How long until humanity creates an AI that is better at arguing than...

[Speakpigeon]

I still disagree with Speakpigeon's claim, unless he means something else by "free will", in which case I would ask him what he means by that expression.

I meant the kind of free will that I believe we all think we have. This one I don't really believe it exists at all beyond the impression of free will, which is something. I also have a different concept of free will and this one I believe it exists but that's the sort of concept that people engaging in Free Will debates aren't going to be interested in. And I won't tell you what it is.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Oh, never mind.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Same.
EB

 

[Angra Mainyu]

No. I was merely loudly entertaining a fiction for the sake of articulating an inference from a particular view. My own position is that we don't know the answers to this kind of questions.

The mistaken assumption I was talking about was that we all agree that there is no free will, not an assumption about whether AI would have free will.

Interesting answer I say. It's a way of operationalising meaning and there are precedents for this. However, here "what people usually mean" remains unclear. We don't necessarily all mean the same thing. At least, and excluding scholarly debates about Free Will, you would have to show that most of ordinary people do mean the same thing, or perhaps, that we all mean the same thing when we are not engaged in any scholarly debate. That's possibly true, especially if there is indeed free will. After all, no one is really disputing that the colour red or that pain exist.

I don't think I would have to show that. But then, "have to" depends on one's goal.
I would say this: there are people who really dispute that the color red exists - there is such thing as a color error theorist -, there are error theorists about folk psychology, and also, there are (more) people who dispute whether moral wrongness, immorality, etc., exists.
However, if someone asked me what I mean by "red" or "immoral" I would give a similar answer, and I wouldn't agree that I have to show that people mean the same.
Then again, what I "have to" do depends on goals, so I guess if I wanted to persuade some people who remain unpersuaded, I would have to show that to their satisfaction. I will not attempt that, though.

I meant the kind of free will that I believe we all think we have. This one I don't really believe it exists at all beyond the impression of free will, which is something.

Right, so we disagree about that, which is why I was saying there was a mistaken assumption of agreement.
I think we do have the kind of free will that I believe nearly all of us think we have (maybe not all, after all; for example, you don't seem to believe we have it).

I also have a different concept of free will and this one I believe it exists but that's the sort of concept that people engaging in Free Will debates aren't going to be interested in. And I won't tell you what it is.

Okay. Btw, I'm a compatibilist about free will, and I'm interested in debates about FW between philosophers mostly.

 

[DBT]

Rather hard to reconcile determinism and freedom given that events are entirely shaped by antecedent events rather than any form of freedom of the will...which cannot be defined as free due to the position of will/decision making within the cognitive process. Which is basically why the argument for compatibility fails.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The claim that somehow the position of the will in the decision-making process makes it not free in the usual sense of the words is a claim we compatibilists reject. You would need to provide linguistic evidence against that if you want to persuade (many of) those who don't share your belief about the meaning of the words. Evidence about brains won't cut it, because as we understand the words, granting everything you might want to say describing how brain works, we still conclude there is no threat to our ability to act of our own free will.

In short, we don't disagree with you about how brains work. We disagree with you about the meaning of the expression "free will" in English (well, some or many of us do, anyway), and more precisely of the expression "of one's free will", and similar ones.

 

[DBT]

That compatibilists reject the place of will within the cognitive process does not change the fact that, within stages of the cognitive process, will is neither the decision maker or the driver or orchestrator of which decisions are made and which decisions are vetoed...nor the the driver of the motor actions that follow from decisions made.

Will is just a part and parcel of the overall process of inputs interacting with memory by means of neural architecture weighing of cost to benefit ratios based on past experience to produce a decision made and an action taken. Will - yes, volition - yes, but not free will.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

That compatibilists reject the place of will within the cognitive process does not change the fact that, within stages of the cognitive process, will is neither the decision maker or the driver or orchestrator of which decisions are made and which decisions are vetoed...nor the the driver of the motor actions that follow from decisions made.

Will is just a part and parcel of the overall process of inputs interacting with memory by means of neural architecture weighing of cost to benefit ratios based on past experience to produce a decision made and an action taken. Will - yes, volition - yes, but not free will.

