Is the mind material or non-material?

[4321lynx]

Can you give an example of such a philosopher?

(Incidentally, getting a really weird technical error trying to use the quote function on your post - ended getting a different post being quoted instead. Anyone getting that?)

If you're addressing me, try again: I quoted what I meant to quote. The "philosophical explanations" statement did not come from me, but I assume they are one form of "philosophizing". Ask that poster for examples if the ones to be seen in this thread are not enough for you.

 

[DBT]

So we have:
Speakpigeon: "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation"
DBT's interpretation: "philosophers need not account for scientific information"
I was the one who made the remark?
EB

What does ''Philosophers don't do scientific explanation. They do philosophical explanations'' mean if there is no implied divide between ''scientific explanations'' and ''philosophical explanations?''

What you said clearly implies a division between science and philosophy. If you meant something else entirely, your remark was ambiguous. Rather than practicing your slow clapping technique, you should be practice clarity.

 

[Togo]

If you're addressing me, try again: I quoted what I meant to quote. The "philosophical explanations" statement did not come from me, but I assume they are one form of "philosophizing". Ask that poster for examples if the ones to be seen in this thread are not enough for you.

Ok, here I am trying again.

You wrote

Yes. In the present state of neuroscience it is almost as sad to see philosophers philosophizing about the functions of the brain as it would be to see them philosophizing about the functions of the kidneys, liver, large bowel, or the heart and circulation.

I am asking you for an example of philosophers philosophizing about the functions of the brain as it is not clear from the context what you are talking about.

So we have:
Speakpigeon: "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation"
DBT's interpretation: "philosophers need not account for scientific information"
I was the one who made the remark?
EB

What does ''Philosophers don't do scientific explanation. They do philosophical explanations'' mean if there is no implied divide between ''scientific explanations'' and ''philosophical explanations?''

What you said clearly implies a division between science and philosophy.

Which is fine, but what such a division doesn't do is imply what you said, which is that philosophers don't have to take account of scientific information.

 

[DBT]

Which is fine, but what such a division doesn't do is imply what you said, which is that philosophers don't have to take account of scientific information.

If you as philosopher ''don't do scientific explanation,'' what exactly do you do in terms of ''philosophical explanation'' when a given scientific explanation is inseparable from your ''philosophical explanation?''

Sure, you may construct your ''philosophical explanation,'' and claim "'Philosophy! But given that as a philosopher must use the very scientific explanation upon which your philosophical explanation rests, you as a philosopher must allow that the scientific explanation is an essential part of your thesis, and as an essential part of your thesis, you cannot claim "I as a philosopher don't do scientific explanations.''

Take the brain/mind issue as an example:how can you possibly give a philosophical explanation of mind without including the science relating to brain/mind?

I don't think there is a division between science and philosophy where it may be said "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation', unless a philosopher is pulling any old stuff out of his hat.

 

[Underseer]

Which is fine, but what such a division doesn't do is imply what you said, which is that philosophers don't have to take account of scientific information.

If you as philosopher ''don't do scientific explanation,'' what exactly do you do in terms of ''philosophical explanation'' when a given scientific explanation is inseparable from your ''philosophical explanation?''

Sure, you may construct your ''philosophical explanation,'' and claim "'Philosophy! But given that as a philosopher must use the very scientific explanation upon which your philosophical explanation rests, you as a philosopher must allow that the scientific explanation is an essential part of your thesis, and as an essential part of your thesis, you cannot claim "I as a philosopher don't do scientific explanations.''

Take the brain/mind issue as an example:how can you possibly give a philosophical explanation of mind without including the science relating to brain/mind?

I don't think there is a division between science and philosophy where it may be said "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation', unless a philosopher is pulling any old stuff out of his hat.

Are you suggesting that Levity isn't a fundamental force of the universe?

