Angra Mainyu
Veteran Member
I'm afraid I don't see it. The issue is that the prior probability that I'm not writing this of my own free will is extremely low (prior to your arguments or the arguments of another error theorist about FW talk). It's akin to the claims of the moral error theorist, the color error theorist, the error theorist about folk psychology, etc. I'm not saying the prior is in all of those cases the same (they're not), but that in all cases, it's astronomically slim, so that you - or another error theorist - has a very steep mountain to climb so to speak.Speakpigeon said:Of course I can't. But that, too, doesn't prove anything one way or the other. I'm not pretending I know you don't have free will, I'm not that kind of magical being. I'm just laying out the very reasonable grounds from which I can confidently infer (not deduce) that you don't have free will.
Moreover, I'm already familiar with many of the arguments of FW error theorists. I'm not talking about clearly misguided arguments like those made by DBT or a number of scientists, but also more subtle philosophical arguments, including those that attempt to use the results of experimental philosophy to make a linguistic case.
So far, in my assessment compatibilists clearly win.
Of course, given that you're not interested in changing my minds, that's okay I guess.
No, that's not the case. It's like saying all I can possible know is that I have the impression that the headphones I'm looking at are blue, or that raping people just for fun is morally wrong, etc. I would say you're mistaken.Speakpigeon said:All you can possibly know is that you have the impression of free will. Whether you really have free will is something else.
Actually, "I think therefore I am" is itself complicated (what did he actually mean?), but in any case, there are of course philosophers who believe the notion of belief has ontological commitments that aren't met. They are mistaken about the meaning of the words. My position is that (sophisticated, not crude) FW error theorists also have mistaken theories about the meaning of the words.Speakpigeon said:I'm sure you have beliefs. The notion of belief doesn't imply anything metaphysical beyond the obvious I think therefore I am.
Still, if you don't want to convince me, that's fine. But if you do, I would like to see your argument for the error theory. Telling me I just have the impression that I have FW is not a good argument.
That's realism, and it's correct. It's not naive, though I do reckon that naive realists might be correct, though I'm not sure since it depends on what you mean by "realism" (e.g., roughly if aliens from another planet develop another visual system that associates the perception of red with other wavelengths, etc., they will have alien-color talk, not color talk. They will also make true claims about alien color, etc.; whether that's realism depends on your definition of "realism", so I don't know).Speakpigeon said:That's what is called 'naive realism': Naive realists think red flowers exist just because they have the impression of seeing red flowers. Instead, you could think less naively that maybe there's something else such that you end up having the impression of seeing red flowers. You wouldn't know which is the case. The something else may be just your mind or it may be an act of God or it may be a bunch of quarks and what not. You can stick to naive realism, though, I'm not interested in trying to change your mind.
I've read arguments of color error theorists. They are either just confused, or are smart and coherent but have a mistaken theory about the meaning of the words, believing that color words have ontological commitments they do not have (similar to what you seem to believe about ordinary free will talk, but not about beliefs; others are mistaken about the commitments of "belief", etc.).
But regardless, since you're not interested in convincing me, and you won't make your case for error theories of color, FW, etc., I don't see more room for further discussion on the subjects (you could keep repeating I'm wrong and I have no way of knowing, and I will keep replying in the same manner, but that's kind of pointless).
Just one question: do you also believe in an error theory about moral blame, guilt, etc.; I mean, if a serial killer didn't kill anyone of his own free will, it seems to me that's an adequate defense. It so seems to several (perhaps most) of the philophers who support a FW error theory, though there is a range of opinions on that, since different semi-compatibilists accept only partial moral error theories as a consequence of their FW error theory.