Metaphysics - Where is it?

[lostone]

Then there are the three pans; panentheism, panpyschism, and pantheism, which also offer possible paths to a materialis' that some people find of interest.

 

[Trebaxian Vir]

There is also what I have termed omnitheism, which embraces atheism, pantheism, monotheism, polytheism, &c., as different facets of a single truth. That happens to be my belief. (Yes, atheism & monotheism,—without contradiction, I might add.)​

 

[Elixir]

Then there are the three pans; panentheism, panpyschism, and pantheism, which also offer possible paths to a materialis' that some people find of interest.

My three are cast iron, carbon steel and non-stick.

 

[lostone]

There is also what I have termed omnitheism, which embraces atheism, pantheism, monotheism, polytheism, &c., as different facets of a single truth. That happens to be my belief. (Yes, atheism & monotheism,—without contradiction, I might add.)​

How do you blend them all together? By Using an interpretation of panpsychism that makes matter more mind-like than physics usually does?

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

Substitute the physical brain for mind.

Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.

You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.

The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.

The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.

There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.

Idealism is nonsense. If as per Berkeley, thingscexist because we percieve them, we have the problem of persistence of un OK bserved objects. Berkeley claims God's observation of all things provides such objects with persistence. How about evil things like fiendish instruments of torture hanging on the walls of an Inquisition torture chamber? Is God obligated helplessly to keep that object in existence by continually observing that instrument? Once we move away from Berkeleian Idealism, the whole idea of Idealism falls apart, it becomes woo woo that cannot actually explain anything, incoherent nonsense. Reification run amuck.

 

[lostone]

Metaphysics allows us to consider models of possible realities about the universe we experience. So does simple materialism / metaphysical naturalism.

Which explains the reality we experience best? Which should be our default position, even if unproven, and maybe even unprovable?

To me, that seems to be metaphysical naturalism, of the sort Steve Banks, and others, propose.

 

[Trebaxian Vir]

Substitute the physical brain for mind.

Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.​

You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.

The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.

The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.

There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.​

Idealism is nonsense. If as per Berkeley, thingscexist because we percieve them, we have the problem of persistence of un OK bserved objects. Berkeley claims God's observation of all things provides such objects with persistence. How about evil things like fiendish instruments of torture hanging on the walls of an Inquisition torture chamber? Is God obligated helplessly to keep that object in existence by continually observing that instrument? Once we move away from Berkeleian Idealism, the whole idea of Idealism falls apart, it becomes woo woo that cannot actually explain anything, incoherent nonsense. Reification run amuck.​

Berkeley espoused the belief of subjective idealism, and not the doctrine of objective idealism.

And so you have erred; for you have addressed the belief that Berkeley held, rather than the doctrine of objective idealism.

Your arguments against Berkeleyian subjective idealism do not apply in this case.

And so, I implore you, reconsider your position, and adjust your arguments accordingly. For to argue against a belief that is not held, is to engage in a fruitless endeavour, and to waste the precious gift of reason that has been bestowed upon us.

Let us instead strive to understand the true beliefs of the wise, and to engage in meaningful debates that will enlighten and edify us all.​

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Despite this, Berkeley's argument against materialism,—an argument with which the atheist sceptic David Hume concurred,—remains a powerful one to this very day. Even the great Hegel and Nietzsche, in their critiques of Kant, echoed Berkeley's argument, particularly with regards to the concept of the thing-in-itself.

And so, we see that the argument made by Berkeley, though it may have been controversial in its time, stands unrefuted to this very day.​

 

[pood]

Substitute the physical brain for mind.

Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.

You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.

The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.

The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.

There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.

Idealism is nonsense. If as per Berkeley, thingscexist because we percieve them, we have the problem of persistence of un OK bserved objects. Berkeley claims God's observation of all things provides such objects with persistence. How about evil things like fiendish instruments of torture hanging on the walls of an Inquisition torture chamber? Is God obligated helplessly to keep that object in existence by continually observing that instrument? Once we move away from Berkeleian Idealism, the whole idea of Idealism falls apart, it becomes woo woo that cannot actually explain anything, incoherent nonsense. Reification run amuck.

My point is not to support idealism, though in fact I think there are good arguments for it, and I can offer some. It’s rather to show that Steve holds a metaphysical stance while decrying metaphysics as meaningless. His position is inconsistent.

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

Wikipedia

...
Objective idealism is a form of metaphysical idealism that accepts Naïve realism (the view that empirical objects exist objectively) but rejects epiphenomenalist materialism (according to which the mind and spiritual values have emerged due to material causes),....
......

