I think we can make the positive claim that nothing like 'gods' exist

[skepticalbip]

While atheists in general have the unassailable neutral position of "I do not believe a god exists because of insufficient evidence", I think we can make significantly strong statements about gods.

Some gods are so incoherently defined and logically inconsistent that they cannot logically exist as defined. For example, the Omni-gods which is all powerful, all knowing and all loving have this contradiction. This contradiction has been well understood by Greek philosophers as early as 500 BCE. Apologists understand that this is a contradiction too and have redefined their gods to be maximally powerful as to not fall into contradiction. The Bible god falls into this category.

Other gods are more carefully defined and/or not logically impossible.

My claim is that we understand the laws of physics sufficiently well to rule-out the existence of large classes of possible gods.

Sean Carrol notes "The laws of physics for everyday life are completely understood". This statement is while shocking is not controversial to people who understand physics. And there simply is no room within the gaps of our knowledge for any god-like thing to exist.

Common criticisms of this point are as follows

1. "But we don't know everything". This is irrelevant because we don't need to know everything when we understand the boundaries of the possible. I don't need to know the number of grains of sand on a beach to know that it is a large but finite number...

2. "But god can break the rules". If such a god operates in the physical world, then we would see results of such a god. We don't see any god operating but many many examples of no god acting in the world on any level.

3. "But god is the physical laws of the universe". A redefinition of god into 'the physical laws' is just a version of deism and equivalent to a non-existent god.

4. Clark's Third Law "Any sufficient technology will be seen as magic". This is a literary rule-of-thumb not a physical law. It also makes a unfalsifiable claim that has no evidence. No matter what technology a god might be using, it will be based in physical law... not magic. And we typically don't refer to advanced technological beings as being gods.... although we have yet to see any evidence for such beings existing outside of fiction.

***

My claim is: The bible god absolutely doesn't exist and our understanding of physical law is sufficient to rule out the existence of anything we would label gods.

I would agree that for any specific version of God it is conceivable that we can disprove it, but that doesn't mean that we can say for sure that no entity that would be seen as a God does not exist.

You would first have to define what you mean by 'god' before I would agree with you. If you only mean someone bigger, stronger, more intelligent, more talented, or better looking than me then I would agree, there is likely such a critter. Sorta like the possibly of there being a magic turnip depends on what you mean by magic.

I have heard Tom Brady called a god by football fans and George Clooney called a god by some women.

 

[Jarhyn]

While atheists in general have the unassailable neutral position of "I do not believe a god exists because of insufficient evidence", I think we can make significantly strong statements about gods.

Some gods are so incoherently defined and logically inconsistent that they cannot logically exist as defined. For example, the Omni-gods which is all powerful, all knowing and all loving have this contradiction. This contradiction has been well understood by Greek philosophers as early as 500 BCE. Apologists understand that this is a contradiction too and have redefined their gods to be maximally powerful as to not fall into contradiction. The Bible god falls into this category.

Other gods are more carefully defined and/or not logically impossible.

My claim is that we understand the laws of physics sufficiently well to rule-out the existence of large classes of possible gods.

Sean Carrol notes "The laws of physics for everyday life are completely understood". This statement is while shocking is not controversial to people who understand physics. And there simply is no room within the gaps of our knowledge for any god-like thing to exist.

Common criticisms of this point are as follows

1. "But we don't know everything". This is irrelevant because we don't need to know everything when we understand the boundaries of the possible. I don't need to know the number of grains of sand on a beach to know that it is a large but finite number...

2. "But god can break the rules". If such a god operates in the physical world, then we would see results of such a god. We don't see any god operating but many many examples of no god acting in the world on any level.

3. "But god is the physical laws of the universe". A redefinition of god into 'the physical laws' is just a version of deism and equivalent to a non-existent god.

4. Clark's Third Law "Any sufficient technology will be seen as magic". This is a literary rule-of-thumb not a physical law. It also makes a unfalsifiable claim that has no evidence. No matter what technology a god might be using, it will be based in physical law... not magic. And we typically don't refer to advanced technological beings as being gods.... although we have yet to see any evidence for such beings existing outside of fiction.

***

My claim is: The bible god absolutely doesn't exist and our understanding of physical law is sufficient to rule out the existence of anything we would label gods.

I would agree that for any specific version of God it is conceivable that we can disprove it, but that doesn't mean that we can say for sure that no entity that would be seen as a God does not exist.

You would first have to define what you mean by 'god' before I would agree with you. If you only mean someone bigger, stronger, more intelligent, more talented, or better looking than me then I would agree, there is likely such a critter. Sorta like the possibly of there being a magic turnip depends on what you mean by magic.

I have heard Tom Brady called a god by football fans and George Clooney called a god by some women.

Whereas I argue that "god" is more like a relationship title like "father" or "mother" or "brother".

Not every universe needs one, of course, I expect some varieties of universe MUST be "from nothing", quite likely including our own.

I point to people who satisfy the relationship model who are in fact plain old ugly, dumb, fucked up, sad humans.

And yours is probably one of the most mature views and usages of the word "magic" I've seen tossed around on these forums!

 

[AdamWho]

I would agree that for any specific version of God it is conceivable that we can disprove it, but that doesn't mean that we can say for sure that no entity that would be seen as a God does not exist.

I gave three broad classes of gods...

Can you could think of another class of gods which isn't covered by my examples?...

So far people only suggest a trivial renaming of some existing thing as 'god'?... such as 'a vague feeling' or 'that hot guy'? or maybe 'some other non-existent thing'?

 

[connick]

I know this probably just amounts to talking to the wind, but I think the tone of this thread has been more toxic than it needs to be. If anyone cares to take this comment to heart, I think it could help the discussion but, hey, I'm not your dad.

Anyway, I just wanted to chime in about some of the statements regarding whether or not we could be in a simulation.

(I guess I've been out of practice too long here at IIDB and don't know how to properly attribute this quote, but it was stated by Jarhyn.)