See, this kind of nonsense is why real philosophers don't concern themselves with any of that science crap. Anyone who knows anything knows that levity is a real thing. How else do you explain smoke rising?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Philosophers don't do scientific explanation. They do philosophical explanations. You don't like them, don't read them. Remember, this is a philosophy forum.
And nobody is ever going to be interested in your opinion on what philosophers should want to explain.
It's kinda trying to play football with tennis players. A sort of category error.

apumanyav said

Brain may flush out toxins during sleep
NIH-funded study suggests sleep clears brain of damaging molecules associated with neurodegeneration
http://www.nih.gov/news/health/oct2013/ninds-17.htm

Yes. In the present state of neuroscience it is almost as sad to see philosophers philosophizing about the functions of the brain as it would be to see them philosophizing about the functions of the kidneys, liver, large bowel, or the heart and circulation.

I don't know which philosophers you are refering to. It's all very well to talk in the abstract but can you actually give names and quote any offending material? I might well agree with you.

Also, can you explain what you mean by "philosophers philosophizing about the functions of the brain"? Any real-life example of that you can share with us?

Originally Posted by Speakpigeon
Philosophers don't do scientific explanation. They do philosophical explanations. You don't like them, don't read them. Remember, this is a philosophy forum.

So should we just leave them to play their games?

You can criticise any philosophy all you like but on its own merit. It's idiotic to criticise philosophers merely for philosophising about nature (e.g. the brain), about science (e.g. the science of the brain), about scientists (e.g. neuroscientists). Sure, if it's making idiotic claims, go for it.

They are harmless, unless people believe them.

Are you saying that all philosophy is damaging? Can you explain that?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

So we have:
Speakpigeon: "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation"
DBT's interpretation: "philosophers need not account for scientific information"
I was the one who made the remark?
EB

What does ''Philosophers don't do scientific explanation. They do philosophical explanations'' mean if there is no implied divide between ''scientific explanations'' and ''philosophical explanations?''

What you said clearly implies a division between science and philosophy. If you meant something else entirely, your remark was ambiguous. Rather than practicing your slow clapping technique, you should be practice clarity.

Let me give you an example of clarity: "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation".

Now, compare with bullshit: "philosophers need not account for scientific information".
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Which is fine, but what such a division doesn't do is imply what you said, which is that philosophers don't have to take account of scientific information.

If you as philosopher ''don't do scientific explanation,'' what exactly do you do in terms of ''philosophical explanation'' when a given scientific explanation is inseparable from your ''philosophical explanation?''

Sure, you may construct your ''philosophical explanation,'' and claim "'Philosophy! But given that as a philosopher must use the very scientific explanation upon which your philosophical explanation rests, you as a philosopher must allow that the scientific explanation is an essential part of your thesis, and as an essential part of your thesis, you cannot claim "I as a philosopher don't do scientific explanations.''

Take the brain/mind issue as an example:how can you possibly give a philosophical explanation of mind without including the science relating to brain/mind?

I don't think there is a division between science and philosophy where it may be said "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation', unless a philosopher is pulling any old stuff out of his hat.

Quote any offending material.

I can't help you here. I don't remember reading any philosophical explanation that was somehow inseparable from some scientific explanation.
EB

 

[Togo]

Which is fine, but what such a division doesn't do is imply what you said, which is that philosophers don't have to take account of scientific information.

If you as philosopher ''don't do scientific explanation,'' what exactly do you do in terms of ''philosophical explanation'' when a given scientific explanation is inseparable from your ''philosophical explanation?''

??? can you give an example of this inseparability?

[Sure, you may construct your ''philosophical explanation,'' and claim "'Philosophy! But given that as a philosopher must use the very scientific explanation upon which your philosophical explanation rests,

Wait, why would a philosophical explanation necessarily rest on a scientific one?

Take the brain/mind issue as an example:how can you possibly give a philosophical explanation of mind without including the science relating to brain/mind?

Philosophical theses are generally concerned with logical implications of states or positions, and what they can tell us about various problems and issues to do with the mind, or models thereof. They're not looking to explain the physical activity of the mind in some rival way to science.

 

[DBT]

So we have:
Speakpigeon: "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation"
DBT's interpretation: "philosophers need not account for scientific information"
I was the one who made the remark?
EB

What does ''Philosophers don't do scientific explanation. They do philosophical explanations'' mean if there is no implied divide between ''scientific explanations'' and ''philosophical explanations?''

