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Numbers

beero1000

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Here is my overview of the standard number systems of mathematics. For those interested, you should be able to find the details in any book on undergraduate analysis. The underlying theme in the development of number systems is 'completion' - the notion that we are missing numbers to describe certain situations and want to find a number system that includes them.

We start with the integers Z = {...,-2,-1,0,1,2,...} (Z for 'Zahlen', which is German for 'numbers'). I'm assuming you all already know the arithmetic properties of the integers - specifically, addition, subtraction, and multiplication - as of yet, division is not well defined on integers because the result might not be an integer (a number system with these operations is called a 'ring'). All other arithmetic properties of the rationals, reals, and complex numbers will ultimately derive from the analogous properties in the integers. Like Kronecker said "God made the integers; all else is the work of man". The positive integers are sometimes called the 'natural numbers' and are denoted by N = {1,2, ...}.

Since division is not well-defined in the integers, we want to define a bigger number system that lets us perform all four operations (except dividing by zero) while remaining in the number system (this is called a 'field'). The smallest field that includes the integers is the rational numbers. One way to define rational numbers Q (Q for quotient) is as an ordered pair (a,b) where a is an integer and b is a natural number (specifically, b is not zero). We have addition (a,b) + (c,d) = (ad + bc,bd) and multiplication (a,b)*(c,d) = (ac,bd), and the standard representation of (a,b) is a/b. Addition gives rise to well-defined subtraction, and multiplication gives rise to well-defined division (by non-zero rationals, where (a,b) is zero if a = 0). Note that each of the four arithmetic operations in the rationals is entirely defined by operations for integers.

Suspiciously, the rationals don't contain the integers explicitly. Remember that by our definition an integer is a single number, while the rationals are pairs of numbers (a,b), and they aren't the same. However, the rationals contain numbers that act very much like the integers. If we look at (a,1), then (a,1) + (b,1) = (a+b,1) and (a,1)*(b,1) = (ab,1). We say that the integers are isomorphic to a sub-ring of the rationals, and they are essentially integers in all but name, which is why treating 3/1 as 3 is not a problem even though we are actually switching between number systems.

Even more suspiciously, we note that there are multiple ways of writing the same rational. In particular (a,b) = (c,d) if and only if (a,b) - (c,d) = 0 (where 0 is the analog of the zero integer in the rationals, i.e. (0,b) for some b in N). If you work out the subtraction you get that (a,b) = (c,d) if and only if ad - bc = 0 (this operation now lives entirely in the integers). That means that there many equivalent ways of writing the same rational number, so 6/2, 3/1, and 45/15 all represent the same rational number. If we look at all rationals equal to (a,b) we get what is called the 'equivalence class of (a,b)' in the rationals. Usually, we don't care which representative of the class is used (in arithmetic 6/2 and 45/15 are really the same for all intents and purposes), but if we want to pick the 'nicest' version, we'll pick the rational (c,d) with smallest d. This always exists, and is unique, and is (a,b) in 'simplest form'. Keep in mind this fact that people are perfectly OK with these numbers having multiple representations when we get to the 0.999... = 1 fiasco.

So we have the rationals, but the rationals are still missing numbers that we'd like to talk about. In particular, Greek mathematicians noted that the diagonal of a square with side length 1 cannot be a rational number. Since rational numbers contain the integers, it can't be an integer either, so we don't have a description of the number that is the length of that line segment. So we want to 'complete' the rationals in this new sense. Keep in mind that we can't just stick in the square root of 2 into our number system, because we would mess up the arithmetic operations (i.e. if you include \(\sqrt{2}\) you need to include \(1 + \sqrt{2}\) and \(\frac{3}{2}\sqrt{2}\), etc in order to make sure that we remain in our new field.

So, just like before, define a new kind of number. We'll say that this new kind of number is an ordered pair (a,b) of rational numbers, and give it the arithmetic representation \(a + b\sqrt{2}\). This is a new field of numbers that now includes the number we were missing (it is usually called Q(\(\sqrt{2}\)) and is known as a 'field extension'). But for us, it still isn't good enough, as it is still missing \(\sqrt{3},\sqrt{5},\sqrt{\sqrt{2}}\), etc, etc. If we continue to add all those numbers, we get what is called 'the algebraic closure of Q' and is also known as the set of algebraic numbers (i.e. numbers that are solutions to polynomial equations with integer coefficients).

