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Minimum Wage and Unionization (split)

Make that two...

"What is remarkable...is how this [Card and Kruger's] rather iffy result has been seized upon by some liberals as a rationale for making large minimum wage increases a core component of the liberal agenda.... Clearly these advocates very much want to believe that the price of labor--unlike that of gasoline, or Manhattan apartments--can be set based on considerations of justice, not supply and demand, without unpleasant side effects." - Paul Krugman

Krugman Contra Krugman on the Minimum Wage?
That article is poorly reasoned. and a hack job. There is no contradiction between being skeptical about or against large increases in the minimum wage and supporting small increases. Moroever, trotting a statement from 1988 before the current research on the effects of the minimum wage were made is just effing intellectually dishonest - compelling new information ought to change someone's mind.
You misread that -- his statement was from 1998, not 1988. The article quoted Krugman addressing the research we're discussing, not statements he made before he became aware of it. And Krugman hasn't just supported small increases; he's argued for a $15/hour minimum wage. As for current research, here's some. The compelling new information mostly supports Krugman's 1998 contention.
Sorry, I did misread the date.

The "current research" you cite is from 2006 - not terribly current. From the article -
"Our review indicates that there is a wide range of existing estimates and, accordingly,
a lack of consensus about the overall effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum
wage." - which is my point.

Finally, an increase of a federal minimum wage to $15 an hour is a large increase compared to current federal level but it is not a very large increase compared to current starting market wages in many areas. For example in my area (a small town in Mn), fast food sites are starting people at $12+. Target claims its starting hourly wage is $15 per hour.
 
But right-to-work laws most assuredly DO discourage unionizing.
You misunderstand -- I wasn't asking for your assurance that there's an effect. I was asking for the mechanism by which the effect operates, so we can examine whether it still operates if ITUC is right that demand for low-skill labor is infinitely inelastic.
I haven't read the papers either, but I've listened to a podcast where an economist explained it. So here's my take, others can correct me if I'm wrong.

The effect is due to the fact that in a single workplace, like a restaurant, the employer cannot realistically have unequal pay for different employees. So let's say a restaurant owner has 8 waiters making $12 an hour. And let's further assume that after all the other expenses except the waiters' salaries, the restaurant makes $20 profit per hour per customers served by one waiter. And thirdly, the restaurant would have capacity for 2 more waiters before running out of tables to serve. So at the moment the owner makes $160 - $96 = $64 per hour.

If he could find two more people willing to serve at $12 / h rate, he could profit 2 x ($20 - $12) = $16 more per hour. But not everybody is willing to work at that rate. He might need to pay $15, which would give him $10 more profit per hour. But that would mean that the other waiters would probably find out and also demand $15 / h. Making his total profit just $50 / hour. So in this situation, it makes no sense for the owner to hire more people, but rather stick with the few who are willing to work for less. Which leads to higher unemployment. With a minimum wage of $15 he would still make a profit and continue to hire everybody, and there would be no reason not to hire the extra two people that are available at that price point.

Why don't the old employees ask for a raise anyway, you might ask? Because of asymmetrical negotiating power. They need their jobs more than the restauranter needs any single employee. And they don't know what the owner would be willing to pay.
Your explanation doesn't look like it's addressing the post it's a response to -- those eight $12/hour employees could all get together and demand a $15/hour wage whether there's a right-to-work law or not -- so I take it you're explaining something different. Did you mean to be explaining how it's feasible for a minimum wage hike not to cause job losses?

If that's what you're getting at, I don't think the explanation quite works. The reason your sample restauranteur won't lay anybody off at $15/hour is because his personal demand for his employees' labor is a step function that's a flat eight from $12 to $15 and then suddenly drops to a flat six at $15 (because if his current employees' price point were to go up to $16 he could replace two of them with the two currently non-working waiters who are willing to work for $15/hour).

The total demand function for the labor of current waiters in a region is the sum of the individual demand functions of all the local restauranteurs. And each of those restauranteurs' individual demand function is a step function much like the one in your example. If those personal demand functions all had their steps in the same place, at $15/hour, then your explanation would work; but they don't. The steps are all in different places because each restauranteur has a unique individual situation -- different numbers of unused tables, different expenses, different pools of potential replacement waiters, different working conditions, different customers with different food price sensitivities, and so forth. So when you add up all those step functions you'll get an overall demand function that instead of having one big step at $15 has so many little steps spread out over a range of wage levels that it looks pretty much like a smooth declining curve. So as the minimum wage is hiked from $12 up to $15, your example restaurant won't lay anybody off but some other restaurant will.
 