What you said clearly implies a division between science and philosophy. If you meant something else entirely, your remark was ambiguous. Rather than practicing your slow clapping technique, you should be practice clarity.

Let me give you an example of clarity: "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation".

Now, compare with bullshit: "philosophers need not account for scientific information".
EB

Tell me, Speakpigeon, what does the sentence "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation" mean? What was it meant to convey in the context it was used?

Here is the exchange between you and 4321lynx

QUOTE=4321lynx This is what we get from philosophy, endless argument/discussion of the meaning of every word and every phrase.

To which you reply:

Why are you here at all I wonder...

This is a philosophy forum, not a science one.

Beyond this, philosophy has no place <in the scientific explanation of facts> in an explanation of scientific facts

Philosophers don't do scientific explanation. They do philosophical explanations. You don't like them, don't read them. Remember, this is a philosophy forum.
And nobody is ever going to be interested in your opinion on what philosophers should want to explain.
It's kinda trying to play football with tennis players. A sort of category error.
EB

 

[DBT]

??? can you give an example of this inseparability?

Depends on the branch of philosophy: ''Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions concern what counts as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth.''

Of course there are branches of philosophy that are completely divorced from science, and it may be said, reality.

On the subject of this thread, the nature of brain/mind, the philosophical question of the nature of mind must necessarily be related to the structures and functions of a brain, which in turn is a matter of neuroscience. Any valid philosophy of Mind must account for the nature and function of the Brain.

Wait, why would a philosophical explanation necessarily rest on a scientific one?

How are you to understand the existence and function of mind without references the structure and function of the brain? Didn't some of the ancients consider the heart to be the seat of the soul or consciousness in man? There your an example of philosophy divorced from science.

They're not looking to explain the physical activity of the mind in some rival way to science.

I would not think so. Nevertheless, we have many examples of philosophy throughout human history that was a rival to science, that was completely divorced from science.

 

[4321lynx]

Ok, here I am trying again.

You wrote

Yes. In the present state of neuroscience it is almost as sad to see philosophers philosophizing about the functions of the brain as it would be to see them philosophizing about the functions of the kidneys, liver, large bowel, or the heart and circulation.

I am asking you for an example of philosophers philosophizing about the functions of the brain as it is not clear from the context what you are talking about.
.

You only have to look at Block's two kinds of consciousness and Lyman's seven or is it eight kinds. Great minds engaged in speculation, pure guesswork. Dennett has the right approach. More power to him.

 

[Togo]

On the subject of this thread, the nature of brain/mind, the philosophical question of the nature of mind must necessarily be related to the structures and functions of a brain, which in turn is a matter of neuroscience. Any valid philosophy of Mind must account for the nature and function of the Brain.

Again, why? You can't just make sweeping generalisations like that in philosophy, based on intution and guesswork, or not being personally familiar with a counter-example. You have to justify them in some way.

Let's take an example, from Frank Jackson's arguement for Epiphenomenal Qualia:

Show

It is undeniable that the physical, chemical and biological sciences have provided a great deal on information about the world we live in and about ourselves. I will use the label 'physical information' for this kind of information, and also for information that automatically comes with it...

...Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kinds of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won't have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky....

...There are, unfortunately for us, many who do not find the premise intuitively obvious. The task then is to present an arguement whose premises are obvious to all, or at least to as many as possible. This I try to do in I with what I will call 'the Knowledge arguement'. In II I contrast the knowledge arguement with the Modal arguement and in III with the 'What is it like to be' arguement. In IV I tackle the question of the causal role of qualia...

Here we have an example of a philosophical arguement that doesn't, in point of fact, depend on scientific conclusions, nor is it related to the structures or functions of the brain. Now you may have your own views on whether philosophy that doesn't turn on these points is useful or valuable, but your contention that it does and has to is a factual claim, and it is wrong on the facts.

You only have to look at Block's two kinds of consciousness and Lyman's seven or is it eight kinds. Great minds engaged in speculation, pure guesswork. Dennett has the right approach. More power to him.

