In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[Togo]

Why would the device wait? If the result is determined by prior factors such as brain state, environmental conditions, and so on, then it will know what you're going to do well before you do it, in plenty of time for you to press either button. Indeed, if your decision to press is determined, that decision must come before your action to press, with enough time for you to initiate either action.

It's not clear to me that what this kind of experiment does is test decisions. It certainly tests something, which may be what I would call the neurological precursor of action. I don't think decisions are always reduced to that. I may take the decision to attend a meeting two months in advance of it and then change my mind and take a different decision one week before the meeting and change again at the last moment. Does this device tests that?
EB

If you're referring to Libet-style experiments, then I agree with your criticisms and share your reservations.

However, this isn't one. It's simply a thought experiment, in which you have a box (Godelbox) that scans the relevant environment, including your brain states, for the precursors of decisions and actions that people say determine what you will do in terms of button pressing. And then works out what button you will press. And the lights up so that you know which button it will be.

The point is to illustrate a logical problem with determinism.

 

[Juma]

Ok so let's change the scenario slightly. You have the Godelbox in your hand, the light comes on to predict which button you will push. But there's also a machine with a gun pointed at your head, that will shoot you if you push the button that the box indicates.

So here we have a paradox. If the universe is determined as you say, then nothing can prevent you from pressing the lit button, and getting shot. But this is totally contrary to our observations of human behaviour.
.

The result would obviously be that you doesnt push any button.

If the gunmachine and godelbox even can that in consideration and there is no way to flee then you will be shot.

That is neither a paradox or against how humans behave. It is simply a situation you cannot get out of.

 

[fromderinside]

It's not clear to me that what this kind of experiment does is test decisions. It certainly tests something, which may be what I would call the neurological precursor of action. I don't think decisions are always reduced to that. I may take the decision to attend a meeting two months in advance of it and then change my mind and take a different decision one week before the meeting and change again at the last moment. Does this device tests that?
EB

If you're referring to Libet-style experiments, then I agree with your criticisms and share your reservations.

However, this isn't one. It's simply a thought experiment, in which you have a box (Godelbox) that scans the relevant environment, including your brain states, for the precursors of decisions and actions that people say determine what you will do in terms of button pressing. And then works out what button you will press. And the lights up so that you know which button it will be.

The point is to illustrate a logical problem with determinism.

Oh come on. the only problem with determinism is causality. Pick this and things are determined like that. Pick that and things are determines like something else. It isn't a deterministic construction unless one selects an event after which all things following are fixed. Intervening is just a bunch of gobbledygook.

 

[DBT]

But that's a different claim. If you're talking about the comparison between the decision made and the brain process as the decision is made, then all you're saying is that the decision process is a brain process. Which is relatively uncontroversial. The bit where determinism comes in is the idea that that decision process/brain process is determined by prior states (or random chance).

And that's also where the apparent paradox of the Godelbox comes in - because you end up with a conflict with the principle of determinism and the observation of how people make decisions.

It is both, an interaction of prior brain states and prior inputs, (from microseconds to memory content from from theearliest memories) determines the information state of the brain in the current moment, which is an ongoing process of acquiring information that alters architecture and connectivity, which is consequently expressed as behaviour, conscious experience: thoughts, deliberations and actions performed. Consciousness being the brains information 'display' in the form of subjective experience.

Which is not a matter of choice. We cannot choose to be conscious, or what to be conscious of, even though it seems that way. It being the prior inputs and processing that governs/determines what information the brain represents in conscious form.

Hence the illusion of free will.

 

[Togo]

Ok so let's change the scenario slightly. You have the Godelbox in your hand, the light comes on to predict which button you will push. But there's also a machine with a gun pointed at your head, that will shoot you if you push the button that the box indicates.

So here we have a paradox. If the universe is determined as you say, then nothing can prevent you from pressing the lit button, and getting shot. But this is totally contrary to our observations of human behaviour.
.

The result would obviously be that you doesnt push any button.

The box predicted that you would. In a determined universe, you will push a button.

That is neither a paradox

Of course it is. The initial conditions are in line with determinism, but as soon as the determined information is made available you end up with implausible results. That's why it's called a Gödel-Box.

