Copernicus said:
Not necessarily. How theists actually use a word like "God" does not always conform to their ideal of how the word ought to be used. We have arguments about that all the time in a forum like this. God is omnipotent yet vulnerable. God is omniscient yet always needing to test people to see how they will behave. God loves everyone but sends sinners to eternal torment. Even when the definitions don't lead to cognitive dissonance of that sort, they don't necessarily accurately reflect what people believe.
Of course, how theists actually use a word like "God" does not always conform to their ideal of how the word ought to be used. As I said, often the same theists uses the word very differently in different contexts, or even in the same without realizing it. But regardless, given how theists - specifically, philosophically informed theists - use the words in the context of some of their arguments, it seems like a reasonably close match.
Copernicus said:
Angra Mainyu said:
Second, different people mean different things by the word "God". It is even frequent for the same person to mean different things in different arguments, often without realizing it.
That's true, but completely irrelevant. We are interested in common usage, not idiosyncratic usage.
It is relevant, because I was talking about common usage. I don't think there is such thing as a unique common usage of the word "God", or even "god". It's all over the place.
Copernicus said:
Angra Mainyu said:
Third, even a definition that does not represent a reasonable definition of the concept can be useful for showing non-existence, as long as the definition captures a necessary condition built in the concept.
I have no idea what criteria you think renders a definition reasonable, so I can't stipulate to that. Moreover, I consider the expressions "necessary condition" and "sufficient condition" misleading when it comes to word meanings. Meanings are very complex networks of associated concepts in which the associations can be strong or weak. Just about every attribute or component of a word meaning can be cancelled out in different conversational contexts. So it is hard to identify any component of meaning that is absolutely necessary in every instance of usage. If all you are saying here is that concepts strongly associated with the word can be useful, and I agree to that. Just bear in mind that all words have some range of ambiguity and a certain amount of vagueness associated with them.
First, you brought up the concept of "reasonable definition".
Second, what I said above does not depend on what I consider to be a reasonable definition. Any definition that captures a
necessary condition built in the concept is potentially useful to show nonexistence - as long as one can show that there is nothing that fulfils that condition, that's that.
Third, I disagree with you about word's meaning. For example, a necessary condition for an agent to be God in the usage of nearly all people is that the entity be more powerful than a human being (that's trivially clear). But also, a necessary condition in much of the usage (the actual usage, not only the definitions they provide) of nearly all Christian philosophers is that the agent be morally perfect. And most Christian philosophers would also require that the entity be omniscient and omnipotent, at least in a weak form of omniscience. This often extends to the usage of Christians who are philosophically informed to a considerably degree, even if not professional philosophers.
Fourth, the condition that the agent be worthy of worship covers much of the actual usage of many theists including much of the usage of Christian philosophers, so it is a pretty good target.
Copernicus said:
This argument is wrong on so many levels. Basically, it is just a "No True Scotsman" fallacy. The mere declaration that a subjective value judgment such as "worthy of worship" is a necessary property of an entity does not actually make it a necessary property.
That is not a subjective value judgment, but a moral assessment. Other than that, yes, of course the mere declaration does nothing, but it is a necessary property in much of the usage of many theists, in my experience. So, we disagree. But remember, Bomb#20 was replying to Lion IRC's post demanding that atheists explained what it was they did not believe in.
Copernicus said:
We can obviously conceive of gods that aren't worthy of worship but are nevertheless worshiped by some people.
I cannot, in one of the many usages of "God" that are pretty common and not limited to one or two people, because that's part of their usage.
Copernicus said:
All you are saying here is that your made-up definition serves as a means of distinguishing "true gods" from "false gods". So the real argument comes down to whether that definition is realistic, and I don't think it is. You might as well define a "true dog" as a four-legged canine and then declare an animal not to be a "true dog" because it lost one of its legs in an accident. That kind of procrustean logic isn't very convincing. Most dogs have four legs, but not every dog does.
Sure, we just disagree about usage. By the way, that's not my definition of "God". It's a modification of Bomb#20's, weakening the condition. I already explained my definition in another post (i.e., God is an omnimax agent). It's not meant to capture all usages of "God", but necessary conditions in the usage of most theist philosophers and many other theists. That is the target. Let me put it this way: were they to conclude that there is no omnimax agent, they would grant that God does not exist, or else they would be inconsistent.