And yet when we have had a relatively higher minimum wage and a much more unionized economy none of what you said happened. Wages were higher and profits were lower. This is what happens in the real economy where profits are what is left after the bills are paid, wages are what you negotiate and prices are set by the company to generate an ROI, but not in your fantasy economics 101 where everyone is paid what they are worth, the lower wages are the more people will be hired, and every transaction is a bartered one determined by supply and demand setting prices. You believe that the economy is supply-driven where corporations invest because money is available and not that the economy is demand-driven where corporations invest because there is unfulfilled demand for the product.

Wages were higher for white, male Americans. The shitty jobs were for those that fell into other categories.
Your asserting race into the discussion risks another derailing and another split. (sarcasm emogee)

Does anyone know why the like, quote, and reply targets don't appear when I am on my tablet, a Surface Pro 8?

I am having to move to the tablet to use eye-tracking to input words into the computer. I am losing the fine motor control needed to use a mouse. If I use the tablet I can't participate in the discussions.
 
Does anyone know why the like, quote, and reply targets don't appear when I am on my tablet, a Surface Pro 8?

I am having to move to the tablet to use eye-tracking to input words into the computer. I am losing the fine motor control needed to use a mouse. If I use the tablet I can't participate in the discussions.
Are you logged in properly?
 
But right-to-work laws most assuredly DO discourage unionizing.
You misunderstand -- I wasn't asking for your assurance that there's an effect. I was asking for the mechanism by which the effect operates, so we can examine whether it still operates if ITUC is right that demand for low-skill labor is infinitely inelastic.
I haven't read the papers either, but I've listened to a podcast where an economist explained it. So here's my take, others can correct me if I'm wrong.

The effect is due to the fact that in a single workplace, like a restaurant, the employer cannot realistically have unequal pay for different employees. So let's say a restaurant owner has 8 waiters making $12 an hour. And let's further assume that after all the other expenses except the waiters' salaries, the restaurant makes $20 profit per hour per customers served by one waiter. And thirdly, the restaurant would have capacity for 2 more waiters before running out of tables to serve. So at the moment the owner makes $160 - $96 = $64 per hour.

If he could find two more people willing to serve at $12 / h rate, he could profit 2 x ($20 - $12) = $16 more per hour. But not everybody is willing to work at that rate. He might need to pay $15, which would give him $10 more profit per hour. But that would mean that the other waiters would probably find out and also demand $15 / h. Making his total profit just $50 / hour. So in this situation, it makes no sense for the owner to hire more people, but rather stick with the few who are willing to work for less. Which leads to higher unemployment. With a minimum wage of $15 he would still make a profit and continue to hire everybody, and there would be no reason not to hire the extra two people that are available at that price point.

Why don't the old employees ask for a raise anyway, you might ask? Because of asymmetrical negotiating power. They need their jobs more than the restauranter needs any single employee. And they don't know what the owner would be willing to pay.
Your explanation doesn't look like it's addressing the post it's a response to -- those eight $12/hour employees could all get together and demand a $15/hour wage whether there's a right-to-work law or not -- so I take it you're explaining something different. Did you mean to be explaining how it's feasible for a minimum wage hike not to cause job losses?
Yes, that's what I meant; a mechanism that may explain the counterintuitive empirical results.

Of course the low-wage employees could band up and collectively negotiate a higher wage. But in reality it doesn't necessarily happen.

If that's what you're getting at, I don't think the explanation quite works. The reason your sample restauranteur won't lay anybody off at $15/hour is because his personal demand for his employees' labor is a step function that's a flat eight from $12 to $15 and then suddenly drops to a flat six at $15 (because if his current employees' price point were to go up to $16 he could replace two of them with the two currently non-working waiters who are willing to work for $15/hour).

