Staircaseghost
New member
Indeed it would.Just as it would be highly non-trivial to learn (as a current of 20th century thought around such figures as Foucault and Szasz actually once asserted!) that schizophrenia qua medical diagnosis is culturally relative, and simply a way of society's elites to delegitimize alternate ways of thinking by calling it a "sickness".
Well, then this rather puts paid to the claim that "'independence of mind' is a definition devoid of philosophical implications," doesn't it. Some set of truths being relativized to optional conceptual schemes or historically contingent social norms is, philosophically speaking, a real BFD. In fact, it is one of the central preoccupations of the profession, and has been in one form or another ever since Plato declared his jihad against the Sophists.
That someone might challenge claims of morality's mind-dependence is perfectly natural. That someone might challenge whether the question is even philosophically relevant is just downright odd. If there is any equivocation going on, it is between the mundane type-3 or type-3' mind-dependencies and the decidedly BFD dependency of type-3''.
So getting someone to admit that mental illness's mind dependence (in the trivial sense) is not a knock on its objectivity (in the non-trivial sense) is not going to force them to the realization "how silly of me to have thought morality's being mind-dependent or not was at all philosophically interesting."
Are you suggesting that the Labor Theory of Value is an element of the semantics of objective value claims?
I'm not sure what you mean by a theory being an element of something, but it was indeed thought by Smith, Ricardo, and Marx that there was an objective, "absolute value" or "real cost" to goods proportional to invested labor. And so under this metaphysical hunch, our thoughts about economic value hook up with the world such that
"The economic value of this soda is less than that of this automobile"
is a mind-independent predication of soda in the same way as
"The volume of this soda is less than one liter"
is a mind-independent predication, and in a way that
"The taste of this soda is better than orange juice"
is not. There is a genuine, non-trivial philosophical difference between people who think economic valuing is more like the third kind of phenomenon than like the second.
If you mean one can choose to reinterpret his "just in our minds" criterion to mean something more reasonable, something about beliefs or attitudes that will not be slayable by the ugly fact I presented, possibly so.
Indubitably so. I tried hard to dubit it and came up short. The truth of (3) and (3') is no more an "ugly fact" he needs to face up to than the truth of (1) and (1') is an "ugly fact" that "slays" the subjectivity of taste.