In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[ryan]

Now that's how it's done!

Who's next?

So you are proud of being a jerk and a fool?

Does this mean I can join the club now?

Besides, my last post was only meant to be bait for bilby, not you.

 

[Juma]

So you are proud of being a jerk and a fool?

Does this mean I can join the club now?

Besides, my last post was only meant to be bait for bilby, not you.

Just the fact that you call your post "a bait" disqualifies you from any honest discussion.

 

[ryan]

Does this mean I can join the club now?

Besides, my last post was only meant to be bait for bilby, not you.

Just the fact that you call your post "a bait" disqualifies you from any honest discussion.

I was honest about it being bait wasn't I?

 

[The AntiChris]

Yes, this does this does seem to me to be the only way of proceeding if we're going to ensure that the concepts we're discussing relate to the real world. Once you dissociate the subject of discussion from actual usage, you're doing philosophy which has no relevance to the real world.

This appears to be where the problem lies. One step at a time.

Good. This is what I've been trying to do throughout our exchanges.

Are you saying that common usage, in this instance 'free will' in relation to an absence of coercion, may be proven inaccurate by evidence from the ''real world?"

Yes, I think so (I'm just not sure in what sense you're using "inaccurate") What I said in the question to which you answered "No I don't agree" (post #731), was that there is more than one meaning of the term free will in common use and that the existential status of free will is dependent on the specific meaning. By this I simply meant that the determination of existential status (testing the claim against e.g. evidence and logical consistency etc.) will differ dependent on which meaning is under scrutiny.

It follows from this that a particular meaning could, in theory, be logically consistent and make no factually inaccurate claims. The only objection that could be made to a claim of this sort is that it did not accurately reflect popular usage.

 

[Speakpigeon]

One of the first processes that life developed (photosynthesis) uses  quantum walking for efficiency. It just so happened that quantum effects increase the efficiency of the process by some amount, so things which take advantage of this quantum effect are more fit.

Yes, that's true, and I mentionned this aspect a few weeks back myself in a different thread.

I don't really understand the mechanism but it seems to me that the efficacy of the quantum effect here is not based on randomness per se but on the superposition of all the virtual particles created by one incident photon being all over the place so to speak, although that is indeed due to randomness. Each virtual particle tries a pathway, and that where I don't understand it, it finds the best spot at the centre of photosynthesis cells system. However, I would say that the result is really the reverse of randomness. It is more like casting dice many times to make sure you get a number 6, which again is more like integration. The photosynthesis cells integrate all possible locations of the virtual particles to reduce them into one which is most efficient for producing energy. The result is not random, it's probabilitistic. This is similar to finding the best spot in an interference pattern in a Young experiment. Put green plants all around the place there and those that will grow and grow faster will form the same pattern as that of the interferences. Randomness is destroyed in the process, so to speak.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Each virtual particle tries a pathway, and that where I don't understand it, it finds the best spot at the centre of photosynthesis cells system.

Oops, it's not "cells", it's "chromophores", which according to Wikipedia, are "light-sensitive molecules arranged in an antenna-shaped structure named a photocomplex".

The quasiparticle, in this case an exciton, or electron and hole bound together, tries all the chromophores and... somehow finds the best one. Beats me.

In quantum computing, quantum walks are the quantum analogue of classical random walks. Analogous to the classical random walk, where the walker's current state is described by a probability distribution over positions, the walker in a quantum walk is in a superposition of positions.

Because of that last bit, you could argue that the quantum effect in photosynthesis is the result of quantum computing occurring each time a photon hits a photocomplex. However, in effect, it is the photocomplex, a macroscopic piece of biological hardware, which is selected by evolution. So the question is: Is it because a photocomplex works better because of the quantum effect that it has been selected by evolution, possibly over other macroscopic biological structures. Would a photocomplex work at all without the quantum effect? In other words, it may not be the quantum effect that allowed photocomplexes to "survive" and be selected and they might have been selected anyway without this quantum effect.

Anybody knows?
EB

 

[Juma]

Just the fact that you call your post "a bait" disqualifies you from any honest discussion.

I was honest about it being bait wasn't I?

So fucking what? Stop this shit and stick to the actual thread subject.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Now that's how it's done!

Who's next?

So you are proud of being a jerk and a fool?

Can't stop yourself, can you?
EB

 

[Juma]

So you are proud of being a jerk and a fool?

Can't stop yourself, can you?
EB

Why would I? He certainly deserves it, he should know better.