The total demand function for the labor of current waiters in a region is the sum of the individual demand functions of all the local restauranteurs. And each of those restauranteurs' individual demand function is a step function much like the one in your example. If those personal demand functions all had their steps in the same place, at $15/hour, then your explanation would work; but they don't. The steps are all in different places because each restauranteur has a unique individual situation -- different numbers of unused tables, different expenses, different pools of potential replacement waiters, different working conditions, different customers with different food price sensitivities, and so forth. So when you add up all those step functions you'll get an overall demand function that instead of having one big step at $15 has so many little steps spread out over a range of wage levels that it looks pretty much like a smooth declining curve. So as the minimum wage is hiked from $12 up to $15, your example restaurant won't lay anybody off but some other restaurant will.
That's the usual argument why raising the minimum wage would cause unemployment: some businesses become unprofitable at the new price point for labor. But that effect doesn't need to be ignored for the mechanism I provided to work, if it happens that the other effect is stronger in certain range of price points.

The root cause here is that while theoretically, you could imagine that the price point is a sum of all the demand functions, real life is messier. The employees don't know what their particular employer would be willing to pay. They just know what they are willing to accept (which depends on their own life situations and expenses) and what their colleagues at the same establishment are making. Situations arise in which the employers are able to squeeze more profit out of a smaller pool of people willing to accept a lower pay, rather than hiring as many people as they could.

The (better) solution in my opinion would not be minimum wage, but rather, better collective bargaining and information sharing between employees, i.e. unionization. That's why Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and some other countries in Europe don't have and don't need minimum wage laws.
 
That's the usual argument why raising the minimum wage would cause unemployment: some businesses become unprofitable at the new price point for labor. But that effect doesn't need to be ignored for the mechanism I provided to work, if it happens that the other effect is stronger in certain range of price points.

The root cause here is that while theoretically, you could imagine that the price point is a sum of all the demand functions, real life is messier. The employees don't know what their particular employer would be willing to pay. They just know what they are willing to accept (which depends on their own life situations and expenses) and what their colleagues at the same establishment are making. Situations arise in which the employers are able to squeeze more profit out of a smaller pool of people willing to accept a lower pay, rather than hiring as many people as they could.

The (better) solution in my opinion would not be minimum wage, but rather, better collective bargaining and information sharing between employees, i.e. unionization. That's why Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and some other countries in Europe don't have and don't need minimum wage laws.
Unionization is simply another means of reducing the available labor pool--benefit to it's members, pain to non-members.
 
That's the usual argument why raising the minimum wage would cause unemployment: some businesses become unprofitable at the new price point for labor. But that effect doesn't need to be ignored for the mechanism I provided to work, if it happens that the other effect is stronger in certain range of price points.

The root cause here is that while theoretically, you could imagine that the price point is a sum of all the demand functions, real life is messier. The employees don't know what their particular employer would be willing to pay. They just know what they are willing to accept (which depends on their own life situations and expenses) and what their colleagues at the same establishment are making. Situations arise in which the employers are able to squeeze more profit out of a smaller pool of people willing to accept a lower pay, rather than hiring as many people as they could.

The (better) solution in my opinion would not be minimum wage, but rather, better collective bargaining and information sharing between employees, i.e. unionization. That's why Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and some other countries in Europe don't have and don't need minimum wage laws.
Unionization is simply another means of reducing the available labor pool--benefit to it's members, pain to non-members.
It's no worse than the opposite: employers reducing the available open jobs.

Ideally, the bargaining power of both unions and employers should be balanced so that neither side can dictate terms to the other. The problem is that it's hard to balance. Unions tend to become bloated with time.

The reason why I think this is "better" is that a minimum wage for a particular industry that's negotiated between the employers and the employees is preferable than it being legislated by the government. But actually, the "best" solution would be UBI that would increase the bargaining power of lowest paid workers directly.
 
The reason why I think this is "better" is that a minimum wage for a particular industry that's negotiated between the employers and the employees is preferable than it being legislated by the government. But actually, the "best" solution would be UBI that would increase the bargaining power of lowest paid workers directly.
A UBI also solves another problem:
And yet, in spite of this rather obvious reality, for some reason the delusion persists among economic creationists that since a person is worth $30,000 a year, it magically follows that his labor is worth $30,000 a year.
By paying everyone a UBI of $30,000 per year, there is no need for a minimum wage. Employers could offer work for $10 an hour, and who knows, some people might take that work for a bit of extra income. Employers get cheap labour if they can find someone to do the work, and everyone can cover their basic living costs regardless of employment status. Seems like a good deal.

