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objective morality

Homosexuality impairs an ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people of the opposite sex, or even prevents the development of such ability completely. That's not the point. The point is whether that's an impairment that would make homosexuality a mental illness. And that is not something that you can get explicitly from the definition - definition which came after a preexisting concept anyway.

And heterosexuality similarly impars the ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people of the opposite sex. If you want to call both a mental illness, that's fine, but it's inane and incorrect to simply single one of them out.
 
This kind of problem is threaded throughout psychology, or more precisely throughout forms of clinical psychology that rely on a disease model - the model that any mental difference is potentially a conditions to be 'cured'. The trouble comes when you try and work out what is and isn't a disease, and where in the range of human behaviour and mental states you need to fall before you can be considered 'normal' or 'cured'.

There was an attempt to define depression in terms of abnormal responses to life events, but this backfired when it was discovered that depressed people, on average, make more accurate predictions about future events than 'normal' people. This led to one mischievous researcher to label happiness as nervous effective disorder - pleasant type.
 
Homosexuality impairs an ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people of the opposite sex, or even prevents the development of such ability completely. That's not the point. The point is whether that's an impairment that would make homosexuality a mental illness. And that is not something that you can get explicitly from the definition - definition which came after a preexisting concept anyway.

And heterosexuality similarly impars the ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people of the opposite sex. If you want to call both a mental illness, that's fine, but it's inane and incorrect to simply single one of them out.
The question is whether it's a mental illness, not what I want to call them.
Also, more importantly, when you say it's inane to single one out, do you assume that there is objective inanity? In other words, do you think there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane to single one out? If so, why do you believe in objective inanity, but not objective immorality?
 
And heterosexuality similarly impars the ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people of the opposite sex. If you want to call both a mental illness, that's fine, but it's inane and incorrect to simply single one of them out.
The question is whether it's a mental illness, not what I want to call them.
Also, more importantly, when you say it's inane to single one out, do you assume that there is objective inanity? In other words, do you think there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane to single one out? If so, why do you believe in objective inanity, but not objective immorality?

I believe you have reduced this discussion to a silly word game. There no other kind of inanity than subjective inanity, just as there is no objective morality.
 
The question is whether it's a mental illness, not what I want to call them.
Also, more importantly, when you say it's inane to single one out, do you assume that there is objective inanity? In other words, do you think there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane to single one out? If so, why do you believe in objective inanity, but not objective immorality?

Exactly. The question is whether or not it's a mental illness. That's something that has a definition and homosexuality does not meet that definition.

The inanity comes from calling something a mental illness which does not meet the definition of a mental illness. It's the same as how it's inane to call a balloon a car.
 
Tom Sawyer said:
Because the two things are completely different and unrelated matters.

The only thing that people have against gay sex is not liking gay sex. There's nothing about it which makes it a negative in and of itself. Attitudes about it are entirely based on subjective opinions.

Mental illness, on the other hand, is a term with a definition and things either fit that definition or don't fit that definition. You can go on about homosexuality and breakfast cereals being mental illnesses all you want, but all you're doing is using words wrong.
No, I already showed repeatedly why you're wrong about that. I would recommend that you take a look at our exchange for more details on why you're wrong about that, but let me give a couple of reasons:

1. The concept of mental illness existed before there was any definition. In fact, people discussing what a useful operational definition would be already had the concept of mental illness - the intuitive, pre-definition concept.
So, what is the relevant difference between mental illness, in the sense of "mental illness" used by people before they gave the definition, and immorality, objectivity wise?

2. The definition of mental illness is defined in terms of other, non-defined terms. In the case of whether homosexuality is a mental illness, well, it can be said that it does impair the ability to enjoy romantic relations with people of the opposite sex, or the ability not to feel sexually attracted to people the same sex, and so on.
Now, you say that singling one out is inane, but "inane" is not defined, and yet you agree, it seems, that there is objective inanity. Moreover, I would say that saying that gay sex is always immoral is also inane, so why is it that homosexuality is not a mental illness, and that's an objective fact, but it's not an objective fact that gay sex is not always immoral?
What if the difference, objectivity-wise?
It surely isn't that some people gave a definition of "mental illness", for the reasons I've been explaining in several posts.