 

[The AntiChris]

That is neither a paradox

Of course it is. The initial conditions are in line with determinism, but as soon as the determined information is made available you end up with implausible results. That's why it's called a Gödel-Box.

To be a paradox it would have to be logically impossible not merely "implausible".

That you find it implausible is just a measure of your own lack of imagination.

By your own stipulation, the box accurately predicts what will happen. If you're consistent, then that's what must happen - there's nothing logically problematic.

 

[Juma]

The result would obviously be that you doesnt push any button.

The box predicted that you would. In a determined universe, you will push a button.

That is neither a paradox

Of course it is. The initial conditions are in line with determinism, but as soon as the determined information is made available you end up with implausible results. That's why it's called a Gödel-Box.

No. In short the setup is this: you have a box that can calulate your action and another machine that shots you if the prediction is correct.

Either the box works and you will be shot or the box doesnt work.

Where is the paradox?

 

[Togo]

Of course it is. The initial conditions are in line with determinism, but as soon as the determined information is made available you end up with implausible results. That's why it's called a Gödel-Box.

To be a paradox it would have to be logically impossible not merely "implausible".

That you find it implausible is just a measure of your own lack of imagination.

By your own stipulation, the box accurately predicts what will happen. If you're consistent, then that's what must happen - there's nothing logically problematic.

Fair enough. It's not a paradox in the same way that Schrodinger's cat is not a paradox. If you're consistent, there is no paradox and the cat is simply both alive and dead at the same time.

However, like Schrodinger's cat, the end result is not what we observe in the real world. In practice, we don't see dead-alive cats. The Gödel-box thought experiment produces the strange result that people will choose to knowingly kill themselves simply because that it what it had already been decided that they would do. In practice, this doesn't fit with what we know and observe of human behaviour.

 

[The AntiChris]

To be a paradox it would have to be logically impossible not merely "implausible".

That you find it implausible is just a measure of your own lack of imagination.

By your own stipulation, the box accurately predicts what will happen. If you're consistent, then that's what must happen - there's nothing logically problematic.

Fair enough. It's not a paradox in the same way that Schrodinger's cat is not a paradox. If you're consistent, there is no paradox and the cat is simply both alive and dead at the same time.

No.

A cat that is both dead and alive is a logical contradiction.

The fulfillment of an unexpected prediction is not a logical contradiction. It's just - unexpected.

 

[Togo]

Fair enough. It's not a paradox in the same way that Schrodinger's cat is not a paradox. If you're consistent, there is no paradox and the cat is simply both alive and dead at the same time.

No.

A cat that is both dead and alive is a logical contradiction.

Schrodinger's cat is not both dead and alive, it is in a state of quantum uncertainty. This is how particle physics works. However, it isn't how the our experience of how cats works. That's the reason why Schrodinger's cat is a problem.

If you want to deny quantum uncertainty, you have to deny quantum physics in the name of determinism. Some posters here do just that, but the more mainstream approach is to accept that quantum uncertainty does exist, and then work out why in practice we can't see it at anything above a certain scale.

Similarly, the problem with the Gödel-box thought experiment is that determinism tells us the future is fixed, but we do not experience it as fixed.

If it helps, eliminate the free will element entirely, and just have two machines. Machine A predicts which of it's two buttons will be pressed, and Machine B presses whichever button Machine A does not predict. Machine B's task is not complicated, nor does it need any thought. Simple cause and effect will be sufficient to violate the determinist universe. The issue is that a determined universe is extremely hostile to our basic concepts of causality.

Determinism is a thesis that sounds straightforward and simple and obvious until you examine it closely, where it starts to fall apart.

 

[The AntiChris]

...the cat is simply both alive and dead at the same time.

Schrodinger's cat is not both dead and alive,

I'm pretty sure that's a contradiction.

The issue is that a determined universe is extremely hostile to our basic concepts of causality.

That's just a fancy way of saying it's unintuitive.

That it's unintuitive is no foolproof indication that it's true or not.

 

[DBT]

Schrodingers cat is just a metaphor for 'probability waves' - if the Copenhagen interpretation is correct, wave collapse occurs and particle position is a definite state - the cat is indeed alive. If the 'many worlds' model is correct, all probability is expressed in multiple versions of the world...neither model allows for conscious manipuation of probablity wave collapse or how it is expressed in this world, or any other. The latter restoring Determinism, the former being a softer version allowing for random events, but not free will.