Alas, even the algebraic numbers have gaps. For example the number e is not algebraic, and neither is \(\pi\). So we seem to be stuck again. We can continue extending our numbers, but there's no reason to believe that this procedure will actually complete our field. So we need a different approach. The idea is to look at limits.

We can define a sequence of numbers as a function from the natural numbers. In other words, the 'list' of numbers a1, a2, a3, ... is just shorthand for a function f that takes entries in N and returns those numbers, specifically f(1) = a1, f(2) = a2, ..., f(n) = an, ..., etc. As a shorthand for the shorthand, we write {a}n to stand for the sequence a1, a2, a3, ...

We define a 'metric' (distance function) by taking the distance between numbers x and y to be the absolute value of their difference, so d(x,y) = |x - y|. A set with a well-defined metric is called a metric space, and one particular property of a metric is that the distance between two points is 0 if and only they are the same point. Once we have a metric space, we can start talking about convergence.

We say a sequence {a}n converges to a value A if all ai with big enough index are arbitrarily close to A. The formal statement is that for any positive epsilon \(\epsilon > 0\), there exists an N such that \(|a_i-A| < \epsilon\) for every i > N. We say that the limit of the sequence is A, or \(\lim_{n\to\infty} a_i = A\). We say that a sequence is Cauchy if all entries with large enough index are arbitrarily close to each other. The formal statement of that is that for any positive epsilon \(\epsilon > 0\), there exists an N such that \(|a_n-a_m| < \epsilon\) for every n,m > N. Keep in mind that even though the sequences have varying indices, they are fixed mathematical objects (each is just a function). The limits, even though they seem like varying objects are just numbers, again, fixed mathematical objects.

Now, the hope is that we can find a field such that every Cauchy sequence converges to a number in the field. The idea being that in Q, the sequence 1, 1.4, 1.41, 1.414, ... is Cauchy, but does not converge to a rational number. Similarly, in the algebraic numbers 3, 3.1, 3.14, 3.141,... is Cauchy, but does not converge to an algebraic number.

So here is the completion idea - take the collection of all Cauchy sequences of Q. Define those to be the real numbers. It's almost too naive an idea to work, but it does work. Now, the sequence 3, 3.1, 3.14, .... is defined to be the real number \(\pi\). We can correctly define addition and multiplication of sequences index by index, and therefore we can do subtraction and division (being careful about zeros) so what we get is a field. Now, we get the nice property that every Cauchy sequence of real numbers converges to a real number. Two Cauchy sequences are equal if their difference converges to 0. Every real number has at least one decimal expansion - just take your epsilons small enough to fix each digit, and every decimal expansion corresponds to a real number. But, we need to be careful. Just like the rationals, that means that multiple different Cauchy sequences converge to the same real number - in particular the sequence 0, 0.9, 0.99, ... and the sequence 1,1,1,1,... have differences 1, .1, .01, .001, ... which converges to 0. Therefore, the two Cauchy sequences refer to the same real number. Keep in mind that the decimal expansion .99999... is just a representation of the real number corresponding to that specific Cauchy sequence, just like 6/2 is a representation of the rational numbers.

One thing we can prove is that the real numbers R have no more 'gaps'. If we imagine the number line, the integers, rationals, and algebraic numbers all had missing points (this despite the fact that the rationals and algebraic numbers are 'dense' - meaning there are no non-zero gaps). The real numbers are 'completed' in the sense that any sequence of reals that converges converges to a real. The reals contain the rationals as a subfield (again, in the isomorphic sense) because if r is rational, the Cauchy sequence r,r,r,... converges to r. That is why it is OK to write 0.3333333... as 1/3 and vice versa. In the same way, the reals contain the integers.

The next step in completion is algebraic - we want to be able to take square roots of any number and get a number back. So we go back to field extensions and extend R by the only square root that's missing, which is \(\sqrt{-1}\). This extension of the reals gives the complex numbers, which are complete in the sense that every complex polynomial has a complex root.

