non-existence of objective morality

[Juma]

One of the criteria for the objective quality of an extant moral law would be its enforceability.

This is where you go off the rails, at the very beginning. You're completely wrong. Enforceability is no part of the criteria for objectivity. To claim that it is is just a dressed-up way to say "Might makes right." Might does not make right. Right makes right.

So, what makes right?

What is moral in one culture can appear to be horrendous in another. In the episode where Jesus tells the adulteress to "Go and sin no more," it is she who has behaved immorally and the people who want to stone her to death, who are acting morally. This seems rather extreme to us, but this peculiar bit of moral code is intended to protect one's property from theft. This woman is a man's property, and another man has diminished its value. Of course, killing her does reduce her value to zero, but there is always social value in deterrence. Which is to say, might(in this case, a crowd carrying stones) does make right.

There is no human act which can be perfectly moral, given the proper circumstances, and abhorrently immoral in other circumstances. To try to write an absolute code of right and wrong is an exercise in futility.

Bomb#20 doesnt discuss which moral is right. He clearifyhow science works, what an objective law is.
The law of gravity is an objective law. There is no might needed to uphold it. Its a description of how the universe works.
That what makes talk about objective moral so paradoxual. Supose someone really found an objective moral law. Then what could force us to believe it is morally right? I can only think of one way: that we were somehow hardwire to think it is morally right. But then, if we are hardwired to gave this moral then we will follow it anyway, wouldnt we? its treally not an issue, is?

 

[Bronzeage]

So, what makes right?

What is moral in one culture can appear to be horrendous in another. In the episode where Jesus tells the adulteress to "Go and sin no more," it is she who has behaved immorally and the people who want to stone her to death, who are acting morally. This seems rather extreme to us, but this peculiar bit of moral code is intended to protect one's property from theft. This woman is a man's property, and another man has diminished its value. Of course, killing her does reduce her value to zero, but there is always social value in deterrence. Which is to say, might(in this case, a crowd carrying stones) does make right.

There is no human act which can be perfectly moral, given the proper circumstances, and abhorrently immoral in other circumstances. To try to write an absolute code of right and wrong is an exercise in futility.

Bomb#20 doesnt discuss which moral is right. He clearifyhow science works, what an objective law is.
The law of gravity is an objective law. There is no might needed to uphold it. Its a description of how the universe works.
That what makes talk about objective moral so paradoxual. Supose someone really found an objective moral law. Then what could force us to believe it is morally right? I can only think of one way: that we were somehow hardwire to think it is morally right. But then, if we are hardwired to gave this moral then we will follow it anyway, wouldnt we? its treally not an issue, is?

The idea of objective morality is a human fantasy which is based on a contradiction in terms, compounded by a definition error. It is impossible for morality to be objective, due to its nature, which results from a human group's need to survive. The most objective form of morality is that of a human group which is pitted against its environment, but not other human groups. Once we have to deal with humans who are not within our group, all objectivity ceases to exist.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

An unenforceable law is called an opinion.

No, it is not. It is still called a law in English. The scenario in my previous post illustrates that fact: Ivanov broke the law of the UK. He behaved illegally. He got away with it, but he still behaved illegally. There are plenty of real-life situations in which criminals commit crimes and get away with them. It remains the case that they committed crimes, that they broke the law, etc.; those are matters of fact, and the fact is that they did so.

 

[Learner]

But there is corruption and injustice in the human race here on Earth. So are you implying Earth doesn't belong to God? Or are you implying man was not created by God?

Well yes... you'd be right as the theology goes - as its written : This is Satans world now and man was still created by God. Corruption and injustice remains only here and doesn't exist or go into Gods heavenly domain or the "new earth" to follow after each individual gets screened of unrepenting bad habits, so to speak.

Are you proposing that nobody who actually "wants" to exist and "belong" in the Christian Heaven by His ways is corrupt or unjust? We have had two thousand years of appalling history proving that that is not the case.

Of course not. We've had appalling history but there are people who have had everything by unjust means, loving the life they've had or live,why give that up for being merely humble? Not until they suddenly for some reason believe there is a God after all. The suffering ...well they'd probably love the idea to exist in the Christian heaven for obvious said reasons.

 

[Learner]

According to whom? God's PR Department?

Yes I suppose so ... the PR is in the bible. Jesus the adviser.

That sounds reasonable, but if we take the Christian at his word, God has created two paradise environments populated with free-willed beings. The first was before the creation of the world, and the result was that Lucifer and one-third of the angels rebelled and were exiled. The second was the Garden of Eden, and the result was that Adam and Eve rebelled and ushered sin into the world.

