In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[DBT]

I'm using the words according to their accepted meaning.

No, you are not. You are using it in some sloppy undistinct meaning that has nothing with the current context.

Not at all. The word 'random' essentially means that there is no disernable pattern, or predictability.

That a QM property has a random value means that you cannot predict the result itself, only its probability and that is best modelled by a stochastic variable.

It depends on the specific reference: electrons may have predicable shapes and energy levels but if you try to measure the location of an electron in its orbit, the results is random

If you want to say that all values have equal probability or that the probabilities sre unknown then say so. But randomness does not require that.

That's not what I'm saying.

 

[Juma]

electrons may have predicable shapes and energy levels but if you try to measure the location of an electron in its orbit, the results is random..

Exactly what i am saying. And the probability to find an electron within a specific volume can be calculated.

Thus we have a random location with a known probability distribution.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Doxa = opinion, belief

Ok. I'd not seen that particular sub-definition before so I'll happily concede that the godel box TE can reasonably called a paradox.

Good!

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - It is obvious that a subject informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction of the action he is to decide on will be able to change his decision, thereby making the prediction false.

Proposition B is the one I take issue with. It simply doesn't logically follow that because "a subject informed in advance" is able to change his decision that he will change his decision. For this reason it's not necessarily a logical contradiction.

We don't need the implication you say doesn't exist. All we need is that you see proposition A and B as both true. If there is this apparent conflict then it is paradoxical. So we need to change proposition B to make sure you accept it as true.

If you want to tighten up Togo's TE I suppose you could stipulate that the subject will always and without exception do the opposite of what's predicted, in which case you've asked the godel-box to perform an unsolvable calculation (it entails an infinite feedback loop). This is why embedded subsystems within the universe are problematic for absolute predictability.

Why "always"?

All you need to fault a claim is one counterexample. I just need to convince you that some people will make the Gödel Box's prediction false by taking a decision different from the one predicted.

So, Ok, I need to change my formulation of the paradox to take your comments into account:

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - Among the subjects informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction, some will change their decision, thereby making the prediction false. This will be true in particular if subjects are sufficiently motivated to fault the Gödel Box, for example by rewarding them if they succeed and by punishing them if they fail, for example by adding a mechanism designed to kill them in case of failure.​

So, what say you? Do you accept both A and B as true? If not, why?

However determinism only implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.

I agree with that but then this is clearly a metaphysical claim, which you and other materialists should dismiss out of hand as unfalsifiable.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Ok. I'd not seen that particular sub-definition before so I'll happily concede that the godel box TE can reasonably called a paradox.

Good!

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - It is obvious that a subject informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction of the action he is to decide on will be able to change his decision, thereby making the prediction false.

Proposition B is the one I take issue with. It simply doesn't logically follow that because "a subject informed in advance" is able to change his decision that he will change his decision. For this reason it's not necessarily a logical contradiction.

We don't need the implication you say doesn't exist. All we need is that you see proposition A and B as both true. If there is this apparent conflict then it is paradoxical. So we need to change proposition B to make sure you accept it as true.

If you want to tighten up Togo's TE I suppose you could stipulate that the subject will always and without exception do the opposite of what's predicted, in which case you've asked the godel-box to perform an unsolvable calculation (it entails an infinite feedback loop). This is why embedded subsystems within the universe are problematic for absolute predictability.

Why "always"?

All you need to fault a claim is one counterexample. I just need to convince you that some people will make the Gödel Box's prediction false by taking a decision different from the one predicted.

So, Ok, I need to change my formulation of the paradox to take your comments into account:

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - Among the subjects informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction, some will change their decision, thereby making the prediction false. This will be true in particular if subjects are sufficiently motivated to fault the Gödel Box, for example by rewarding them if they succeed and by punishing them if they fail, for example by adding a mechanism designed to kill them in case of failure.​

So, what say you? Do you accept both A and B as true? If not, why?

However determinism only implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.

