Philosophy Of Science

[pood]

In this thread and in this thread, I have given Steve numerous examples of philosophy informing science and having a dialogue with science, and he keeps asking the same question that I have repeatedly answered! He asks the same question when just yesterday, I provided him the current input of phenomenology to QM, which ScienceDirect centered an issue around, and I gave him a link that issue! And yet … Steve asks the same question, over and over, which has been answered repeatedly.

 

[pood]

And how can one find aesthetics “mind numbing?” It is at the root of the visual arts, literature and music! And yes, there are philosophical schools around each of those. The philosophy of the visual arts became especially important from the 19th century on, when the rise of photography freed artists from depicting subjects with painstaking realism and paved the way for the rise of nonrepresentational art and modernism. The aforementioned Husserl’s phenomenology has links to Picasso’s cubism.

 

[pood]

This post should rankle Steve further, and maybe @bilby, too.

In this paper, Materialism is Holding Back Science, Alex Gomez-Marin, a theoretical physicist and neuroscientist, presents a defeasible case for remote viewing, based on an “an anomalous” 1979 paper in Nature. Remote viewing is the claim that we obtain information about distant events without any recourse to our known senses. It was a staple of discussion on Art Bell’s Coast to Coast crackpottery (?) in the 1990s. (I’ve not yet read the Nature paper.)

The linked essay is a study in both the philosophy and sociology of science, which are both very real things. The author does not attempt to defend remote viewing, but argues that the reaction of the scientific community to the claim was insular.

Confronted with the remove viewing claim, most scientists, as the author describes, responded that it was not true, because it cannot be true. The author points out that this is not a very scientific way of thinking.

A lot of modern science, whether acknowledged or not by scientists, depends on the philosphical assumption of metaphysical naturalism or physicalism, or materialism — what have you. On this assumption, something like remote viewing would be hard if not impossible to defend, and so is ruled out a priori.

But is metaphysical naturalism true?

This thread examines the analytic idealism of Bernardo Kastrup.

Broadly, metaphysical idealism is the philosophical concept that all of existence is mental, and that the existence of a material world external to our own private mental worlds is mythical. Note that Kastrup rejects supernaturalism but draws a distinction between naturalist materialism, which he rejects, and naturalist idealism, which he advocates.

One reason to favor idealism as opposed to materialism or physicalism is Chalmers’ Hard Problem, which is discussed in the analytic idealism thread. But there are problems with using the Hard Problem in defense of idealism, about which more later.

Still, an account of remote viewing, consciousness surviving death, and other things besides, might be sustainable under an assumption of idealism.

The above linked paper also deals, as mentioned, with the sociology of science — in the race for grants, peer acceptance and prestige, stuff Iike remote viewing and idealism must be ruled out a priori. This, as the author argues, holds back science.

Whether remote viewing or idealism is true is beside the point.

The author describes his own near-death experience here, which I expect probably motivated his interest in remote viewing and the possible shortcomings of materialism.

 

[Elixir]

in the race for grants, peer acceptance and prestige, stuff Iike remote viewing and idealism must be ruled out a priori.

Okay … let’s examine what happens if you “rule it in”. What predictive benefit does that confer? If it’s MY money going to a grant, I’d want to know that before offering my support. AFAICT it would only impede and complicate any “physicalist-based” effort and would to nothing to compensate for that detriment.

This, as the author argues, holds back science.

I posit that science would be held back by embracing remote viewing, idealism and anything else that offers infinite explanatory and zero predictive value.

 

[pood]

in the race for grants, peer acceptance and prestige, stuff Iike remote viewing and idealism must be ruled out a priori.

Okay … let’s examine what happens if you “rule it in”. What predictive benefit does that confer? If it’s MY money going to a grant, I’d want to know that before offering my support. AFAICT it would only impede and complicate any “physicalist-based” effort and would to nothing to compensate for that detriment.

This, as the author argues, holds back science.

I posit that science would be held back by embracing remote viewing, idealism and anything else that offers infinite explanatory and zero predictive value.

That isn’t the point. The author isn’t talking about “embracing” remote viewing, idealism, or anything else. He is talking about not ruling out some ideas a priori because they “can’t” be true. Specifically, he is also citing a Nature paper which perhaps offers defeasible evidence for remote viewing.

 

[pood]

A discussion here from 1995, which I have only just skimmed so far: Psychic spying research produces credible evidence.

