Human Instinct and Free Will

[Juma]

Good that you agree on this.

Do you want a ghost in the machine or do you want entanglement where a new and irreducible object emerges due to entanglement.

False dicotomy. We have a complex system of processes in our brain. The total behaviour of this system is our mind.
No ghost needed and no entaglement observed or even needed.

You are just ignoring the problem of an irreducible mind.

The mind is not irreducible.

Imagine you have 2 apples on your desk. And let's say that the apples are put out in such a way that your mind only observes one apple at a time. Without inherently connected particles (entanglement) composing your mind, you should only observe one apple then observe the other. Your consciousness would only know about one thing at a time. But instead, the observation must be a singular/whole and instantaneous notion of multiple objects. Without entanglement, these 2 observations are not connected to each other in any way, which includes the intermediate memory between seeing the two apples.

But the reality is - if we can make an ontologically realistic assumption - that we know of two apples existing and not just one apple at a time. There is an inherently whole meaning of 2 objects existing.

The only way this makes sense to me scientifically is with entanglement where you are physically entangled with the observation of the pieces that make up the thought of 2 objects.

This also explains other metaphysical mysteries like aboutness. Our consciousness could be entangled with what we are actually observing. This would also explain how we can understand concepts like space and time.

What makes us aware of both apples is called "memory" and the ability of see differences in the apples.

If we do not see any differences we will (wrongly) believe it to be a single apple shown twice.

 

[ryan]

The mind is not irreducible.

Imagine you have 2 apples on your desk. And let's say that the apples are put out in such a way that your mind only observes one apple at a time. Without inherently connected particles (entanglement) composing your mind, you should only observe one apple then observe the other. Your consciousness would only know about one thing at a time. But instead, the observation must be a singular/whole and instantaneous notion of multiple objects. Without entanglement, these 2 observations are not connected to each other in any way, which includes the intermediate memory between seeing the two apples.

But the reality is - if we can make an ontologically realistic assumption - that we know of two apples existing and not just one apple at a time. There is an inherently whole meaning of 2 objects existing.

The only way this makes sense to me scientifically is with entanglement where you are physically entangled with the observation of the pieces that make up the thought of 2 objects.

This also explains other metaphysical mysteries like aboutness. Our consciousness could be entangled with what we are actually observing. This would also explain how we can understand concepts like space and time.

What makes us aware of both apples is called "memory" and the ability of see differences in the apples.

But when we "pull up" a memory, how do we know it's a memory?

 

[Juma]

The mind is not irreducible.

Imagine you have 2 apples on your desk. And let's say that the apples are put out in such a way that your mind only observes one apple at a time. Without inherently connected particles (entanglement) composing your mind, you should only observe one apple then observe the other. Your consciousness would only know about one thing at a time. But instead, the observation must be a singular/whole and instantaneous notion of multiple objects. Without entanglement, these 2 observations are not connected to each other in any way, which includes the intermediate memory between seeing the two apples.

But the reality is - if we can make an ontologically realistic assumption - that we know of two apples existing and not just one apple at a time. There is an inherently whole meaning of 2 objects existing.

The only way this makes sense to me scientifically is with entanglement where you are physically entangled with the observation of the pieces that make up the thought of 2 objects.

This also explains other metaphysical mysteries like aboutness. Our consciousness could be entangled with what we are actually observing. This would also explain how we can understand concepts like space and time.

What makes us aware of both apples is called "memory" and the ability of see differences in the apples.

But when we "pull up" a memory, how do we know it's a memory?

That is a technical issue, not a principal one.

Because it is not a currently perceived input? Because it is different parts of the brain involved? Because almost everything?
Because it feels clearly different?

 

[bilby]

Good that you agree on this.

Do you want a ghost in the machine or do you want entanglement where a new and irreducible object emerges due to entanglement.

False dicotomy. We have a complex system of processes in our brain. The total behaviour of this system is our mind.
No ghost needed and no entaglement observed or even needed.

You are just ignoring the problem of an irreducible mind.

The mind is not irreducible.

Imagine you have 2 apples on your desk. And let's say that the apples are put out in such a way that your mind only observes one apple at a time. Without inherently connected particles (entanglement) composing your mind, you should only observe one apple then observe the other with no intermediary memory inbetween. Your consciousness would only know about one thing at a time. But instead, the observation must be a singular/whole and instantaneous notion of multiple objects. Without entanglement, these 2 observations are not connected to each other in any way, which includes the intermediate memory between seeing the two apples.

But the reality is - if we can make an ontologically realistic assumption - that we know of two apples existing and not just one apple at a time. There is an inherently whole meaning of 2 objects existing.

The only way this makes sense to me scientifically is with entanglement where you are physically entangled with the observation of the pieces that make up the thought of 2 objects.

