Ontological Argument: Understanding What is Meant by the Term 'Greatness' and How It's Applied to the Idea of God

[Picasmo1]

In a discussion I had with the user Wiploc on Quora, we examined the possibilities of how to counter the ontological argument made by Anselm. Of course, to many of you on this website, this may appear to be old news, especially when considering the fact that Immanuel Kant has so wonderfully dismissed the ontological argument by explaining why existence is not a predicate. But there is potential knowledge to be found in considering the other possibilities Anselm's claims' possess. It is for that reason that I encourage you to press onward in this discussion about Anselm's understanding of God.

Let me first break down the ontological argument in the simplest way possible:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. God exists in this way at least in the understanding.
3. A God that exists in reality as well as in the understanding is better than a God that exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore, God must exist in reality.

What I have noticed in discussing the ontological argument with people is that there is an infatuation with the great amount of ambiguity behind the term 'great'. It is this ambiguity that most people seem to strike arguments against. But I see no point in dismissing Anselm's claims simply because the term is ambiguous; instead, I see it opening the doorway for further conversation on what we can define as greatness, whether we can apply greatness to an idea such as God, whether we can conclude that existence has relation to greatness, how do we judge greatness, etc.

To begin this conversation, I will lay out what Wiploc and I have have come to agree on in our discussion:

1. Greatness is not a quality in and of itself but the sum of many different qualities that deem a thing as great or greater than something else
2. Existence in reality does not make qualities greater as opposed to only existing in the understanding
3. There must be some degree of objectivity to the term 'greatness', or else there could be no true way to deem something as greater than another thing
4. We are not speaking of 'greatness' as in size or quantity (not specifically, at least). We are referrng to greatness in a way that is similar to the title 'Great' in the name 'Alexander the Great'

Please comment on whether you agree with our baseline understanding of greatness or add upon our baseline understanding if you agree with it.

 

[Wiploc]

Hey, you made it!

Picasmo is new here, everybody. He came to discuss the ontological argument.

Okay, having checked in, I'm going to actually read his post.

 

[Wiploc]

... Of course, to many of you on this website, this may appear to be old news, especially when considering the fact that Immanuel Kant has so wonderfully dismissed the ontological argument by explaining why existence is not a predicate.

I take no position on Kant's predicate argument.

Let me first break down the ontological argument in the simplest way possible:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. God exists in this way at least in the understanding.
3. A God that exists in reality as well as in the understanding is better than a God that exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore, God must exist in reality.

Step one:

This claim seems just weird. Would god's greatness be reduced if we were stupider, unable to conceive as much greatness? Would god have to be even greater if we were smarter? Is this claim a definition, or does follow from some other alleged characteristics of god? Might there be other great things, even greater than god, but they aren't god because we can't conceive of them?

I'd like to stipulate to step one so that we could discuss step three, but greatness is not defined, and I don't see how to stipulate that something undefined is true.

Mostly, this seems like an emotional claim rather than an logical claim. It's a way of saying, "I like my religion's god!"

Also, there's no reason to think that this describes a single god. I use an analogy about full production:

Joe has a factory that can produce ten cars or one hundred air conditioners. It will be at full production either way. It can also produce five cars and fifty air conditioners, or one car and ninety air conditioners. You can graph it. Anywhere on that line between 10 cars and 100 air conditioners will be full production. Full production is not a single place on that line. It's a whole range of places.

Now consider what factors might affect a god's greatness. Take just two factors, mercy and justice. Assuming you regard those both as "great making" characteristics, then a god might be perfectly just or perfectly merciful, and he would be maximally great either way. He could also be anywhere on the line between mercy and justice, and he would still be maximally great (as far as those two characteristics are concerned). Add in a third factor, like, say, good looking, intelligible, smart, powerful, or good at taking tests, and you have a plane rather than a line. Add in the numberless other factors that could play into greatness, and you get an ungraphable morass of points--each of which can be called maximal greatness.

Some of those aspects of greatness can't be imagined, of course, so I guess they don't come into this argument.

In any case, we aren't defining a single god, but a whole realm of gods, many of whom are incompatible with each other. They might have to war against each other.

Defining a god as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is like saying that the best place in the world is "that location which is farther than twelve feet from the equator." That's not a single place. It's almost everyplace.

And Anselm's god is almost every god, depending on who thinks which aspects are great.

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

As per Descartes (Letters to Mersenne), God creates the laws and logic, the metaphysical necessities of the Universe. and of course is perfectly morally good. So if God is good, God would want to eliminate as much moral evil as possible. Since God creates the laws and logic of the universe, he could have that and there is no hidden reason why not possible. God has a good nature and free will to freely follow his perfectly good nature. God could then give man a good moral nature and a free will as God enjoys and no man would do moral evil. We don't live in such a world. God then is not the greatest thing imaginable by any means.