I rather think all that "proof" is spurious. Part of the reason why science cannot prove zero gods is in fact that science cannot prove we are not in a simulation, and simulations can allow events to be observed uncaused by internal simulation mechanics.

As I've acknowledged in a number of previous threads, I believe it is true that we cannot disprove the possibility of being within a simulation. However, I believe that it is necessary to axiomatically reject the possibility of being in a simulation in order to make any inferences or draw any conclusions.

My reasoning is that if we accept the possibility of being in a simulation, then absolutely everything is uncertain (up to and including apparently self-evident properties and laws such as the laws of identity and non-contradiction) and no coherent arguments can be made. If one does not expressly (and without evidence, I concede) reject the possibility of being in a simulation, then one is rendered utterly mute.

To tie this back to the OP, I'm inclined to agree in broad terms that entire classes of "gods" (at least many of those that have been described in the past) cannot exist. I think there is room for entities or concepts that are a bit more nebulous than your typical omni-god, such as "god is love", or "god is the universe", but I don't think those are the types of gods that Adam has asserted to be inconsistent with the current or future state of scientific understanding.

Ordinarily, statements like "there is a house" are not preceded by a lengthy list of the underlying assumptions that must be accepted to understand and agree with them. We don't say "assuming we're not in a simulation" and "assuming that some things are actually knowable" and "assuming that minds other than my own are real" and "assuming that I am not currently hallucinating", etc. Nevertheless, some of those often unspoken assumptions (and many others) are necessary for such statements to be intelligible, communicable and acceptable.

Now, nobody is obliged to adopt the same axioms as everyone else. Anyone may entertain the idea of our being in a simulation, but as I mentioned before, that cuts off any further statements or conclusions. I think, however, that if one accepts certain subsets of axioms (such as the aforementioned laws of identity and non-contradiction) then one must draw certain conclusions as a matter of necessity. As such, if one axiomatically accepts the basis of formal logic, then beings with certain self-contradictory properties (such as entire classes of gods) are necessarily impossible.

If one further accepts certain axioms or follows from them the presentation of credible evidence and the necessary implications of that evidence then I think I think Adam is correct that, even beyond logically impossible gods, there are others which are ascribed properties that are not and, arguably, can never be, consistent with our understanding of the universe (or are entirely separate from it and therefore meaningless).

There are, as Adam notes, no gaps in our understanding (assuming one accepts a series of axioms which allows one to participate in discussion and evaluate the implications of credible evidence) where entities ascribed certain properties or behaviors might fit. If someone rejects all of the axioms that lead from solipsism to coherent consideration of scientific and logical arguments, I think they are compelled to speak no further on any subject, for all is doubted. If, on the other hand, one accepts some or all of the axioms that allow one to coherently participate in science, logic and discussions thereof, they must admit that certain types of gods to which are attributed logically impossible or physically impossible (i.e. those requiring the upending of the entire corpus of scientific knowledge to date) cannot exist.

Frankly, I don't think it should be as contentious of a statement as it has been taken to be. I'll hazard an attempt at combining my argument with Adam's.

If one accepts conclusions established through the exercise of logic and the scientific method (and that by dint of accepting certain underlying axioms and the necessary implications thereof) then that implies that there are logically and physically impossible classes of gods. If one rejects the impossibility of these classes of gods then it can only be by virtue of rejecting one of the underlying axioms or conclusions which they entail. Depending on the axioms or conclusions that are rejected, one is at best not talking about the same thing or, at worst, excluded from scientific discussions (if the verity of evidence or conclusions are rejected) or even from discussions at all (if the possibility of being in a simulation [or similar possibilities] are entertained).

 

[AdamWho]

There are, as Adam notes, no gaps in our understanding (assuming one accepts a series of axioms which allows one to participate in discussion and evaluate the implications of credible evidence) where entities ascribed certain properties or behaviors might fit. If someone rejects all of the axioms that lead from solipsism to coherent consideration of scientific and logical arguments, I think they are compelled to speak no further on any subject, for all is doubted. If, on the other hand, one accepts some or all of the axioms that allow one to coherently participate in science, logic and discussions thereof, they must admit that certain types of gods to which are attributed logically impossible or physically impossible (i.e. those requiring the upending of the entire corpus of scientific knowledge to date) cannot exist.

Frankly, I don't think it should be as contentious of a statement as it has been taken to be. I'll hazard an attempt at combining my argument with Adam's.

If one accepts conclusions established through the exercise of logic and the scientific method (and that by dint of accepting certain underlying axioms and the necessary implications thereof) then that implies that there are logically and physically impossible classes of gods. If one rejects the impossibility of these classes of gods then it can only be by virtue of rejecting one of the underlying axioms or conclusions which they entail. Depending on the axioms or conclusions that are rejected, one is at best not talking about the same thing or, at worst, excluded from scientific discussions (if the verity of evidence or conclusions are rejected) or even from discussions at all (if the possibility of being in a simulation [or similar possibilities] are entertained).

Thanks for making this clearer.

 

[Jarhyn]

I know this probably just amounts to talking to the wind, but I think the tone of this thread has been more toxic than it needs to be. If anyone cares to take this comment to heart, I think it could help the discussion but, hey, I'm not your dad.

Anyway, I just wanted to chime in about some of the statements regarding whether or not we could be in a simulation.

(I guess I've been out of practice too long here at IIDB and don't know how to properly attribute this quote, but it was stated by Jarhyn.)

I rather think all that "proof" is spurious. Part of the reason why science cannot prove zero gods is in fact that science cannot prove we are not in a simulation, and simulations can allow events to be observed uncaused by internal simulation mechanics.

As I've acknowledged in a number of previous threads, I believe it is true that we cannot disprove the possibility of being within a simulation. However, I believe that it is necessary to axiomatically reject the possibility of being in a simulation in order to make any inferences or draw any conclusions.