This also explains other metaphysical mysteries like aboutness. Our consciousness could be entangled with what we are actually observing. This would also explain how we can understand concepts like space and time.

Wow. I can actually feel myself getting dumber as I read that.

 

[DBT]

But when we "pull up" a memory, how do we know it's a memory?

The brain forms conscious memories in response to some input or impulse.

We generally, but not always, know it's a memory because the brain categorises information, conscious experience as it is being formed (recognition), spatial awareness, etc.

 

[fromderinside]

But when we "pull up" a memory, how do we know it's a memory?

The 'we know' comes from our thinking about it. Information leads to compatible pathways is one solution of your calling up question.. Referring back in time is a capability we have like no other species. Its not unique. Every species has some level of referring back. We just have much better capacity.

There's not a big percentage in putting this or that in boxes either. Calling up is not what happens. Common pathways for similar information suggests other modes. There is a long history of changes in neurotransmitter activity in same pathway for changes in information.

Extreme solutions for common problems, especially when very good existing solutions are in place using more normal assertions, is not a productive methodology at all.

I suggest you try "the more assumptions you have to make, the more unlikely an explanation is"

 

[ryan]

The mind is not irreducible.

Imagine you have 2 apples on your desk. And let's say that the apples are put out in such a way that your mind only observes one apple at a time. Without inherently connected particles (entanglement) composing your mind, you should only observe one apple then observe the other. Your consciousness would only know about one thing at a time. But instead, the observation must be a singular/whole and instantaneous notion of multiple objects. Without entanglement, these 2 observations are not connected to each other in any way, which includes the intermediate memory between seeing the two apples.

But the reality is - if we can make an ontologically realistic assumption - that we know of two apples existing and not just one apple at a time. There is an inherently whole meaning of 2 objects existing.

The only way this makes sense to me scientifically is with entanglement where you are physically entangled with the observation of the pieces that make up the thought of 2 objects.

This also explains other metaphysical mysteries like aboutness. Our consciousness could be entangled with what we are actually observing. This would also explain how we can understand concepts like space and time.

What makes us aware of both apples is called "memory" and the ability of see differences in the apples.

But when we "pull up" a memory, how do we know it's a memory?

That is a technical issue, not a principal one.

Because it is not a currently perceived input? Because it is different parts of the brain involved? Because almost everything?
Because it feels clearly different?

Forget for the time being all of the particles that have to somehow emerge a consciousness from no conscious parts, and let's just take for granted that the consciousness exists as a it does.

Now, imagine a 4 dimensional outline of the consciousness being conscious of a memory. There is no physical connection to anything else outside of this 4 dimensional object. You can't be conscious of anything else other than that memory because you are not connected to anything else. You can only go back and forth from memory to reality (selective attention) and carry no prior knowledge about the other thoughts because your consciousness does not have a little internal memory. And even if it did have a little internal memory, the same problem of disconnection would start all over again.

 

[ryan]

But when we "pull up" a memory, how do we know it's a memory?

The brain forms conscious memories in response to some input or impulse.

We generally, but not always, know it's a memory because the brain categorises information, conscious experience as it is being formed (recognition), spatial awareness, etc.

You are just glossing over so so so much mystery and controversy with this post.

As for your other post:

And if for the sake of argument we assume that the brain is a quantum computer, this does not help to establish your version of free will, the underlying conditions are not subject to conscious will or control, consciousness has no access to information processing, neural architecture, information exchange, pattern recognition, memory function, sensory inputs, connectivity, being the determinants of decision making.....the parts relevant to interaction with the external world being represented in conscious form.

you shift to reductionism and make compositional fallacies with it. Terms like decision-making process have already been set. By definition it is whole processes that make decisions entangled or not; you cannot say that we do not make decisions because it is really the underlying parts that ultimately make the decision. A process makes the decision.

I have told you this many times, but we never get any further.

 

[Juma]

The mind is not irreducible.

Imagine you have 2 apples on your desk. And let's say that the apples are put out in such a way that your mind only observes one apple at a time. Without inherently connected particles (entanglement) composing your mind, you should only observe one apple then observe the other. Your consciousness would only know about one thing at a time. But instead, the observation must be a singular/whole and instantaneous notion of multiple objects. Without entanglement, these 2 observations are not connected to each other in any way, which includes the intermediate memory between seeing the two apples.

But the reality is - if we can make an ontologically realistic assumption - that we know of two apples existing and not just one apple at a time. There is an inherently whole meaning of 2 objects existing.

The only way this makes sense to me scientifically is with entanglement where you are physically entangled with the observation of the pieces that make up the thought of 2 objects.