If one defines God as having existence as part of his perfection, one simply claims that God is existent and perfect, but if God does not exist, he is not perfect by any means. His existence and supposed perfection fall together.

 

[Wiploc]

Let me first break down the ontological argument in the simplest way possible:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. God exists in this way at least in the understanding.
3. A God that exists in reality as well as in the understanding is better than a God that exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore, God must exist in reality.

Step 2:

Step 2 strikes me as sleight of mouth. If a god exists only in understanding, then it does not exist. It doesn't exist in understanding; rather it does not exist.

Perhaps we can fix that by going back to step one and making that say, "God is defined as that which exists if you think of it."

That might (with some appropriate adjustment) make Anselm's argument valid, but nobody would think it persuasive. Nobody would think you could get an ice cream cone by defining it that way and then imagining it. The trick is too obvious if you phrase it that way.

Note that I'm not insisting that Anselm defined god in step one. He may have been stating a conclusion based on unstated premises.

I do say that "greatness" is undefined, and that whole argument is just word salad until that issue is dealt with. And the only way I know of to deal with that is to stipulate that greatness entails existence. Something like that. The we can proceed to see if the argument works.

But that amounts to rewriting step one to say something like, "Step 1: God is something that exists."

Which we might as well reduce to, "Step 1: God exists."

That makes the argument circular, unpersuasive, without noticeable soundness. It makes the argument worthless.

What we're looking for a way to make the argument stronger than worthless. I don't know of an approach that accomplishes this.

 

[PyramidHead]

The ontological argument strikes me as odd because my intuition is precisely the opposite of what it says about existence and greatness. For me, it seems obvious that something whose existence is purely an idea or a possibility is far greater than anything concrete. Artists are familiar with the sense of narrowing and constraining that accompanies the process of rendering an idea into physical form. Anything with actual existence seems necessarily cordoned-off, limited, and thus somehow contaminated in a way that purely imaginary things are not.

 

[Jimmy Higgins]

God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

God is bigger than the biggest big thing we can imagine.

God exists in this way at least in the understanding.

God exists in our imagination... well God doesn't because we already said we can't even imagine God... but overlook that.

A God that exists in reality as well as in the understanding is better than a God that exists only in the understanding.

Complete BS statement that means absolutely nothing in the empirical world. A biggest big thing than we can't imagine would be totally cooler if it was real. Being better, being cooler means absolutely nothing. Something being "better" is a fake concept being introduced here. While "great" can be understood for capacity, "better" is a judgment and not empirical. The lack of positrons being common in the universe is not because electrons were "better".

Therefore, God must exist in reality.

Therefore the English language has been grossly abused to presume a word has empirical value.

What I have noticed in discussing the ontological argument with people is that there is an infatuation with the great amount of ambiguity behind the term 'great'. It is this ambiguity that most people seem to strike arguments against. But I see no point in dismissing Anselm's claims simply because the term is ambiguous; instead, I see it opening the doorway for further conversation on what we can define as greatness, whether we can apply greatness to an idea such as God, whether we can conclude that existence has relation to greatness, how do we judge greatness, etc.

To begin this conversation, I will lay out what Wiploc and I have have come to agree on in our discussion:

1. Greatness is not a quality in and of itself but the sum of many different qualities that deem a thing as great or greater than something else
2. Existence in reality does not make qualities greater as opposed to only existing in the understanding
3. There must be some degree of objectivity to the term 'greatness', or else there could be no true way to deem something as greater than another thing
4. We are not speaking of 'greatness' as in size or quantity (not specifically, at least). We are referrng to greatness in a way that is similar to the title 'Great' in the name 'Alexander the Great'

Please comment on whether you agree with our baseline understanding of greatness or add upon our baseline understanding if you agree with it.

Great in the argument applies to breadth and concept. God is bigger than all existence, bigger than we can ever presume. The problem with the ontalogical argument is that it is a fraud. It presumes a concept exists in imagination and therefore, thanks to some word play... it must exist in reality.

Some concept having unimaginable breadth doesn't automatically give it viability. Especially in light of it being unimaginable!

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

Now a days, this is all known to theologians as perfect being theology. We exchange such words as greatest for perfect. That is, not lacking in any powerful ability or attribute to its greatest possible extent. This has several major problems. The well known problem of contradictions that occur when examining how these perfect abilities interact with each other. And the fact that the Universe does not resemble a Universe with an all powerful, unlimited, perfectly good God. The Universe in fact most resembles a universe with no God at all. Trying to square all of this with the nature of the Universe becomes a problem of saving appearances for perfect being theologians.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

1. Greatness is not a quality in and of itself but the sum of many different qualities that deem a thing as great or greater than something else.