Whatever you mean by "will", I'm saying I'm writing this post of my own free will, in the usual sense of the word. You keep denying it, but you're not giving me any good reason to think otherwise.
Of course, I made the decision freely, and of course, my decision had previous causes. The talk about neutral architecture, etc., misses the point. One might as well forget all that and talk about particle interactions. But that would miss the point as well, because we don't disagree about how brains work, or about how particles interact, but about the meaning of the words (well, we might also disagree about how brains work or about how particles interact to some extent; I'm not sure, but it's beside the point, since I can grant your description of how brains operate (minus the use of the words "free" and "will"), or whatever particle-based description you might come up with (though you seem to prefer brain-talk to particle-talk), and I would still reckon that I'm writing this post of my own free will).

 

[DBT]

You are writing your reply because your brain, prompted by the challenge of its inputs (my post)shaped, formed and generated the will (impulse to act) to respond. It, the brain, processed inputs, correlated inputs and memory before the composition of the response formed into consciousness (readiness potential).

You, the conscious experience had no part in that process, no part in forming the will, the drive, the volition to respond, or the composition of the response.

If ''will'' is claimed to be ''free'' the cognitive process of input to processing to conscious action cannot support this claim. It cannot support the idea free will because the very things (sensory inputs, memory function, neural architecture) that determine the shape and form conscious thoughts and actions take, is the agency of conscious experience. Unchosen information condition of the brain (brain state) rather than 'free will' being the sole driver of all experience.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

You are writing your reply because your brain, prompted by the challenge of its inputs (my post)shaped, formed and generated the will (impulse to act) to respond. It, the brain, processed inputs, correlated inputs and memory before the composition of the response formed into consciousness (readiness potential).

You, the conscious experience had no part in that process, no part in forming the will, the drive, the volition to respond, or the composition of the response.

If ''will'' is claimed to be ''free'' the cognitive process of input to processing to conscious action cannot support this claim. It cannot support the idea free will because the very things (sensory inputs, memory function, neural architecture) that determine the shape and form conscious thoughts and actions take, is the agency of conscious experience. Unchosen information condition of the brain (brain state) rather than 'free will' being the sole driver of all experience.

Actually, the conscious experience does have a causal role in the process, and if I had consciously chosen not to write this post, I would not have written it.
In fact, I'm now consciously choosing to keep writing, and that causes my hands to keep writing (yes, there are plenty of other causes, as it is always the case with any and all causes in our universe).
Even if someone looking at my brain can predict before my conscious experience what I will do (not always, actually, but even assuming always) does not do anything to undermine that. It only tells us that my conscious experience has previous causes, but doesn't eliminate the causal role of my conscious experience.
It would be like saying that a nuclear explosion didn't have any causal role in killing people in Hiroshima, because the explosion could be predicted on the basis of earlier particle interactions.

It seems we do disagree about something other than the meaning of the words.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The mistaken assumption I was talking about was that we all agree that there is no free will, not an assumption about whether AI would have free will.

Interesting answer I say. It's a way of operationalising meaning and there are precedents for this. However, here "what people usually mean" remains unclear. We don't necessarily all mean the same thing. At least, and excluding scholarly debates about Free Will, you would have to show that most of ordinary people do mean the same thing, or perhaps, that we all mean the same thing when we are not engaged in any scholarly debate. That's possibly true, especially if there is indeed free will. After all, no one is really disputing that the colour red or that pain exist.

I don't think I would have to show that. But then, "have to" depends on one's goal.
I would say this: there are people who really dispute that the color red exists - there is such thing as a color error theorist -, there are error theorists about folk psychology, and also, there are (more) people who dispute whether moral wrongness, immorality, etc., exists.
However, if someone asked me what I mean by "red" or "immoral" I would give a similar answer, and I wouldn't agree that I have to show that people mean the same.
Then again, what I "have to" do depends on goals, so I guess if I wanted to persuade some people who remain unpersuaded, I would have to show that to their satisfaction. I will not attempt that, though.

I meant the kind of free will that I believe we all think we have. This one I don't really believe it exists at all beyond the impression of free will, which is something.

Right, so we disagree about that, which is why I was saying there was a mistaken assumption of agreement.
I think we do have the kind of free will that I believe nearly all of us think we have (maybe not all, after all; for example, you don't seem to believe we have it).

I also have a different concept of free will and this one I believe it exists but that's the sort of concept that people engaging in Free Will debates aren't going to be interested in. And I won't tell you what it is.

