "we are our brains". It is not necessary for me to control my brain in order to control other things, I only need to BE my brain. There is no such thing as "freedom from oneself". We are who we are. And our brain is the most significant part of who and what we are. What our brain decides, we have decided. Otherwise, you get dualism.

Ok, then you need to link 'free will' to the state and function of the system.

A physical system that functions according to architecture is not a matter of its Will, be it conscious or unconcious

That World works according to its own principles does not equal free will. The brain functions according to its architecure, not its will.

To say a brain making decisions without coercion is an instance of free will is asserting one's own terms upon a system that does not function on the principle of will, be it conscious or unconscious.

That the world functions unempeded does not equal free will.
That the brain may function unempeded (absence of coersion) does not equal free will.

Besides that, without regulative control and actual alternatives (not possible in a determined system) there is no actual choice, the course taken is determined and any reference to ones 'choice' is an illusion borne of insufficient information: one is not aware of the absence of realizable options.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I'm not clear on what you mean. Are you saying that this 'I'' who performs the 'choosing operation' is somehow conscious controller of the brain?

That there is an agent that's somehow independent of the brain, an agent who controls what the brain does?

I am saying as David Eagleman does, that "we are our brains". It is not necessary for me to control my brain in order to control other things, I only need to BE my brain. There is no such thing as "freedom from oneself". We are who we are. And our brain is the most significant part of who and what we are. What our brain decides, we have decided. Otherwise, you get dualism.

Ok, then you need to link 'free will' to the state and function of the system.

A physical system that functions according to architecture is not a matter of its Will, be it conscious or unconcious

That World works according to its own principles does not equal free will. The brain functions according to its architecure, not its will.

To say a brain making decisions without coercion is an instance of free will is asserting one's own terms upon a system that does not function on the principle of will, be it conscious or unconscious.

That the world functions unempeded does not equal free will.
That the brain may function unempeded (absence of coersion) does not equal free will.

Besides that, without regulative control and actual alternatives (not possible in a determined system) there is no actual choice, the course taken is determined and any reference to ones 'choice' is an illusion borne of insufficient information: one is not aware of the absence of realizable options.

"Free will" as I am using it, refers to a person deciding for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. The brain is the origin of these notions (and all notions, for that matter). So, these notions, by your description, would be the necessary result of one brain's architecture interacting with other brains according to their architecture.

Possibilities (alternatives) are causally necessary notions that the brain created to deal with practical matters in the context of uncertainty. Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. For example, we cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But the notion of possibility is essential, because we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge.

Within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we imagine. Ironically, we get to choose what becomes inevitable.

 

[DBT]

Ok, then you need to link 'free will' to the state and function of the system.

A physical system that functions according to architecture is not a matter of its Will, be it conscious or unconcious

That World works according to its own principles does not equal free will. The brain functions according to its architecure, not its will.

To say a brain making decisions without coercion is an instance of free will is asserting one's own terms upon a system that does not function on the principle of will, be it conscious or unconscious.

That the world functions unempeded does not equal free will.
That the brain may function unempeded (absence of coersion) does not equal free will.

Besides that, without regulative control and actual alternatives (not possible in a determined system) there is no actual choice, the course taken is determined and any reference to ones 'choice' is an illusion borne of insufficient information: one is not aware of the absence of realizable options.

"Free will" as I am using it, refers to a person deciding for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. The brain is the origin of these notions (and all notions, for that matter). So, these notions, by your description, would be the necessary result of one brain's architecture interacting with other brains according to their architecture.

Possibilities (alternatives) are causally necessary notions that the brain created to deal with practical matters in the context of uncertainty. Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. For example, we cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But the notion of possibility is essential, because we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge.

Within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we imagine. Ironically, we get to choose what becomes inevitable.

Yet within a determined system, there is no actual deciding. There being no possibility of an alternative action in any given instance in time, the result is inevitable and our reference to a decision being made refers to surface appearance....the world progressing on the principle of the specified way things are at a time t and the way things go thereafter being fixed as a matter of natural law.

1- If determinism allows multiple options to be realized by an agent, as a matter of choice, why call it determinism?

2- If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world proceeds along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?

3- If 'freedom' does not require a means for the selection an option from set of realizable alternatives, what is freedom?

4 - Without regulative control or realizable options, why call it free will?

 

[WAB]

Just flying by to drop a quote from a much-neglected philosopher, which is relevant to the discussion of free will & free choice:

And, if we have any evidence that the wisdom which formed the plan is in the man, we have the very same evidence, that the power which executed it is in him also. - Thomas Reid

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Ok, then you need to link 'free will' to the state and function of the system.

A physical system that functions according to architecture is not a matter of its Will, be it conscious or unconcious

That World works according to its own principles does not equal free will. The brain functions according to its architecure, not its will.

To say a brain making decisions without coercion is an instance of free will is asserting one's own terms upon a system that does not function on the principle of will, be it conscious or unconscious.

That the world functions unempeded does not equal free will.
That the brain may function unempeded (absence of coersion) does not equal free will.