You'll forgive me if I'm not confident that God's third version will go any better.

Lucifer was given great power and could do great things to some extent, an entity with great standing, a tree of knowledge and he also caused Adam and Eve to do sin. Now, a new heaven and Earth without the said character, I'd say that the "third version" is better.

 

[James Brown]

According to whom? God's PR Department?

Yes I suppose so ... the PR is in the bible. Jesus the adviser.

That sounds reasonable, but if we take the Christian at his word, God has created two paradise environments populated with free-willed beings. The first was before the creation of the world, and the result was that Lucifer and one-third of the angels rebelled and were exiled. The second was the Garden of Eden, and the result was that Adam and Eve rebelled and ushered sin into the world.

You'll forgive me if I'm not confident that God's third version will go any better.

Lucifer was given great power and could do great things to some extent, an entity with great standing, a tree of knowledge and he also caused Adam and Eve to do sin. Now, a new heaven and Earth without the said character, I'd say that the "third version" is better.

I'd agree. Too bad God couldn't have used the third version the first time around. Or the second time, for that matter. It seems that God is learning as he goes along, experimenting, trial-and-error, throwing stuff against the wall to see what sticks, etc.

 

[Learner]

I'd agree. Too bad God couldn't have used the third version the first time around. Or the second time, for that matter. It seems that God is learning as he goes along, experimenting, trial-and-error, throwing stuff against the wall to see what sticks, etc.

You're not far off the mark (as I see it at least) but you made a good point. For example in Genesis :

The Beginning

1 In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. 2 Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters.

3 And God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light. 4 "God saw that the light was good", and he separated the light from the darkness. 5 God called the light “day,” and the darkness he called “night.” And there was evening, and there was morning—the first day.

6 And God said, “Let there be a vault between the waters to separate water from water.” 7 So God made the vault and separated the water under the vault from the water above it. And it was so. 8 God called the vault “sky.” And there was evening, and there was morning—the second day.

9 And God said, “Let the water under the sky be gathered to one place, and let dry ground appear.” And it was so. 10 God called the dry ground “land,” and the gathered waters he called “seas.” "And God saw that it was good".

26 Then God said, “Let us make mankind in our image", in our likeness, so that they may rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals,[a] and over all the creatures that move along the ground.”
Verse 26 ... decides to make man.

I won't flood the thread with verses but what it seems to me, is God is making up HIS creations as He's going along! NO pre-planned idea but creating as an artist (for lack of better wording).

 

[bilby]

Yes I suppose so ... the PR is in the bible. Jesus the adviser.




Lucifer was given great power and could do great things to some extent, an entity with great standing, a tree of knowledge and he also caused Adam and Eve to do sin. Now, a new heaven and Earth without the said character, I'd say that the "third version" is better.

I'd agree. Too bad God couldn't have used the third version the first time around. Or the second time, for that matter. It seems that God is learning as he goes along, experimenting, trial-and-error, throwing stuff against the wall to see what sticks, etc.

“But you . . . you’re omnicognisant,” said Brutha.

“That doesn’t mean I know everything.”

Brutha bit his lip. “Um. Yes. It does.”

- Terry Pratchett, Small Gods

 

[Treedbear]

...
The idea of objective morality is a human fantasy which is based on a contradiction in terms, compounded by a definition error. It is impossible for morality to be objective, due to its nature, which results from a human group's need to survive. The most objective form of morality is that of a human group which is pitted against its environment, but not other human groups. Once we have to deal with humans who are not within our group, all objectivity ceases to exist.

(My bolding in the above.) And so can it not be true that although morality is necessarily subjective in practice, it has an objective basis from which we can extrapolate(*) moral truth? I would say survival (especially of the species in question) qualifies as a good starting point. Actually, when any particular moral code is examined this is what it comes down to. Even theistic religions which seek to appease an all powerful enforcer God. Who would believe in a God that wants to totally destroy the human race?


* ("extend the application of a method or conclusion to an unknown situation by assuming that existing trends will continue or similar methods will be applicable.")

 

[Bronzeage]

...
The idea of objective morality is a human fantasy which is based on a contradiction in terms, compounded by a definition error. It is impossible for morality to be objective, due to its nature, which results from a human group's need to survive. The most objective form of morality is that of a human group which is pitted against its environment, but not other human groups. Once we have to deal with humans who are not within our group, all objectivity ceases to exist.