Okay. Btw, I'm a compatibilist about free will, and I'm interested in debates about FW between philosophers mostly.

The crucial point to me is that you can't prove your impression of free will (and I can't mine), as you have it, is anything more than an impression. Sure we all talk of red flowers but only as long as our brain can somehow entertain the impression of there being red flowers not because there are actual red flowers anywhere. Wait till you start to loose your brain and you'll see what I mean, although by then you won't understand much at all I guess. But do keep talking about doing things of your own free will, for all it's worth.
EB

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The crucial point to me is that you can't prove your impression of free will (and I can't mine), as you have it, is anything more than an impression. Sure we all talk of red flowers but only as long as our brain can somehow entertain the impression of there being red flowers not because there are actual red flowers anywhere. Wait till you start to loose your brain and you'll see what I mean, although by then you won't understand much at all I guess. But do keep talking about doing things of your own free will, for all it's worth.

But you're the one who can't show that I'm not writing this of my own free will.
DBT suggested that my choice to write this post and keep writing it is not a cause of my writing this post (or the same for previous posts), but he is making an astronomically improbable claim, on a proper prior epistemic probabilistic assessment. He would have to provide a lot of evidence in order to show that. But he has provided no evidence whatsoever, since pointing out that my choices have causes does nothing to challenge their causal efficacy.
So, without evidence supporting his claim, the prior assessment stands: my choice to write this post and keep writing it is a cause of my writing this post.
But given that, why would I not be writing it of my own free will?
Neither he nor you have given me no choice to believe otherwise, and so - again - it's extremely improbable that for some unknown reason, I'm not acting of my own free will.
For that matter, someone could claim that I don't have any beliefs whatsoever - some people do make such claims; they are error theorists about belief talk. But unless they provide a lot of evidence (which they haven't), the probability of their claims remains astronomically low.

Now, there is another avenue you might take - and argue against compatibilism on linguistic grounds. That's a conversation we can have, but based on the evidence I have, I reckon the arguments do not succeed at all.

The same goes for red flowers. Are you suggesting that there aren't any red flowers?
That also looks astronomically improbable, since I've seen red flowers. For that matter, one might just challenge the existence of the external world, and say I can't prove that the Moon exists, or even that the Earth exists. Yet, I consider such radical skeptical scenarios also astronomically improbable. Yet, the claim that there aren't red flowers seems to be just a more limited version of such scenarios. Why would the existence of red flowers be less likely than the existence of the Moon?

 

[DBT]

You are writing your reply because your brain, prompted by the challenge of its inputs (my post)shaped, formed and generated the will (impulse to act) to respond. It, the brain, processed inputs, correlated inputs and memory before the composition of the response formed into consciousness (readiness potential).

You, the conscious experience had no part in that process, no part in forming the will, the drive, the volition to respond, or the composition of the response.

If ''will'' is claimed to be ''free'' the cognitive process of input to processing to conscious action cannot support this claim. It cannot support the idea free will because the very things (sensory inputs, memory function, neural architecture) that determine the shape and form conscious thoughts and actions take, is the agency of conscious experience. Unchosen information condition of the brain (brain state) rather than 'free will' being the sole driver of all experience.

Actually, the conscious experience does have a causal role in the process.

Not according to the evidence. Consciousness always after the event. First the event, then information input from the event, light waves, pressure waves, etc, then processing and correlation and finally patterns of neuronal firing forming conscious experience....which is fed information (updated, refreshed) as it becomes available.

and if I had consciously chosen not to write this post, I would not have written it.

Nope, that was decided by inputs interacting with memory, enabling a cost to benefit analysis microseconds before conscious report/activity, aka, Libet, Hallet, Haynes, Haggard.

In fact, I'm now consciously choosing to keep writing, and that causes my hands to keep writing (yes, there are plenty of other causes, as it is always the case with any and all causes in our universe).

It's more than a cause. It's a matter of sole agency. The brain is the sole agent of both you and your conscious experience. 'You' and what 'you' think, feel and do is being produced by, not you the conscious experience, but patterns of firings being fed information from the senses, interacting with memory function and thereby forming self awareness and sense of conscious agency, and there lies the illusion of conscious or 'free' will.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Not according to the evidence. Consciousness always after the event. First the event, then information input from the event, light waves, pressure waves, etc, then processing and correlation and finally patterns of neuronal firing forming conscious experience....which is fed information (updated, refreshed) as it becomes available.