 

[pood]

Ok, read it now. From the above:

Utts and Hyman separated the research of the past 20 years into two distinct eras. Both academics found serious methodological problems in the first era of research, including no controlled experiments and selectively chosen research results. By the late 1980s, Utts and Hyman agree, research protocols had greatly improved. But the reviewers vary in their interpretation of the later research. Utts found the results were consistent with the small- to medium-sized effect that psychic functioning seems to generate in other laboratories. Remote viewing has been conceptually replicated across a number of laboratories, she says, helping to refute the idea of fraud, sloppy protocols or some methodological problem. In contrast, Hyman asserts that one of the biggest drawbacks to the scientific credibility of the government-funded research into remote viewing was its covert nature. Only two peer-reviewed papers were published until 1989. "From the scientific standpoint, the program was hampered by its secrecy," he says, "which kept the program from benefiting from the checks and balances that come from doing research in a public forum." Both Utts and Hyman agree more research is needed into psychic functioning. Hyman thinks the research should be designed to offer unequivocal proof; Utts believes future experiments should focus not on whether the phenomenon exists, but how it works.

 

[Elixir]

He is talking about not ruling out some ideas a priori because they “can’t” be true.

That’s not how it works or how it SHOULD work. Those things are not “ruled out”, they simply have no utility.
We don’t bother ruling out Fairy Princesses as causal factors to explain our observations; there’s no need because remaining “open” to FPs as explanations does exactly nothing to further enhance or impede any effort to explain or predict any phenomenon. It’s just irrelevant.

Sure, Fairy Princesses with magical powers are “ possible”. So what?

 

[pood]

He is talking about not ruling out some ideas a priori because they “can’t” be true.

That’s not how it works or how it SHOULD work. Those things are not “ruled out”, they simply have no utility.
We don’t bother ruling out Fairy Princesses as causal factors to explain our observations; there’s no need because remaining “open” to FPs as explanations does exactly nothing to further enhance or impede any effort to explain or predict any phenomenon. It’s just irrelevant.

Sure, Fairy Princesses with magical powers are “ possible”. So what?

That still is not the point. We are talking about edge cases, not fairy princesses. Idealism as a metaphysical basis might actually be true — see Kastrup’s arguments (an argument that goes back to Berkeley). The edge case of remote viewing might be true — see the links above, We should keep in mind something I mentioned earlier, the pessimistic meta-induction, which holds that since all our past theories have been strictly (though not totally, e.g. Newtonianism) false, we ought to expect our current theories are, too. This is most prominently exemplified by the disjuncture of QM and GR.

 

[Elixir]

That still is not the point. We are talking about edge cases, not fairy princesses.

Example? “Remote viewing”?

Idealism as a metaphysical basis might actually be true

What difference would it make?

The edge case of remote viewing might be true — see the links above,

“True” as in having some objective existence, or “true” as in being unfalsifiable? I think the latter is being advanced.

(Real) since all our past theories have been strictly (though not totally, e.g. Newtonianism) false, we ought to expect our current theories are, too

Expect? I think we have to ASSUME their incompleteness. Falsity doesn’t arise until phenomena present that are better explained and predicted by something other than the “false” explanation we have been accepting as our best available.

Science is a means for converging on practical (real) truths, and when remote viewing contributes to that process, it will be embraced.

 

[pood]

That still is not the point. We are talking about edge cases, not fairy princesses.

Example? “Remote viewing”?

Yes. From one of the above links:

Ray Hyman, a psychology professor at the University of Oregon in Eugene and a noted debunker of psychic phenomena, disagrees. "I admit that the latest findings should make Professor Utts and some parapsychologists optimistic," he says. "The case for psychic functioning seems better than it ever has been. Inexplicable statistical departures from chance, however, are a far cry from compelling evidence for anomalous cognition."

The debunker of psychic phenomena, it seems to be, is taking the correct attitude toward this. He admits there is SOME evidence for remote viewing, but does not find the evidence compelling. This is a far cry from fairy princesses for which there is no evidence and indeed negative evidence, for we know that such entities have been made up by fanciful story tellers.

Idealism as a metaphysical basis might actually be true

What difference would it make?

It could make a lot of difference, Kastrup, in his analytic idealism essays, argues that the universe is made of mind and that individual minds are “dissociate alters” that might (note the “might”) re-emerge with the universal mind after death.

The edge case of remote viewing might be true — see the links above,

“True” as in having some objective existence, or “true” as in being unfalsifiable? I think the latter is being advanced.

If you read this thread, you will have already seen the numerous problems with falsification as a marker of science.

(Real) since all our past theories have been strictly (though not totally, e.g. Newtonianism) false, we ought to expect our current theories are, too

Expect? I think we have to ASSUME their incompleteness. Falsity doesn’t arise until phenomena present that are better explained and predicted by something other than the “false” explanation we have been accepting as our best available.

Science is a means for converging on practical (real) truths, and when remote viewing contributes to that process, it will be embraced.

That is fine. The point of the linked article is not to rule remote viewing out a priori, because it might contribute to this process. IF remote viewing were true (of course a huge IF), it would seem to thoroughly overhaul our presumed understanding of the world. But as mentioned, it would be hard to justify remote viewing on a materialist assumption of reality, but much easier to do so on an idealist reading of reality.