I agree with that but then this is clearly a metaphysical claim, which you and other materialists should dismiss out of hand as unfalsifiable.
EB

Many materialists like to push around the edges of such claims as, its seems, AntiChris is doing. If it happens there is an external being that for some reason leaves evidence of his being that humans can trace then the search becomes one where external predictablility exists making such claims no longer unfalsifiable since humans can gather evidence to its existence and likely gain access to methods to predict access to its methods for predicting all future states. Its a good materialistic goal. It would also be evidence that an all all knowing being may not be all powerful.

 

[fromderinside]

Good!

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - It is obvious that a subject informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction of the action he is to decide on will be able to change his decision, thereby making the prediction false.

Proposition B is the one I take issue with. It simply doesn't logically follow that because "a subject informed in advance" is able to change his decision that he will change his decision. For this reason it's not necessarily a logical contradiction.

We don't need the implication you say doesn't exist. All we need is that you see proposition A and B as both true. If there is this apparent conflict then it is paradoxical. So we need to change proposition B to make sure you accept it as true.

If you want to tighten up Togo's TE I suppose you could stipulate that the subject will always and without exception do the opposite of what's predicted, in which case you've asked the godel-box to perform an unsolvable calculation (it entails an infinite feedback loop). This is why embedded subsystems within the universe are problematic for absolute predictability.

Why "always"?

All you need to fault a claim is one counterexample. I just need to convince you that some people will make the Gödel Box's prediction false by taking a decision different from the one predicted.

So, Ok, I need to change my formulation of the paradox to take your comments into account:

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - Among the subjects informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction, some will change their decision, thereby making the prediction false. This will be true in particular if subjects are sufficiently motivated to fault the Gödel Box, for example by rewarding them if they succeed and by punishing them if they fail, for example by adding a mechanism designed to kill them in case of failure.​

So, what say you? Do you accept both A and B as true? If not, why?

However determinism only implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.

I agree with that but then this is clearly a metaphysical claim, which you and other materialists should dismiss out of hand as unfalsifiable.
EB

Many materialists like to push around the edges of such claims as, its seems, AntiChris is doing. If it happens there is an external being that for some reason leaves evidence of his being that humans can trace then the search becomes one where external predictablility exists making such claims no longer unfalsifiable since humans can gather evidence to its existence and likely gain access to methods to predict access to its methods for predicting all future states. Its a good materialistic goal. It would also be evidence that an all all knowing being may not be all powerful.

But, hey, what has this to do with free will?

 

[The AntiChris]

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - It is obvious that a subject informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction of the action he is to decide on will be able to change his decision, thereby making the prediction false.

If you want to tighten up Togo's TE I suppose you could stipulate that the subject will always and without exception do the opposite of what's predicted, in which case you've asked the godel-box to perform an unsolvable calculation (it entails an infinite feedback loop). This is why embedded subsystems within the universe are problematic for absolute predictability.

Why "always"?

All you need to fault a claim is one counterexample.

But it's not "one counterexample".

It would be if your proposition A had claimed that the Godel box always "correctly predicts decisions".

Sorry to be nitpicky but this is not the first time that the godel box TE (or something similar) has been has been presented to me as evidence against determinism - it's not. It's a silly argument so I'm not inclined to give sloppy argumentation a pass.

I just need to convince you that some people will make the Gödel Box's prediction false by taking a decision different from the one predicted.

You don't need to.

I'm perfectly willing to concede that the godel-box (like any embedded subsystem within the universe) cannot be relied upon to correctly predict all things. However this is not evidence of indeterminacy and therefore does not count as evidence against determinism.

However determinism only implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.

I agree with that but then this is clearly a metaphysical claim, which you and other materialists should dismiss out of hand as unfalsifiable.EB

No. The claim that the universe is deterministic/indeterministic is a metaphysical claim. However the claim of external observer predictability is not (it logically follows from determinism).