 

[PyramidHead]

ryan, a few points that you hopefully won't dismiss before considering them:

1. If classical mechanics are just quantum mechanics in action at macro scales, and the effects of classical mechanics are predictable on those scales, then the effects of quantum mechanics are predictable at macro scales. So, while the quantum world may have an element of randomness at small scales, it does not have this element at larger scales. You seem to be assuming that quantum effects are random at every level of resolution. They aren't; if the phenomenon being observed is large enough where randomness no longer dominates, it is predictable.

2. Nothing in point #1 matters when talking about free will. Even if small scale interactions are unpredictable, which is what you mean by 'free,' it still remains to be demonstrated that they have a will. More specifically, it remains to be demonstrated that the entity you are calling 'free' is the same entity as the entity with a will. It is not enough to say the entity with a will is composed of entities that are free, therefore the entity with a will has 'free will.' For example, my car is an entity with a muffler. My car is composed of entities that are invisible to the naked eye. From this, it does not follow that my car has a muffler that is invisible to the naked eye.

3. Nothing in point #2 matters when talking about free will. To say that something behaves unpredictably is a necessary condition for freedom, but it is not a sufficient condition. Suppose someone implanted a chip in your brain that caused you to spontaneously recite lines from random Shakespeare plays at irregular intervals. Before the chip was implanted, your behavior was more predictable than after the chip was implanted. Yet, you did not gain any freedom because of the chip, because you are not in control of the resulting unpredictable behavior. Unless you are using a strange definition of freedom, conscious control over one's actions is usually a big part of what it means to be free.

In short, unpredictability is not freedom without conscious control; even if it were, this freedom is not 'free will' just because something with a will is made of particles that are free; even if it were, quantum mechanics is not indeterminate at classical scales.

There are no more avenues available to you for this line of argumentation without creating private definitions of terms that do not resemble ordinary usage.

 

[ryan]

ryan, a few points that you hopefully won't dismiss before considering them:

1. If classical mechanics are just quantum mechanics in action at macro scales, and the effects of classical mechanics are predictable on those scales, then the effects of quantum mechanics are predictable at macro scales. So, while the quantum world may have an element of randomness at small scales, it does not have this element at larger scales. You seem to be assuming that quantum effects are random at every level of resolution. They aren't; if the phenomenon being observed is large enough where randomness no longer dominates, it is predictable.

All of the randomness adds up to classical mechanics, but it is still random and free. Yes there are many interventions from other particles that detour the "will" of other particles, but that doesn't matter to the will. My free will might lead me to go eat a piece of cake in the fridge, but on my way to the fridge somebody shoots me in the head. I still had that free will even though I wasn't successful in achieving it.

2. Nothing in point #1 matters when talking about free will. Even if small scale interactions are unpredictable, which is what you mean by 'free,' it still remains to be demonstrated that they have a will.

I agree. That's why I only argue that free will might be possible.

More specifically, it remains to be demonstrated that the entity you are calling 'free' is the same entity as the entity with a will.

Well this depends on whether or not QM is actually random or if it is determinable. From what I understand, this is a major division in quantum physics.

It is not enough to say the entity with a will is composed of entities that are free, therefore the entity with a will has 'free will.' For example, my car is an entity with a muffler. My car is composed of entities that are invisible to the naked eye. From this, it does not follow that my car has a muffler that is invisible to the naked eye.

I am taking the philosophical liberties that psychology and many other sciences take.

If I am defined a certain way in some static form, then I need everyone of my particles to be me, by definition. Similarly, if you keep taking away particles from me without replacing them, then I am scattered all over the universe. The point is, I need my particles to do what they are doing. I am every action a particles takes, no more no less. I am my parts and the whole. I am random and mostly determinable.

3. Nothing in point #2 matters when talking about free will. To say that something behaves unpredictably is a necessary condition for freedom, but it is not a sufficient condition.

Now this is probably the biggest problem on the thread. I warned everyone that I was not arguing for free will; but rather, I was arguing for the possibility of free will to exist. People kept forgetting this, and I kept reminding them.

In short, unpredictability is not freedom without conscious control; even if it were, this freedom is not 'free will' just because something with a will is made of particles that are free; even if it were, quantum mechanics is not indeterminate at classical scales.

They are currently finding more and more evidence that human systems have quantum mechanisms.

And remember; big decisions can be made from the smallest cause, such as a flap from a butterfly wing.

 

[DBT]

Good. This is what I've been trying to do throughout our exchanges.

So have I.

Yes, I think so (I'm just not sure in what sense you're using "inaccurate")

Someone who is not familiar with metallurgy may refer to aluminum alloy as 'steel' - both aluminum alloy and steel being metals. Despite both being 'metals,' referring to former as 'steel' is inaccurate, it is a different substance.