Besides that, without regulative control and actual alternatives (not possible in a determined system) there is no actual choice, the course taken is determined and any reference to ones 'choice' is an illusion borne of insufficient information: one is not aware of the absence of realizable options.

"Free will" as I am using it, refers to a person deciding for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. The brain is the origin of these notions (and all notions, for that matter). So, these notions, by your description, would be the necessary result of one brain's architecture interacting with other brains according to their architecture.

Possibilities (alternatives) are causally necessary notions that the brain created to deal with practical matters in the context of uncertainty. Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. For example, we cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But the notion of possibility is essential, because we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge.

Within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we imagine. Ironically, we get to choose what becomes inevitable.

Yet within a determined system, there is no actual deciding. There being no possibility of an alternative action in any given instance in time, the result is inevitable and our reference to a decision being made refers to surface appearance....the world progressing on the principle of the specified way things are at a time t and the way things go thereafter being fixed as a matter of natural law.

1- If determinism allows multiple options to be realized by an agent, as a matter of choice, why call it determinism?

2- If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world proceeds along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?

3- If 'freedom' does not require a means for the selection an option from set of realizable alternatives, what is freedom?

4 - Without regulative control or realizable options, why call it free will?

Ironically, when someone uses phrases like "actual" deciding or "really" choosing, it often flags a switch from speaking literally to speaking figuratively. We can check for this by stepping back and observing what is actually happening in empirical reality.

For example, choosing is a real event that takes place in empirical reality. Choosing is an operation that inputs two or more options, applies come criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. A woman goes into a restaurant, browses the menu, and places her order. She literally has a menu of options and she literally told the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please". So, we empirically observed the multiple options and the single choice. As to the evaluation phase, we can walk up to her and simply ask, "Why did you choose the Chef Salad?" She says, "I was tempted by the cheeseburger, but I had eggs and sausage for breakfast, and I wanted to balance that with some veggies for lunch. The Chef Salad will help me meet my dietary goals and it looks tasty".

So, the event we call "choosing" actually took place right there in front of us, we objectively observed it happening in empirical reality.

Was her choice determined? Yes. It was determined by her own purposes and her own reasoning. And, we may assume that her own reasoning was the inevitable result of prior events, events with their own prior causes, going back as far as anyone can imagine (I like to use the phrase, "causally necessary from any prior point in eternity"). But the most meaningful and relevant causes of her choice were the thoughts and feelings she experienced while making this decision for herself.

So, within a determined system, actual deciding does happen. The process of deciding was just as causally necessary as the choice. And the fact that she would be the single object within the physical universe that would make that choice was also causally necessary.

Let's take the questions now:

"1- If determinism allows multiple options to be realized by an agent, as a matter of choice, why call it determinism?"

Well, determinism asserts that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, where each event is the reliable result of prior causes, and each of these prior causes is the reliable result of their own prior causes, going back as far as we can imagine. We are assuming that there is such a chain of prior causes leading up to her deciding to eat at that restaurant, reading the menu, considering her options, and making her choice. And her choosing operation was also deterministic, following a reliable chain of reasoning, leading to her choosing the Chef Salad from her many options on the menu.

So, apparently, the notions of determinism and the notions of deciding for ourselves what we will do, are not contradictory, but are in fact compatible.

"2- If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world proceeds along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?"

But her options were in fact realizable. The chef at the restaurant was able to prepare any of the items on the menu. All of them were real possibilities, things that could happen if she chose them. She imagined having the cheeseburger. She imagined having the salad. Real possibilities exist solely within the imagination, and that is were she evaluated her options. None of them would become an actuality until she chose them and the chef prepared them. That's how real possibilities work.

Was she "free" to choose either option? Free from what? Did anything meaningful or relevant keep her from choosing for herself what she would eat? No. So, apparently she was in fact free to choose for herself the Chef Salad.

The terms "free" and "freedom" are meaningless unless they reference some meaningful and relevant constraint, something that actually constrains us from doing what we want (meaningful) and something we can actually do something about (relevant). Is causal necessity a meaningful or relevant constraint? I don't think so. What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, choosing what we choose, and doing what we do. And that is not a meaningful constraint. Nor is it something that anyone can, or needs to be, free of. So, bringing it up is usually irrelevant.

"3- If 'freedom' does not require a means for the selection an option from set of realizable alternatives, what is freedom?"

Freedom is the ability to do what we want. Freedom requires reliable causal mechanisms that enable us to do what we want. Right now, I want to type my thoughts in this comment. This requires a working brain, working fingers, and a working keyboard. If any of these mechanism were unreliable, I would not have the freedom to do what I wanted.

"4 - Without regulative control or realizable options, why call it free will?"

We actually need both, so it's fortunate that we have both. We need the ability to control what we do through reliable causal mechanisms. We need the ability to choose for ourselves what we will do. Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Most of the time we are neither coerced nor unduly influenced by someone or something else. So, most of the time we are free to choose for ourselves what we will do.