(My bolding in the above.) And so can it not be true that although morality is necessarily subjective in practice, it has an objective basis from which we can extrapolate(*) moral truth? I would say survival (especially of the species in question) qualifies as a good starting point. Actually, when any particular moral code is examined this is what it comes down to. Even theistic religions which seek to appease an all powerful enforcer God. Who would believe in a God that wants to totally destroy the human race?


* ("extend the application of a method or conclusion to an unknown situation by assuming that existing trends will continue or similar methods will be applicable.")

The only objective element in any moral code is the two basic dictums, "Do not kill your friends" and "Don't steal your friend's stuff." These two imperatives are what allows humans to live in cooperative social groups, and thus, survive in a hostile world.

That's where objectivity ends. Everything after this point is arguing over definitions of "who is my friend?" and "what stuff can you own?" and that is completely subjective.

 

[Treedbear]

...
The idea of objective morality is a human fantasy which is based on a contradiction in terms, compounded by a definition error. It is impossible for morality to be objective, due to its nature, which results from a human group's need to survive. The most objective form of morality is that of a human group which is pitted against its environment, but not other human groups. Once we have to deal with humans who are not within our group, all objectivity ceases to exist.

(My bolding in the above.) And so can it not be true that although morality is necessarily subjective in practice, it has an objective basis from which we can extrapolate(*) moral truth? I would say survival (especially of the species in question) qualifies as a good starting point. Actually, when any particular moral code is examined this is what it comes down to. Even theistic religions which seek to appease an all powerful enforcer God. Who would believe in a God that wants to totally destroy the human race?


* ("extend the application of a method or conclusion to an unknown situation by assuming that existing trends will continue or similar methods will be applicable.")

The only objective element in any moral code is the two basic dictums, "Do not kill your friends" and "Don't steal your friend's stuff." These two imperatives are what allows humans to live in cooperative social groups, and thus, survive in a hostile world.

That's where objectivity ends. Everything after this point is arguing over definitions of "who is my friend?" and "what stuff can you own?" and that is completely subjective.

I don't know if that really holds up unless you want to define friend as someone you don't kill and don't steal from. Like saying murder is immoral when the word only has meaning when applied to immoral killing. Killing in war may be a moral good. Likewise there are circumstances when I might be morally bound to kill or steal from someone I consider a personal friend in the service of a higher moral good (eg, the old run-away train scenario). So the objectivity has to transend the local group in some situations to include people you might never have met, as a matter of survival.

But then you probably have more friends than me. On the other hand my moral code prevents me from killing or stealing from people who I don't or wouldn't even consider friends. And that might be even more important in an increasingly tribal world.

 

[Bomb#20]

One of the criteria for the objective quality of an extant moral law would be its enforceability.

This is where you go off the rails, at the very beginning. You're completely wrong. Enforceability is no part of the criteria for objectivity. To claim that it is is just a dressed-up way to say "Might makes right." Might does not make right. Right makes right.

An unenforceable law is called an opinion.

Not by normal English speakers. You can invent your own private language if you want, but that doesn't make what you write in it an argument.

You say "right makes right" but that's just a brute claim so we need some way to deal with the person who disagrees with that subjective opinion.

"Right makes right." is a brute claim, and "It's immoral to disobey Me because if you do I'll torture you forever." isn't? You have a curious understanding of "brute". Sorry, my bad, I guess I'm supposed to spell it "Brute".

I say the absence of transcendent, universal enforcement would render a so-called 'law' moot.

Sure, you say it; but do you have any reasoning to back it up, or are we supposed to believe it just because you say it?

It's a law of biology that only mammals grow placentas. There's no transcendent enforcement of this, no cosmic placenta police, nobody killing every snake that tries to grow a placenta. That doesn't make the law moot. Unenforceability notwithstanding, it remains a fact that if you grow a placenta, you're a mammal. Do you have a problem with that concept?

So how the heck is that any different from fast's colorful example? Whether or not anyone stops you by force notwithstanding, if you steal your neighbor's lawnmower and pawn it for the purpose of buying porn, you're a bad person. How the heck do you figure the mere circumstance that somebody did that and got away with it could possibly make him, or anybody else who did it, a good person? What's your reasoning for that bizarre inference?

See the cartoon below. Wabbit and Duck both agree there is such a thing as "hunting season". They both agree that you can appeal to the existence of an authority that decides which season it is.

