In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[ryan]

No, one of the Schrodinger equation describes everything we see using QM and special relativity. Interference of probabilities gives us everything that we see and don't see. There is just QM and general relativity that is needed to describe pretty much everything we observe.

Classical mechanics also describes pretty much everything we observe. That it accurately maps to QM is hard evidence that QM effects beyond those that map to classical mechanics are largely negligible in the real world.

It is not necessary to consider the sphericity of the Earth when mapping a journey of a few hundred miles. It is equally unnecessary to consider QM effects when discussing brain activity.

Reality is almost totally QM. Classical mechanics is just the result of QM. You get CM from QM.

 

[ryan]

Do you not see that QM would have a major impact on what happens at larger scales?

The jittery uncertainty of quantum behaviour smooths out above Compton scale and transforms into the classical behaviour of macro scale structures where it is possible to predict orbits and land spacecraft on distant planets with great precision, know that every action has an equal and opposite reaction, entropy, relativity and so on.

You still ignore decoherance (Copenhagen interpretation) or MW, etc. Which is why QM is still not a ToE.

This is not meant to be disrespectful in any way, but I highly recommend that you spend some time understanding these issues a little more. You are making a lot of your own conclusions.

Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhnKBKZvb_U . This video will help you understand what they know and what the actual problems are.

 

[DBT]

My argument is based on a theory of word meaning derived from common usage.

I know it is. I remember that you were also saying this on FRDB several years ago - ''this is how word are used'' etc etc.

Of course this argument only works if you accept the theory of 'meaning is usage'. On this you're ambiguous:

No, I'm ambiguous on this. Not at all. Of course, it does suit you to say it. That way you can feign incomprehension in order to avoid dealing with the difficulties of an argument based purely on semantics.

Common usage may entail 'the will of god'' for example. Anything tragic that happens, it was 'the will of god' Hence 'tragic events are expressions of the will of god; therefore - based on 'common usage' - the 'will of god' is an real phenomena. The will of god is proven.

Hilarious.

This looks promising, but ...

However, since you reject 'meaning is usage'
So it turns out you subscribe to 'meaning is usage' except when it would mean giving up one of your ideological beliefs.

You are making up your own narrative, a narrative that does not represent what I have said, but does suit your own purpose.

The trouble is, in the absence of the way people actually use a word, how on earth do decide what a word means?

Lordy Lordy....the way people actually use a word is based on the agreed meaning of words: what a word refers to. Consequently, we agree that the word 'moon' does not represent the 'sun' which is an entirely different object.

Words that have multiple meanings are defined by the context in which they are being used in the instance that they are used.

In every instance the word represents something in terms of concepts, ideas, objects, events, etc, etc...words being symbols and not the actual article they represent.

Language Is Symbolic
''Our language system is primarily made up of symbols. A symbol is something that stands in for or represents something else. Symbols can be communicated verbally (speaking the word hello), in writing (putting the letters H-E-L-L-O together), or nonverbally (waving your hand back and forth).''


So, again, common usage of words alone cannot establish the nature and attributes, or even the reality of the objects or ideas (the will of god) or events because a word is a symbol used for the purpose of communication and does not necessarily describe its related object, the will of god, free will, etc, in detail or prove its validity or even reality. For that you need hard evidence.

 

[DBT]

The jittery uncertainty of quantum behaviour smooths out above Compton scale and transforms into the classical behaviour of macro scale structures where it is possible to predict orbits and land spacecraft on distant planets with great precision, know that every action has an equal and opposite reaction, entropy, relativity and so on.

You still ignore decoherance (Copenhagen interpretation) or MW, etc. Which is why QM is still not a ToE.

This is not meant to be disrespectful in any way, but I highly recommend that you spend some time understanding these issues a little more. You are making a lot of your own conclusions.

Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhnKBKZvb_U . This video will help you understand what they know and what the actual problems are.

Rather than begin with ''this is not meant to be disrespectful in any way'' which assumes that you have the answers because you have watched a video, why not give the relevant argument so that I can respond without looking at a video that I don't have time to watch?

Just list your points and provide an argument.

