lpetrich
Contributor
That made it possible to be very selective about what one attacks, even attacks far inside one's opponent's territory.Second, there was a growing awareness that attacks on civilians were counterproductive. This was the conclusion of studies undertaken immediately after World War II on the impact of the Allied strategic bombing campaigns, and then the later experience of the Vietnam War, in which the efforts to seek out and eliminate the communist Viet Cong led to many civilian casualties.
The third development was the advent in the 1970s of precision-guided munitions.
With precision-guided weapons, there was an opportunity to revive classic warfare by concentrating on undermining an enemy’s military organization through deep strikes and rapid maneuvers. This was the lesson drawn from the United States’ decisive defeat of Iraqi forces in the first Gulf War.
Nevertheless, although this doctrinal shift has been evident in the planning of recent Western military interventions, classic warfare strategy has often fallen by the wayside once those wars turn into counterinsurgency campaigns, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Then a section on "RUSSIAN BRUTISHNESS, UKRAINIAN RESTRAINT"
"For its part, in the decades after the Cold War, Russia never quite abandoned the total-war model." noting Russia's sort of war in Syria and Chechnya.
But is Russia's war a total one? Russia has avoided using nuclear weapons or attacking NATO countries.Now Russia is doing the same in Ukraine. But this time around, it faces an increasingly well-organized and professional army. As the Kremlin has become more frustrated in its campaign to occupy the country, it has resorted to regular attacks on Ukrainian civil society and economy. These have included aiming missiles at Kyiv and other cities, leveling apartment complexes and sometimes whole towns, attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and laying prolonged sieges, such as against Mariupol in the spring, Severodonetsk in the summer, and Bakhmut more recently. These are operations that involve artillery barrages that reduce cities to rubble and force their populations to flee.
Like not receiving anything that would enable Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia.Nonetheless, in most respects, Russia has followed the total-war approach that it has used in other conflicts since the end of the Cold War.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is following a classic-war approach. In defending their own cities, factories, and energy plants, Ukrainian forces have every reason to avoid unnecessary damage to civilian areas, and they have needed to conserve their scarce ammunition for high-priority Russian military targets. Moreover, Kyiv has also been constrained by the limitations placed on it by its Western suppliers.
So far, the results of the Russian approach have confirmed the standard criticisms of total-war strategy. The onslaught against Ukraine’s civil society has made no dent in popular support for the Ukrainian government. Instead, accumulating evidence of egregious Russian behavior has made Ukraine all the more determined to ensure that these territories are liberated and that none is handed over to Russia indefinitely. The humanitarian consequences of Russia’s methods have also strengthened Western support for Ukraine. In addition, Russia’s total-war aims have reinforced the Ukrainian belief that there is no obvious “compromise peace” available. Nor have Russia’s total-war tactics impeded Ukrainian operations.