But whether it's hunting season is a matter of authority. Morality, as Socrates proved and any number of TFT posters have pointed out, is not a matter of authority. How the heck would God saying "It's okay to steal your neighbor's lawnmower and pawn it for the purpose of buying porn" make it true? It remains a rotten thing to do to your neighbor, God's subjective opinion notwithstanding.

 

[Bomb#20]

Right on cue bilby shows up to ruin the interesting thread with vulgar personal attacks

... And the 'personal attack' is a figment of your imagination ...

Actually, "Perhaps you should consider learning to think ... On reflection, I would advise you against learning to think, because were you to do so, and to then re-read your above post, the embarrassment could be fatal." is a vulgar personal attack.

 

[Bomb#20]

One of the criteria for the objective quality of an extant moral law would be its enforceability.

This is where you go off the rails, at the very beginning. You're completely wrong. Enforceability is no part of the criteria for objectivity. To claim that it is is just a dressed-up way to say "Might makes right." Might does not make right. Right makes right.

So, what makes right?

An excellent question, but one that needs to be tabled until the conceptual deadwood is cleared away.

What is moral in one culture can appear to be horrendous in another.

And what is measles-preventing in one culture can appear to be horrendously autism-causing in another. Cultures can and do blind themselves to all sorts of realities, and make all manner of idiocies appear to be true to people in those cultures. The circumstance that something appears to be different from the point of view of some other culture is not evidence against it being objective fact.

In the episode where Jesus tells the adulteress to "Go and sin no more," it is she who has behaved immorally

Well, assuming she promised her husband she wouldn't copulate with anyone else, yes, she probably behaved immorally.

and the people who want to stone her to death, who are acting morally.

Um, your evidence for that contention being...? That stoning people for adultery "appeared" moral to them? It probably also appeared to them that the sun goes around the earth.

This seems rather extreme to us, but this peculiar bit of moral code is intended to protect one's property from theft. This woman is a man's property, and another man has diminished its value. Of course, killing her does reduce her value to zero, but there is always social value in deterrence. Which is to say, might(in this case, a crowd carrying stones) does make right.

And Jeff Dahmer intended to protect himself from his lunch escaping. Intending to accomplish a bad end doesn't make the means adopted to secure that end good. Which is to say, what evidence do you have that wives are a man's property, and what evidence do you have that the mighty stone-carrying crowd were in the right?

There is no human act which can be perfectly moral, given the proper circumstances, and abhorrently immoral in other circumstances.

Sure there is. Killing your uncle, for instance. Perfectly moral if you do it because it's the only way to stop him from killing you; abhorrently immoral if you do it in order to inherit his riches.

To try to write an absolute code of right and wrong is an exercise in futility.

To try to write an absolute code of mathematics is an exercise in futility, as Goedel proved, if by "absolute code" we mean a complete code that answers every question. That's no reason to think it's futile to try to write a code of mathematics that covers enough of the topic to answer a lot of important questions -- Zermelo and Fraenkel might have something to say about that. Morality, like mathematics, is very complicated.

So if you mean an absolute and complete code of right and wrong that answers every moral question, I expect you're perfectly right, but so what? Why should the impossibility of reaching Andromeda stop us from launching moonshots? But if you mean it's futile to try to write an absolute but incomplete code of right and wrong that only answers some questions, show your work.

Hey, I'll give it a try. It's wrong for people to rape other people for fun. Can you exhibit a circumstance in which that moral rule is wrong?

 

[Lion IRC]

If there is no such (extant) thing as the objectively true demarcation between rabbit and duck season then we can argue or wage war about it forever and never know which is right - because there IS no objective right or wrong.
This is ontology 101

BUT if an objectively true definitive hunting season does exist transcendent and independent of competing opinions about the time of year, then we are entitled - obligated - to explore epistemology 101.
How might two people, who both agree there is such an objectively real/true thing as a hunting season, decide the matter?

I'm not arguing might equals right in the sense that Bugs Bunny and Daffy should settle it by arm wrestling. I'm arguing that if there is no enforceability of the so-called 'law' then Bugs and Daffy can freely ignore each other's opinions.
They certainly wouldn't agree to "settle" by arm wrestling because that would be needlessly burdening themselves with a voluntary (moral) obligation - an optional, preferential moral choice.

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?

If (since) God exists we have an objective transcendent law giver, law arbiter and inescapable consequential enforcement. And this doesn't in any way imply that God's Laws are moral just because they are universally, inevitably enforced. It means they are more than just God's opinions.

We can freely argue whether it's rabbit season but God gives us an objective way to find out if it isn't.

 

[Bronzeage]

So, what makes right?