The completeness of the reals is absolutely vital for all of the mathematics of continuity - like calculus. In particular, statements like the intermediate value theorem are not true on the rationals or the algebraic numbers, we really need a number line with no 'holes'. In particular, once we can talk about limits of converging sequences like numbers in the real field without worry, we can talk about continuity of functions. A function f is continuous at a point x if every sequence {x}n that converges to x has the sequence f({x}n) converging to f(x). The paradox in the other thread is, in essence, a discontinuity of the cardinality function. The problem is that the limit of the cardinalities of the sets is not equal to the cardinality of the limit of the sets because one does not converge (it 'goes to infinity') and the other can be any countable cardinal number.
 
bump. What about a math subsection Loren?

Divide up stuff into threads on various subjects, with you and/or beero as a mod, reordering subject threads to reflect the correct information order (order of learning.... whatever that's called)?

Have intros first, in the thread, and then information, as it's added, would go to the beginning of the thread to flesh out the intro part, with discussion and problems in the thread after the intro part. Have an overarching stickied thread with subject tree.
 
This is great stuff.

But I think it could have been more awesome if you'd started with the non-negative integers (the naturals) rather than the full integers. The integers are just as a recent invention, at least in developed Western (by which I mean European and Islamic) mathematics, and originated at exactly the same time as the complex numbers.

Your story would then start, not by pointing out that division is not generally well-defined of the integers, but that subtraction is not well-defined of the naturals. And instead of looking first to form "fields" you would first look to form "rings."

And the story would go: to define an integer, we take pairs of natural numbers (m,n) where m and n are both naturals. We have addition by (m1,n1) + (m2,n2) = (m1+m2, n1+n2). We have multiplication by (m1,n1) * (m2,n2) = (m1 * m2 + n1 * n2, m1 * n2 + m2 * n1). The standard representation of m - n is just (m,n).

Note how similar is the approach here. Just as we define rationals as pairs of integers such that p/q is taken to be (p,q), so I define integers as pairs of naturals such that m - n is taken to be (m,n). There's no ingenuity here on my part. I know full well that the definitions of addition and multiplication are entirely reverse engineered from the algebraic laws we want to end up with.

Suspiciously, also, the integers do not contain the naturals explicitly. Remember that integers are pairs of naturals. But these pairs act like integers. If we look at (m,0) and (n,0), we see that (m,0) + (n,0) = (m+n, 0) and (m,0) * (n,0) = (m*n, 0). We say that the naturals are isomorphic to a sub-semiring of the integers.

Even more suspiciously, also, we note that there are multiple ways of writing the same integer. In particular, (m1,n1) = (m2,n2) if m1 + n2 = n1 + m2. This means that there are many ways to write the same integer: (6,2), (4,0), (45,41). We get equivalence classes. Though if we want to play nice, we'll always pick the pair where one of the components is 0.

Admittedly, the integers here aren't quite as interesting as the rationals, since you can always view them as just a second copy of the naturals going in another direction. But the parallels in the construction are pretty interesting. Note the role played by 1 in picking out canonical rationals and the role played by 0 in picking out canonical integers. 1 is the number that does nothing when you multiply by it, and 0 is the number that does nothing when you add it.

The construction of the reals is particularly exotic, but the construction of the complex numbers is actually much like the construction of integers and rationals. In particular, the definition of complex multiplication on pairs of reals looks suspiciously like the definition of multiplication of integers on pairs of naturals. In all cases, the trick is to reify the hole: for integers, you reify the hole that comes from subtractions that aren't defined. For rationals, you reify the hole that comes from divisions. For reals, you reify the hole that comes from taking limits of sequences. For complex numbers, you reify the hole that comes from taking square roots of negatives. You then fill in the meaning of operations on these reified holes by reverse engineering from the algebraic laws you eventually want.

I would go so far as to say that this reverse engineering strategy is literally how negative and complex numbers were first invented by Italian mathematicians looking for quick tricks to win competitions solving equations.

As for Kronecker, I disagree and say that everything begins at recursion, the naturals being the premier example of recursively given data.
 
bump. What about a math subsection Loren?

Divide up stuff into threads on various subjects, with you and/or beero as a mod, reordering subject threads to reflect the correct information order (order of learning.... whatever that's called)?

Have intros first, in the thread, and then information, as it's added, would go to the beginning of the thread to flesh out the intro part, with discussion and problems in the thread after the intro part. Have an overarching stickied thread with subject tree.

I proposed that a while back, but nothing came of it. Maybe this time...

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?51-Math-Subforum

This is great stuff.