3. No definition of illness has been given, and yet, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether homosexuality is an illness, right? And there was an objective fact of the matter as to whether homosexuality was an illness 200 years ago, in the usual sense in which the word "illness" was used, which is the sense in which it's used now. Yet, no definition of "illness" is given. Or do you think that in order for there to be objective illness, a definition (i.e., an explicit definition) is required?

4. Generally, definitions are given in terms of other terms, and some of those are not defined, but used intuitively - or defined in terms of terms used intuitively, etc. If definitions were required for there to be objectivity, barring infinite definitional regress, there would be no objectivity of any issues. But there is no infinite definitional regress, so there are objective issues in which the relevant terms are not defined.
So, again, why do you think this is a problem for objective immorality, but not a problem for objective illness, impairment, inanity, or for that matter horseness. There is no definition of a horse, right? I mean, dictionaries give definitions that try to approximate a non-defined concept already in use

In short, the idea that a definition is required for objectivity is mistaken, and so is the assessment that the fact that some people (psychologists, etc.) gave a definition of "mental illness" makes a relevant difference that would justify your distinction between whether gay sex is immoral and whether homosexuality is a mental illness, objectivity-wise.
 
The question is whether it's a mental illness, not what I want to call them.
Also, more importantly, when you say it's inane to single one out, do you assume that there is objective inanity? In other words, do you think there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane to single one out? If so, why do you believe in objective inanity, but not objective immorality?

Exactly. The question is whether or not it's a mental illness. That's something that has a definition and homosexuality does not meet that definition.

The inanity comes from calling something a mental illness which does not meet the definition of a mental illness. It's the same as how it's inane to call a balloon a car.
No, the issue of definitions is mistaken. But as I pointed out, homosexuality does match it, since it does impair some ability - for example, the ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people the opposite sex.

In order for homosexuality to not meet the definition, it would have to be the case that the ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people the opposite sex is not an ability in the sense you consider in the definition, or its impairment is not an impairment in the sense of the definition, and in any case, those are not defined in your definition (if you're using Wikipedia's, please let me know, but the result is basically the same), and yet you hold there is an objective fact of the matter.
 
The question is whether it's a mental illness, not what I want to call them.
Also, more importantly, when you say it's inane to single one out, do you assume that there is objective inanity? In other words, do you think there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane to single one out? If so, why do you believe in objective inanity, but not objective immorality?

I believe you have reduced this discussion to a silly word game. There no other kind of inanity than subjective inanity, just as there is no objective morality.
No, I have not, and I disagree.
But regardless, the point is that Tom Sawyer holds there is objective inanity, but not objecitve immorality. I would ask him why inanity is objective, but immorality is not.
 
I believe you have reduced this discussion to a silly word game. There no other kind of inanity than subjective inanity, just as there is no objective morality.
No, I have not, and I disagree.
But regardless, the point is that Tom Sawyer holds there is objective inanity, but not objecitve immorality. I would ask him why inanity is objective, but immorality is not.

It is my subjective observation that Tom does not hold there is objective inanity and you are attempting to make him say something absurd. You are simply blurring the lines between objective and subjective in order to make your argument, which is sophistry.
 
Bronzeage said:
It is my subjective observation that Tom does not hold there is objective inanity and you are attempting to make him say something absurd.
First, subjective observations aside (whatever that is), there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Tom Sawyer holds that there is objective inanity, right?