It would, however, have the side-effect of reducing the labour pool for low-paying jobs. Nobody is going to work like a slave in some awful job (or two, or three) if they don't need that money for rent and food. Employers might actually need to, I don't know, make jobs less shitty in order to attract people to low-paying positions.
 
The (better) solution in my opinion would not be minimum wage, but rather, better collective bargaining and information sharing between employees, i.e. unionization. That's why Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and some other countries in Europe don't have and don't need minimum wage laws.
Unionization is simply another means of reducing the available labor pool--benefit to it's members, pain to non-members.
Yes -- just as a group of people pooling their money to set up a many-worker pin factory is a benefit to its members and a pain to any competing non-member small workshop owner who employs a metal worker to make pins. A union is just a funny kind of company. Capitalism is all about cooperation.

Since what improves worker standard-of-living is converting consumer-surplus into producer-surplus by moving to a different point on the supply-and-demand chart where more money is paid for less labor, and this typically causes the side-effect of screwing over a subset of the workers, there's an obvious opportunity to construct a Pareto-optimal* outcome by transfer payments, so as to arrange for the money from the employers to be shared among all the workers instead of freezing some of them out. Instead of reducing the labor supply by having some** of the workers no longer work, it can be reduced by simply having all the workers work less.

The first hundred and fifty-odd years of capitalism saw the work-week gradually declining, from 70 or 80 hours or more, down to 40. But for some reason it's been rock solid for about the last ninety years. We could get it moving again.

(* That is, Pareto-optimal from the point of view of the employees.)
(** "Some" means the non-members if the labor supply reduction is achieved by unionizing; it means those unskilled who are priced out of the labor force if it's achieved by minimum wage hikes. Same principle.)
 
That's the usual argument why raising the minimum wage would cause unemployment: some businesses become unprofitable at the new price point for labor. But that effect doesn't need to be ignored for the mechanism I provided to work, if it happens that the other effect is stronger in certain range of price points.

The root cause here is that while theoretically, you could imagine that the price point is a sum of all the demand functions, real life is messier. The employees don't know what their particular employer would be willing to pay. They just know what they are willing to accept (which depends on their own life situations and expenses) and what their colleagues at the same establishment are making. Situations arise in which the employers are able to squeeze more profit out of a smaller pool of people willing to accept a lower pay, rather than hiring as many people as they could.

The (better) solution in my opinion would not be minimum wage, but rather, better collective bargaining and information sharing between employees, i.e. unionization. That's why Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and some other countries in Europe don't have and don't need minimum wage laws.
Unionization is simply another means of reducing the available labor pool--benefit to it's members, pain to non-members.
It's no worse than the opposite: employers reducing the available open jobs.

Ideally, the bargaining power of both unions and employers should be balanced so that neither side can dictate terms to the other. The problem is that it's hard to balance. Unions tend to become bloated with time.

The reason why I think this is "better" is that a minimum wage for a particular industry that's negotiated between the employers and the employees is preferable than it being legislated by the government. But actually, the "best" solution would be UBI that would increase the bargaining power of lowest paid workers directly.

Unions are the equivalent of employers blacklisting.

Union: You don't agree to our terms, you get no workers.
Blacklisting: You don't agree to our terms, nobody will hire you.

Both are a form of extortion.
 
The first hundred and fifty-odd years of capitalism saw the work-week gradually declining, from 70 or 80 hours or more, down to 40. But for some reason it's been rock solid for about the last ninety years. We could get it moving again.

(* That is, Pareto-optimal from the point of view of the employees.)
(** "Some" means the non-members if the labor supply reduction is achieved by unionizing; it means those unskilled who are priced out of the labor force if it's achieved by minimum wage hikes. Same principle.)

Fundamentally, the standard of living (measured in $ available, not that this is non-linear with what you actually get for your $) will scale worse than linearly with the length of the workweek. A 32-hour workweek means a 30-40% drop in take-home pay. (Because the overhead costs of having an employee are unchanged.)
 
The first hundred and fifty-odd years of capitalism saw the work-week gradually declining, from 70 or 80 hours or more, down to 40. But for some reason it's been rock solid for about the last ninety years. We could get it moving again.

(* That is, Pareto-optimal from the point of view of the employees.)
(** "Some" means the non-members if the labor supply reduction is achieved by unionizing; it means those unskilled who are priced out of the labor force if it's achieved by minimum wage hikes. Same principle.)