 

[Kharakov]

Classical mechanics also describes pretty much everything we observe. That it accurately maps to QM is hard evidence that QM effects beyond those that map to classical mechanics are largely negligible in the real world.

It is not necessary to consider the sphericity of the Earth when mapping a journey of a few hundred miles. It is equally unnecessary to consider QM effects when discussing brain activity.

Reality is almost totally QM. Classical mechanics is just the result of QM. You get CM from QM.

Claims of observation of QM effects have had a measurable effect on this discussion. I suppose you could say that this discussion won't have a measurable impact on the orbit of the Earth, or the trajectory of the solar system, if you want to get all classical. Then GR has a measurable effect upon the brains of people here as well.

I challenge you to mention something that doesn't have a measurable and provable impact upon your brain (consciousness, if you're monistic).

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course this argument only works if you accept the theory of 'meaning is usage'. On this you're ambiguous:

No, I'm [not] ambiguous on this. Not at all. Of course, it does suit you to say it. That way you can feign incomprehension in order to avoid dealing with the difficulties of an argument based purely on semantics.

I don't appreciate the implied accusation of dishonesty. I can assure you my comments are completely sincere and I assume the same of you.

The problem is I genuinely don't know if you subscribe to a theory of 'meaning is usage' for the meaning of words. You say "of course" in one comment then go on to say that you "question the validity of some common applications" a little later in the same post. So I honestly don't know if you subscribe to 'meaning is usage' wholeheartedly or only in certain specific situations.

Could you please help me here?

Common usage may entail 'the will of god'' for example. Anything tragic that happens, it was 'the will of god' Hence 'tragic events are expressions of the will of god; therefore - based on 'common usage' - the 'will of god' is an real phenomena. The will of god is proven.

Hilarious.

This is important. It goes to the core of our inability to communicate.

It seems you misunderstand the theory of word meaning derived from common usage. It's a theory about the meaning of words. It says nothing about the truth or falsity of any claims we make.

So, for instance, if you want want to understand what a community of users mean by the word 'god' you study how the word is used within that community. Having done so, you would arrive at a working definition of what the word means within that community. What the theory would not tell you is whether the concept of god in that community refers to something that has any real existence.

 

[bilby]

Classical mechanics also describes pretty much everything we observe. That it accurately maps to QM is hard evidence that QM effects beyond those that map to classical mechanics are largely negligible in the real world.

It is not necessary to consider the sphericity of the Earth when mapping a journey of a few hundred miles. It is equally unnecessary to consider QM effects when discussing brain activity.

Reality is almost totally QM. Classical mechanics is just the result of QM. You get CM from QM.

Yes, that is both completely true, and completely compatible with what I wrote. If it is intended as a rebuttal of my post, then it is a complete failure.

 

[ryan]

This is not meant to be disrespectful in any way, but I highly recommend that you spend some time understanding these issues a little more. You are making a lot of your own conclusions.

Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhnKBKZvb_U . This video will help you understand what they know and what the actual problems are.

Rather than begin with ''this is not meant to be disrespectful in any way'' which assumes that you have the answers because you have watched a video, why not give the relevant argument so that I can respond without looking at a video that I don't have time to watch?

Just list your points and provide an argument.

What's the point? I just don't care anymore. I think I'm done with TFT; it's just a drain on me.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'm not sure that's the point, is it?

My understanding was that the point about QM was not that the brain could use QM somehow to make the brain do non-determined things, but rather that QM is evidence that we do not, in fact, live in a determined universe. You can argue that some things are still in effect determined, but that's just a determinism-of-the-gaps argument.

Right. I agree and disagree.

Quantum events are not deterministic at all. True randomness like no other. But macroscopic events are necessarily massively probabilistic due to the massive number of particles involved in ordinary processes, including those inside the brain. The longer you throw a coin the closer the average gets to the probable. So macroscopic events massively follow quasi-deterministic laws. So, I agree that the universe according to quantum physics is not strictly deterministic but for nearly all practical purposes it is as good as and free will falls into that category in my view.
In relation to free will, I think that the mere fact that quantum effects appear baffling to us suggests our brain doesn't escape these quasi-deterministic laws. There's still the possibility of some freak event but not nearly as often as would be required to underpin the more substantive notion of free will some would like to, given that we are supposed to exercise free will at least once a day on average.