My reasoning is that if we accept the possibility of being in a simulation, then absolutely everything is uncertain (up to and including apparently self-evident properties and laws such as the laws of identity and non-contradiction) and no coherent arguments can be made. If one does not expressly (and without evidence, I concede) reject the possibility of being in a simulation, then one is rendered utterly mute.

To tie this back to the OP, I'm inclined to agree in broad terms that entire classes of "gods" (at least many of those that have been described in the past) cannot exist. I think there is room for entities or concepts that are a bit more nebulous than your typical omni-god, such as "god is love", or "god is the universe", but I don't think those are the types of gods that Adam has asserted to be inconsistent with the current or future state of scientific understanding.

Ordinarily, statements like "there is a house" are not preceded by a lengthy list of the underlying assumptions that must be accepted to understand and agree with them. We don't say "assuming we're not in a simulation" and "assuming that some things are actually knowable" and "assuming that minds other than my own are real" and "assuming that I am not currently hallucinating", etc. Nevertheless, some of those often unspoken assumptions (and many others) are necessary for such statements to be intelligible, communicable and acceptable.

Now, nobody is obliged to adopt the same axioms as everyone else. Anyone may entertain the idea of our being in a simulation, but as I mentioned before, that cuts off any further statements or conclusions. I think, however, that if one accepts certain subsets of axioms (such as the aforementioned laws of identity and non-contradiction) then one must draw certain conclusions as a matter of necessity. As such, if one axiomatically accepts the basis of formal logic, then beings with certain self-contradictory properties (such as entire classes of gods) are necessarily impossible.

If one further accepts certain axioms or follows from them the presentation of credible evidence and the necessary implications of that evidence then I think I think Adam is correct that, even beyond logically impossible gods, there are others which are ascribed properties that are not and, arguably, can never be, consistent with our understanding of the universe (or are entirely separate from it and therefore meaningless).

There are, as Adam notes, no gaps in our understanding (assuming one accepts a series of axioms which allows one to participate in discussion and evaluate the implications of credible evidence) where entities ascribed certain properties or behaviors might fit. If someone rejects all of the axioms that lead from solipsism to coherent consideration of scientific and logical arguments, I think they are compelled to speak no further on any subject, for all is doubted. If, on the other hand, one accepts some or all of the axioms that allow one to coherently participate in science, logic and discussions thereof, they must admit that certain types of gods to which are attributed logically impossible or physically impossible (i.e. those requiring the upending of the entire corpus of scientific knowledge to date) cannot exist.

Frankly, I don't think it should be as contentious of a statement as it has been taken to be. I'll hazard an attempt at combining my argument with Adam's.

If one accepts conclusions established through the exercise of logic and the scientific method (and that by dint of accepting certain underlying axioms and the necessary implications thereof) then that implies that there are logically and physically impossible classes of gods. If one rejects the impossibility of these classes of gods then it can only be by virtue of rejecting one of the underlying axioms or conclusions which they entail. Depending on the axioms or conclusions that are rejected, one is at best not talking about the same thing or, at worst, excluded from scientific discussions (if the verity of evidence or conclusions are rejected) or even from discussions at all (if the possibility of being in a simulation [or similar possibilities] are entertained).

And my point is that axiomatic rejection of simulation is not necessary. Merely the possibility of not implies we ought operate as if we are not.

Axiomatic rejection is simply not necessary, when "rejection unto evidence" is sufficient.

Zero being in "zero or more" gets you there to where you wish to be without dogmatic bullshit attached.

Further, "or more" allows putting together such ideas as "even if this is a simulation, there's nothing that says the god is good".

In some ways it prepares the person who holds this for what to do in the event the person is wrong, and for how to argue their position with someone who believes "or more", and who cannot be shaken from "or more".

Such persons recognize the inherent dishonesty in "exactly zero" even if they are unsure entirely how to articulate the exact nature of why such declarations of absolute are problematic, and you will never get them from "or more" to "exactly zero", nor should you try.

I can hold up a concrete proof that "gods are under no obligation to be good, so why should I care even if there is?"

I can hold up a concrete proof that "zero is still an open possibility on the table: no concrete causal adjacencies have been recorded, even as we look intently for them."

I can hold up concrete proof that every "spiritual" and "magical" claim is explained well through material mechanism, including the evidence that most point to to claim positively that there is a god; it does not prove what they think it proves.

But I know that if I try to claim "zero," I will be answered with claims which are similar to the ones I make here, for similar reasons, although drawn to incorrect conclusions (so to draw a line to 'or more'). Why would they not reject such spurious claims? I can reject them easily and I am practically an atheist.

So I seek not to post on stupid hills that cannot and should not be defended, such as the hill the OP stands on. I don't need that hill nor do I want it. It is a hill the creationist dies on all the same.

 

[Kylie]

I would agree that for any specific version of God it is conceivable that we can disprove it, but that doesn't mean that we can say for sure that no entity that would be seen as a God does not exist.

I gave three broad classes of gods...

Can you could think of another class of gods which isn't covered by my examples?...

So far people only suggest a trivial renaming of some existing thing as 'god'?... such as 'a vague feeling' or 'that hot guy'? or maybe 'some other non-existent thing'?

Do you mean in your opening post?

It would seem that those broad categories are:

1. The gods that are so incoherently defined and logically inconsistent that they cannot logically exist as defined.
2. Gods that are more carefully defined than those in Group 1.
3. Gods that are not logically impossible.

I think those categories are so vague and ill defined that they could cover anything.

 

[AdamWho]

I think those categories are so vague and ill defined that they could cover anything.

They cover literally all the gods that people worship and build religions around.

It is ok if you cannot think of other classes of gods.

 

[AdamWho]

I know this probably just amounts to talking to the wind, but I think the tone of this thread has been more toxic than it needs to be. If anyone cares to take this comment to heart, I think it could help the discussion but, hey, I'm not your dad.

Anyway, I just wanted to chime in about some of the statements regarding whether or not we could be in a simulation.