Fundamentally, the standard of living (measured in $ available, not that this is non-linear with what you actually get for your $) will scale worse than linearly with the length of the workweek. A 32-hour workweek means a 30-40% drop in take-home pay. (Because the overhead costs of having an employee are unchanged.)
Why would you assume take pay would fall with a reduced workweek?
 
That's the usual argument why raising the minimum wage would cause unemployment: some businesses become unprofitable at the new price point for labor. But that effect doesn't need to be ignored for the mechanism I provided to work, if it happens that the other effect is stronger in certain range of price points.

The root cause here is that while theoretically, you could imagine that the price point is a sum of all the demand functions, real life is messier. The employees don't know what their particular employer would be willing to pay. They just know what they are willing to accept (which depends on their own life situations and expenses) and what their colleagues at the same establishment are making. Situations arise in which the employers are able to squeeze more profit out of a smaller pool of people willing to accept a lower pay, rather than hiring as many people as they could.

The (better) solution in my opinion would not be minimum wage, but rather, better collective bargaining and information sharing between employees, i.e. unionization. That's why Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and some other countries in Europe don't have and don't need minimum wage laws.
Unionization is simply another means of reducing the available labor pool--benefit to it's members, pain to non-members.
It's no worse than the opposite: employers reducing the available open jobs.

Ideally, the bargaining power of both unions and employers should be balanced so that neither side can dictate terms to the other. The problem is that it's hard to balance. Unions tend to become bloated with time.

The reason why I think this is "better" is that a minimum wage for a particular industry that's negotiated between the employers and the employees is preferable than it being legislated by the government. But actually, the "best" solution would be UBI that would increase the bargaining power of lowest paid workers directly.

Unions are the equivalent of employers blacklisting.

Union: You don't agree to our terms, you get no workers.
Blacklisting: You don't agree to our terms, nobody will hire you.

Both are a form of extortion.
That is an extremely naive and simplistic view of unions. Unions do more than organize workers. With each post, you simply prove you have little to no idea what unions do or about.
 
The award of this year’s Nobel Prize in economics has further exploded a decades-old myth that increasing minimum wages costs jobs.


I.e., the Nobel Prize for Political Correctness
----- or for pandering to the mindless mob




The prize was awarded to David Card, Joshua Angrist and Guido Imbens for real-world research in the 1990s that demonstrated, empirically, that the idea touted by conservative economists that higher minimum wages mean fewer jobs is not based on fact.
What all that research really demonstrated is that it's not possible to calculate precisely how much damage minimum wage does, in each case. It can't be measured, just as it's impossible to measure how much damage is inflicted when a storm damages crops, or how much damage is inflicted when a pile-up accident on the freeway destroys trucks shipping products to market. The higher prices imposed onto consumers whenever the supply is adversely affected can never be precisely measured.

That pileup which destroyed a certain amount of product caused a certain loss to capitalist suppliers or retailers and inevitably drives up price/cost, by 1% or or .1% or .01% somewhere, here or there, but there's no way to really calculate this exact amount of damage. We know the damage takes place because of the law of supply and demand. And in some cases, where the cause is something major and losses huge, there are ways an economist can make good guesses how much is the damage, and it becomes more empirically- and data-based. But even when the cause is a small accident somewhere there is a cost imposed onto someone because of the reduced supply, even if it's impossible to measure.

That's all any minimum-wage research has ever proved: that we can't really measure the exact damage done by the MW increase, and we can't even prove that there is any damage at all if it can't be measured. Not even the damage due to that pileup accident on the freeway can be proved, by any empirical data. You could claim there is no damage, like MW promoters claim there's no damage from a MW increase, because the empirical cause/accident/MW-increase data is too indirect and minor compared to all the other factors in the economy which drive prices up or down, or drive demand/supply up or down.


ITUC General Secretary Sharan Burrow said: “These Nobel Prize winners have demolished the unproven, yet influential, theory that ensuring that workers have a decent minimum wage somehow means job losses.
Just as they demolished the unproven theory that the freeway accident caused higher prices somewhere for the products destroyed in the accident, because 2 or 3 truckloads of product got lost. That loss of product itself does not give us the empirical data for how much higher prices are at a WalMart 20 miles away which now will have (small) shortages. No economist has ever proved how much the prices went up at this or that retailer because of such an accident, and yet it's assumed that when product is destroyed, somewhere it causes reduced supply and higher price = ideologically-based "unproven, yet influential, theory" that supply-and-demand applies even in small cases of reduced supply or higher cost. In major damage cases they can make good guesses, but there's no empirical data to prove it, and any Nobel Prize economist could have fun poking holes in claims that supply or price was adversely affected, for lack of hard data.

