Then there are the three pans; panentheism, panpyschism, and pantheism, which also offer possible paths to a materialis' that some people find of interest.
How do you blend them all together? By Using an interpretation of panpsychism that makes matter more mind-like than physics usually does?There is also what I have termed omnitheism, which embraces atheism, pantheism, monotheism, polytheism, &c., as different facets of a single truth. That happens to be my belief. (Yes, atheism & monotheism,—without contradiction, I might add.)
Substitute the physical brain for mind.
Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.
You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.
The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.
The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.
There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.
Substitute the physical brain for mind.
Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.
You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.
The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.
The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.
There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.
Idealism is nonsense. If as per Berkeley, thingscexist because we percieve them, we have the problem of persistence of un OK bserved objects. Berkeley claims God's observation of all things provides such objects with persistence. How about evil things like fiendish instruments of torture hanging on the walls of an Inquisition torture chamber? Is God obligated helplessly to keep that object in existence by continually observing that instrument? Once we move away from Berkeleian Idealism, the whole idea of Idealism falls apart, it becomes woo woo that cannot actually explain anything, incoherent nonsense. Reification run amuck.
Substitute the physical brain for mind.
Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.
You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.
The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.
The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.
There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.
Idealism is nonsense. If as per Berkeley, thingscexist because we percieve them, we have the problem of persistence of un OK bserved objects. Berkeley claims God's observation of all things provides such objects with persistence. How about evil things like fiendish instruments of torture hanging on the walls of an Inquisition torture chamber? Is God obligated helplessly to keep that object in existence by continually observing that instrument? Once we move away from Berkeleian Idealism, the whole idea of Idealism falls apart, it becomes woo woo that cannot actually explain anything, incoherent nonsense. Reification run amuck.
Substitute the physical brain for mind.
Mind is an abstraction. Metaphysics ends up being like a dog chasing its tail.
You are selling metaphysics short. Your whole position is called metaphysical naturalism — which itself is a philosophical idea, not provable from within the idea itself. It is an assumption, a starting axiom, that may or may not be true.
The standard rival assumption is metaphysical supernaturalism. But there is a third metaphysical assumption, metaphysical idealism. This is what Trebaxian Vir is talking about.
The idea here is that the world consists entirely of mental states. Rather than the mind supervening on the brain, as MN assumes, MI would have it that the brain supervenes on the mind.
There are a number of good reasons for thinking that MI might be true. Vir listed some of them. But like MN, MI cannot be proved by, or from within, its original assumption. The point, however, is that your own world view is entirely philosophical, and so you are practicing the very metaphysics that you dismiss as meaningless.
Idealism is nonsense. If as per Berkeley, thingscexist because we percieve them, we have the problem of persistence of un OK bserved objects. Berkeley claims God's observation of all things provides such objects with persistence. How about evil things like fiendish instruments of torture hanging on the walls of an Inquisition torture chamber? Is God obligated helplessly to keep that object in existence by continually observing that instrument? Once we move away from Berkeleian Idealism, the whole idea of Idealism falls apart, it becomes woo woo that cannot actually explain anything, incoherent nonsense. Reification run amuck.
My point is not to support idealism, though in fact I think there are good arguments for it, and I can offer some. It’s rather to show that Steve holds a metaphysical stance while decrying metaphysics as meaningless. His position is inconsistent.
The metaphysical truth that much metaphysics is nonsense ….
Cheerful Charlie said:Wikipedia
...Objective idealism is a form of metaphysical idealism that accepts Naïve realism (the view that empirical objects exist objectively) but rejects epiphenomenalist materialism (according to which the mind and spiritual values have emerged due to material causes),..........
The problem here is this is not a good claim. Our brains did evolve and can indeed have spiritual ideas, etc. We know complex brains like ours are a very new item on planet Earth. For the previous 13.7 billion years our minds did not exist. Minds then had nothing to do with the Universe, its origin, its operation for billions of years. It is an idea that explains nothing, is incoherent, and invites bad hypothesis mongering. Where does these minds and spiritual values come from? God? Alien brains in vats? Whose spiritual values. Ancient Aztecs with their massive displays of human sacrifice? The Mongols? The profusion of very bad human spiritual values through history leaves the idea spiritual values are always admirable, necessary or metaphysically privledged an idea that is not a good hypothesis.
Pood said:My point is not to support idealism, though in fact I think there are good arguments for it, & I can offer some. It’s rather to show that Steve holds a metaphysical stance while decrying metaphysics as meaningless. His position is inconsistent.
Cheerful Charlie said:Aztec metaphysics. Bad. Hegel's cockeyed Idealism. Bad. Metaphysics does not necessarily mean good, useful, real, true or intellectually admirable because it has that label, metaphysics.
Not unlike the Flying Spaghetti Monster.And so, we see that the argument made by Berkeley, though it may have been controversial in its time, stands unrefuted to this very day.
And so, we see that the argument made by Berkeley, though it may have been controversial in its time, stands unrefuted to this very day.Not unlike the Flying Spaghetti Monster.