An excellent question, but one that needs to be tabled until the conceptual deadwood is cleared away.

What is moral in one culture can appear to be horrendous in another.

And what is measles-preventing in one culture can appear to be horrendously autism-causing in another. Cultures can and do blind themselves to all sorts of realities, and make all manner of idiocies appear to be true to people in those cultures. The circumstance that something appears to be different from the point of view of some other culture is not evidence against it being objective fact.

In the episode where Jesus tells the adulteress to "Go and sin no more," it is she who has behaved immorally

Well, assuming she promised her husband she wouldn't copulate with anyone else, yes, she probably behaved immorally.

and the people who want to stone her to death, who are acting morally.

Um, your evidence for that contention being...? That stoning people for adultery "appeared" moral to them? It probably also appeared to them that the sun goes around the earth.

This seems rather extreme to us, but this peculiar bit of moral code is intended to protect one's property from theft. This woman is a man's property, and another man has diminished its value. Of course, killing her does reduce her value to zero, but there is always social value in deterrence. Which is to say, might(in this case, a crowd carrying stones) does make right.

And Jeff Dahmer intended to protect himself from his lunch escaping. Intending to accomplish a bad end doesn't make the means adopted to secure that end good. Which is to say, what evidence do you have that wives are a man's property, and what evidence do you have that the mighty stone-carrying crowd were in the right?

There is no human act which can be perfectly moral, given the proper circumstances, and abhorrently immoral in other circumstances.

Sure there is. Killing your uncle, for instance. Perfectly moral if you do it because it's the only way to stop him from killing you; abhorrently immoral if you do it in order to inherit his riches.

To try to write an absolute code of right and wrong is an exercise in futility.

To try to write an absolute code of mathematics is an exercise in futility, as Goedel proved, if by "absolute code" we mean a complete code that answers every question. That's no reason to think it's futile to try to write a code of mathematics that covers enough of the topic to answer a lot of important questions -- Zermelo and Fraenkel might have something to say about that. Morality, like mathematics, is very complicated.

So if you mean an absolute and complete code of right and wrong that answers every moral question, I expect you're perfectly right, but so what? Why should the impossibility of reaching Andromeda stop us from launching moonshots? But if you mean it's futile to try to write an absolute but incomplete code of right and wrong that only answers some questions, show your work.

Hey, I'll give it a try. It's wrong for people to rape other people for fun. Can you exhibit a circumstance in which that moral rule is wrong?

I don't know if my syntax was unclear, or you misinterpreted my words, but your uncle analogy agrees with what I intended to say.

Your apparent moral stricture against "rape for fun", as opposed to the other motivations for rape, contains a lot of assumptions. The first assumption is that the rape victim and the rapist are contained within the same moral code. We need to remember, moral treatment only applies to members of our own group and interactions between group members. If there is no moral stricture against killing someone from outside the group, it would be inconsistent to think rape, for whatever reason, would be taboo.

What we have here, is not an absolute moral code, but a case of you believing your code is superior to all others. There's nothing new in that.

 

[PyramidHead]

If there is no such (extant) thing as the objectively true demarcation between rabbit and duck season then we can argue or wage war about it forever and never know which is right - because there IS no objective right or wrong.
This is ontology 101

BUT if an objectively true definitive hunting season does exist transcendent and independent of competing opinions about the time of year, then we are entitled - obligated - to explore epistemology 101.
How might two people, who both agree there is such an objectively real/true thing as a hunting season, decide the matter?

I'm not arguing might equals right in the sense that Bugs Bunny and Daffy should settle it by arm wrestling. I'm arguing that if there is no enforceability of the so-called 'law' then Bugs and Daffy can freely ignore each other's opinions.
They certainly wouldn't agree to "settle" by arm wrestling because that would be needlessly burdening themselves with a voluntary (moral) obligation - an optional, preferential moral choice.

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?[

If (since) God exists we have an objective transcendent law giver, law arbiter and inescapable consequential enforcement. And this doesn't in any way imply that God's Laws are moral just because they are universally, inevitably enforced. It means they are more than just God's opinions.

We can freely argue whether it's rabbit season but God gives us an objective way to find out if it isn't.