This study is nothing new. Minimum-wage fanatics have been cranking out these "studies" for decades, proving that the law of supply-and-demand does not apply (to wage-earners) because there's no empirical data to prove how much exact damage is done to which particular employers and which job-seekers still unemployed or which workers laid off due to cutbacks.

“Those who have peddled that mythical theory for decades, and the governments and institutions that have imposed the same theory, without proper evidence or against evidence to the contrary, are responsible for millions . . .
Just as there's no "proper evidence" of higher prices due to accidents when truckloads are lost in a freeway pileup. Whereas the "evidence to the contrary," for minimum wage increase, is that you can see a few employees who get a wage increase, so you can say with glee that here is a particular person who now has a higher income than before = increase in living standard for that one person, or that one group of employees, without being able to see the cost to someone else, in job loss or reduced production by a company due to the higher cost, just as there is higher cost to a producer whose cargo got lost in an accident and yet the empirical consequence cannot be measured.
. . . for millions upon millions of people living in poverty.
If this could make any sense, it means we could impose a minimum-wage increase in any 3rd-world country having substandard wage level, increase that wage to a "decent" level, and it would bring all those millions out of poverty. And yet exactly the opposite is what happens if the minimum wage is increased to a "decent" level in any 3rd-world country. This was proved in American Samoa, where the minimum wage was increased by Congress in 2007-2009, and the result was a severe recession/depression of the Samoan economy, and President Obama in 2010 had to sign the bill to RESCIND that minimum wage increase, which he had voted for 3 years earlier as a Senator. That Democrats in Congress were forced to reverse their own minimum-wage increase 3 years later is virtual PROOF that minimum wage does more harm than good, putting MORE into poverty than it brings out of poverty. Though you can always prove that some employees do benefit from the wage increase, while ignoring those damaged by it (and pretending they don't exist).


“This prize is a serious indictment of many economists in that it has taken some thirty years for the facts to be given prominence over a damaging and groundless idea.
There is nothing new in this "research" which only proves the same as all the earlier research, which is that we cannot accurately measure the damage done by minimum wage. And so therefore the conclusion is that there is no damage. As long as the empirical data cannot give us the exact breakdown of the job losses, the lost production, the reduced supply, etc., then the Nobel Prize winner assumes there is no loss, no reduction, no damage. Just as we could assume there is no loss, no damage when a truck accidently goes off the road and the cargo is lost. Because there's no way to calculate how much prices went up at a WalMart store 20 miles away. So therefore there's no damage to the economy as a result of truck accidents? That's all this research is saying. It's the same as such research promoting minimum wage has always concluded, in decades of research in dozens of university studies, by minimum-wage economist ideologues who score cheap points telling millions of wage-earners what they want to hear.

At a time when the world needs evidence-based and scientific research to tackle a global pandemic, economics too needs to be based on factual analysis rather than ill-informed and ideological speculation dressed up as legitimate policy advice.
But this means we have to assume that accidents in transportation or production of goods have no negative effect on the economy, because we cannot prove where the price went up somewhere, to which consumers, to which retailers 100 or 1000 miles away from the accident location. Likewise damage due to weather disasters, which in small cases cannot be measured in terms of losses and layoffs and supply reduction and costs to consumers harmed somewhere nearby or far away.

There is no scientific factual analysis to prove how much consumers were hurt -- by an accident, by weather damage, by a criminal act -- which consumers, which retailers, which producers dependent on deliveries, what the exact damage is to each consumer at the end of the line experiencing those losses of that particular production. There are often "empty shelves" as a result of lost production, such as in the current pandemic, but generally it's not possible to scientifically document exactly which loss at a production plant 1000 miles away caused which consumer to have to pay how much higher price or end up unable to make that anticipated purchase.