But maybe I misunderstood your point?
EB

 

[ryan]

Reality is almost totally QM. Classical mechanics is just the result of QM. You get CM from QM.

Claims of observation of QM effects have had a measurable effect on this discussion. I suppose you could say that this discussion won't have a measurable impact on the orbit of the Earth, or the trajectory of the solar system, if you want to get all classical. Then GR has a measurable effect upon the brains of people here as well.

I challenge you to mention something that doesn't have a measurable and provable impact upon your brain (consciousness, if you're monistic).

I am leaving, but I will leave you with this reply.

I am not talking about the miniscule wave property that macro objects have. I am saying that even their predictive behavior is QM. All I can say is that everything is quantum mechanical, and in this universe it gives the illusion that classical mechanics arises from it.

 

[ryan]

Reality is almost totally QM. Classical mechanics is just the result of QM. You get CM from QM.

Yes, that is both completely true, and completely compatible with what I wrote. If it is intended as a rebuttal of my post, then it is a complete failure.

One last post:

You said, "That it accurately maps to QM is hard evidence that QM effects beyond those that map to classical mechanics are largely negligible in the real world.".

I am trying to say that QM is practically everything, not just the negligible wave properties of the macro world. QM is even the classical mechanical properties that we see work so deterministically by way of an unimaginable coincidence that began since the beginning of the universe. You too need to read up on this more.

 

[bilby]

Yes, that is both completely true, and completely compatible with what I wrote. If it is intended as a rebuttal of my post, then it is a complete failure.

One last post:

You said, "That it accurately maps to QM is hard evidence that QM effects beyond those that map to classical mechanics are largely negligible in the real world.".

I am trying to say that QM is practically everything, not just the negligible wave properties of the macro world. QM is even the classical mechanical properties that we see work so deterministically by way of an unimaginable coincidence that began since the beginning of the universe.

This is all true. What I don't understand is why you think it in any way rebuts my position. Classical Mechanics is what QM looks like at macro scales. So the determinate nature of CM is what you get when QM applies to massive numbers of particles. So there is no handle in the macroscopic world of neurons by which they can access the probabilistic effects you are seeking.

Although even if there was, as neither probability nor randomness are synonymous with freedom, you still would be no closer to demonstrating the existence of free will.

You too need to read up on this more.

You are not remotely qualified to make that assessment.

 

[DBT]

I don't appreciate the implied accusation of dishonesty. I can assure you my comments are completely sincere and I assume the same of you.

Ok, so it's a difficulty with communication.

The problem is I genuinely don't know if you subscribe to a theory of 'meaning is usage' for the meaning of words. You say "of course" in one comment then go on to say that you "question the validity of some common applications" a little later in the same post. So I honestly don't know if you subscribe to 'meaning is usage' wholeheartedly or only in certain specific situations.

Of course I do. Meaning is related to usage. That is not in question, never was and never will be.

There are several aspects to this issue. One, is the question of whether 'meaning' through 'common usage' is in fact an accurate representation of the object, event, idea, etc.

The 'will of god' is an example I gave of 'meaning' developed through common usage in reference to 'the will of god' in relation to certain events in the World....references and meanings that are related to entirely unproven principles - the existence of the will of god, and that events in the world are effected by and conform to the 'will of god'

The meaning, developed through common usage, having no relationship to an actual entity, god, or the reality of the will of god.

Again, meaning developed through common usage cannot prove the reality of the objects they refer to, god, gods will, free will, etc.

If there is such a thing as 'free will' it is a question that can only be understood by an understanding of the nature of the brain (agency) and how the brain generates the things we associate with 'will' - and not merely through 'common usage and meaning' of a word or term.

Could you please help me here?

As I've been trying to point out, usage and common meaning alone does not mean that the things that are being referred to with words and terms are actual entities, objects or events. The references may be mistaken or unproven 'god created man in his image' 'god's will' etc, there may be no 'god' and no 'will of god'

This is important. It goes to the core of our inability to communicate.