This also explains other metaphysical mysteries like aboutness. Our consciousness could be entangled with what we are actually observing. This would also explain how we can understand concepts like space and time.

What makes us aware of both apples is called "memory" and the ability of see differences in the apples.

But when we "pull up" a memory, how do we know it's a memory?

That is a technical issue, not a principal one.

Because it is not a currently perceived input? Because it is different parts of the brain involved? Because almost everything?
Because it feels clearly different?

Forget for the time being all of the particles that have to somehow emerge a consciousness from no conscious parts, and let's just take for granted that the consciousness exists as a it does.

Now, imagine a 4 dimensional outline of the consciousness being conscious of a memory. There is no physical connection to anything else outside of this 4 dimensional object. You can't be conscious of anything else other than that memory because you are not connected to anything else. You can only go back and forth from memory to reality (selective attention) and carry no prior knowledge about the other thoughts because your consciousness does not have a little internal memory. And even if it did have a little internal memory, the same problem of disconnection would start all over again.

"the conciousness does not have a little internal memory"

What the heck are you talking about? The conciousness is not a separate thing. It is not separate from the memory. The conciousness It is the total of the processes in the brain.

 

[ryan]

Forget for the time being all of the particles that have to somehow emerge a consciousness from no conscious parts, and let's just take for granted that the consciousness exists as a it does.

Now, imagine a 4 dimensional outline of the consciousness being conscious of a memory. There is no physical connection to anything else outside of this 4 dimensional object. You can't be conscious of anything else other than that memory because you are not connected to anything else. You can only go back and forth from memory to reality (selective attention) and carry no prior knowledge about the other thoughts because your consciousness does not have a little internal memory. And even if it did have a little internal memory, the same problem of disconnection would start all over again.

"the conciousness does not have a little internal memory"

What the heck are you talking about? The conciousness is not a separate thing. It is not separate from the memory. The conciousness It is the total of the processes in the brain.

Are you even reading the context? You still should be able to physically outline/define the consciousness. Without entanglement, you can't be simultaneously conscious of more than one line of thinking. Now read the whole post again.

 

[Juma]

"the conciousness does not have a little internal memory"

What the heck are you talking about? The conciousness is not a separate thing. It is not separate from the memory. The conciousness It is the total of the processes in the brain.

Are you even reading the context? You still should be able to physically outline/define the consciousness. Without entanglement, you can't be simultaneously conscious of more than one line of thinking. Now read the whole post again.

No, you just make a lot of stuff up without any evidens at all: you seem to mistake the perceived awareness as evidens of how the awareness works. You cant do that.

 

[DBT]

you shift to reductionism and make compositional fallacies with it. Terms like decision-making process have already been set. By definition it is whole processes that make decisions entangled or not; you cannot say that we do not make decisions because it is really the underlying parts that ultimately make the decision. A process makes the decision.

I have told you this many times, but we never get any further.

Not again. What I said has nothing to do with 'reductionism'

I am simply describing the attributes and functions of a brain in relation to your erroneous interpretations of studies, the role of quantum effects at synaptic clefts, microtubules and even the notes of caution made by the researches themselves, in order to show that you do not have a valid case for free will based on quantum mechanics, the brain as a whole, probability, randomness or 'it could have been a different decision.'

All of which you blithely ignore, misrepresent, divert and misdirect with accusations of 'reductionism' - this in spite of the fact that your argument is based on the ultimate reductionism of quantum effects.

Yet at the same time you claim it is the whole system that decides. Can you see the difficulty. If it is the whole system, it is the state of the whole system that determines output and any quantum effects within the system are minimal (decoherence being too fast and superposition unstable).

Do you see the irony?

 

[DBT]

Without entanglement, you can't be simultaneously conscious of more than one line of thinking.

Where is the evidence for this claim?

 

[ryan]

Are you even reading the context? You still should be able to physically outline/define the consciousness. Without entanglement, you can't be simultaneously conscious of more than one line of thinking. Now read the whole post again.

No, you just make a lot of stuff up without any evidens at all: you seem to mistake the perceived awareness as evidens of how the awareness works. You cant do that.

I have no idea what you are talking about. Be more specific.

 

[ryan]

you shift to reductionism and make compositional fallacies with it. Terms like decision-making process have already been set. By definition it is whole processes that make decisions entangled or not; you cannot say that we do not make decisions because it is really the underlying parts that ultimately make the decision. A process makes the decision.

I have told you this many times, but we never get any further.

Not again. What I said has nothing to do with 'reductionism'

I am simply describing the attributes and functions of a brain in relation to your erroneous interpretations of studies, the role of quantum effects at synaptic clefts, microtubules and even the notes of caution made by the researches themselves, in order to show that you do not have a valid case for free will based on quantum mechanics, the brain as a whole, probability, randomness or 'it could have been a different decision.'

