Now it is, of course, possible to simplify the medium in which a scientist
works by simpliiying its main actors. The history of science, after all,
does not just consist of facts and conclusions drawn from facts. It also
contains ideas, interpretations of facts, problems created by conflicting
interpretations, mistakes, and so on. On closer analysis we even find
that science knows no 'bare facts' at all but that the 'facts' that enter our
knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore,
essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be
as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it
contains, and these ideas in tum will be as complex, chaotic, full of
mistakes, and entertaining as are the minds of those who invented
them. Conversely, a little brainwashing will go a long way in making the
history of science duller, simpler, more uniform, more 'objective' and
more easily accessible to treatment by strict and unchangeable rules.
Scientific education as we know it today has precisely this aim. It ismplifies '
science' by simplifying its participants: first, a domain of research is defined.
The domain is separated from the rest of history
(physics, for example, is separated from metaphysics and from
theology) and given a 'logic' of its own. A thorough training in such a
'logic' then conditions those working in the domain; it makes their
actions more uniform and it freezes large parts of the historical process
as well. Stable 'facts' arise and persevere despite the vicissitudes of
history. An essential part of the training that makes such facts appear
consists in the attempt to inhibit intuitions that might lead to a
blurring of boundaries. A person's religion, for example, or his
metaphysics, or his sense of humour (his natural sense of humour and
not the inbred and always rather nasty kind of jocularity one finds in
specialized professions) must not have the slightest connection with
his scientific activity. His imagination is restrained, and even his
language ceases to be his own. This is again reflected in the nature of
scientific 'facts' which are experienced as being independent of
opinion, belief, and cultural background.
It is thus possible to create a tradition that is held together by strict
rules, and that is also successful to some extent. But is it desirable to
support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else?