Second, I already showed repeatedly the mistakes in his definition-based argumentation - you just haven't realized it, and maybe will not, but that is not the point -, and regardless of whether he holds that there is objective inanity.
But with respect to inanity, he's saying that it's inane to say homosexuality is a mental illness because it impairs the ability under consideration (see the exchange), but heterosexuality isn't even if it impairs some other parallel ability (see the exchange).
But for that matter, if there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane, someone might insist in making the distinction and holding that homosexuality but not heterosexuality is a mental illness. Is there an objective fact of the matter about that?

By the way, if my assessment that Tom Sawyer holds that there objective inanity is mistaken, then he can always correct me, but the wording of his posts decisively supports the assessment that he does hold so, even if implicitly (i.e., even if he has not thought about it).

At any rate, you can always ask him.


Bronzeage said:
You are simply blurring the lines between objective and subjective in order to make your argument, which is sophistry.
That is false.
The problem seems to be that you do not understand the exchange, else you would have changed your position on the issue of objectivity already, and you would refrain from making such false accusations against me.

By the way, do you hold that there is objective illness?
If so, do you know what the relevant difference between illness and immorality is, which basis your different assessments, objectivity-wise?
Remember, "illness" is not defined (else, please provide a definition; your argument will not work if you do, though, for the same reasons Tom Sawyer's arguments didn't), and definitions are not required for objectivity in the first place, anyway.
 
<snip>

The only thing that people have against gay sex is not liking gay sex. There's nothing about it which makes it a negative in and of itself. Attitudes about it are entirely based on subjective opinions.


Mental illness, on the other hand, is a term with a definition and things either fit that definition or don't fit that definition. You can go on about homosexuality and breakfast cereals being mental illnesses all you want, but all you're doing is using words wrong.

Demonstrably not true and demonstrably not true.

gay sex presumably conducted by gay people is an objective misuse of some human or any other species procreative features in that the behavior does not result in objective design result of pregnancy and procreation. In some species there are well established adaptive advantages to homosexual behavior such as blocking the operating mechanisms for sexual reproduction int competition. Such has not been established for humans yet. there seems to be a range of sexuality expression in humans indicating some interactions among sexual aspects in both sexes and there are correlative indicators homosexuality is genetic in nature. However the fitness effects of removal from procreation pool has not been substantively established in humans.

Mental illness as a personal disease has been established via genetics and hormonal means, but, it has not been disconnected from extant social conditions as far as I know. So we can treat the disease to some extent, but, we can't ascertain whether we are effecting cure. This last rests on an the 80 percent recidivism for such as schizophrenia and some other paranoia.

Hell we can say the same for gayness. Yes we can scare some to not ever repeat their behavior thereby mask their proclivity, But seriously, is this a cure.
 
I believe you have reduced this discussion to a silly word game. There no other kind of inanity than subjective inanity, just as there is no objective morality.
No, I have not, and I disagree.
But regardless, the point is that Tom Sawyer holds there is objective inanity, but not objecitve immorality. I would ask him why inanity is objective, but immorality is not.

That statement makes no sense. You're using two different definitions of the word objective as if they were synomyms.
 
<snip>

The only thing that people have against gay sex is not liking gay sex. There's nothing about it which makes it a negative in and of itself. Attitudes about it are entirely based on subjective opinions.


Mental illness, on the other hand, is a term with a definition and things either fit that definition or don't fit that definition. You can go on about homosexuality and breakfast cereals being mental illnesses all you want, but all you're doing is using words wrong.

Demonstrably not true and demonstrably not true.

gay sex presumably conducted by gay people is an objective misuse of some human or any other species procreative features in that the behavior does not result in objective design result of pregnancy and procreation.

How did you determine that it is a 'misuse'? Is there some document or blueprint, perhaps in the 'objective design' you refer to, that says sex can only be for procreation?
 
First, subjective observations aside (whatever that is), there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Tom Sawyer holds that there is objective inanity, right?