With enough entangled Posner molecules entangled together thus triggering enough neurons there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that our decisions could have been different. I am not even interested in arguing that anymore.

All of which you blithely ignore, misrepresent, divert and misdirect with accusations of 'reductionism' - this in spite of the fact that your argument is based on the ultimate reductionism of quantum effects.

No, my argument is based on quantum holistic properties.

Yet at the same time you claim it is the whole system that decides.Can you see the difficulty. If it is the whole system, it is the state of the whole system that determines output and any quantum effects within the system are minimal (decoherence being too fast and superposition unstable).

Functionally speaking, whatever is necessary to make any decision is what it is.

 

[ryan]

Without entanglement, you can't be simultaneously conscious of more than one line of thinking.

Where is the evidence for this claim?

Because it just doesn't make sense in a reducible brain. You end up with a mind body problem that doesn't need to be there at all.

 

[Juma]

Where is the evidence for this claim?

Because it just doesn't make sense in a reducible brain. You end up with a mind body problem ....

Eh. There is a mind-body problem. There is nothing indicating it being unsolvable witout entanglement, and: nothing indicates that it is being solved by entaglement. Entaglement is just a unknown that you like, it doesnt fit and it doesnt explain anything.

 

[Juma]

No, you just make a lot of stuff up without any evidens at all: you seem to mistake the perceived awareness as evidens of how the awareness works. You cant do that.

I have no idea what you are talking about. Be more specific.

1) the is no evidens that entanglement would enable us to be concious of several thibg at the same time.

2) there is no evidens that entanglement is necessary for us to be concious of several things at the same time.

3) there is no evidens that we really are concious of several things at the same time. It just feels that way.

 

[DBT]

Where is the evidence for this claim?

Because it just doesn't make sense in a reducible brain. You end up with a mind body problem that doesn't need to be there at all.

That is not evidence that supports your claim. You are just rewording your claim. What is the evidence that supports your claim?

Entangled Posner molecules is not the mechanism of decision making.

Posner molecules do not process information by triggering neurons.

That's not how it works.

You appear to be making up your own version of cognition.

 

[ryan]

Because it just doesn't make sense in a reducible brain. You end up with a mind body problem ....

... nothing indicates that it is being solved by entaglement.

Well that's what you say.

Read,

"The cognitive binding problem is a central question in the study of consciousness: how
does the brain synthesize its modal and submodal processing systems to generate a
unity of conscious experience? This essay considers several solutions to the binding
problem, as well as their shortcomings. In particular, the current theory of neural
synchronization as the basis for binding and consciousness is explored in its relationship
to the relativity of simultaneity. This discussion of cognitive binding and simultaneity in
the brain incorporates the philosophy of Kant, notably the principles of the
transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental aesthetic found in his
Critique of Pure Reason. This leads to a more general consideration of consciousness
and time, and explores the possibility of non-temporal theories of consciousness. The
emerging field of quantum neurodynamics is discussed in this context, and its
remarkable relationship to Kant is elucidated. Finally, the relevance of KantÊs
philosophy to cognitive binding is used as a basis for the discussion of a
neurophilosophical method in the investigation of consciousness."

and later in the paper,

"The quantum theory of the brain is as yet hypothetical and theoretical, with no
empirical confirmation. It is of interest, however, to examine how quantum neurodynamics
explains cognitive binding and unity of consciousness. First, because it is a theory that views
the brain as a quantum unity in itself, it eliminates the problem a priori. In short, if there
are no spatially discrete information processors, then there is no binding problem. Binding
ceases to be a difficulty for the brain to solve a posteriori , but simply follows from the
quantum structure, i.e. the quantum unity, of the brain. This unity, however, transcends the
mere interconnectedness of microtubules and other brain proteins. Quantum unity also
implies quantum non-locality, in which entangled particles can influence one another
instaneously."

from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.737.8147&rep=rep1&type=pdf


Here is support for Hameroff's and Penrose's ORCH OR Theory

"Quantum states in dendrites and soma of a particular neuron could
entangle with microtubules in the dendritic tree of that neuron, and also
in neighboring neurons via dendritic–dendritic (or dendritic–interneuron–
dendritic) gap junctions, enabling quantum entanglement of superposed
microtubule tubulins among many neurons (Fig. 1). This allows unity and
binding of conscious content, and a large EG which reaches threshold (by
τ ≈ ℏ/EG) quickly, such as at end-integration in EEG-relevant periods of
time, e.g., τ = 0.5 s to τ = 10−2 s."

from http://consciousness.arizona.edu/do...ReviewofOrchOR2016b2237_Ch-14_Revised-2-3.pdf