What I said in the question to which you answered "No I don't agree" (post #731), was that there is more than one meaning of the term free will in common use and that the existential status of free will is dependent on the specific meaning. By this I simply meant that the determination of existential status (testing the claim against e.g. evidence and logical consistency etc.) will differ dependent on which meaning is under scrutiny. [

It follows from this that a particular meaning could, in theory, be logically consistent and make no factually inaccurate claims. The only objection that could be made to a claim of this sort is that it did not accurately reflect popular usage.

But all references to 'will' or 'free will' must relate to what is a single source of 'will' - the brain being the sole agency of decision making and response.

Consequently each and every reference to free will must necessarily relate to the source and production of 'will' if it to be used to support an argument for the existence of free will as an attribute or feature of the human brain, which includes the person as a whole.

So what is consistent with popular usage, which may represent surface appearances, but may not represent the mechanism and means of production.

There lies the problem.

 

[DBT]

All of the randomness adds up to classical mechanics, but it is still random and free.

That's a contradiction. If jittery randomness turns probabilist then classical as the scale increases, it is no longer random. And the word 'free' in this instance implies that particles consciously and knowingly do whatever they please, being 'free.' But this is not the case. You are equivocating 'random' with 'free' - random just being random and not free to choose what to do.

 

[ryan]

All of the randomness adds up to classical mechanics, but it is still random and free.

That's a contradiction. If jittery randomness turns probabilist then classical as the scale increases, it is no longer random. And the word 'free' in this instance implies that particles consciously and knowingly do whatever they please, being 'free.' But this is not the case. You are equivocating 'random' with 'free' - random just being random and not free to choose what to do.

Please read the next 3 sentences I put in that same paragraph,

Yes there are many interventions from other particles that detour the "will" of other particles, but that doesn't matter to the will. My free will might lead me to go eat a piece of cake in the fridge, but on my way to the fridge somebody shoots me in the head. I still had that free will even though I wasn't successful in achieving it.

.

 

[DBT]

That's a contradiction. If jittery randomness turns probabilist then classical as the scale increases, it is no longer random. And the word 'free' in this instance implies that particles consciously and knowingly do whatever they please, being 'free.' But this is not the case. You are equivocating 'random' with 'free' - random just being random and not free to choose what to do.

Please read the next 3 sentences I put in that same paragraph,

Yes there are many interventions from other particles that detour the "will" of other particles, but that doesn't matter to the will. My free will might lead me to go eat a piece of cake in the fridge, but on my way to the fridge somebody shoots me in the head. I still had that free will even though I wasn't successful in achieving it.

.

That doesn't make sense. There is absolutely no connection being made between quantum randomness or quantum probability and your desire to 'eat a piece of cake'

 

[The AntiChris]

But all references to 'will' or 'free will' must relate to...

Why?

Why must all references to 'will' or 'free will' relate to your preconceived idea of what 'will' or 'free will' mean?

Some people may refer to 'will' as the specific brain neurology associated with decision making while others may refer to 'will' simply as purposeful human decision making in its broadest behavioural sense.

Having agreed that word meanings are derived from usage on what possible grounds do you have for stipulating what any particular usage must relate to?

 

[DBT]

But all references to 'will' or 'free will' must relate to...

Why?

Why must all references to 'will' or 'free will' relate to your preconceived idea of what 'will' or 'free will' mean?

It's got nothing to do with my ideas, or preconceived ideas, but the nature and attributes of the object itself.

You, yourself expressed it when you said:
''So, for instance, if you want want to understand what a community of users mean by the word 'god' you study how the word is used within that community. Having done so, you would arrive at a working definition of what the word means within that community. What the theory would not tell you is whether the concept of god in that community refers to something that has any real existence.''

The latter being the key point - ''whether the concept of god [free will in this instance]in that community refers to something that has any real existence''

So our theory in relation of a 'working definition' of what the term 'free will' means within the community, is still insufficient to establish, in your own words: whether what community refers to as 'free will' is something that has any real existence''

That is the point, the relationship between common usage and the actual existence, features and attributes of the object being referred to by common usage.

Common usage may be inaccurate, it may be entirely misplaced: a misnomer.

Some people may refer to 'will' as the specific brain neurology associated with decision making while others may refer to 'will' simply as purposeful human decision making in its broadest behavioural sense.

Having agreed that word meanings are derived from usage on what possible grounds do you have for stipulating what any particular usage must relate to?