(I guess I've been out of practice too long here at IIDB and don't know how to properly attribute this quote, but it was stated by Jarhyn.)

I rather think all that "proof" is spurious. Part of the reason why science cannot prove zero gods is in fact that science cannot prove we are not in a simulation, and simulations can allow events to be observed uncaused by internal simulation mechanics.

As I've acknowledged in a number of previous threads, I believe it is true that we cannot disprove the possibility of being within a simulation. However, I believe that it is necessary to axiomatically reject the possibility of being in a simulation in order to make any inferences or draw any conclusions.

My reasoning is that if we accept the possibility of being in a simulation, then absolutely everything is uncertain (up to and including apparently self-evident properties and laws such as the laws of identity and non-contradiction) and no coherent arguments can be made. If one does not expressly (and without evidence, I concede) reject the possibility of being in a simulation, then one is rendered utterly mute.

To tie this back to the OP, I'm inclined to agree in broad terms that entire classes of "gods" (at least many of those that have been described in the past) cannot exist. I think there is room for entities or concepts that are a bit more nebulous than your typical omni-god, such as "god is love", or "god is the universe", but I don't think those are the types of gods that Adam has asserted to be inconsistent with the current or future state of scientific understanding.

Ordinarily, statements like "there is a house" are not preceded by a lengthy list of the underlying assumptions that must be accepted to understand and agree with them. We don't say "assuming we're not in a simulation" and "assuming that some things are actually knowable" and "assuming that minds other than my own are real" and "assuming that I am not currently hallucinating", etc. Nevertheless, some of those often unspoken assumptions (and many others) are necessary for such statements to be intelligible, communicable and acceptable.

Now, nobody is obliged to adopt the same axioms as everyone else. Anyone may entertain the idea of our being in a simulation, but as I mentioned before, that cuts off any further statements or conclusions. I think, however, that if one accepts certain subsets of axioms (such as the aforementioned laws of identity and non-contradiction) then one must draw certain conclusions as a matter of necessity. As such, if one axiomatically accepts the basis of formal logic, then beings with certain self-contradictory properties (such as entire classes of gods) are necessarily impossible.

If one further accepts certain axioms or follows from them the presentation of credible evidence and the necessary implications of that evidence then I think I think Adam is correct that, even beyond logically impossible gods, there are others which are ascribed properties that are not and, arguably, can never be, consistent with our understanding of the universe (or are entirely separate from it and therefore meaningless).

There are, as Adam notes, no gaps in our understanding (assuming one accepts a series of axioms which allows one to participate in discussion and evaluate the implications of credible evidence) where entities ascribed certain properties or behaviors might fit. If someone rejects all of the axioms that lead from solipsism to coherent consideration of scientific and logical arguments, I think they are compelled to speak no further on any subject, for all is doubted. If, on the other hand, one accepts some or all of the axioms that allow one to coherently participate in science, logic and discussions thereof, they must admit that certain types of gods to which are attributed logically impossible or physically impossible (i.e. those requiring the upending of the entire corpus of scientific knowledge to date) cannot exist.

Frankly, I don't think it should be as contentious of a statement as it has been taken to be. I'll hazard an attempt at combining my argument with Adam's.

If one accepts conclusions established through the exercise of logic and the scientific method (and that by dint of accepting certain underlying axioms and the necessary implications thereof) then that implies that there are logically and physically impossible classes of gods. If one rejects the impossibility of these classes of gods then it can only be by virtue of rejecting one of the underlying axioms or conclusions which they entail. Depending on the axioms or conclusions that are rejected, one is at best not talking about the same thing or, at worst, excluded from scientific discussions (if the verity of evidence or conclusions are rejected) or even from discussions at all (if the possibility of being in a simulation [or similar possibilities] are entertained).

And my point is that axiomatic rejection of simulation is not necessary. Merely the possibility of not implies we ought operate as if we are not.

Axiomatic rejection is simply not necessary, when "rejection unto evidence" is sufficient.

Zero being in "zero or more" gets you there to where you wish to be without dogmatic bullshit attached.

Further, "or more" allows putting together such ideas as "even if this is a simulation, there's nothing that says the god is good".

In some ways it prepares the person who holds this for what to do in the event the person is wrong, and for how to argue their position with someone who believes "or more", and who cannot be shaken from "or more".

Such persons recognize the inherent dishonesty in "exactly zero" even if they are unsure entirely how to articulate the exact nature of why such declarations of absolute are problematic, and you will never get them from "or more" to "exactly zero", nor should you try.

I can hold up a concrete proof that "gods are under no obligation to be good, so why should I care even if there is?"

I can hold up a concrete proof that "zero is still an open possibility on the table: no concrete causal adjacencies have been recorded, even as we look intently for them."

I can hold up concrete proof that every "spiritual" and "magical" claim is explained well through material mechanism, including the evidence that most point to to claim positively that there is a god; it does not prove what they think it proves.

But I know that if I try to claim "zero," I will be answered with claims which are similar to the ones I make here, for similar reasons, although drawn to incorrect conclusions (so to draw a line to 'or more'). Why would they not reject such spurious claims? I can reject them easily and I am practically an atheist.

So I seek not to post on stupid hills that cannot and should not be defended, such as the hill the OP stands on. I don't need that hill nor do I want it. It is a hill the creationist dies on all the same.

If you have a coherent point to make, why obscure it in this word salad jumble?

From what I can glean, you seem to be saying, "If I can imagine a possibility, that is enough to say something is possible".

To add to this you suggest, "If someone doesn't accept my urbane solipsism then they are like dull creationists".... sorry but the world doesn't work like that... Facts, evidence and scientific consensus exists.

God claims are (mostly) claims about how the universe operates and are squarely in the realm of scientific investigation.

 

[connick]

And my point is that axiomatic rejection of simulation is not necessary. Merely the possibility of not implies we ought operate as if we are not.

Axiomatic rejection is simply not necessary, when "rejection unto evidence" is sufficient.