That is not true. There is no evidence supporting your claim that the conscious experience has no causal role in the process, for the reasons I have been explaining. The fact that there are previous causes does not deny the causal role of conscious experience, of course.

Actually, the conscious experience does have a causal role in the process, and if I had consciously chosen not to write this post, I would not have written it.

Nope, that was decided by inputs interacting with memory, enabling a cost to benefit analysis microseconds before conscious report/activity, aka, Libet, Hallet, Haynes, Haggard.

No, that's not true. It remains the case that if I had consciously chosen not to write it, I would not have written it. None of those experiments shows that a person acts against their conscious will. They only show that it's possible (not very accurately, but that's beside the point) to predict behavior before conscious experience. But that's not to say that it was "decided" before. For that matter, all of those things you talk about microseconds before, etc., also have causes, and given enough info, could have similarly been predicted before they happen, and so could the decision, so with your rationale, one ought to conclude that those things didn't decide it, either.

It's more than a cause. It's a matter of sole agency. The brain is the sole agent of both you and your conscious experience. 'You' and what 'you' think, feel and do is being produced by, not you the conscious experience, but patterns of firings being fed information from the senses, interacting with memory function and thereby forming self awareness and sense of conscious agency, and there lies the illusion of conscious or 'free' will.

You keep saying that. it's a cause (or a bundle of causes). Those are some of many causes. Everything that happens in the brain also has previous causes. Why not call them the "sole agent of both you and your conscious experience"?
Why do you keep talking about "patterns of firings" and "information", when one might as well talk about previous or concurrent particle interactions?
These whole line of argumentation against free will is deeply misguided.

 

[DBT]

That is not true. There is no evidence supporting your claim that the conscious experience has no causal role in the process, for the reasons I have been explaining. The fact that there are previous causes does not deny the causal role of conscious experience, of course.

Actually, the conscious experience does have a causal role in the process, and if I had consciously chosen not to write this post, I would not have written it.

The evidence is there, but you appear to be either unfamiliar with the subject matter, or unwilling to consider the evidence seriously because it puts your position on free will to question.

Consider the fact that it is not our eyes that see, but our brain that forms imagery after receiving signals/nerve impulses via the optic nerve, processed by the visual cortex, correlated with memory, enabling recognition, then the images of what is to be perceived form. And of course followed by associated feelings and thoughts, then actions.

That is the only possible order terms of the physical process: actions cannot precede thoughts cannot precede perception, perception cannot cannot inputs.

It impossible for the brain to alter conscious perception of an object or event before that information enters the system, wavelength, pressure waves, etc, and provides the stimulus to update perception....or of course memory input feeding conscious activity with information....'don't do that, it's dangerous.'

The basic physics of cognition;

''Every moment of the day your nervous system is active. It exchanges millions of signals corresponding with feeling, thoughts and actions. A simple example of how important the nervous system is in your behavior is meeting a friend.
First, the visual information of your eyes is sent to your brain by nervous cells. There the information is interpreted and translated into a signal to take action. Finally the brain sends a command to your voice or to another action system like muscles or glands. For example, you may start walking towards him.
Your nervous system enables this rapid recognition and action. ''

Well lets take just one of our senses, vision. Light enters through the cornea, reaches the retina and is converted to nerve impulses by complex chemical reactions (rod,cones, etc) and conveyed by the optic nerve to the visual cortex, from there it is propogated throughout the brain, gathering memory and infomation before the signals return to the visual cortex and a representation of that information is formed, a conscious image of what we see.

The visual information is interpreted by the various systems of the brain and translated into a signals to take action (visual,auditory,tactile reflexes) and on to the prefrontal cortex region which deal with complex responses, one's social values, cultural expectations, ethics, etc - the seat of one's personality and sense of self. Finally the brain forms conscious thoughts a deliberation and sends a commands to its motor neurons, muscle groups, glands... and the action is undertaken.

Despite the complexity of the process, this is quite rapid in recognition and action. 160 to 215 milliseconds for auditory and visual response, and 500 milliseconds for higher order decision making.

No, that's not true. It remains the case that if I had consciously chosen not to write it, I would not have written it.