The problem here is this is not a good claim. Our brains did evolve and can indeed have spiritual ideas, etc. We know complex brains like ours are a very new item on planet Earth. For the previous 13.7 billion years our minds did not exist. Minds then had nothing to do with the Universe, its origin, its operation for billions of years. It is an idea that explains nothing, is incoherent, and invites bad hypothesis mongering. Where does these minds and spiritual values come from? God? Alien brains in vats? Whose spiritual values. Ancient Aztecs with their massive displays of human sacrifice? The Mongols? The profusion of very bad human spiritual values through history leaves the idea spiritual values are always admirable, necessary or metaphysically privledged an idea that is not a good hypothesis.

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

Substitute the physical brain for mind.

Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.

You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.

The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.

The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.

There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.

Idealism is nonsense. If as per Berkeley, thingscexist because we percieve them, we have the problem of persistence of un OK bserved objects. Berkeley claims God's observation of all things provides such objects with persistence. How about evil things like fiendish instruments of torture hanging on the walls of an Inquisition torture chamber? Is God obligated helplessly to keep that object in existence by continually observing that instrument? Once we move away from Berkeleian Idealism, the whole idea of Idealism falls apart, it becomes woo woo that cannot actually explain anything, incoherent nonsense. Reification run amuck.

My point is not to support idealism, though in fact I think there are good arguments for it, and I can offer some. It’s rather to show that Steve holds a metaphysical stance while decrying metaphysics as meaningless. His position is inconsistent.

The metaphysical truth that much metaphysics is nonsense is all the metaphysics us Skeptics need. Pointing out that stance seems metaphysical does not privledge bad metaphysics simply because it is metaphysics.

 

[pood]

The metaphysical truth that much metaphysics is nonsense ….

If metaphysics is nonsense, then any clained metaphysical truth must itself be nonsense, rendering your claim above nonsensical by your own stadards.

If you want to dismiss metaphysics as meaningless, then it seems to me that the consistent stance would be to dismiss metaphysical naturalism, metaphysical supernaturalism and metaphysical idealism as irrelevant to the practice of science (and it’s my observation that a great many scientists think all philosophy is BS). Science practices methodological naturalism, which is consistent with MN, MS and MI. But if you subscribe to a metaphysical stance, it’s inconsistent to hold that metaphysics is meaningless.

 

[pood]

Well, not exactly. You did write “much” metaphysics, not “all” metaphysics.

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

Aztec metaphysics. Bad. Hegel's cockeyed Idealism. Bad. Metaphysics does not necessarily mean good, useful, real, true or intellectually admirable because it has that label, metaphysics.

 

[Trebaxian Vir]

​

Wikipedia
...Objective idealism is a form of metaphysical idealism that accepts Naïve realism (the view that empirical objects exist objectively) but rejects epiphenomenalist materialism (according to which the mind and spiritual values have emerged due to material causes),..........
The problem here is this is not a good claim. Our brains did evolve and can indeed have spiritual ideas, etc. We know complex brains like ours are a very new item on planet Earth. For the previous 13.7 billion years our minds did not exist. Minds then had nothing to do with the Universe, its origin, its operation for billions of years. It is an idea that explains nothing, is incoherent, and invites bad hypothesis mongering. Where does these minds and spiritual values come from? God? Alien brains in vats? Whose spiritual values. Ancient Aztecs with their massive displays of human sacrifice? The Mongols? The profusion of very bad human spiritual values through history leaves the idea spiritual values are always admirable, necessary or metaphysically privledged an idea that is not a good hypothesis.

My dear sir, permit me to express my dissent with your perspective on the coherence of these ideas. To me, they are as clear as crystal, & it is only through a lack of proper understanding on your part that any confusion arises.
 The doctrine of materialism, which you espouse, is not only flawed, but demonstrably incoherent. The self-contradiction inherent in the materialist doctrine, which I have previously highlighted, is the very source of its lack of coherence. The materialist doctrine presumes the existence of mental categories in its very assertion of the existence of matter, & this is a self-contradiction that cannot be ignored.
 Thus, I would advise you to reconsider your position & to engage in a deeper examination of the ideas at hand. For it is only through a thorough & rigorous examination of these ideas that we may arrive at a deeper understanding of the truth.
 Even those philosophers who have argued against objective idealism have not regarded it as an incoherent doctrine, but rather as a highly coherent one. To claim that it is an incoherent idea is a thought peculiar to yourself, & lacks sufficient evidence to support such a conclusion.
 As I have shewn in a previous missive, the alleged incoherency of materialism is not a matter of personal opinion, but a well-reasoned argument rooted in logic & sound reasoning. The self-contradiction inherent in materialism has been clearly shewn, & it is a position which I hold with the utmost confidence.
 Contradistinctively, it appears that you have a tendency to use terms such as "incoherent" & "woo-woo" in a dismissive manner, as mere epithets, without a clear understanding of their meaning or any arguments behind them; & so, I say, let us not engage in the use of meaningless epithets. Such tactics are unseemly of a serious philosophical inquiry, & do little to advance the discourse. Let us instead engage in meaningful and well-reasoned debate, so that we may arrive at a profounder understanding of these complex ideas.​

My point is not to support idealism, though in fact I think there are good arguments for it, & I can offer some. It’s rather to show that Steve holds a metaphysical stance while decrying metaphysics as meaningless. His position is inconsistent.