Jarhyn, thanks for the response. I'm not sure I fully grasp what you're trying to say after the part I've snipped here, but I think the above is clear enough to me that I can meaningfully respond.

I agree that axiomatic rejection of the possibility of being in a simulation is not necessary in and of itself. However, if that possibility is not rejected, I believe that the only coherent position one can take is to assign indefinite truth values to every possible statement. Even apparently self-evident truths must be doubted. It could be, for instance, that in a supervening universe where our simulation is being run, the very foundations of logic - our conceptions of existence, truth, rules of inference - have different meanings or (as incomprehensible as it may be) don't exist at all.

I contend that there are no statements that can be made about anything if we accept the possibility of being in a simulation, other than "we could be in a simulation" (or some equivalent statement about how nothing can be known). 1 + 1 = 2 could be an illusion presented by the simulation. That A cannot be both A and not A could be an illusion presented by the simulation. By extension, this very discussion assumes that we are not in a simulation. So, while axiomatic rejection of the possibility of our being in a simulation is not strictly necessary, without adopting such an axiom one is prohibited from participating coherently in discussion of anything and everything.

I disagree that "rejection unto evidence" is sufficient reason to exclude the possibility of our being in a simulation. There is, as far as I can tell, no conceivable way to know whether or not we are actually in a simulation. Even if an omni-god appeared before our very eyes and lit up a giant neon sign that said "you are not in a simulation", that too could be simulated.

Simply put, we can never prove we are not in a simulation, but in order to say any more than that, one has to reject that premise out of hand and without any evidence whatsoever. If one is willing to remain mute, then axiomatic rejection is not necessary, but if one wants to participate in any thinking or discussion of any kind, then it is necessary.

To carry this just a little further back to where it ties in with the OP, consider the other axioms that one must adopt and the dependent inferences that must be made in order to reach the point where the participants in this conversation can hold coherent positions. There are unspoken assumptions (e.g. that rules of logic and inference are applicable, that we are not simply dreaming, that our interlocutors are actually other people, etc.) that allow us to hold, in principle at least, self-coherent worldviews. One cannot, for instance, believe both that AdamWho holds incorrect beliefs and is a simulation. If they are not real then they hold no beliefs.

Now, if we start with primordial axioms (one of which I believe is the rejection of simulation hypotheses or other equivalents that entail a fundamental numinousness) and work our way up to this discussion, there are some that I think we collectively agree upon and others I think we might not. As I mentioned in my previous response, depending on which of these we do not agree upon, we end up either 1) not talking about the same thing, 2) disagreeing about something which precludes mutual understanding on specific topics, or 3) not being able to have meaningful discussion about any topic.

In the first case (such as disagreeing about specific terms or the implications of certain evidence), that gap might be bridged by aligning high-level assumptions and definitions. In the second case (such as rejecting well-established scientific understanding) the gap might be bridged by education or reliance on credible expertise. In the third case (such as entertaining the possibility of being in a simulation), the gap is closed only by a personal decision about whether one wants to be in an unassailable epistemological position or go out on a limb for the sake of further discussion.

I think that if we all agree to a certain set of axioms and dependent inferences (probably too many to readily enumerate here) then we must, by necessity, reach the same conclusions. I think I'm aligned with Adam, up to the point where I am of the belief that any new discoveries are largely limited to refinements of existing understanding or, in the case of new discoveries that upend science as we know it, that they could not result in opening up a gateway for certain classes of gods to exist (e.g. those which are logically contradictory or those which require established facts to be invalidated [e.g. communication of information in excess of the speed of light, violation of conservation laws, etc.]).

Thanks to all for the discourse!

 

[Jarhyn]

I know this probably just amounts to talking to the wind, but I think the tone of this thread has been more toxic than it needs to be. If anyone cares to take this comment to heart, I think it could help the discussion but, hey, I'm not your dad.

Anyway, I just wanted to chime in about some of the statements regarding whether or not we could be in a simulation.

(I guess I've been out of practice too long here at IIDB and don't know how to properly attribute this quote, but it was stated by Jarhyn.)

I rather think all that "proof" is spurious. Part of the reason why science cannot prove zero gods is in fact that science cannot prove we are not in a simulation, and simulations can allow events to be observed uncaused by internal simulation mechanics.

As I've acknowledged in a number of previous threads, I believe it is true that we cannot disprove the possibility of being within a simulation. However, I believe that it is necessary to axiomatically reject the possibility of being in a simulation in order to make any inferences or draw any conclusions.

My reasoning is that if we accept the possibility of being in a simulation, then absolutely everything is uncertain (up to and including apparently self-evident properties and laws such as the laws of identity and non-contradiction) and no coherent arguments can be made. If one does not expressly (and without evidence, I concede) reject the possibility of being in a simulation, then one is rendered utterly mute.

To tie this back to the OP, I'm inclined to agree in broad terms that entire classes of "gods" (at least many of those that have been described in the past) cannot exist. I think there is room for entities or concepts that are a bit more nebulous than your typical omni-god, such as "god is love", or "god is the universe", but I don't think those are the types of gods that Adam has asserted to be inconsistent with the current or future state of scientific understanding.

Ordinarily, statements like "there is a house" are not preceded by a lengthy list of the underlying assumptions that must be accepted to understand and agree with them. We don't say "assuming we're not in a simulation" and "assuming that some things are actually knowable" and "assuming that minds other than my own are real" and "assuming that I am not currently hallucinating", etc. Nevertheless, some of those often unspoken assumptions (and many others) are necessary for such statements to be intelligible, communicable and acceptable.

Now, nobody is obliged to adopt the same axioms as everyone else. Anyone may entertain the idea of our being in a simulation, but as I mentioned before, that cuts off any further statements or conclusions. I think, however, that if one accepts certain subsets of axioms (such as the aforementioned laws of identity and non-contradiction) then one must draw certain conclusions as a matter of necessity. As such, if one axiomatically accepts the basis of formal logic, then beings with certain self-contradictory properties (such as entire classes of gods) are necessarily impossible.