Copernicus said:
Arguments based on popularity and authority are not very compelling.
It is when you argue against their claims and arguments, where they use that condition.
Copernicus said:
In any case, "worthy of worship" is not necessary to consider a putative being a "god". One can conceive of gods that are not worthy or worship or are not even worshiped.
Not worshiped, sure, but that's not the point. Not worthy of worship, that depends on the usage of "god", but not in one of the many usages of "God" that are pretty common and not limited to one or two people, because that's part of their usage. Look at philosophers.
Copernicus said:
There could be such a thing as a god that nobody has ever heard of and that would therefore not be worshiped. Such a god might or might not be worthy of worship, but it could be a god in all other respects.
I was talking about God, not about a god. I don't know what the latter is. I do know what God would be, in some of the usages of many people, including most philosophers - or at least, close enough to target it.
Copernicus said:
This is someone talking about his concept of "God", not gods in general.
But I was not. The word "God" is frequently used to mean one among several different things. But "god" is just far more ambiguous still. If you're talking about gods in general, I ask "what's a god?". Regardless, Bomb#20 was talking about non-capitalized "god", but gave a definition, and explained what he did not believe in, addressing Lion's question.
Copernicus said:
And I don't really care how much Christians admire and respect William Lane Craig. He is not an authority on linguistic usage.
That is true, and I actually considered that later in the post you're replying to. But to the extent that they use his arguments and that they incorporate his usage of the word (in which he assumes it's part of the concept) in their own arguments (directly or by citing his, or those of other philosophers), that creates a reasonably good target as well.
Copernicus said:
All he is doing here is advocating for some ideal regarding one individual god. In principle, there could be a creator god that is malevolent or indifferent towards humans.
That would definitely
not be God, in the usage of "God" of nearly all theist philosophers, and philosophically informed Christians.
Copernicus said:
That would violate Craig's ideal for the name "God", but it would do nothing to prevent others from using that name.
Certainly. But then, Bomb#20 did not mean to target
those potential usages. Neither did I.
Copernicus said:
That's true. But let me point out that one cannot define something into existence or nonexistence. I can define a unicorn. Whether or not unicorns exist is not part of the meaning or definition. The word can be used to refer to fictional unicorns as well as real ones, should one happen to encounter a real unicorn. Similarly, whether or not gods exist is not part of the meaning of the word "god".
But then your point does not work as an objection to Bomb#20's argument. He did not introduce existence or nonexistence in the definition.
Copernicus said:
But the word "God"--even the proper name--is not used that way. Christians who ask you whether you believe in the existence of God are not asking you whether you believe in the "God that exists", as opposed to a god by that name that doesn't exist. They are asking you whether you believe that an entity by that name exists. The concept is a purely hypothetical concept in that usage.
First, it is used that way in the context of arguments for the existence of God (e.g., Swinburne's, which I already mentioned). Many Christians use those arguments to support their beliefs and claims that God exists, making a counterargument using those definitions a fair way of going about that.
Second, actually, when they ask you, it depends on the Christian what they mean by "God". Some are asking about the biblical creator (i.e., "God" names whatever person (if any) is picked by the biblical description). Others are asking about an omnimax agent, etc.
Copernicus said:
I have put the part of your argument in boldface that stands out to me as utterly wrong. We do not have to accept Craig's definition, especially if it does not reflect his actual usage. That said, I'm not even conceding here that you have characterized Craig properly, if you think that God's actual existence is inherent in his definition of "God". It seemed to me that he was only claiming that the "God" concept was like the "unicorn" concept. There can be gods and unicorns that don't exist. He just doesn't wish to use the proper name "God" to refer to an entity with divine powers that is not worthy of worship. Such an entity would be a god unworthy of worship--e.g. Satan or Loki. You can pick up any Marvel comic book and find such gods talked about all the time.
Actually, I was not characterizing Craig's position in that manner. I never said anything about including existence in the definition. You did that in our exchange, attributing it apparently to Bomb#20, and now to me attributing it to Craig. What Craig was saying was that in the common usage of "God", being worthy of worship was part of the concept, not that existing was part of the concept.
Now, as it turns out, there is a pretty good case to be made that Craig thinks necessary existence (though weirdly, not existence) is also built into the concept of "God" (at least, when he is making some arguments; his concept seems to change in different contexts, even if he would deny that), but I don't need to make that case. I was talking about being worthy of worship, not about existence.