Second, I already showed repeatedly the mistakes in his definition-based argumentation - you just haven't realized it, and maybe will not, but that is not the point -, and regardless of whether he holds that there is objective inanity.
But with respect to inanity, he's saying that it's inane to say homosexuality is a mental illness because it impairs the ability under consideration (see the exchange), but heterosexuality isn't even if it impairs some other parallel ability (see the exchange).
But for that matter, if there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether it's inane, someone might insist in making the distinction and holding that homosexuality but not heterosexuality is a mental illness. Is there an objective fact of the matter about that?

By the way, if my assessment that Tom Sawyer holds that there objective inanity is mistaken, then he can always correct me, but the wording of his posts decisively supports the assessment that he does hold so, even if implicitly (i.e., even if he has not thought about it).

At any rate, you can always ask him.


Bronzeage said:
You are simply blurring the lines between objective and subjective in order to make your argument, which is sophistry.
That is false.
The problem seems to be that you do not understand the exchange, else you would have changed your position on the issue of objectivity already, and you would refrain from making such false accusations against me.

By the way, do you hold that there is objective illness?
If so, do you know what the relevant difference between illness and immorality is, which basis your different assessments, objectivity-wise?
Remember, "illness" is not defined (else, please provide a definition; your argument will not work if you do, though, for the same reasons Tom Sawyer's arguments didn't), and definitions are not required for objectivity in the first place, anyway.

If you do not understand the difference between subjective and objective, and believe definitions are not needed for objectivity, there is no point to this discussion. It is simply your rehashing of the same statements, over and over again.
 
As an aside, is there any endeavor of philosophy more fruitless and dull than the objective/subjective distinction? It always just seems to go around and around, never resolving, and when everybody is tired of talking about it we go back to behaving according to the norms we agree with anyway. In practice, it appears to make no difference whatsoever whether morality is objective or not. I don't know why so many (myself included) are keen on chewing the topic over time and time again.
 
As an aside, is there any endeavor of philosophy more fruitless and dull than the objective/subjective distinction? It always just seems to go around and around, never resolving, and when everybody is tired of talking about it we go back to behaving according to the norms we agree with anyway. In practice, it appears to make no difference whatsoever whether morality is objective or not. I don't know why so many (myself included) are keen on chewing the topic over time and time again.

The ultimate reason for chewing the topic of morality over time and time again is actually simple. People want to know that the things they do are approved by some authority outside themselves. Just as we need to cooperate with one another, we need morality in order to live in close proximity to one another. We don't want to feel alone and believing our actions are morally justified make us one of the group.
 
How would we infer that our actions and our joy do not create an overall negative state in others, such as bacteria?

If bacteria have great joy in life, killing trillions of them so that we do not suffer may cause there to be less joy in the universe.
 
How would we infer that our actions and our joy do not create an overall negative state in others, such as bacteria?

If bacteria have great joy in life, killing trillions of them so that we do not suffer may cause there to be less joy in the universe.

Everytime I kill a trillion bacteria, I feel two trillion units of joy. Therefore, leaving them alive makes the universe (and Baby Jesus) cry.
 
Just as it would be highly non-trivial to learn (as a current of 20th century thought around such figures as Foucault and Szasz actually once asserted!) that schizophrenia qua medical diagnosis is culturally relative, and simply a way of society's elites to delegitimize alternate ways of thinking by calling it a "sickness".
Indeed it would.

Well, then this rather puts paid to the claim that "'independence of mind' is a definition devoid of philosophical implications," doesn't it.
Well, it certainly would rather put paid to that claim, if "independence of mind" meant "not culturally relative, and not simply a way of society's elites to delegitimize alternate ways of thinking". So, no, it doesn't.

Some set of truths being relativized to optional conceptual schemes or historically contingent social norms is, philosophically speaking, a real BFD.
And if "independence of mind" meant "not relativized to optional conceptual schemes or historically contingent social norms", that would make independence of mind, philosophically speaking, a real BFD.