If one further accepts certain axioms or follows from them the presentation of credible evidence and the necessary implications of that evidence then I think I think Adam is correct that, even beyond logically impossible gods, there are others which are ascribed properties that are not and, arguably, can never be, consistent with our understanding of the universe (or are entirely separate from it and therefore meaningless).

There are, as Adam notes, no gaps in our understanding (assuming one accepts a series of axioms which allows one to participate in discussion and evaluate the implications of credible evidence) where entities ascribed certain properties or behaviors might fit. If someone rejects all of the axioms that lead from solipsism to coherent consideration of scientific and logical arguments, I think they are compelled to speak no further on any subject, for all is doubted. If, on the other hand, one accepts some or all of the axioms that allow one to coherently participate in science, logic and discussions thereof, they must admit that certain types of gods to which are attributed logically impossible or physically impossible (i.e. those requiring the upending of the entire corpus of scientific knowledge to date) cannot exist.

Frankly, I don't think it should be as contentious of a statement as it has been taken to be. I'll hazard an attempt at combining my argument with Adam's.

If one accepts conclusions established through the exercise of logic and the scientific method (and that by dint of accepting certain underlying axioms and the necessary implications thereof) then that implies that there are logically and physically impossible classes of gods. If one rejects the impossibility of these classes of gods then it can only be by virtue of rejecting one of the underlying axioms or conclusions which they entail. Depending on the axioms or conclusions that are rejected, one is at best not talking about the same thing or, at worst, excluded from scientific discussions (if the verity of evidence or conclusions are rejected) or even from discussions at all (if the possibility of being in a simulation [or similar possibilities] are entertained).

And my point is that axiomatic rejection of simulation is not necessary. Merely the possibility of not implies we ought operate as if we are not.

Axiomatic rejection is simply not necessary, when "rejection unto evidence" is sufficient.

Zero being in "zero or more" gets you there to where you wish to be without dogmatic bullshit attached.

Further, "or more" allows putting together such ideas as "even if this is a simulation, there's nothing that says the god is good".

In some ways it prepares the person who holds this for what to do in the event the person is wrong, and for how to argue their position with someone who believes "or more", and who cannot be shaken from "or more".

Such persons recognize the inherent dishonesty in "exactly zero" even if they are unsure entirely how to articulate the exact nature of why such declarations of absolute are problematic, and you will never get them from "or more" to "exactly zero", nor should you try.

I can hold up a concrete proof that "gods are under no obligation to be good, so why should I care even if there is?"

I can hold up a concrete proof that "zero is still an open possibility on the table: no concrete causal adjacencies have been recorded, even as we look intently for them."

I can hold up concrete proof that every "spiritual" and "magical" claim is explained well through material mechanism, including the evidence that most point to to claim positively that there is a god; it does not prove what they think it proves.

But I know that if I try to claim "zero," I will be answered with claims which are similar to the ones I make here, for similar reasons, although drawn to incorrect conclusions (so to draw a line to 'or more'). Why would they not reject such spurious claims? I can reject them easily and I am practically an atheist.

So I seek not to post on stupid hills that cannot and should not be defended, such as the hill the OP stands on. I don't need that hill nor do I want it. It is a hill the creationist dies on all the same.

If you have a coherent point to make, why obscure it in this word salad jumble?

From what I can glean, you seem to be saying, "If I can imagine a possibility, that is enough to say something is possible".

To add to this you suggest, "If someone doesn't accept my urbane solipsism then they are like dull creationists".... sorry but the world doesn't work like that... Facts, evidence and scientific consensus exists.

God claims are (mostly) claims about how the universe operates and are squarely in the realm of scientific investigation.

Facts exist, evidence exists, widely observed material effects clearly exist.

You are the one departing from those things when you try to claim "exactly zero". You are engaging in wishful philosophy as much as the creationist.

Your imagining of what other people's God claims are about does not make it so.

The basic fundamental core of the God claims I encounter among the religious is exactly targeting "we cannot know", because you can't prove a negative through science, and when you pretend you can, rather than just leaning on the burden of proof, you just look a bit silly.

However, if that possibility is not rejected, I believe that the only coherent position one can take is to assign indefinite truth values to every possible statement.

Well, it certainly means accepting such ideas as "I'm right until I'm wrong" and "trust but verify".

And in terms of axiomatic systems, we can absolutely assemble modal statements that lead to contingent truths. I can absolutely say, in all confidence that it is true "a creator god is not guaranteed to be good".

It does mean that one gets to forever cast doubt on their understanding of the world, as they ought, because doubt is the foundation of all improvement of understanding.

It means being strategic and critical with doubt, and so to apply the scientific method, and to be rigorous. It means looking at the properties of the universe and seeing if you can spot anomalies or aberrations against your understanding, and it means being able to reconfigure your understanding when you discover it is wrong.

This is what the atheist ostensibly asks the creationist to do, so why would the atheist reject the expectation of such?

I am, for all intents and purposes, an atheist. I do not believe in a creator god. I do not believe any of the things called God or worshipped as gods deserve such, nor deserve such a title. I do recognize that to ask someone else to assign indefinite truth to some aspect of their understanding, you have to show your understanding is vulnerable nor afraid of such.

 

[AdamWho]

If you have a coherent point to make, why obscure it in this word salad jumble?

From what I can glean, you seem to be saying, "If I can imagine a possibility, that is enough to say something is possible".

To add to this you suggest, "If someone doesn't accept my urbane solipsism then they are like dull creationists".... sorry but the world doesn't work like that... Facts, evidence and scientific consensus exists.

God claims are (mostly) claims about how the universe operates and are squarely in the realm of scientific investigation.

Facts exist, evidence exists, widely observed material effects clearly exist.

You are the one departing from those things when you try to claim "exactly zero". You are engaging in wishful philosophy as much as the creationist.