Dennett's approach is to deal with these arguements in quite some detail. He doesn't dismiss them as mere speculation or guesswork. Are you disgreeing with him on this point? Or are you just saying you prefer his metaphysical conclusions to those of his rivals on the basis of your intuition?

 

[DBT]

Again, why? You can't just make sweeping generalisations like that in philosophy, based on intution and guesswork, or not being personally familiar with a counter-example. You have to justify them in some way.

You asked me a general question - namely the question of inseparability - and I gave a reply that addressed your question: a branch of philosophy that deals specifically with scientific information..which in turn falsifies the claim "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation" when in fact there is a branch of philosophy that deals specifically deals with the findings of science. If you want more specific examples, you need to ask more specific questions.

Let's take an example, from Frank Jackson's arguement for Epiphenomenal Qualia:

Show

It is undeniable that the physical, chemical and biological sciences have provided a great deal on information about the world we live in and about ourselves. I will use the label 'physical information' for this kind of information, and also for information that automatically comes with it...

...Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kinds of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won't have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky....

...There are, unfortunately for us, many who do not find the premise intuitively obvious. The task then is to present an arguement whose premises are obvious to all, or at least to as many as possible. This I try to do in I with what I will call 'the Knowledge arguement'. In II I contrast the knowledge arguement with the Modal arguement and in III with the 'What is it like to be' arguement. In IV I tackle the question of the causal role of qualia...

You are constructing a strawman. This issue was about the relationship between philosophy and science. You example misses the point. It misses the point because the nature of qualia cannot be properly understood without the body of scientific inquiry that we have.

Why did you ignore my example of the Ancient Greek idea of the heart as being the seat of the soul or consciousness in man? The idea of the heart as the centre of consciousness being an example of philosophy that was not founded upon scientific methodology.

Here we have an example of a philosophical arguement that doesn't, in point of fact, depend on scientific conclusions, nor is it related to the structures or functions of the brain. Now you may have your own views on whether philosophy that doesn't turn on these points is useful or valuable, but your contention that it does and has to is a factual claim, and it is wrong on the facts.

Not really. An understanding of the source and nature of qualia is inseparable from understanding the sole source and nature of the phenomena, a brain. Otherwise there is the risk of making false conclusions, such as the heart being the seat of one's being.

Just curious, why does the article misspell the argument in exactly the way you have always done... arguement instead of argument?

 

[4321lynx]

You only have to look at Block's two kinds of consciousness and Lyman's seven or is it eight kinds. Great minds engaged in speculation, pure guesswork. Dennett has the right approach. More power to him.

Dennett's approach is to deal with these arguements in quite some detail. He doesn't dismiss them as mere speculation or guesswork. Are you disgreeing with him on this point? Or are you just saying you prefer his metaphysical conclusions to those of his rivals on the basis of your intuition?

Dennett is probably too much of a gentleman philosopher. More power to him.

BTW my 'Lyman' should be 'Lycan' ( the man, William; not a werewolf.)

 

[Togo]

You asked me a general question - namely the question of inseparability - and I gave a reply that addressed your question: a branch of philosophy that deals specifically with scientific information..which in turn falsifies the claim "Philosophers don't do scientific explanation" when in fact there is a branch of philosophy that deals specifically deals with the findings of science.

But that doesn't falsify the claim. Philosophy of science deals with philosophical concerns relating to science - the reasoning employed within science. They're not trying to model the world on a mechanical level.

Let's take an example, from Frank Jackson's arguement for Epiphenomenal Qualia:

Show

It is undeniable that the physical, chemical and biological sciences have provided a great deal on information about the world we live in and about ourselves. I will use the label 'physical information' for this kind of information, and also for information that automatically comes with it...

...Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kinds of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won't have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky....

...There are, unfortunately for us, many who do not find the premise intuitively obvious. The task then is to present an arguement whose premises are obvious to all, or at least to as many as possible. This I try to do in I with what I will call 'the Knowledge arguement'. In II I contrast the knowledge arguement with the Modal arguement and in III with the 'What is it like to be' arguement. In IV I tackle the question of the causal role of qualia...