 

[pood]

To raise yet another topic in the robust philsophy of science, I note this site has a pseudoscience forum. But — stop using the word pseudoscience. It is essentially meaningless.

 

[Shadowy Man]

To raise yet another topic in the robust philsophy of science, I note this site has a pseudoscience forum. But — stop using the word pseudoscience. It is essentially meaningless.

I kind of disagree with this article. I think there’s a useful application of the term the author is not considering though I agree that because there’s been so much misuse of the term that perhaps it’s utility has been poisoned. Like many other originally useful terms that are no longer useful because of that (like “woke” for example).

 

[pood]

To raise yet another topic in the robust philsophy of science, I note this site has a pseudoscience forum. But — stop using the word pseudoscience. It is essentially meaningless.

I kind of disagree with this article. I think there’s a useful application of the term the author is not considering though I agree that because there’s been so much misuse of the term that perhaps it’s utility has been poisoned. Like many other originally useful terms that are no longer useful because of that (like “woke” for example).

At the end of the article she lists more useful terms that are not rhetorically charged and potentially misleading.

 

[pood]

To raise yet another topic in the robust philsophy of science, I note this site has a pseudoscience forum. But — stop using the word pseudoscience. It is essentially meaningless.

I kind of disagree with this article. I think there’s a useful application of the term the author is not considering though I agree that because there’s been so much misuse of the term that perhaps it’s utility has been poisoned. Like many other originally useful terms that are no longer useful because of that (like “woke” for example).

At the end of the article she lists more useful terms that are not rhetorically charged and potentially misleading.

Yes but those were just alternatives for the definitions presented. But “pseudoscience” as a word can have a well defined meaning that is applicable now that wasn’t considered in the article. Pretty much the literal definition. But now it’s rendered essentially meaningless by the copious abuse of the term.

What would that well-defined meaning be? Basically the word means “fake science,” but it has been indiscriminately applied to science that might be wrong or unevidenced but is hardly fake. For actual fraud, the author just says call it what it is: fraud.

 

[pood]

I think the main point is that “pseudoscience” (fake science) serves as primarily a rhetorical bludgeon in the same way that “fake news” does in Trump’s filthy trap.

 

[Shadowy Man]

To raise yet another topic in the robust philsophy of science, I note this site has a pseudoscience forum. But — stop using the word pseudoscience. It is essentially meaningless.

I kind of disagree with this article. I think there’s a useful application of the term the author is not considering though I agree that because there’s been so much misuse of the term that perhaps it’s utility has been poisoned. Like many other originally useful terms that are no longer useful because of that (like “woke” for example).

At the end of the article she lists more useful terms that are not rhetorically charged and potentially misleading.

Yes but those were just alternatives for the definitions presented. But “pseudoscience” as a word can have a well defined meaning that is applicable now that wasn’t considered in the article. Pretty much the literal definition. But now it’s rendered essentially meaningless by the copious abuse of the term.

What would that well-defined meaning be? Basically the word means “fake science,” but it has been indiscriminately applied to science that might be wrong or unevidenced but is hardly fake. For actual fraud, the author just says call it what it is: fraud.

I deleted my post but what I was thinking was not so much the products of science but the process itself. People who are undergoing kinds of research but not in a proper scientific way. Not necessarily “fraud” and not just “unevidenced” hypotheses. But a process itself that is undertaken in unscientific ways but is presented as “science”. So it is pseudo in the same sense that a pseudonym is a false name.

 

[Shadowy Man]

But I grant that I haven’t given it too much thought.

 

[pood]

Well, but this goes to the alleged “scientific method.” is there actually such a thing, or just a series of methodologies with fuzzy edge cases? Feyerabend in Against Method argues against any such “method.”

 

[steve_bank]

Pood

What I object to is your idea of philosophy(undefined) as a kind of global outside active agent guiding science. People who do not do science presuming to guide science?

For me paradigm is a better term than philosophy. Working groups of all kinds evolve a working paradigm that leads to success, or the group fails. The nature of our competitive culture. Science is part of it. It is driven by profit and individual success.

To me one of the most competitive occupations is classical musicians. Many qualified people, few paying potions. In the 70s my girlfriend was a ballet student and most of my friends were music and art students. Intensely competitive.

Academic and industrial science is competitive. I had to compete for the kind of projects I wanted to advance my experience.

Personal motivations are part of the advancement of science.

It is NFL Sunday and I am watching Eagles vs Rams. The Eagles ‘philosophy’ of the tush push is controversial among team owners and fans. Philosophically is it rugby or football?

Hotly debated among fans and sports commentators. Is there a philosophical guide to football?

A philosophical observed who never payed sports writing a philosophy of sports to giude football?

My infinite loop detector warning light is flashing. The last word is yours.