Although I lean toward the possibility that the universe is fundamentally deterministic, I am strictly speaking agnostic. I have no idea why you think materialists should dismiss out of hand all metaphysical (unfalsifiable) claims.

 

[PyramidHead]

If it happens there is an external being that for some reason leaves evidence of his being that humans can trace then the search becomes one where external predictablility exists making such claims no longer unfalsifiable since humans can gather evidence to its existence and likely gain access to methods to predict access to its methods for predicting all future states.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma

 

[Perspicuo]

How so?

Let's say I want to buy a car. So first, I try and learn more about cars, their performance, good points, bad points, etc. This gives me more information on which to base a decision.

What you seem to be saying is that gaining information on which to base a decision is automatically equivalent to predicting and determining the outcome of the decision based on that information. That because I have information about cars, that removes any choice I have as to what car I buy. I'm not sure how having information violates free will, or why deciding to base a decision on evidence would somehow imply never having had a choice in the first place. Can you explain?

Only a behavior that is random in the face of any and all conditions, is ontologically free.

Where are you getting this definition from, and what makes you think it is accurate? Is it just a straw man?

How so?
Simple.

If a behavior is predicatble it is not free, but contingent upon the situation, controllable, unfree.

If I train a dog to beg whenever I say, "Play dead!", the dog's behavior has been controlled, which is evidently unfree. But if there is no way to mathematically predict behavior given any initial circumstances (stimuli), then the behavior is, for all intents and purposes, free.

Summing up: Controlled > unfree; Uncontrolled(unpredictable) > free.

 

[PyramidHead]

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - It is obvious that a subject informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction of the action he is to decide on will be able to change his decision, thereby making the prediction false.

Why "always"?

All you need to fault a claim is one counterexample.

But it's not "one counterexample".

It would be if your proposition A had claimed that the Godel box always "correctly predicts decisions".

Then imagine it did: would it refute determinism in that case? If so, then determinism is already refuted, or at any rate just a rewording and mouse-click away from being refuted.

The point is that as a thought experiment, it works pretty well: it posits something that is theoretically possible in the framework of determinism, and then deduces from those premises a conclusion that refutes determinism.

If determinism is true, there is no logical barrier to the existence of a computer that accurately predicts the future. There may be logistical barriers, but this is a hypothetical scenario so those can be ignored for the sake of argument.

All that remains is to connect the dots. If the future is determined, the events foretold by a 100% accurate forecasting computer are bound to take place, whether a person views the computer's predictions or not (the person's viewing of the predictions and subsequent behavior would simply be part of the 100% likely future predicted by the computer). Yet, if I viewed the prediction that I will eat cereal for breakfast tomorrow morning, determinism implies I cannot eat anything other than cereal for breakfast tomorrow morning, which is absurd. Having viewed the prediction, suppose I consciously choose to eat toast for breakfast tomorrow morning. Is it the determinist position that natural events will intervene and prevent me from having anything other than cereal? Will my toaster short-circuit, or the bread spontaneously develop mold? If so, wouldn't those eventualities be part of the infallible prediction I had already viewed, such that I could take measures to overcome them? I could simply lock myself in my bedroom until noon; would a bowl of cereal somehow materialize on my shelf in that case? The absurdity of these scenarios is good prima facie evidence that determinism is problematic.

 

[Juma]

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - Among the subjects informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction, some will change their decision, thereby making the prediction false. This will be true in particular if subjects are sufficiently motivated to fault the Gödel Box, for example by rewarding them if they succeed and by punishing them if they fail, for example by adding a mechanism designed to kill them in case of failure.

But why would anybody believe that the gödelbox can predict before it has all facts? To correctly predict the action at time t we need all input up to that time. Maybe some one screams "dont do it" which make them change their mind etc.

Or should we assume that the gödelbox is omniscient? And thus can calculate what will happen? But then it is not clear that it possible to both predict what will happen if it also has to inform the person of that prediction in advance, since that prediction will affect the result. It may be possible to give an answer that will make itself happen or it may be not. In neither case this has anything to do with free will.