Your imagining of what other people's God claims are about does not make it so.

The basic fundamental core of the God claims I encounter among the religious is exactly targeting "we cannot know", because you can't prove a negative through science, and when you pretend you can, rather than just leaning on the burden of proof, you just look a bit silly.

At no time did I say the words "exactly zero"... you are constructing a strawman. You have failed to understand the argument. What I did say is that given the characteristics of the gods I described in the OP, we can positively rule out the existence of those gods. If you would like to come up with a class of gods which isn't covered by my examples or trivial, then bring it. I cannot read your mind.

If you want to define a god as "that which we don't know", then I would argue that

1. That isn't a god anybody actually cares about; the kind that people worship, passes laws for, knocks on door, or kill people over.

2. You have just renamed "things we don't know" as a god... Therefor god exists? That is exactly the trivial redefinition I am talking about

3. At best this theoretical god is a deist god, which I already addressed.

 

[Jarhyn]

If you have a coherent point to make, why obscure it in this word salad jumble?

From what I can glean, you seem to be saying, "If I can imagine a possibility, that is enough to say something is possible".

To add to this you suggest, "If someone doesn't accept my urbane solipsism then they are like dull creationists".... sorry but the world doesn't work like that... Facts, evidence and scientific consensus exists.

God claims are (mostly) claims about how the universe operates and are squarely in the realm of scientific investigation.

Facts exist, evidence exists, widely observed material effects clearly exist.

You are the one departing from those things when you try to claim "exactly zero". You are engaging in wishful philosophy as much as the creationist.

Your imagining of what other people's God claims are about does not make it so.

The basic fundamental core of the God claims I encounter among the religious is exactly targeting "we cannot know", because you can't prove a negative through science, and when you pretend you can, rather than just leaning on the burden of proof, you just look a bit silly.

At no time did I say the words "exactly zero"... you are constructing a strawman. You have failed to understand the argument. What I did say is that given the characteristics of the gods I described in the OP, we can positively rule out the existence of those gods. If you would like to come up with a class of gods which isn't covered by my examples or trivial, then bring it. I cannot read your mind.

If you want to define a god as "that which we don't know", then I would argue that

1. That isn't a god anybody actually cares about; the kind that people worship, passes laws for, knocks on door, or kill people over.

2. You have just named "things we don't know" as a god... Therefor god exists? That is exactly the trivial redefinition I am talking about

3. At best this theoretical god is a deist god, which I already addressed.

"Exactly zero" is a restatement of the OP's titular claim: making a positive claim that there are none, and nothing of "anything like".

If you wish to make lesser claims than your title, make lesser claims in your title. This has been my contention, that you use evidence of a weak claim to bolster a ridiculous claim.

Instead of making such ridiculous claims, I make more reasonable ones, ones that do not stand on the same ridiculous language of your OP title: there are zero or more creator gods.

I can always drag the religious believer to acknowledge the implications of 0 being in that set, and the meaningless of "or more" in any approach to recommendations on behavior, and as you point out, the triviality and uselessness of other concepts of 'god', given better names which refer more directly to formal impersonal materialistic and mathematical notions.

I can't do that if I stamp my feet and say "we can say this empirically: exactly zero", I would be acting like an ass and a fool.

I would be displaying exactly as much faith, in doing so, as the religious believer, and then it would be unreasonable to ask them to doubt their beliefs with me.

I do not name what we do not know "god". I name it "that which we do not know" and I'm unafraid of it in those terms, but moreover I accept that most of what I do know is in that box too. I encourage others to do the same, and if they feel a need to worship, fuel that with "the act of expressing doubt on every belief you hold, and with a broad section of peers, such that those beliefs which do not survive the razor of doubt are left behind; worship through growth of self-critical understanding".

Generally, claims involving "god: creator of our experience of the universe" end up on the floor for exactly the reasons that "there is no evidence and simpler explanations that don't involve that are available; your concept does not survive critical understanding."

Sometimes those claims are useful and are not so easily dismissed: "IF there is a god: creator of our experience of the universe, they are under no obligation to understand philosophy or ethics any better than a human, and they might even be a right shit."

This means that "it is right because Gawd Sez" goes right out the window.

Such metaphysical claims are proven by the direct observation of this existing, as a fact, pertaining to a given simulated universe. Those stay on the table, because no razor can cut logical proofs, assuming the logic is sound, which it is and trivially so, in observation of the genuine article.

And so the conclusion that most religious believers are trying to sell, "Gawd Sez", becomes directly assailable with honest rhetoric.

 

[connick]

However, if that possibility is not rejected, I believe that the only coherent position one can take is to assign indefinite truth values to every possible statement.

Well, it certainly means accepting such ideas as "I'm right until I'm wrong" and "trust but verify".

And in terms of axiomatic systems, we can absolutely assemble modal statements that lead to contingent truths. I can absolutely say, in all confidence that it is true "a creator god is not guaranteed to be good".

It does mean that one gets to forever cast doubt on their understanding of the world, as they ought, because doubt is the foundation of all improvement of understanding.

It means being strategic and critical with doubt, and so to apply the scientific method, and to be rigorous. It means looking at the properties of the universe and seeing if you can spot anomalies or aberrations against your understanding, and it means being able to reconfigure your understanding when you discover it is wrong.

This is what the atheist ostensibly asks the creationist to do, so why would the atheist reject the expectation of such?

I am, for all intents and purposes, an atheist. I do not believe in a creator god. I do not believe any of the things called God or worshipped as gods deserve such, nor deserve such a title. I do recognize that to ask someone else to assign indefinite truth to some aspect of their understanding, you have to show your understanding is vulnerable nor afraid of such.

To me, this seems me like a case of having one's cake and eating it too.

As I've conceded, it is quite possible that we are in a simulation. However, if that is possible than that implies that everything is potentially false. One could not then state, "I think therefore I am" or "something cannot be itself and not itself" or "1 + 1 = 2" or anything at all. Each and every possible statement could be countered by the possibility that we are deceived. "It could be a simulation," would soundly counter every argument ever made or that could ever be made. Would you agree with that?