It seems you misunderstand the theory of word meaning derived from common usage. It's a theory about the meaning of words. It says nothing about the truth or falsity of any claims we make.

No I don't. and of course I agree with the latter, but you appear to go further. I get the impression that you imply that common usage justifies the reality of the object of reference.

For instance, that free will is an actual attribute of human consciousness because will may be free of coercion and common usage call this 'free will' - therefore we can be said to have free will.

If this is not your position, what are you disputing? It can't be common usage and meaning, which I don't deny, but do question the validity of its references.

So, for instance, if you want want to understand what a community of users mean by the word 'god' you study how the word is used within that community. Having done so, you would arrive at a working definition of what the word means within that community. What the theory would not tell you is whether the concept of god in that community refers to something that has any real existence.

That is precisely what I have been saying and arguing in relation to the issue of free will!!!!!!!

How did you get the idea that I was denying common usage and meaning alone? I've never said, or suggested it, implied it or even hinted at it.

It was always about references, hence I pointed out that 'words are symbols used for the purpose of communication' and not 'the objects themselves' and so on, which says nothing about the nature and attribute of the objects.

Different wording, but essentially the same thing as you said in your last statement.

 

[Juma]

The jittery uncertainty of quantum behaviour smooths out above Compton scale and transforms into the classical behaviour of macro scale structures where it is possible to predict orbits and land spacecraft on distant planets with great precision, know that every action has an equal and opposite reaction, entropy, relativity and so on.

You still ignore decoherance (Copenhagen interpretation) or MW, etc. Which is why QM is still not a ToE.

This is not meant to be disrespectful in any way, but I highly recommend that you spend some time understanding these issues a little more. You are making a lot of your own conclusions.

Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhnKBKZvb_U . This video will help you understand what they know and what the actual problems are.

Really?

A video with a cosmologist explains cosmological solutions to avoid the "Boltzmanbox" of universe evolution will explain what the actual problems of the theory of QM as an probable source of free will are?

Really?

 

[Togo]

I'm not sure that's the point, is it?

My understanding was that the point about QM was not that the brain could use QM somehow to make the brain do non-determined things, but rather that QM is evidence that we do not, in fact, live in a determined universe. You can argue that some things are still in effect determined, but that's just a determinism-of-the-gaps argument.

Right. I agree and disagree.

Quantum events are not deterministic at all. True randomness like no other.

Careful. Those two statements are not in any way related to each other. Lack of determinism does not imply randomness. Quantum mechanical outcomes are probabilistic. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that, for example, a 70/30 split of outcomes is 'true randomness like no other'.

But macroscopic events are necessarily massively probabilistic due to the massive number of particles involved in ordinary processes, including those inside the brain.

And this is where our understanding starts to break down. The entire point of the Schrodinger's cat experiment is that macro events can be driven by the actions of a single molecule. And a cat is much larger than a synapse.

The longer you throw a coin the closer the average gets to the probable. So macroscopic events massively follow quasi-deterministic laws. So, I agree that the universe according to quantum physics is not strictly deterministic but for nearly all practical purposes it is as good as and free will falls into that category in my view.

Ok, how? What is it about (libertarian) free will that is contradicted by quasi-deterministic laws?

There are two separate issues, the distinction between deterministic laws and determinism, and the problem of quasi-determined laws.

Consider the difference between deterministic laws (that there exist laws that where the input strictly determines the output), and determinism (the principle that all events in the universe are determined (or random)). The existence of the former isn't a problem for Libertarian Free Will, the latter is. A rejection of LFW on these grounds relies on the idea that the former necessitates the latter. It's arguable whether the former really does necessitate the latter, and the case is surely even weaker for the existence of quasi-determined laws necessitating determinism. Unless you can explain the connection?

There is also the problem of quasi-determined laws themselves, and how often and in what pattern we can expect them to behave non-deterministically. I think we're largely on the same page here, although I will point out that you seem to be suggesting that a quasi-determined law would only produce variations from a determined law at rare occurrences where probability defied expected outcomes (freak events). That's not a valid assumption to my mind. All we know is that we can see laws that appear determined at the macro scale, and we can see probabilistic behaviour and unfixed states at the micro scale. If we take the idea that the macro observation is simply the effect of many trillions of observations (which I believe is a simplification) then we would expect to see QM effects occurring in certain specialised circumstances at different scales, depending on how the micro level interactions are combined. A massively complicated system designed to take molecule-level and ion-level interactions and scale them up to the macro level would be a logical place to look.