 

[PyramidHead]

Or should we assume that the gödelbox is omniscient? And thus can calculate what will happen? But then it is not clear that it possible to both predict what will happen if it also has to inform the person of that prediction in advance, since that prediction will affect the result. It may be possible to give an answer that will make itself happen or it may be not. In neither case this has anything to do with free will.

Under determinism, the bolded part would not be a problem. Whether the prediction affected the result would be part of the future that is already determined to happen. But as you say, once a person is informed of the prediction, suddenly there is ambiguity about whether it will occur the way that the omniscient box predicted. This has everything to do with free will, since showing the results of the omniscient box's prediction to a cat or a stack of pancakes wouldn't make a difference. Only showing them to a person, the very entity claimed to have free will, introduces this problem.

 

[Juma]

Or should we assume that the gödelbox is omniscient? And thus can calculate what will happen? But then it is not clear that it possible to both predict what will happen if it also has to inform the person of that prediction in advance, since that prediction will affect the result. It may be possible to give an answer that will make itself happen or it may be not. In neither case this has anything to do with free will.

Under determinism, the bolded part would not be a problem. Whether the prediction affected the result would be part of the future that is already determined to happen. But as you say, once a person is informed of the prediction, suddenly there is ambiguity about whether it will occur the way that the omniscient computer predicted. This has everything to do with free will.

That we have determinism does not in any way imply that that everything is possible. It may be logically impossible to give a correct prediction if it has to be shown to the person.

For example: assume that the person is forced, by a mental sickness, to do the opposite of the prediction what ever it is. Then the prediction will never be true. And yet the persons action is definitely not free.

And why do you believe that a cat is not free at all??

 

[The AntiChris]

But it's not "one counterexample".

It would be if your proposition A had claimed that the Godel box always "correctly predicts decisions".

Then imagine it did: would it refute determinism in that case?

No. If you'd read beyond the bit you quoted you'd see that I went on to say "it's not" (evidence against determinism).

The point is that as a thought experiment, it works pretty well: it posits something that is theoretically possible in the framework of determinism, and then deduces from those premises a conclusion that refutes determinism.

No it doesn't.

You probably missed what I said earlier:

This is why embedded subsystems within the universe are problematic for absolute predictability. However determinism only implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.

The Godel-box is an embedded (i.e. internal) sub-system and as such, logically cannot be expected to reliably predict the outcome of other embedded subsystems because it leads to infinite feedback looping (in order to perform its calculation, the predictive subsystem requires feedback about the effect of it's prediction on the target sub-system).

This problem is not in the slightest related to indeterminacy and so does not present any challenge to determinism.

 

[The AntiChris]

But, hey, what has this to do with free will?

Not a thing as far as I'm concerned.

 

[DBT]

That a cat or a human is able to act upon its needs and desires does not mean they have free will. The distinction between the ability to act and will (whether conscious or unconscious) was made long ago. Nor is randomness or unpredicability an aid, for the reasons already given.

 

[Bronzeage]

When you choose to do something you don't really enjoy, that's free will.

 

[DBT]

When you choose to do something you don't really enjoy, that's free will.

No that's compulsion. Decision making is essentially the weighing of the cost to benefit for the individual (or their associates) that the option presents.

 

[Bronzeage]

When you choose to do something you don't really enjoy, that's free will.

No that's compulsion. Decision making is essentially the weighing of the cost to benefit for the individual (or their associates) that the option presents.

So you are telling me that the best option is always something enjoyable?

 

[fromderinside]

No that's compulsion. Decision making is essentially the weighing of the cost to benefit for the individual (or their associates) that the option presents.

So you are telling me that the best option is always something enjoyable?

ocumon. Voting is about choosing among the better of two negative possibilities. Choosing not to vote is worse still. If one can't vote one is in in Russia or North Korea. Really!?

 

[Juma]

When you choose to do something you don't really enjoy, that's free will.

But you do you are rewarded for it: you feel that you doing the right thing. That is a very high reward.