Not at all. Libet's proposal for a veto function doesn't work because vetoing a decision that's been made (changing your mind) follows the same rules steps of cognition that the original decision is subject to. Fresh information from either memory function or sensory inputs modifies conscious thought, just as it does during the normal flow of information, just that a prior decision is modified instead of reinforced.
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/324/5928/811.short]Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans;[/url]
''Parietal and premotor cortex regions are serious contenders for bringing motor intentions and motor responses into awareness. We used electrical stimulation in seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery. Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a strong intention and desire to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas stimulating the left inferior parietal region provoked the intention to move the lips and to talk. When stimulation intensity was increased in parietal areas, participants believed they had really performed these movements, although no electromyographic activity was detected. Stimulation of the premotor region triggered overt mouth and contralateral limb movements. Yet, patients firmly denied that they had moved. Conscious intention and motor awareness thus arise from increased parietal activity before movement execution.''

You keep saying that. it's a cause (or a bundle of causes). Those are some of many causes. Everything that happens in the brain also has previous causes. Why not call them the "sole agent of both you and your conscious experience"?
Why do you keep talking about "patterns of firings" and "information", when one might as well talk about previous or concurrent particle interactions?

I am saying it because it is specifically the patterns of firings that are considered to be the conscious activity of the brain. And yes, all of the prior conditions that you mention are particle interactions, and yes they are inputs, but they are not the particle interactions that directly form your conscious experience, an experience that is not chosen by you.

These whole line of argumentation against free will is deeply misguided.

Hah...you wish.


''If free will does not generate movement, what does? Movement generation seems to come largely from the primary motor cortex, and its input comes primarily from premotor cortices, parts of the frontal lobe just in front of the primary motor cortex. The premotor cortices receive input from most of the brain, especially the sensory cortices (which process information from our senses), limbic cortices (the emotional part of the brain), and the prefrontal cortex (which handles many cognitive processes). If the inputs from various neurons “compete,” eventually one input wins, leading to a final behavior. For example, take the case of saccadic eye movements, quick target-directed eye movements. Adding even a small amount of electrical stimulation in different small brain areas can lead to a monkey's making eye movements in a different direction than might have been expected on the basis of simultaneous visual cues.4 In general, the more we know about the various influences on the motor cortex, the better we can predict what a person will do.'' M. Hallett. Clinical Neurophysiology

Information Processing in the Brain that Bypasses Consciousness

''Cognitive and clinical research demonstrates that much complex information processing can occur without involving consciousness. This includes visual, auditory and linguistic priming, implicit memory, the implicit recognition of complex sequences, automatic behaviors such as driving a car or riding a bicycle and so on (Velmans 1991) and the dissociations found in patients with lesions in cerebral cortex (e.g., such as residual visual functions in the professed absence of any visual awareness known as clinical blindsight in patients with lesions in primary visual cortex; Weiskrantz 1997).

The cognitive scientist Jackendoff (1987) argues at length against the notion that consciousness and thoughts are inseparable and that introspection can reveal the contents of the mind. What is conscious about thoughts are sensory aspects, such as visual images, sounds or silent speech. Both the process of thought and its content are not directly accessible to consciousness.''

 

[Juma]

Whatever you mean by "will", I'm saying I'm writing this post of my own free will, in the usual sense of the word.

I suggest that you stop writing "in the usual sense of the word" sinse that is extremely vague.

Do you believe that you could have willingly choised to do otherwise if everything was exactly the same?

Thing is this:

You have your will. It is in no way "free" as in "causally detached".

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The evidence is there, but you appear to be either unfamiliar with the subject matter, or unwilling to consider the evidence seriously because it puts your position on free will to question.

No, the evidence is not there, and I don't appear to be either of that. It may appear like that to you, but that's another matter. I already explained why your arguments miss the point, and the new ones do the same. It's time for me to leave it at that.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I suggest that you stop writing "in the usual sense of the word" sinse that is extremely vague.

I mean in the usual sense of the expression "of one's own free will". I don't agree it's extremely vague, but in any event, it's the relevant sense, since it's the ordinary one.
Now, it's not precise to any arbitrary degree of accuracy, but none of the words we use to describe our world is.

Do you believe that you could have willingly choised to do otherwise if everything was exactly the same?

I don't have that belief, but I don't have the belief I couldn't have. It depend on when.
For example, it may be that the universe is indeterministic, and even if things had been just the same 10 years ago, particles could have done something else, and then today I would have had a different plan, and would have decided not to write this post. That's not the same as randomness messing with my decision-making process; the randomness would have ocurred long ago.