In relation to free will, I think that the mere fact that quantum effects appear baffling to us suggests our brain doesn't escape these quasi-deterministic laws.

??? I'm not seeing the connection here, between the brain running on particular logical lines, and the nature of the laws of physics underpinning its operation.


In general, I'm not particularly fond of using QM as a justification for LFW - I much prefer questioning the assumptions that go into a determined universe, which tend to be neither justified, nor particularly scientific. However, I think that QM arguments are not as easy to dismiss as you make out. Simply demonstrating that the universe is not, in fact, determined, is a huge problem for a position that assumes a determined universe.

 

[The AntiChris]

The problem is I genuinely don't know if you subscribe to a theory of 'meaning is usage' for the meaning of words. You say "of course" in one comment then go on to say that you "question the validity of some common applications" a little later in the same post. So I honestly don't know if you subscribe to 'meaning is usage' wholeheartedly or only in certain specific situations.

Of course I do. Meaning is related to usage. That is not in question, never was and never will be.

Good.

There are several aspects to this issue. One, is the question of whether 'meaning' through 'common usage' is in fact an accurate representation of the object, event, idea, etc.

No, they're not aspects of the same issue. Deriving meaning from usage is an entirely separate activity from determining the truth/accuracy of what's said.

Could you please help me here?

As I've been trying to point out, usage and common meaning alone does not mean that the things that are being referred to with words and terms are actual entities, objects or events. The references may be mistaken or unproven 'god created man in his image' 'god's will' etc, there may be no 'god' and no 'will of god'

And you've been pushing at an open door. Nothing I've posted has claimed or suggested that meaning implies anything about truth/accuracy of the concepts expressed.

It seems you misunderstand the theory of word meaning derived from common usage. It's a theory about the meaning of words. It says nothing about the truth or falsity of any claims we make.

No I don't. and of course I agree with the latter, but you appear to go further. I get the impression that you imply that common usage justifies the reality of the object of reference.

No I don't. This strawman representation of what I've been saying is a complete figment of your imagination. If you can cite anything I've posted in which I claim or imply that establishing meaning entails anything with regard to the truth/accuracy of the "object of reference" I'll willingly issue an unreserved apology.

For instance, that free will is an actual attribute of human consciousness because will may be free of coercion and common usage call this 'free will' - therefore we can be said to have free will.

Not quite. My position is that whether free will exists (or if it is the kind of thing that can be said to 'exist') will depend entirely on what is meant by the words "free will". This seems entirely uncontroversial to me.

If, as seems indisputably the case, there is more than one meaning of the term 'free will' in common use, then it would seem to follow that the existential status of 'free will' will depend on which version we're talking about.

Do you agree so far?

 

[Juma]

And this is where our understanding starts to break down. The entire point of the Schrodinger's cat experiment is that macro events can be driven by the actions of a single molecule. And a cat is much larger than a synapse.

So what? Schrödingers cat is still nothing but a thought experiment. It has absolutely nothing to do what happens in a warm living brain!

An atom is about 1000 times bigger than electrons and protons. The number of molecules for activation of a chemical synapse is about 10^7 molecules.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Right. I agree and disagree.

Quantum events are not deterministic at all. True randomness like no other.

Careful. Those two statements are not in any way related to each other. Lack of determinism does not imply randomness. Quantum mechanical outcomes are probabilistic. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that, for example, a 70/30 split of outcomes is 'true randomness like no other'.

I meant it the other way round. Quantum events are truly random therefore they are not deterministic. You cannot predict the outcome of a quantum event because it is truly random. Quantum events are not individually probabilistic. So quasi-determinism only appears at macroscopic scales with probabilistic effects.

But macroscopic events are necessarily massively probabilistic due to the massive num-ber of particles involved in ordinary processes, including those inside the brain.