Plenty of qualities are also sums of other qualities. I'm not sure why a composed quality would not be a quality. Regardless, it's not clear that there is a sum of qualities that constitute greatness, as opposed to different qualities or sums of qualities depending on context (i.e., "greatness" may have two or more different meanings, even leaving aside size or quantity).

2. Existence in reality does not make qualities greater as opposed to only existing in the understanding.

Right.

There must be some degree of objectivity to the term 'greatness', or else there could be no true way to deem something as greater than another thing.

Sort of. We can properly deem some movies better than others, and some things tastier than others. If that's a degree of objectivity, fair enough. But then again, there are plenty of cases (even real-life cases) in which there is no fact of the matter as to whether A tastes better than B, or whether movie X is better than movie Y, etc. This fact may be a consequence of lack of significant vagueness and/or the words having more than one meaning (but even then, vagueness is at play sometimes).

We are not speaking of 'greatness' as in size or quantity (not specifically, at least). We are referrng to greatness in a way that is similar to the title 'Great' in the name 'Alexander the Great'

Sure, you're not speaking about that, but it's unclear that there is a single meaning the argument manages to isolate, even roughly (not that that would help at all, but that's another matter).
Let me give you an example: I would say a famous, rich, powerful and physically strong man is not a greater person than an unknown, poor, powerless and physically weak man who is not morally worse than the former. If they're moral equals, neither one is a greater person. In the case of comparing persons, it seems to me that a greater person is a morally better person, so in this context, it seems "greater" just means "morally better", or if not, it's otherwise equivalent. But then again, there is the issue of great kings, etc., who aren't necessarily morally good or great. So, it seems the meaning shifts depending on context.

That said, assuming that a single meaning were isolated, assuming no vagueness, etc., the argument still would not succeed.

 

[Underseer]

Pizza is the most excellent thing ever.

The only thing excellenter than pizza is pizza that is in my hand right now.

Therefore, there is pizza in my hand right now.

If you say pizza is not necessary, you are wrong. The excellence of pizza makes it necessary. Didn't you read my previous argument?

 

[OLDMAN]

In a discussion I had with the user Wiploc on Quora, we examined the possibilities of how to counter the ontological argument made by Anselm. Of course, to many of you on this website, this may appear to be old news, especially when considering the fact that Immanuel Kant has so wonderfully dismissed the ontological argument by explaining why existence is not a predicate. But there is potential knowledge to be found in considering the other possibilities Anselm's claims' possess. It is for that reason that I encourage you to press onward in this discussion about Anselm's understanding of God.

Let me first break down the ontological argument in the simplest way possible:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. God exists in this way at least in the understanding.
3. A God that exists in reality as well as in the understanding is better than a God that exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore, God must exist in reality.

What I have noticed in discussing the ontological argument with people is that there is an infatuation with the great amount of ambiguity behind the term 'great'. It is this ambiguity that most people seem to strike arguments against. But I see no point in dismissing Anselm's claims simply because the term is ambiguous; instead, I see it opening the doorway for further conversation on what we can define as greatness, whether we can apply greatness to an idea such as God, whether we can conclude that existence has relation to greatness, how do we judge greatness, etc.

To begin this conversation, I will lay out what Wiploc and I have have come to agree on in our discussion:

1. Greatness is not a quality in and of itself but the sum of many different qualities that deem a thing as great or greater than something else
2. Existence in reality does not make qualities greater as opposed to only existing in the understanding
3. There must be some degree of objectivity to the term 'greatness', or else there could be no true way to deem something as greater than another thing
4. We are not speaking of 'greatness' as in size or quantity (not specifically, at least). We are referrng to greatness in a way that is similar to the title 'Great' in the name 'Alexander the Great'

Please comment on whether you agree with our baseline understanding of greatness or add upon our baseline understanding if you agree with it.

It is not God which exists, but a concept of God that exist....both (supposedly) in reality and in the mind.

Therefore...God does not exist.

 

[Copernicus]

Let me try to bring some linguistic sense to Kant's argument, which is a bit confusing. Predicates are linguistic constructs that attribute a property (or relationship) to one or more arguments. That is, "existence" is a property. Like any predicate, it can be negated. But Kant's argument does seem to make sense. There is something really odd about treating it as the type of predicate that can be perfect or less than perfect.