 

[Juma]

Fair enough. It's not a paradox in the same way that Schrodinger's cat is not a paradox. If you're consistent, there is no paradox and the cat is simply both alive and dead at the same time.

However, like Schrodinger's cat, the end result is not what we observe in the real world.

But it is! The only problem here seems your failure to realize how it actually works.

 

[OLDMAN]

People have wills. They will to do this or that. To say that the will is "free" to do this or that - contra-causal freedom - requires, I propose, three things, at least.

1. A person must have an awareness of the choices available.
2. A person must have some sense of the value inherent in the choices that exist.
3. A person must be able to rationally choose this or that.

With regard to (1), contra-causal freedom says that the most basic choice that is required is A and ~A.
With regard to (2), the person must have a sense of the costs and benefits of choosing A and ~A.
With regard to (3), the person is not forced or compelled to choose A or ~A based on the relative values of A or ~A but rationally considers the choices with their values, and his choice of A or ~A is rational.

Does this work?

Sorry number 1 doesn't work for me. Just being aware of the choices available doesn't represent why something might get preference.

 

[fromderinside]

Schrodinger's cat is not both dead and alive, it is in a state of quantum uncertainty. This is how particle physics works. However, it isn't how the our experience of how cats works. That's the reason why Schrodinger's cat is a problem.

If you want to deny quantum uncertainty, you have to deny quantum physics in the name of determinism. Some posters here do just that, but the more mainstream approach is to accept that quantum uncertainty does exist, and then work out why in practice we can't see it at anything above a certain scale.

Similarly, the problem with the Gödel-box thought experiment is that determinism tells us the future is fixed, but we do not experience it as fixed.

Simple cause and effect will be sufficient to violate the determinist universe. The issue is that a determined universe is extremely hostile to our basic concepts of causality.

Determinism is a thesis that sounds straightforward and simple and obvious until you examine it closely, where it starts to fall apart.

If one can measure quantum mechanics (measure to 10^-40 observations per second) there is no uncertainty.

The problem is causality.

Causal determinism:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

From Causal Determinism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ using Earman's definition.

Please note the antecedent event is the way thing are at time t=0. Causal Determinism is antecedent event producing time zero from which all things are then fixed. Pick an antecedent event that brings us to time zero and we have the problem identified. Which event? Determinism needs no antecedent event just an observation of the way things are at time t=0. One might say "well we'll assume all causes antecedent to time t=0" and we'll get to the same place "which things thereafter". 'The way things are' is also problematic. All we have is what we observe and what we can measure from a single or few perspectives. So all we have is 'the way these known things' are. For this we get determinism every time.

The box with the cat and uncertainty are just outside measurement. Place them inside measurement and they are determined.

With increased ability to measure there is no uncertainty. We use quantum notation to get around our inability to measure such small things. Its nice that the notation seems to work. In a sense we are creating a dimension where one is not observable like we do with imaginary numbers on which I commented to you elsewhere.

No problem with determinism. Just a problem with the human platform or frame.

 

[Togo]

If one can measure quantum mechanics (measure to 10^-40 observations per second) there is no uncertainty.

The problem is causality.
<snip>

No problem with determinism. Just a problem with the human platform or frame.

Certainly abandoning causality is one way to rescue the concept of determinism. It poses far fewer difficulties that way. And the construction of an observational reality outside the frame of reference you want to label as determined is a reliable route, which is why the box is called a Gödel-box, after the mathematicians of the same name. However, some people on this thread appear to be supporting determinism as a means towards preserving a particular kind of causality that they consider important for science. The hostility of determinism to local causation is mainly the point I was attempting to get across.

- - - Updated - - -

If one can measure quantum mechanics (measure to 10^-40 observations per second) there is no uncertainty.

The problem is causality.
<snip>

No problem with determinism. Just a problem with the human platform or frame.

Certainly abandoning causality is one way to rescue the concept of determinism. It poses far fewer difficulties that way. And the construction of an observational reality outside the frame of reference you want to label as determined is a reliable route, which is why the box is called a Gödel-box, after the mathematicians of the same name. However, some people on this thread appear to be supporting determinism as a means towards preserving a particular kind of causality that they consider important for science. The hostility of determinism to local causation is one of the points I was attempting to get across.