And this is where our understanding starts to break down. The entire point of the Schrodinger's cat experiment is that macro events can be driven by the actions of a single molecule. And a cat is much larger than a synapse.

As I understand it, and as I tried explain a few weeks ago, superpositions are only virtual in that it would not be actual cats superposed but the wave functions associated with the possible disintegration of an atom. As long as the observer doesn't open the box, he doesn't know whether the cat is dead or not. So there won't be any observation saying that there are two actual cats and the theory is not talking about actual cats either. That being said, given an appropriate setup, the disintegration of an atom would definitely cause a macroscopic event, e.g. "dead cat". But this is due to a very specific setup by scientists. To have something like this naturally occurring inside the brain, it would have to be the result of evolution, an eventuality that seems to go against all odds, as evolution itself is a massively macroscopic process. I would agree that it doesn't seem entirely impossible but there is no evidence for that at all now.

The longer you throw a coin the closer the average gets to the probable. So macroscopic events massively follow quasi-deterministic laws. So, I agree that the universe according to quantum physics is not strictly deterministic but for nearly all practical purposes it is as good as and free will falls into that category in my view.

Ok, how? What is it about (libertarian) free will that is contradicted by quasi-deterministic laws?

I'm not talking about libertarian free will but about the OP, which I take to be about the ordinary notion of free will as entertained by most people. And it was meant to apply to (and contradict) ryan's view as well.

There are two separate issues, the distinction between deterministic laws and determinism, and the problem of quasi-determined laws.

Consider the difference between deterministic laws (that there exist laws that where the input strictly determines the output), and determinism (the principle that all events in the universe are determined (or random)). The existence of the former isn't a problem for Libertarian Free Will, the latter is. A rejection of LFW on these grounds relies on the idea that the former necessitates the latter. It's arguable whether the former really does necessitate the latter, and the case is surely even weaker for the existence of quasi-determined laws necessitating determinism. Unless you can explain the connection?

There is also the problem of quasi-determined laws themselves, and how often and in what pattern we can expect them to behave non-deterministically. I think we're largely on the same page here, although I will point out that you seem to be suggesting that a quasi-determined law would only produce variations from a determined law at rare occurrences where probability defied expected outcomes (freak events). That's not a valid assumption to my mind. All we know is that we can see laws that appear determined at the macro scale, and we can see probabilistic behaviour and unfixed states at the micro scale. If we take the idea that the macro observation is simply the effect of many trillions of observations (which I believe is a simplification) then we would expect to see QM effects occurring in certain specialised circumstances at different scales, depending on how the micro level interactions are combined. A massively complicated system designed to take molecule-level and ion-level interactions and scale them up to the macro level would be a logical place to look.

Scientists can already produce quantum effects at the macroscopic scale with lasers for example, with the entanglement of small but nonetheless macroscopic clumps of atoms, with the quantum interferences with very large carbon atoms (Bucky balls) and indeed with interference patterns already obtained by Young in 1803. The question is, how evolution would have done a similar trick inside the brain? The brain seems to work by integrating large amount of information by somehow only recording the probabilistic pattern of events. How do you go from there to the use of true randomness as the working principle of neurons? The brain itself is massively macroscopic, very unlike any foreseeable quantum computer, and mental outputs are more likely to be the result of very many interconnected neurons than of just one and even one would be already too massive a device.

In relation to free will, I think that the mere fact that quantum effects appear baffling to us suggests our brain doesn't escape these quasi-deterministic laws.

??? I'm not seeing the connection here, between the brain running on particular logical lines, and the nature of the laws of physics underpinning its operation.

Our perspective on the world, as observers, is macroscopic, in part I'm prepared to venture, because macroscopic events are probabilistic. We understand the utility for living things to spread their behaviours across a large spectrum, for example to take advantage of ecological niches or evade predators and lice. So some sort of freedom is certainly a good thing and we can see how evolution could have selected for it. But I don't see that randomness as a basic mechanism inside our brains would help anyone survive, rather the reverse. It seems to me that true randomness would kill you every second of your life if it hadn't before that. Unless you can go into some sort of specific design showing it could be done.