“Ensuring minimum living wages through statutory processes or collective bargaining is crucial to . . .
Remember that in Samoa the decent "minimum living wage" was provided through statutory processes, "ensuring minimum living wages" to Samoan workers, and yet in the real world the end result was severe job loss and reduced production and economic disaster in Samoa, leading to President Obama having to rescind that "minimum living wage" which had been provided by the statutory processes.
. . . is crucial to ending poverty;
But in Samoa that "minimum living wage" through statutory processes CAUSED POVERTY, did not end it, and so it had to be rescinded in order to prevent any further damage and poverty it was causing.
. . . reversing the long-term trend of declining labour income shares; increasing demand;
The cliché of "increasing demand" has never made any sense, as some kind of need to be met, as though higher demand is something which produces further wealth or economic gain. No economist has ever shown that there's a need to "increase demand" in order to produce an economic benefit. This phrase is just a slogan, mostly of uncompetitive producers who imagine that the problem is the lack of consumers for their product, when the real problem is that their product is inferior, and the need is not to find consumers for their inferior product, but for them to improve their production. When you see this cliché about a need to "increase demand" you know you're getting Snake Oil Economics, from someone on a crusade to promote some special interest at the expense of everyone else. If it's a politician, he's pandering to a certain constituency who might gain from some form of corporate welfare, claiming that a higher demand for their product will benefit the whole society, when in reality it only promotes that particular special interest at someone else's expense, i.e., the expense of taxpayers or consumers generally who will have to pay higher prices as a result. You cannot artificially INCREASE someone's demand at point A without causing a DECREASE in someone else's demand at point B.
. . . and building the basis for recovery – with jobs, decent work and resilience – in an increasingly unequal world.”
In Samoa it made the world MORE unequal, driving those in poverty even deeper into it, or putting someone into poverty when before they were surviving just above poverty.

No matter what benefit you expect for some, as a result of driving up their wage, you are only driving others deeper down into a lower living standard as a result -- e.g., through higher prices consumers must pay as a result of the higher production cost -- because artificially boosting the income of the select ones favored by your scheme can happen only by imposing damage onto others, ignored in your calculation. It's always so simple to ignore the total damage or cost you're imposing onto everyone else when you obsess on the few who benefit from it. As is demonstrated by the Samoa example, which is an easy one to recognize because the total change was great enough for us to be able to see the damage and measure it enough so everyone had to admit that it really caused more harm than benefit.

When the minimum-wage increase is significant enough to be recognized for its total consequences, everyone has to admit that it did more harm than good. This is why they almost never do a significant increase in the minimum wage. Those who crusade for it have learned that it has to be done very gradually, slowly, phased in over a period of years, in order to conceal the net damage that it always causes. If this were not the case, you'd be able to name at least one case where it was increased by a large percent, affecting a large percent of the population, and producing net benefit. There is no such case.

Every case you can name where you think the result was a net benefit is a case where it had to be phased in gradually, and where the percent increase was small, or in small doses, so it was impossible to do any precise measurement of the results taking account of the total harm and benefit.

And of course you can name cases of wage increase which was market-driven, producing net benefit to all, and where no law was necessary because that kind of change happens automatically in the free market where producers sometimes increase the wage in order to attract the needed workers.
 
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Does anyone know why the like, quote, and reply targets don't appear when I am on my tablet, a Surface Pro 8?

I am having to move to the tablet to use eye-tracking to input words into the computer. I am losing the fine motor control needed to use a mouse. If I use the tablet I can't participate in the discussions.
Are you logged in properly?

Face met palm.
 
Does anyone know why the like, quote, and reply targets don't appear when I am on my tablet, a Surface Pro 8?

I am having to move to the tablet to use eye-tracking to input words into the computer. I am losing the fine motor control needed to use a mouse. If I use the tablet I can't participate in the discussions.
Are you logged in properly?

Face met palm.
Glad you got it working. (y)
 
That's the usual argument why raising the minimum wage would cause unemployment: some businesses become unprofitable at the new price point for labor. But that effect doesn't need to be ignored for the mechanism I provided to work, if it happens that the other effect is stronger in certain range of price points.

The root cause here is that while theoretically, you could imagine that the price point is a sum of all the demand functions, real life is messier. The employees don't know what their particular employer would be willing to pay. They just know what they are willing to accept (which depends on their own life situations and expenses) and what their colleagues at the same establishment are making. Situations arise in which the employers are able to squeeze more profit out of a smaller pool of people willing to accept a lower pay, rather than hiring as many people as they could.