Treating all statements as contingent truths, with the contingency being whether or not we are in a simulation, represents the same problem in a slightly different form. Instead of rejecting simulation hypotheses as an axiom, we'd just be saying "if it's true we could be in a simulation then we cannot know anything but, if it's not true that we could be in a simulation, we may be able to know something". Functionally, I think they are equivalent, but not if one wants to play both sides of the contingency in an argument.

One cannot debate the merits of an argument like Adam's, which depends upon simulation hypotheses being impossible and, while doing so, rely on the contingency that simulation hypotheses might be true. I guess what I'm saying is, if you object to his argument on the basis that we could be in a simulation, then that is the maximum extent of your objections. You would be unable to invoke logic or evidence of any kind because those are all completely undercut by the simulation objection.

And, if it is the case that you object on the basis that we could be in a simulation I think the honest response from Adam should be to say, "yes, we could be in a simulation, but assuming we cannot be in a simulation..." If, then, you wished to continue to meaningfully participate you would be limited to either accepting the assumption that we cannot be in a simulation or confined to the single and, admittedly unassailable, objection that we could be in a simulation.

So, to wrap back around to what I mean by having and eating your cake, if you are inclined to argue with Adam using logic, evidence, or any type of appeal you might like, you're more than welcome to (not that you need my permission, of course). However, as soon as you use the objection that we could be in a simulation, the rest of your objections (any statements at all really) are immediately null and void. You can't hold as true that we could possibly be in a simulation and hold anything else as true at the same time. The latter seems to be what you have done, but I would be happy to be corrected as far as your position is concerned and do not wish to misrepresent what you are trying to say.

 

[AdamWho]

"Because we could be in a simulation we cannot know anything for certain... Including the validity of this sentence!!"

Let me know when you get past philosophy 101.

Or maybe you could find some non-trivial category of gods which people actually think are gods that isn't covered by the OP

 

[Jarhyn]

However, if that is possible than that implies that everything is potentially false

No, it doesn't. It implies that we are and have been exactly what we are, as we are, all this time even if there is more "under" it than we first expected.

It does not rob us of the lives we have lived or the thoughts we have had, or the ways we have thought those thoughts though it does imply we could be a little less forceful of our declarations.

We lose nothing, none of our truth or our reality, assuming that the thing is not just shut off one day.

It does acknowledge that we can be wildly wrong about certain things, but I think that is a healthy perspective to take, that one may be wildly wrong about some things. My being a thinking, existing, entity doesn't change just by the discovery of deeper fields of physical interactions than quarks and gluons and the like.

I could not encourage some Christian to think they are wildly wrong about some things if I cannot accept the same of myself.

 

[bilby]

any new discoveries are largely limited to refinements of existing understanding or, in the case of new discoveries that upend science as we know it, that they could not result in opening up a gateway for certain classes of gods to exist

It's in the nature of the scientific method that it shuts down, rather than opening up, possibilities.

This is counterintuitive for people who look at the advancement of technology, that builds on 'new scientific findings', but it is nevertheless true at a fundamental level.

Before science, anything is possible. Science works by ruling out as impossible, those things that can be shown to be impossible. That's what falsifying an hypothesis is.

As a result, new and revolutionary theories that 'upend science as we know it' must incorporate the established old science. When Einstein overturned Newton's gravitational theories, rocks didn't start falling upwards; Rather, the results reported by Newton remained as the core of Einstein's results - Einstein's equations include Newton's equations as highly accurate solutions in a very wide range of conditions, and then explain far better those edge cases where Newton's equations gave results that diverged measurably from observation.

Any radical new physics (such as a grand theory unifying Relativity and Quantum Mechanics) would, in order not to be instantly self refuting, have to incorporate the results given by those existing theories in the realms where these are well tested against observation.

The Standard Model rules out unknown interactions at human scales; And any new physics would necessarily incorporate the Standard Model, at least at those scales at which it has been rigorously tested.

New theories that contradict the Standard Model under the conditions for which we have experimental confirmation are already proven to be wrong.

It's clear, given the severe problems with unifying QM and Relativity, that there exists physics we do not yet understand at all. But it's equally clear that any discovery of that currently unknown physics will not result in rocks that fall upwards, nor in currently unknown fundamental forces that are important at human scales.

There cannot be a new theory that renders such things possible, unless our existing theories are wildly and obviously wrong. They're not. We checked.

 

[Elixir]

It's in the nature of the scientific method that it shuts down, rather than opening up, possibilities.

This is counterintuitive for people who look at the advancement of technology, that builds on 'new scientific findings', but it is nevertheless true at a fundamental level.

Is there any scientist who wouldn’t revel in proving most other scientists “wrong” about something? It really is the motivational foundation for advancements, especially in cosmology and physics.

 

[bilby]

It's in the nature of the scientific method that it shuts down, rather than opening up, possibilities.

This is counterintuitive for people who look at the advancement of technology, that builds on 'new scientific findings', but it is nevertheless true at a fundamental level.

Is there any scientist who wouldn’t revel in proving most other scientists “wrong” about something? It really is the motivational foundation for advancements, especially in cosmology and physics.

Absolutely. But I don't see that this has anything to do with what I wrote.

The motivation of scientists is irrelevant. You can only prove something wrong if it's wrong.

Without access to the scientific method, there's nothing to constrain ideas - anything we can imagine is possible. Science is the process of reducing the number of possible things, by showing individual hypotheses to be impossible.

Science is the process of reducing the number of things we are able to justify imagining that we might be able to do.

 

[Elixir]

I don't see that this has anything to do with what I wrote.

I wrote it as a contrast to creationists and crackpots fixated on proving that their god or conspiracy theory is true (based on mutual assurances). Have you noticed how creationists of different stripes are reticent to voice their differences?