I use the very same criteria that you, yourself describe;

''... you would arrive at a working definition of what the word means within that community. What the theory would not tell you is whether the concept of god in that community refers to something that has any real existence.'' - The AntiChris

That is, that the theory of common usage of words and terms refer to objects that may or may not exist, and it is the latter that needs to be established in order to prove a proposition of reality, actual attributes and features, etc.

 

[ryan]

Please read the next 3 sentences I put in that same paragraph,

Yes there are many interventions from other particles that detour the "will" of other particles, but that doesn't matter to the will. My free will might lead me to go eat a piece of cake in the fridge, but on my way to the fridge somebody shoots me in the head. I still had that free will even though I wasn't successful in achieving it.

.

That doesn't make sense. There is absolutely no connection being made between quantum randomness or quantum probability and your desire to 'eat a piece of cake'

Let me break down what you said so that you know why I said what I said.

You said, "That's a contradiction. If jittery randomness turns probabilist then classical as the scale increases, it is no longer random." So at this point, it seems that you are saying that the total randomness is not random; I agree. From that, I want to say that the freedom was still there for the particles before they began their individual random actions. But through all of the chaos from those actions, they become predictable like a bunch of random winds forming a tornado. Maybe every particle was interfered with one way or another, which led to their predictability; that still doesn't change the fact that the particles acted on an infinite amount of freedom when their actions were initiated.

And because all of this macro scale determinism is based on QM, it is no wonder why scientists are now finding evidence for quantum mechanical processes in biology. For me this is no surprise, and it really shouldn't be a surprise to anyone else.

One last thing, when you say "it is no longer random", you are not being accurate. "It" is really "they" ("it" in plural form). "It" is just some arbitrary part of the universe that you abstracted into your mind. "They" (elementary particles), I am willing to argue are unique from all others systems that we randomly abstract. "They" may be the smallest and most simple systems in the universe.

 

[DBT]

Please read the next 3 sentences I put in that same paragraph,

Yes there are many interventions from other particles that detour the "will" of other particles, but that doesn't matter to the will. My free will might lead me to go eat a piece of cake in the fridge, but on my way to the fridge somebody shoots me in the head. I still had that free will even though I wasn't successful in achieving it.

.

That doesn't make sense. There is absolutely no connection being made between quantum randomness or quantum probability and your desire to 'eat a piece of cake'

Let me break down what you said so that you know why I said what I said.

You said, "That's a contradiction. If jittery randomness turns probabilist then classical as the scale increases, it is no longer random." So at this point, it seems that you are saying that the total randomness is not random; I agree.

It's not that the total randomness is no longer random, but that total randomness virtually disappears at wave function collapse/decoherence...'wave functions - the probability waves of quantum mechanics - evolve in time according to precise mathematical roles, such as the Schrodinger equation' etc.

From that, I want to say that the freedom was still there for the particles before they began their individual random actions.

Still no evident connection between randomness and 'freedom' - nor a connection to be made between randomness and the decision making mechanisms of a brain including the decisions that are made, which are not random, or even that decisions 'evolve in time according to precise mathematical roles' - they do not.

While the brain detects photons/wavelength via its sense organs of sight, the eyes, it is the architecture of the senses/brain that converts photon stimulation to nerve impulses and interprets this information as objects (reflected light) and colours (wavelength). None of which is random or arbitrary. So, while fundamental particles such as 'photons' are indeed inputs into the system, it is the architecture of the system that determines the interpretation of shape and colour, and not the action of the inputs themselves that determines how shape and colour is interpreted....different species have different colour perception, yada, yada.

So, sorry ryan, you have no case.

 

[The AntiChris]

Some people may refer to 'will' as the specific brain neurology associated with decision making while others may refer to 'will' simply as purposeful human decision making in its broadest behavioural sense.

Having agreed that word meanings are derived from usage on what possible grounds do you have for stipulating what any particular usage must relate to?

I use the very same criteria that you, yourself describe;

''... you would arrive at a working definition of what the word means within that community. What the theory would not tell you is whether the concept of god in that community refers to something that has any real existence.'' - The AntiChris

That is, that the theory of common usage of words and terms refer to objects that may or may not exist, and it is the latter that needs to be established in order to prove a proposition of reality, actual attributes and features, etc.

This doesn't address my question. I'm clearly talking about what people mean by free will not whether or not what they mean makes any sense.

You can't put any stipulation on what popular usage must refer to but of course you can stipulate the criteria by which you then assess the validity of any claims implicit in that usage. Establishing what a word means (i.e. its referent) is quite separate from establishing whether or not that referent 'exists'.

Do you agree?