You are constructing a strawman.

No, I'm citing an example you consider irrelevent. That is not a strawman arguement. As strawman arguement would involve me attributing the arguement to you, and then refuting it, and pretending your own point had been refuted.

This issue was about the relationship between philosophy and science. You example misses the point. It misses the point because the nature of qualia cannot be properly understood without the body of scientific inquiry that we have.

But this is an evaluation, a judgement, not fact. Qualia can be understood without reference to a body of scientific enquiry, as in my example, so all you're doing is adding in the word 'properly', and then using that qualification to dismiss any kind of reasoning that's not based on emperical science.

Why did you ignore my example of the Ancient Greek idea of the heart as being the seat of the soul or consciousness in man? The idea of the heart as the centre of consciousness being an example of philosophy that was not founded upon scientific methodology.

Mainly because I couldn't see that any arguement that you'd presented depended on it. Partly because it seemed to contain a basic logical error - an example of someone getting something wrong does not imply that some broader category is always wrong. And partly because the idea isn't particularly based on philosophy but rather on medicine - specifically the study of the relationship between mental states and heart beat, and between disorders of the mind and irregularities of the heart.

Here we have an example of a philosophical arguement that doesn't, in point of fact, depend on scientific conclusions, nor is it related to the structures or functions of the brain. Now you may have your own views on whether philosophy that doesn't turn on these points is useful or valuable, but your contention that it does and has to is a factual claim, and it is wrong on the facts.

Not really. An understanding of the source and nature of qualia is inseparable from understanding the sole source and nature of the phenomena, a brain. Otherwise there is the risk of making false conclusions, such as the heart being the seat of one's being.

The article seemed pretty clear in it's understanding, and doesn't involve modelling the brain at all. Maybe philosopher aren't interested in your 'source and nature' of qualia, but are instead interested in the philosophical implications of the concept?

I'm just pointing out that your beliefs about what must be involved in philosophy of mind don't match philosophy of mind.

Just curious, why does the article misspell the argument in exactly the way you have always done... arguement instead of argument?

Probably because I copied it out by hand. If you have access to an arichive for Philosophical Quarterly I can get you the original reference. It also gets reprinted a lot.

 

[DBT]

But that doesn't falsify the claim. Philosophy of science deals with philosophical concerns relating to science - the reasoning employed within science. They're not trying to model the world on a mechanical level.

There is no evidence of a separation between brain condition and 'qualia' - duality - certain patterns of electrochemical brain activity form perception, thoughts and feelings.

Consciousness as a physical form of brain activity means that philosophy alone is not equipped to deal the nature of consciousness, and the question of the nature of consciousness is purely a matter of science. Without science, we would be probably be still stuck in the realm of ''the heart is the seat consciousness.''

It is neuroscience and not philosophy that has the tools of discovery.

No, I'm citing an example you consider irrelevent. That is not a strawman arguement. As strawman arguement would involve me attributing the arguement to you, and then refuting it, and pretending your own point had been refuted.

What you provided had nothing to do with what I was arguing, and that makes it a strawman.

But this is an evaluation, a judgement, not fact. Qualia can be understood without reference to a body of scientific enquiry, as in my example, so all you're doing is adding in the word 'properly', and then using that qualification to dismiss any kind of reasoning that's not based on emperical science.

How can the nature of qualia be examined and understood without prior knowledge of the brain?

Without the body of knowledge provided by scientific research, philosophy would still be in the middle ages, the realm of soul and astral phenomena. The realm of Duality, mind as separate substance to the brain.

Mainly because I couldn't see that any arguement that you'd presented depended on it. Partly because it seemed to contain a basic logical error - an example of someone getting something wrong does not imply that some broader category is always wrong.

It was an example of philosophical reasoning that unrelated to scientific discovery and the erroneous conclusions that can emerge as a result. The examples erroneous lines of thought without the benefit of correction through empirical testing are numerous, as I'm sure you know.

For the sake of brevity, I'll leave it there. Posts tend to grow out of hand.