That someone might challenge claims of morality's mind-dependence is perfectly natural. That someone might challenge whether the question is even philosophically relevant is just downright odd. If there is any equivocation going on, it is between the mundane type-3 or type-3' mind-dependencies and the decidedly BFD dependency of type-3''.
Among the equivocation going on is the endless refrain that morality being objective means it's mind-independent which in turn means morality would have to remain in place even if all sentient life went extinct. (And proceeding from that lemma, therefore, if (equivocator is a theist) then (objective morality implies there's a god) else (absence of morality from a lifeless world implies morality is subjective).)

How would you go about explaining the error in that eternally recurring fallacy by assigning varying numbers of apostrophes?

So getting someone to admit that mental illness's mind dependence (in the trivial sense) is not a knock on its objectivity (in the non-trivial sense) is not going to force them to the realization "how silly of me to have thought morality's being mind-dependent or not was at all philosophically interesting."
True, assuming they are going to react to the fact that the "trivial sense" of "mind dependence" is the phrase's sense, and the "non-trivial sense" of mind dependence is some sense other than "dependent on mind", by choosing to continue labeling that non-trivial concept "mind dependence". Why would a person make that choice? Well, the obvious reason for making that choice is that "Philosophy is the systematic misuse of a terminology expressly invented for this purpose." If a person's goal were clarity, he would choose a different label.

Are you suggesting that the Labor Theory of Value is an element of the semantics of objective value claims?

I'm not sure what you mean by a theory being an element of something, but it was indeed thought by Smith, Ricardo, and Marx that there was an objective, "absolute value" or "real cost" to goods proportional to invested labor. And so under this metaphysical hunch, our thoughts about economic value hook up with the world such that

"The economic value of this soda is less than that of this automobile"​

is a mind-independent predication of soda in the same way as
"The volume of this soda is less than one liter"​

is a mind-independent predication, and in a way that
"The taste of this soda is better than orange juice"​

is not. There is a genuine, non-trivial philosophical difference between people who think economic valuing is more like the third kind of phenomenon than like the second.
Sure; but you appear to be generalizing from three dark-age monetary value realists to all monetary value realists. Monetary value realists and antirealists could perfectly well recognize that Smith, Ricardo, and Marx believed in prescientific economic metaphysics, while noting that delivering gasoline to an enterprise has a measurable impact on the enterprise's income, and it's possible to take the derivative of the income with respect to the amount of gasoline and calculate the enterprise's marginal income per gallon. When a realist disagrees with an antirealist over the mind-dependence of monetary value, it seems to me they're just as apt to be disagreeing about whether that marginal income is what "monetary value" means, or disagreeing about which of the various senses of "mind-dependence" is the right one to apply to the question of whether that derivative is "mind-dependent", as disagreeing about "stored up labor value".

The question remains, why would anyone be committed to retaining the use of such an ambiguous term, unless he was also committed to retaining the use of some argument that relies on that ambiguity?
 
No, I have not, and I disagree.
But regardless, the point is that Tom Sawyer holds there is objective inanity, but not objecitve immorality. I would ask him why inanity is objective, but immorality is not.

That statement makes no sense. You're using two different definitions of the word objective as if they were synomyms.
That is not true. I'm using "objective" in the colloquial sense, as it applies to things being the case (e.g., whether there is an objective fact of the matter at to whether, say, homosexuality is a mental illness) or properties, which is dependent on the previous one. For example, the property of being inane would be objective if there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether such-and-such classification is inane, and that happens in all (or nearly alll, with some tolerance) cases.

Do you believe that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whethre or not it's inane to make a distinction between the ability to enjoy romantic relationships with people the same sex, and people of the opposite sex, and on the basis of that classify homosexuality as a mentail illness?

If you think there is an objective fact of the matter (if not, please say so), then why do you think there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, gay sex is always immoral?

In any event, I have already explained to you, in several posts, why your arguments are erroneous. I hope you will realize that eventually.
 
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