In general, I'm not particularly fond of using QM as a justification for LFW - I much prefer questioning the assumptions that go into a determined universe, which tend to be neither justified, nor particularly scientific. However, I think that QM arguments are not as easy to dismiss as you make out. Simply demonstrating that the universe is not, in fact, determined, is a huge problem for a position that assumes a determined universe.

I'm not sure what you are talking about. I didn't say the universe was deterministic. I think QM suggests a quasi-deterministic universe at macroscopic scales.

I also don't see how evolution could have given the brain some sort of quantum-effect mechanism. I don't see that true randomness would be useful for survival. Our brain seems to be geared towards integrating the macroscopic probabilities of our environment. And our behaviour and mental abilities try to use a small but macroscopic degree of freedom, in effect pseudo-random variations in the pattern of our physical and mental behaviour.

Even though our brain is really a quantum system, I think its representation of the world is based on the macroscopic properties, i.e. probabilities, of our environment and body. The working of the brain has to be based on the macroscopic properties of assemblies of neurons so as to exploit again probabilities, no on the random behaviour of a few particles lodged somewhere inside our grey matter, something that would kill us off within a few seconds.
EB

 

[Kharakov]

To have something like this naturally occurring inside the brain, it would have to be the result of evolution, an eventuality that seems to go against all odds, as evolution itself is a massively macroscopic process. I would agree that it doesn't seem entirely impossible but there is no evidence for that at all now.

One of the first processes that life developed (photosynthesis) uses  quantum walking for efficiency. It just so happened that quantum effects increase the efficiency of the process by some amount, so things which take advantage of this quantum effect are more fit.

Quantum interactions are omnipresent. The likelihood that life has not evolved another form of utilization of quantum effects, other than that in photosynthesis, would seem to be low.

I also don't see how evolution could have given the brain some sort of quantum-effect mechanism....

Even though our brain is really a quantum system, I think its representation of the world is based on the macroscopic properties, i.e. probabilities, of our environment and body. The working of the brain has to be based on the macroscopic properties of assemblies of neurons so as to exploit again probabilities, not on the random behavior of a few particles lodged somewhere inside our grey matter, something that would kill us off within a few seconds.

I'll bring up  nuclear magnetic resonance again, specifically mentioning low field NMR to indicate that extreme magnetic fields are not needed in order for the phenomena to occur.

In the case of NMR, one might find that certain protein structures have evolved to take advantage of NMR phenomena, "picking up" transmitted resonance radiation (although the majority is radiated out into space without being picked up). Maybe this has some impact on the unitary nature of consciousness.

Maybe within a neuron, the signal is confined to the neuron somewhat, and outside of the neuron at the synaptic cleft, it is transmitted to other neurotransmitters and neuropeptides in nearby synaptic clefts. anyway...

 

[ryan]

One last post:

You said, "That it accurately maps to QM is hard evidence that QM effects beyond those that map to classical mechanics are largely negligible in the real world.".

I am trying to say that QM is practically everything, not just the negligible wave properties of the macro world. QM is even the classical mechanical properties that we see work so deterministically by way of an unimaginable coincidence that began since the beginning of the universe.

This is all true. What I don't understand is why you think it in any way rebuts my position. Classical Mechanics is what QM looks like at macro scales. So the determinate nature of CM is what you get when QM applies to massive numbers of particles. So there is no handle in the macroscopic world of neurons by which they can access the probabilistic effects you are seeking.

Although even if there was, as neither probability nor randomness are synonymous with freedom, you still would be no closer to demonstrating the existence of free will.

You too need to read up on this more.

You are not remotely qualified to make that assessment.

What scares me the most is that I will explain to you what it is that you don't understand, and you will ignore it. A glimmer of hope is that you don't ignore it, and you learn something. But I will never know. And a glimmer inside of the glimmer of hope is that you will actually swallow your ego, and say, "you're right; I'm wrong". But we all know nobody does this (except for me because I actually have respect for others, and I actually realise that it builds trust and ultimately personal growth); therefor, how can I ever know if I got through to you or if you genuinely know that I am wrong?

This is why I am walking a tightrope on getting the hell out of here. Or at the very least, I will be ignoring those who don't show that they can still learn something or be wrong.