Indeed; matter is a metaphysical concept. In positing the existence of matter, one is making a metaphysical claim. In making such a claim, one is, in fact, a metaphysician, whether one realises it or not.​

 

[Trebaxian Vir]

​

Aztec metaphysics. Bad. Hegel's cockeyed Idealism. Bad. Metaphysics does not necessarily mean good, useful, real, true or intellectually admirable because it has that label, metaphysics.​

Well, well, well, I say old bean, what have we here?

'Bad'? 'Incoherent'? 'Woo-woo'? Hahaha!

I say, these are beastly dull arguments, aren't they?

Especially considering that you could just address my argument, instead of all this gratuitous name-dropping.

I must say, you scarcely live up to your name. You ought to call yourself 'Cheerless Charlie' or 'Churlish Charlie,' I say. Methinks that would be more apposite.

Or better yet,—since you call everything 'incoherent' that you can't argue against,—"Confounded Charlie".

Yes, that is what you will be known by from henceforth.​

 

[pood]

An idealist might say that there is no way to prove the existence of an external, mind-independent world. If asked what a rose is, I might say it’s red, smells sweet, and that its thorns prick. We could say several other thing about it, but the above examples and any others you might list are all mental states. Red is a quale, a property of the mind that interprets a particular wavelength of light. Smell and touch are also properties of the mind, not intrinsic to the rose. So what is the rose, if no one observes it? What if no one could observe it even in principle? Does it reduce to a wave function? But what is a wave function? Is it a real thing in nature, or simply a mathematical tool of description? But a description of what, in the absence of a mind seeking a description?

I don’t think these and many other similar questions can be waved aside with the “woo” label.

 

[lostone]

one problem with metaphysics is that it mostly, if not completely, seems to be based on deductive logic. Inductive logic seems to be secondary.

 

[Elixir]

And so, we see that the argument made by Berkeley, though it may have been controversial in its time, stands unrefuted to this very day.

Not unlike the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

 

[Trebaxian Vir]

And so, we see that the argument made by Berkeley, though it may have been controversial in its time, stands unrefuted to this very day.​

Not unlike the Flying Spaghetti Monster.​

Oh my, what is this Flying Spaghetti Monster you speak of?

I must say, I have never heard of such a creature. It sounds like a most fanciful notion, but who am I to say what exists or not? The world is a wonderous enigma, and there are many mysteries yet to be uncovered.

Having said that, whether the creature exists or not, I must respectfully disagree with the comparison you have made between the existence of the material world and that of your so-called Flying Spaghetti Monster.

Whilst it is true that philosophers such as Berkeley have argued, correctly, that the independent existence of the material universe is an inherently self-contradictory proposition,—& therefore cannot be true,—no such argument has been advanced for or against the existence of this mysterious Flying Spaghetti Monster.

All that can be said about the existence of the Flying Spaghatti Monster is that it is impossible to say one way or the other.

And I contend that the material universe does not exist except as a subcategory of mind.
​

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *​

However, you do bring up a most intriguing possibility!

Having pondered the matter for some time now, I have arrived at the following conclusion:

The mere possibility of the Flying Spaghetti Monster's existence is sufficient to convince me of its reality.

After all, what evidence is there for a hard distinction between possibility and actual existence?

This, my dear, is but a supposition based on empty abstractions.

Indeed, it may well be that our entire existence is nothing more than the unfolding of a possibility,—a mere potentiality without any concrete reality beyond that.

This might explain why anything exists at all, rather than nothing.

For aught you know to the contrary, nothing truly exists except as a conceivable possibility.

I do believe in the literal existence of the flying spaghetti monster. And I am very much in earnest about this. I can conceive it as a possibility, therefore it must exist. What a fascinating thought.

The matter at hand is indeed a perplexing one, and I must say, it requires a certain degree of lunacy to contemplate the possibility that nothing truly exists except as a conceivable possibility.

But then again, absurdity is the very essence of reality,—otherwise how could anything exist in the first place? The laws of logic had to be broken at some point.

I for one find absurdity to be a most delightful place.​

 

[pood]

The late analytic philosopher David K. Lewis argued, in his book On the Plurality of Worlds, that all counterfactual worlds that are not logically impossible exist, but are only actual to their inhabitants. On this reading there exists a world in which the Flying Spaghetti Monster exists, but only to its inhabitants and not us in this world. It’s a nice thought, because in the FSM world the afterlife features beer volcanoes and strippers.