 

[Juma]

If one can measure quantum mechanics (measure to 10^-40 observations per second) there is no uncertainty.

The problem is causality.

Causal determinism:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

From Causal Determinism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ using Earman's definition.

Please note the antecedent event is the way thing are at time t=0. Causal Determinism is antecedent event producing time zero from which all things are then fixed. Pick an antecedent event that brings us to time zero and we have the problem identified. Which event? Determinism needs no antecedent event just an observation of the way things are at time t=0. One might say "well we'll assume all causes antecedent to time t=0" and we'll get to the same place "which things thereafter". 'The way things are' is also problematic. All we have is what we observe and what we can measure from a single or few perspectives. So all we have is 'the way these known things' are. For this we get determinism every time.

The box with the cat and uncertainty are just outside measurement. Place them inside measurement and they are determined.

With increased ability to measure there is no uncertainty. We use quantum notation to get around our inability to measure such small things. Its nice that the notation seems to work. In a sense we are creating a dimension where one is not observable like we do with imaginary numbers on which I commented to you elsewhere.

No problem with determinism. Just a problem with the human platform or frame.

This seems to suggest that quantum mechanics is not intrisically random.
That is a gross misunderstanting of QM.

 

[fromderinside]

If one can measure quantum mechanics (measure to 10^-40 observations per second) there is no uncertainty.

The problem is causality.

Causal determinism: From Causal Determinism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ using Earman's definition.

Please note the antecedent event is the way thing are at time t=0. Causal Determinism is antecedent event producing time zero from which all things are then fixed. Pick an antecedent event that brings us to time zero and we have the problem identified. Which event? Determinism needs no antecedent event just an observation of the way things are at time t=0. One might say "well we'll assume all causes antecedent to time t=0" and we'll get to the same place "which things thereafter". 'The way things are' is also problematic. All we have is what we observe and what we can measure from a single or few perspectives. So all we have is 'the way these known things' are. For this we get determinism every time.

The box with the cat and uncertainty are just outside measurement. Place them inside measurement and they are determined.

With increased ability to measure there is no uncertainty. We use quantum notation to get around our inability to measure such small things. Its nice that the notation seems to work. In a sense we are creating a dimension where one is not observable like we do with imaginary numbers on which I commented to you elsewhere.

No problem with determinism. Just a problem with the human platform or frame.

This seems to suggest that quantum mechanics is not intrisically random.
That is a gross misunderstanding of QM.

Not really. One must assume some stochastic process why not that found in  Gaussian noise. There are many event or field interactions taking place outside our time-space limited view. Why not approximate their impacts on an event or particle or field of interest as such. Seems to work pretty well doesn't it. I'm presuming someone will find away to get at other dimensions making our current limitations in measurement moot irregardless of all Planck's numbers. He was in the bubble too.

 

[Juma]

This seems to suggest that quantum mechanics is not intrisically random.
That is a gross misunderstanding of QM.

Not really. One must assume some stochastic process why not that found in  Gaussian noise. There are many event or field interactions taking place outside our time-space limited view. Why not approximate their impacts on an event or particle or field of interest as such. Seems to work pretty well doesn't it. I'm presuming someone will find away to get at other dimensions making our current limitations in measurement moot irregardless of all Planck's numbers. He was in the bubble too.

Eh. Bells teorem shows there are no "hidden variables".

 

[fromderinside]

Not really. One must assume some stochastic process why not that found in  Gaussian noise. There are many event or field interactions taking place outside our time-space limited view. Why not approximate their impacts on an event or particle or field of interest as such. Seems to work pretty well doesn't it. I'm presuming someone will find away to get at other dimensions making our current limitations in measurement moot irregardless of all Planck's numbers. He was in the bubble too.

Eh. Bells teorem shows there are no "hidden variables".

I'm not suggesting any variables are hidden in the sense they lurk in the background. We can look with a sensor at the universe and see noise. There's an awful lot hidden in that don't you agree. All I'm suggesting is that the same noise reflects the universe of the beyond measurement.