A stray from the context of what was said. Horatio used psychic in the more classic sense of "of the mind", instead of the sense of mind interacting with reality "wirelessly" (without a wired nervous system).
Yes. It's psychological. A psychic reality is an idea which influences the mind, and so is real to that person's mind. God is an obvious one. Or, in the example above, a snake.
Not God, no. The idea of God, yes.
Don't you make this basic distinction? Most people do it, you know. So if you want to talk about Universals, you better used words like other people do.
It's not a trivial point either. What is conceived of as eternal is obviously not the idea people have in their presumably mortal minds. Rather, it's probably what some people here call "abstractions". The same people tend to see these sort of abstraction as not in any way "in the mind". Whatever would be in the mind would be at best pale representations of them and definitely not eternal.
Seems to me you are just equivocating.
It comes back to the question of what's real. If eg a person feels that their mind is controlled by an outside entity, that entity constitutes a reality to them. Not an empirical reality, but a symbol of something not easily understood. IOW a psychic reality.
Again, this is equivocation. I agree that people may come to think of the entities they have some idea of as real. Yet, this is very different from saying that these entities constitute realities to them, which would really mean that these entities would be realities to them. Please use the proper words. You could say for example: If eg a person feels that their mind is controlled by an outside entity,
they feel that that entity is a reality to them.
Short of that you are just equivocating.
If an idea is shared by many people, such as beauty, it seems to me a case can be made that beauty is real.
No, it cannot. Something else than beauty (say X) may cause people to share something that may feel to them like beauty even though each of them has a different feeling. What matters, in terms of the logic of it, is that we should nonetheless come to use the same word, believing we are talking about beauty when in fact we would be indirectly talking about X through our private idea of beauty. The reason this would work would be because of X, not beauty.
If real, it can possess properties and qualities, one of which is eternity. Is that an empirical label? No.
Not eternity. The idea or feeling of eternity, yes.
Again, equivocation. I'm not sure it's curable, though.
What a feeling of eternity or timelessness is, in an empirical reality, if anything, is unknown.
Unknown?! No, it's just meaningless. How a "feeling" could be "in" an empirical reality?! Beats me.
The point of all this is that these abstract subjective things are an intimate part of our lives. I don't see anything wrong with a systematized approach, as long as the parameters are understood.
No they are not. What is part of my intimate life are things philosophers call qualia. Nothing abstract about them. Nothing eternal. Nothing shared either.
If they are intimate, how could they be shared? If they are shared, how could they be intimate? How could they be both "in the mind", "shared" and "eternal".
Of course talking as if they were eternal may have it usefulness like mathematical concepts are usually understood by mathematicians as some sort of absolutes and their concepts are definitely useful. However, this is only if you make sure to eschew equivocation and ambiguity. Mathematicians are definitely very careful as to language. They don't usually go about their job on the theoretical basis that their concepts are eternal. And you could try to take from them and bring in some philosophical rigour to what you say.
EB