But I think it could have been more awesome if you'd started with the non-negative integers (the naturals) rather than the full integers. The integers are just as a recent invention, at least in developed Western (by which I mean European and Islamic) mathematics, and originated at exactly the same time as the complex numbers.

...

As for Kronecker, I disagree and say that everything begins at recursion, the naturals being the premier example of recursively given data.

Yup, you could definitely go deeper (or start earlier, depending on your perspective), but me-from-4-years-ago probably thought the post was already lengthy enough. :D
 
bump. What about a math subsection Loren?

Divide up stuff into threads on various subjects, with you and/or beero as a mod, reordering subject threads to reflect the correct information order (order of learning.... whatever that's called)?

Have intros first, in the thread, and then information, as it's added, would go to the beginning of the thread to flesh out the intro part, with discussion and problems in the thread after the intro part. Have an overarching stickied thread with subject tree.

I proposed that a while back, but nothing came of it. Maybe this time...

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?51-Math-Subforum

This is great stuff.

But I think it could have been more awesome if you'd started with the non-negative integers (the naturals) rather than the full integers. The integers are just as a recent invention, at least in developed Western (by which I mean European and Islamic) mathematics, and originated at exactly the same time as the complex numbers.

...

As for Kronecker, I disagree and say that everything begins at recursion, the naturals being the premier example of recursively given data.

Yup, you could definitely go deeper (or start earlier, depending on your perspective), but me-from-4-years-ago probably thought the post was already lengthy enough. :D
Whoops. Didn't notice the necro.
 
This knowledge is needed in what way?

What difference does it make how humans have defined the numbers they invented?

Are we saying they could not have been defined differently?

Are we saying that this system humans invented is universal and not arbitrary and contingent?

That is an interesting question about numbers.

I know I am supposed to be in awe of these schemes humans have put together and they have a logical consistency which is good and of course numbers have given us the modern world but what are numbers is not a question that has been answered in this thread. It has not been addressed.

How some numbers have been defined, sometimes after the fact, after they have existed for a long time, has been addressed.

The philosophy of mathematics is so much more interesting than mathematics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics

And some will say this is the philosophy section.
 
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TThe philosophy of mathematics is so much more interesting than mathematics.
Can you give me some papers in the philosophy of mathematics that particularly interest you? I'd be happy to discuss them in a thread. Hilbert has a nice paper talking about why the concept of infinite doesn't exist in reality. You might enjoy that paper. On the basis of it, he embarked on a serious effort to put together metamathematical proofs in his (sadly impossible) goal to demonstrate that ZF set theory is a conservative extension of primitive recursive arithmetic. Your probably won't like those papers, since those are actual mathematics.

Which might pose a problem if you want to pursue your interest here. If you pick up an anthology on the philosophy of mathematics today, virtually all of the articles will be written by philosophers with proven competence in mathematics and logic. If you scroll down the wiki page to the part talking about the 20th century, you will see it mentioning specifically formal logic and set theory, all developed by mathematicians and mathematically competent philosophers. It mentions "formalism", which is mostly associated with the greatest mathematician of the century,Hilbert; "intuitionism", developed by another working mathematician Brouwer, and "logicism", mostly associated with Frege and Russell, both of whom worked on mathematical formalisations of the concept of number. Moving into the middle century, we get told about the introduction of Category Theory, which is again, just more mathematics. Indeed, category theory is an outgrowth of the sorts of algebraic approach that characterises the OP, and category theorists are usually great at telling you all sorts of funky things about these algebraic constructions.

By the way, the early attempts to define real numbers back in the 19th century, exactly the sort of thing that beero1000 is celebrating, were often dismissed by other mathematicians at the time as mere philosophy.

You can't pretend to be interested in contemporary philosophy of mathematics without also being interested in the sorts of constructions going on in the OP.
 
Can you tell me what the OP has to do with philosophy?

Here's a very simple question.

What is "one"?

Philosophically.

And I do not need any papers to tell me invented concepts like infinity can't possibly be real. It's like thinking Pi is something real or imaginary numbers are real or points are real or lines are real. There is no reason to assume it is something that could possibly be real.

It is not a tough question or one anybody should have difficulty with.

It takes a lot of delusions to even think it could possibly exist as something real.
 
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Here's a very simple question.