Thing is this:

You have your will. It is in no way "free" as in "causally detached".

That wouldn't be free. It would be random. The choices would not be mine, but would be happening to me.
But I'm writing this of my own free will regardless of whether the universe is deterministic (which we do not know, but it's not relevant).
Indeterminism might mess with a person's free will sometimes if the universe is deterministic (e.g., quantum freak event messing with my normal thought processes), but that's very improbable. I'm operating normally now (well, tired, but not nearly enough to compromise my ability to act of my own rfee will), and making free, non-random choices.

 

[DBT]

The evidence is there, but you appear to be either unfamiliar with the subject matter, or unwilling to consider the evidence seriously because it puts your position on free will to question.

No, the evidence is not there, and I don't appear to be either of that. It may appear like that to you, but that's another matter. I already explained why your arguments miss the point, and the new ones do the same. It's time for me to leave it at that.

I don't miss the point at all. The point being that it is the immediate information state of the brain that determines its immediate output in terms of conscious experience, thoughts, decisions and actions. A momentary connectivity failure expresses itself as the inability to remember a name, where you placed something and so on. What the brain is doing according to its information state being the totality of your experience, which does not allow an alternative in that instance. So if you have forgotten an name, you cannot choose to remember that name. Instead, the memory is restored once the connections are made and conscious report initiated....at which point ''you'' consciously remember.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The crucial point to me is that you can't prove your impression of free will (and I can't mine), as you have it, is anything more than an impression. Sure we all talk of red flowers but only as long as our brain can somehow entertain the impression of there being red flowers not because there are actual red flowers anywhere. Wait till you start to loose your brain and you'll see what I mean, although by then you won't understand much at all I guess. But do keep talking about doing things of your own free will, for all it's worth.

But you're the one who can't show that I'm not writing this of my own free will.

Of course I can't. But that, too, doesn't prove anything one way or the other. I'm not pretending I know you don't have free will, I'm not that kind of magical being. I'm just laying out the very reasonable grounds from which I can confidently infer (not deduce) that you don't have free will.

DBT suggested that my choice to write this post and keep writing it is not a cause of my writing this post (or the same for previous posts), but he is making an astronomically improbable claim, on a proper prior epistemic probabilistic assessment. He would have to provide a lot of evidence in order to show that. But he has provided no evidence whatsoever, since pointing out that my choices have causes does nothing to challenge their causal efficacy.
So, without evidence supporting his claim, the prior assessment stands: my choice to write this post and keep writing it is a cause of my writing this post.
But given that, why would I not be writing it of my own free will?
Neither he nor you have given me no choice to believe otherwise, and so - again - it's extremely improbable that for some unknown reason, I'm not acting of my own free will.

People believe all sorts of things. I'm not interested in changing their minds. All you can possibly know is that you have the impression of free will. Whether you really have free will is something else.

For that matter, someone could claim that I don't have any beliefs whatsoever - some people do make such claims; they are error theorists about belief talk. But unless they provide a lot of evidence (which they haven't), the probability of their claims remains astronomically low.

I'm sure you have beliefs. The notion of belief doesn't imply anything metaphysical beyond the obvious I think therefore I am.

Now, there is another avenue you might take - and argue against compatibilism on linguistic grounds. That's a conversation we can have, but based on the evidence I have, I reckon the arguments do not succeed at all.

Not interested.

The same goes for red flowers. Are you suggesting that there aren't any red flowers?
That also looks astronomically improbable, since I've seen red flowers. For that matter, one might just challenge the existence of the external world, and say I can't prove that the Moon exists, or even that the Earth exists. Yet, I consider such radical skeptical scenarios also astronomically improbable. Yet, the claim that there aren't red flowers seems to be just a more limited version of such scenarios. Why would the existence of red flowers be less likely than the existence of the Moon?

That's what is called 'naive realism': Naive realists think red flowers exist just because they have the impression of seeing red flowers. Instead, you could think less naively that maybe there's something else such that you end up having the impression of seeing red flowers. You wouldn't know which is the case. The something else may be just your mind or it may be an act of God or it may be a bunch of quarks and what not. You can stick to naive realism, though, I'm not interested in trying to change your mind.
EB