You misunderstand the nature of transcendent principles. That 2+2=4 is not true because anything exists that "enforces" it, and would not become less true if it could be somehow transgressed without consequence. A transcendent principle transcends even God: if he said 2+2=5, God would be mistaken, regardless of his power to enforce it. If it is wrong to deprive someone of their freedom, and God says it is not wrong, then God would be mistaken about that as well. The issue of how we come to know such transcendent principles is separate, and you are using it as a diversionary tactic. If true principles can fail to be enforced and false principles can be enforced, then being enforced is a contingent thing that has nothing to do with truth and everything to do with empirical conditions (namely, whether or not there is some agent capable and willing to enforce the principles).

 

[Bronzeage]

The only objective element in any moral code is the two basic dictums, "Do not kill your friends" and "Don't steal your friend's stuff." These two imperatives are what allows humans to live in cooperative social groups, and thus, survive in a hostile world.

That's where objectivity ends. Everything after this point is arguing over definitions of "who is my friend?" and "what stuff can you own?" and that is completely subjective.

I don't know if that really holds up unless you want to define friend as someone you don't kill and don't steal from. Like saying murder is immoral when the word only has meaning when applied to immoral killing. Killing in war may be a moral good. Likewise there are circumstances when I might be morally bound to kill or steal from someone I consider a personal friend in the service of a higher moral good (eg, the old run-away train scenario). So the objectivity has to transend the local group in some situations to include people you might never have met, as a matter of survival.

But then you probably have more friends than me. On the other hand my moral code prevents me from killing or stealing from people who I don't or wouldn't even consider friends. And that might be even more important in an increasingly tribal world.

Well, yeah. That is how we define friends, but as I said before, the rest is an argument over definitions. The first thing a moral code does is define the group, so we know our friends. What confuses this issue is the strange idea that all the world is one group. This is a fairly new concept in human thinking and it's obvious we haven't thought it all the way through.

That's the problem. Morality and moral codes evolved along with human culture and society, when we were living in small groups and occasionally there wasn't enough to go around. Enough what? It doesn't really matter. It could be water, food, or dry land. The particulars of a moral code depend upon the challenges of the environment. In a country crisscrossed with streams and rivers, water is not going to be an issue. In an arid country, where the water produced by a few wells, can supply a limited number of people, groups will fight over who gets to drink. When you fight for the well, you insure your friends and family will live, and insure that someone else's friends and family will not.

There is a paradox contained in the "All men are brothers" morality. Since moral codes deal with limited resources, a group with no limit on membership assumes no limit on resources. One has to wonder how such an absurd idea could get traction.

It is an appealing idea, for the same reason the "Don't kill your friends" rule appeals to us. It's nice to be able to fall asleep with the assurance no one is going to kill you in your bed. It's nice to think there's no reason to fight to the death for your next drink of water.

Whatever the original version of Jesus Christ's teachings may have been, "universal brotherhood" became a cornerstone. This meant there was no restrictions on group membership, and everyone was in the group, whether they wanted to be, or even knew there was a group. This brings us back to the resources problem, not enough to go around. This is not such an obstacles for the Christians who worked so hard to preach this bizarre idea. They weren't concerned with the amount of water and food on planet Earth. For them, starvation, disease, violent death, and whatever, were just a temporary state t be endured. Their idea of "one group" was to gain eternal life in paradise, not a tolerable life here on Earth.

This naturally leads to as many conflicts as it solves.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

One of the epistemic criteria for and objectively real/true moral law must surely be that it is enforceable. If I can violate a (supposed) moral law with zero consequences - because there's no punishment - then what other alternative way do we have of differentiating subjective opinion from objective moral law?

Do you think that that criteria is compatible with your own way of making moral assessments?
For example, in several pre-Columbian societies, ritualistic child sacrifice was practiced. Surely, those who carried out those sacrifices were not punished by other people. And they definitely did not have any contact with any Abrahamic religions.
Do you believe that those sacrifices were, at least in some if not all cases, morally wrong?
If the answer is "no", please let me know.
Now if your answer is "yes", let me ask you:
Do you believe the people who carried them out and others in their society had means whatsoever to ascertain that they were immoral?
If so, then given that you believe that moral laws are always enforced, do you believe that those who carried out child sacrifices in those conditions will be (or have been, or are being) punished for their actions, even though they had no epistemic means whatsoever of ascertaining that their actions were in violation of a moral law?

 

[fromderinside]

So a group, say, United Statesians elect a lying fool to act as chief executive. He puts naysayers at the head of every department, eliminates executive actions by his predecessor because that predecessor was of darker hue and for no other reason.

In effect subjective lawmaking.

So are laws objective or are they subjective commerce?

If they are subjective commerce then how can one come to the conclusion that morality is other than objective?

This question turns on the notion that laws are objective things.