 

[Togo]

There is no evidence of a separation between brain condition and 'qualia' - duality - certain patterns of electrochemical brain activity form perception, thoughts and feelings.

There doesn't need to be a separation. The point is not that qualia are a different object, but that philosophy is a different subject, and isn't studying the same things as science.

I think this is the point you're missing. Philosophy is not trying to do the same things as science. It's about the implications of ideas and potential faults in reasoning. It's not about how neurones connect to each other. I've even given you an example of a line of philosophical inquiry that doesn't involve science at all.

You're taking your own preference for what should be explained (explain 'properly', understand the source and nature) and trying to make out that philosophy is somehow flawed for not meeting that preference. It's an entirely subjective evaluation.

No, I'm citing an example you consider irrelevent. That is not a strawman arguement. As strawman arguement would involve me attributing the arguement to you, and then refuting it, and pretending your own point had been refuted.

What you provided had nothing to do with what I was arguing, and that makes it a strawman.

No, it really doesn't. You're using the term incorrectly.

It was an example of philosophical reasoning that unrelated to scientific discovery and the erroneous conclusions that can emerge as a result. The examples erroneous lines of thought without the benefit of correction through empirical testing are numerous, as I'm sure you know.

I don't agree that it is philosophy. It's medicine, based on empirical observation. And science works by refining initially erroneous conclusions, so I'm not sure what your point is supposed to be.

 

[Togo]

You only have to look at Block's two kinds of consciousness and Lyman's seven or is it eight kinds. Great minds engaged in speculation, pure guesswork. Dennett has the right approach. More power to him.

Dennett's approach is to deal with these arguements in quite some detail. He doesn't dismiss them as mere speculation or guesswork. Are you disgreeing with him on this point? Or are you just saying you prefer his metaphysical conclusions to those of his rivals on the basis of your intuition?

Dennett is probably too much of a gentleman philosopher. More power to him.

BTW my 'Lyman' should be 'Lycan' ( the man, William; not a werewolf.)

He's written entire books on the subject. That's really a lot to put down to him being gentlemanly.

I had a quick look at Block. The point about his two forms of consciousness is not 'pure speculation'. It's an analysis of what we mean by conscious thought. What we refer to when we think of conscious thought is both phenomena, and information available to reason with. Conscious thought involves more than merely an experience, it actually goes through a process that uses real information. He's not indulging in random speculation as to the nature of the brain - the nature of the brain isn't particularly relevant to what he's saying. He's saying that what we mean by consciousness is at odds with various descriptions of it.

 

[DBT]

There doesn't need to be a separation. The point is not that qualia are a different object, but that philosophy is a different subject, and isn't studying the same things as science.

Given that that what we call 'qualia' is a form of electrochemical activity of the brain, what philosophy is dealing with is precisely the phenomena that science is dealing with when studying the nature and function of the brain. The difference being, science is actually equipped to investigate the phenomena of 'experience' whilst philosophy is not.

At least not without referring to the discoveries of science.

I think this is the point you're missing. Philosophy is not trying to do the same things as science. It's about the implications of ideas and potential faults in reasoning. It's not about how neurones connect to each other. I've even given you an example of a line of philosophical inquiry that doesn't involve science at all.

You may believe you have, but the article you transcribed works within the confines of science, it does not assume 'soul' or 'heart is the seat of consciousness'' as its foundation, but the scientific principles that underlie subjective experience. Nor can your semantic or ontological arguments actually make discoveries or prove the principles of the physical world of brain function and experience. That is the role of neuroscience and not philosophy. Philosophy may take the discoveries of science and seek to make sense of them, as it will.

You're taking your own preference for what should be explained (explain 'properly', understand the source and nature) and trying to make out that philosophy is somehow flawed for not meeting that preference. It's an entirely subjective evaluation.

No, I'm talking about scientific methodology as the foundation of understanding how the physical world works. The associated philosophy follows.

No, it really doesn't. You're using the term incorrectly.

Doubt that I am: strawman
''You misrepresented someone's argument to make it easier to attack.''

You are misrepresenting my position, but it may be because you have not understood my position well enough. Nevertheless, it's still a strawman.