The semantics of predication are actually more complex than Kant realized, because linguistic structure has a great many ways to express predication. From a linguistic perspective, and predicates and predicate phrases can be formed off of adjectives, nouns, verbs, or adverbs. So "exists" is a verb, but "real" is an adjective that can mean the same thing in some contexts. That is, you can say "Is God real?" or "Does God exist?" to elicit roughly the same response.

So, what is it about "existence" as a predicate that makes it resistant to Anselm's argument? What did Anselm get wrong? Many predicates are scalar concepts, and perfection only makes sense in terms of an end point on a scale. So "good" and "bad" are scalars that have comparative and superlative forms. There is a sense of "real" that is scalar (i.e. my version of someone may be more "real" or physically accurate than someone else's), but it is not scalar when used to mean the same thing as "exists". It is binary--like the concept of pregnancy. It is odd to say that "Jane is more pregnant than Mary" unless you extend the meaning of the word to refer to a time scale or the physical size or shape of her midriff. Existence is either true or not true, and it is difficult to imagine how it could be extended to a scalar concept. So Kant was right, but he didn't have a good understanding of linguistic semantics. So he said that "existence" was not a predicate.

 

[Treedbear]

Pizza is the most excellent thing ever.

The only thing excellenter than pizza is pizza that is in my hand right now.

Therefore, there is pizza in my hand right now.

If you say pizza is not necessary, you are wrong. The excellence of pizza makes it necessary. Didn't you read my previous argument?

That's not Anshelm. It's Euthyphro dilemma. The God dilemma has to do with the anchovies.

 

[Kharakov]

Wiploc and Picasmo- is this a semi-formal debate between you 2?

Should we look into debate/peanut gallery threads like in the old forum?


Me winning the lottery in my mind is not as great as me winning the lottery in the world, therefore I must have won the lottery for realzies... which means someone has stolen all of my money.

 

[Jimmy Higgins]

Wiploc and Picasmo- is this a semi-formal debate between you 2?

Should we look into debate/peanut gallery threads like in the old forum?


Me winning the lottery in my mind is not as great as me winning the lottery in the world, therefore I must have won the lottery for realzies... which means someone has stolen all of my money.

Clearly it is not greater for you to win the lottery, as you haven't won the lottery, therefore god exists.

 

[Wiploc]

Wiploc and Picasmo- is this a semi-formal debate between you 2?

Should we look into debate/peanut gallery threads like in the old forum?

I'm happy to do this in a 1-on-1 thread if Picasmo wants. But so far he hasn't responded to my comments or anyone else's.

 

[Treedbear]

As per Descartes (Letters to Mersenne), God creates the laws and logic, the metaphysical necessities of the Universe. and of course is perfectly morally good. So if God is good, God would want to eliminate as much moral evil as possible. Since God creates the laws and logic of the universe, he could have that and there is no hidden reason why not possible. God has a good nature and free will to freely follow his perfectly good nature. God could then give man a good moral nature and a free will as God enjoys and no man would do moral evil. We don't live in such a world. God then is not the greatest thing imaginable by any means.

If one defines God as having existence as part of his perfection, one simply claims that God is existent and perfect, but if God does not exist, he is not perfect by any means. His existence and supposed perfection fall together.

What I got out of Philosophy 101 is that Descartes recognized the imperfection in human thought due to our inability to know the true nature of things we perceive. That's basically the best argument against Anshelm because it sets such a low bar for the notion of greatness. Greater than the greatest imaginable is nowhere close to the accepted notion of the greatness required of this hypothetical God. So while Anshelm's argument might be a useful way to understand the material world it is insufficient as proof of a God. I agree, and place all the blame for this idealistic sophistry on Plato and his imaginary realm of the Ideal Forms^tm. Descartes tried to get around this inconvenient truth by asserting that since the concept of perfection itself is beyond the capability of human imagination it therefore must have been placed in our minds by a God. This is often cited as the classic example of circular reasoning. So yeah, what you said.

 

[BH]

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. God exists in this way at least in the understanding.
3. A God that exists in reality as well as in the understanding is better than an God that exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore, God must exist in reality.

An Ancient Greek could say:

1. Goddess Athena is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Goddess Athena exists in this way at least in the understanding.
3. Goddess Athena that exists in reality as well as in the understanding is better than a Goddess Athena that exists only in the understanding.
4.Therefore, Goddess Athena must exist in reality.


I would say that just because we can imagine something to be so does not actually make it so.

 

[Wiploc]

Picasmo, where are you?

Do you have anything to contribute?

Did we say something wrong?

 

[blastula]

A Picasmo that exists in reality is greater than one in the imagination.