The (better) solution in my opinion would not be minimum wage, but rather, better collective bargaining and information sharing between employees, i.e. unionization. That's why Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and some other countries in Europe don't have and don't need minimum wage laws.
Unionization is simply another means of reducing the available labor pool--benefit to it's members, pain to non-members.
It's no worse than the opposite: employers reducing the available open jobs.

Ideally, the bargaining power of both unions and employers should be balanced so that neither side can dictate terms to the other. The problem is that it's hard to balance. Unions tend to become bloated with time.

The reason why I think this is "better" is that a minimum wage for a particular industry that's negotiated between the employers and the employees is preferable than it being legislated by the government. But actually, the "best" solution would be UBI that would increase the bargaining power of lowest paid workers directly.

Unions are the equivalent of employers blacklisting.

Union: You don't agree to our terms, you get no workers.
Blacklisting: You don't agree to our terms, nobody will hire you.

Both are a form of extortion.
The zombies of Debs, Gompers, and Bryan just walked by again. They said "*^^%!" Never seen zombies swear before. A union isn't extortion. It is collective bargaining, and provides leverage to employees to be able to get fair wages and benefits. Sure, there could be more jobs without unions. But those jobs would be lower paying and less providing to the employees. Effectively, there could be 100% employment if people worked for nothing.

You love bringing up the unions kill jobs thing, but we are looking for the median where people are working and living off of that work. Meanwhile, other people, where options for work are less than ideal, are working at wages that require assistance for food, housing, medical care. So clearly, that isn't working either.
 
Unions are the equivalent of employers blacklisting.

Union: You don't agree to our terms, you get no workers.
Blacklisting: You don't agree to our terms, nobody will hire you.

Both are a form of extortion.
Buffett: You don't pay your premium, you get no insurance.

Is that a form of extortion?
What your union says sounds to me more like Buffett than blacklisting.
 
Unions are the equivalent of employers blacklisting.

Union: You don't agree to our terms, you get no workers.
Blacklisting: You don't agree to our terms, nobody will hire you.

Both are a form of extortion.
The zombies of Debs, Gompers, and Bryan just walked by again. They said "*^^%!" Never seen zombies swear before. A union isn't extortion. It is collective bargaining, and provides leverage to employees to be able to get fair wages and benefits.
Well, that's an oversimplification. Unions have been known to beat people up for refusing to join their strikes. That's not "a form of" extortion; it's just straight up extortion. Fortunately that sort of thing has declined a lot since the days of Debs, Gompers, and Bryan.

Sure, there could be more jobs without unions. But those jobs would be lower paying and less providing to the employees. Effectively, there could be 100% employment if people worked for nothing.

You love bringing up the unions kill jobs thing, but we are looking for the median where people are working and living off of that work. Meanwhile, other people, where options for work are less than ideal, are working at wages that require assistance for food, housing, medical care. So clearly, that isn't working either.
Meanwhile if we unionize more and/or raise the minimum wage, then there will be some extra people who won't be working at all; they'll require even more assistance. That evidently works for you. So on what grounds do you claim that where options for work are less than ideal and some are working at wages that require assistance for food, housing, medical care, "So clearly, that isn't working either." That's what we're doing now. Looks to me like it's working.

Some people don't know how to produce enough to fill their own needs all by themselves. Therefore we assist them. Why should we prohibit them from helping out and producing something and needing less assistance by filling as much of their own needs as they can? That's insane.
 
The first hundred and fifty-odd years of capitalism saw the work-week gradually declining, from 70 or 80 hours or more, down to 40. But for some reason it's been rock solid for about the last ninety years. We could get it moving again.

(* That is, Pareto-optimal from the point of view of the employees.)
(** "Some" means the non-members if the labor supply reduction is achieved by unionizing; it means those unskilled who are priced out of the labor force if it's achieved by minimum wage hikes. Same principle.)

Fundamentally, the standard of living (measured in $ available, not that this is non-linear with what you actually get for your $) will scale worse than linearly with the length of the workweek. A 32-hour workweek means a 30-40% drop in take-home pay. (Because the overhead costs of having an employee are unchanged.)
Why would you assume take pay would fall with a reduced workweek?

Because productivity would drop.
 
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