What is "one"?
The terminal object in Finord?

Philosophically.
Well, that's a definition that a category theorist might give, which was mentioned in the wiki article you linked. Did you read it?

And I do not need any papers to tell me invented concepts like infinity can't possibly be real.
Okay.
 
The terminal object in Finord?

Are you claiming one did not exist and was not used until this understanding?

If "one" exists before this understanding then it is just some arbitrary addition to an already existing concept.
 
TThe philosophy of mathematics is so much more interesting than mathematics.
Can you give me some papers in the philosophy of mathematics that particularly interest you? I'd be happy to discuss them in a thread. Hilbert has a nice paper talking about why the concept of infinite doesn't exist in reality. You might enjoy that paper. On the basis of it, he embarked on a serious effort to put together metamathematical proofs in his (sadly impossible) goal to demonstrate that ZF set theory is a conservative extension of primitive recursive arithmetic. Your probably won't like those papers, since those are actual mathematics.

Which might pose a problem if you want to pursue your interest here. If you pick up an anthology on the philosophy of mathematics today, virtually all of the articles will be written by philosophers with proven competence in mathematics and logic. If you scroll down the wiki page to the part talking about the 20th century, you will see it mentioning specifically formal logic and set theory, all developed by mathematicians and mathematically competent philosophers. It mentions "formalism", which is mostly associated with the greatest mathematician of the century,Hilbert; "intuitionism", developed by another working mathematician Brouwer, and "logicism", mostly associated with Frege and Russell, both of whom worked on mathematical formalisations of the concept of number. Moving into the middle century, we get told about the introduction of Category Theory, which is again, just more mathematics. Indeed, category theory is an outgrowth of the sorts of algebraic approach that characterises the OP, and category theorists are usually great at telling you all sorts of funky things about these algebraic constructions.

By the way, the early attempts to define real numbers back in the 19th century, exactly the sort of thing that beero1000 is celebrating, were often dismissed by other mathematicians at the time as mere philosophy.

You can't pretend to be interested in contemporary philosophy of mathematics without also being interested in the sorts of constructions going on in the OP.

Linking papers would be cool, I hope. :)
 
Linking papers would be cool, I hope. :)
I would really love to link On the Infinite, but I can't find the damn thing. I know it's in "From Brouwer to Hilbert", but I have no idea why this paper from the 1920s is not freely available online in the 21st century. I almost want to go on a rant, but will save it for now.
 
Hilbert has a nice paper talking about why the concept of infinite doesn't exist in reality.
Synopsis?
I think it's been 10 years since I read it, so I can't vouch for the accuracy of this synopsis, but here goes:

After the crises of early 20th century mathematics, showing that cavalier arguments involving the infinite end up in contradiction, Hilbert wants to say that the "infinite" should become just a theoretical tool, and that we must always remain faithful to the true ground of mathematics. He uses, as an analogy, the "points at infinity" that appear in projective geometry. These points at infinity are weird, but useful, and can always be analysed away. They're, to use Hilbert's term, "ideal elements". He wants to use this idea of weird, useful, but analysable away, as a means to tame the infinite and set theory, reducing it to a tool with which to make the real claims of mathematics.

Those real, meaningful claims of mathematics occur only in the most simple claims of arithmetic: they're concrete claims about concrete marks on paper, like the claim that 2 + 3 = 5. Hilbert goes further than this and says that this claim is the following:

II + III = IIIII

where "+" is just concatenation of marks. This is, ultimately, all that mathematics is. It's simple arithmetic, where arithmetic reduces to concatenations and simple substitutions of marks.

This renders a huge amount of mathematics, on the face of it, effectively meaningless. Everything else that mathematicians are doing is unreal. Even the very basic claims of arithmetic like

m + n = n + m

are literally meaningless. Such claims only acquire meaning once you plug in concrete terms, at which point the equation becomes verifiable by actually concatenating the marks and then comparing the marks on each side.

Hilbert believed that everything else you do over the top of this had to be, in principle, analysable away, reducing any statement involving variables, existentials and universals to simple procedures which reduce to claims about concrete equations about marks. However crazy it sounds, he was convinced there was a proof that this could be done for the entirety of set theory, and he relied heavily on his experience with metamathematics which had already shown that arbitrary logical systems could be boiled down to mucking around with concrete numbers.
 
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